The Islamic Republic’s Foreign Policy through the Iranian Lens: Initiatives of Engagement with the GCC

ABSTRACT

Despite the often perceived rigidity of its ideology and inflammatory rhetoric, Iran’s foreign policy is inherently pragmatic while nonetheless moving within the institutionalised frame of its revolutionary discourse. An alternative perspective on the Islamic Republic’s and Persian Gulf relations is offered by analysing Iran’s discursive and practical initiatives of constructive engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency through the Iranian lens. This includes strategies of discursive persuasion and initiatives such as “World Against Violence and Extremism” (WAVE) as well as the “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” (HOPE), both aimed at building confidence and improving Iran’s legitimacy in the region.

KEYWORDS:

• Islamic Republic
• constructive engagement
• ideology
• foreign policy
• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for the insightful comments and suggestions they provided.

Notes

¹ The debate on US foreign policy in the Middle East under the Obama and Trump administrations centred on the re-definition of US relations with GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia. While “retrenchment” was the term used by many to define the Obama doctrine following its critical approach, especially towards Saudi Arabia, “withdrawal” was used by others to define Trump’s doctrine and the priority given to symmetrical bilateral relations. See Saleh (2020); Koleilat Khatib (2017); Guzansky (2015).

² For an account of the different political factions and the competition among them, see for example Rakel (2009).

³ This divergence was evident when Zarif resigned temporarily from his position on 25 February 2019, following a meeting with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad which included Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani, the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force Qasem Soleimani as well as other officials, but which, however, excluded the Foreign Minister. The differences between the Rouhani government and the IRGC were further exemplified by the leaked parts of an interview with Zarif conducted by Saeed Laylaz in April 2021.

⁴ Article 176 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic provides for the composition of the National Security High Council.

⁵ It should be noted, however, that the GCC countries do not entertain a uniform approach towards Iran. In line with their perception of the Islamic Republic, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain are characterised by a more closed approach, whereas Oman, Kuwait and Qatar have a more open attitude towards Iran overall. For details, see for example Bianco (2020).

⁶ The ideological square is a conceptual square for the ideological analysis of all levels of discourse structures based on the combination of two opposing pairs: emphasise positive things about us – emphasise negative things about them; de-emphasise negative things about us – de-emphasise positive things about them. See Van Dijk (2000, 44).

⁷ The discourse-historical approach is an approach linked to critical theory that focuses on politics and that aims at developing conceptual frameworks for political discourse. It places emphasis on interdisciplinarity and triangulation. It therefore considers a wide range of empirical observations, theories, methods and background information. See Reisigl and Wodak (2009).

⁸ On the Iran-Contra Affair see for example Axworthy (2013, 252–7); Hiro (1989, 215–25); Seliktar (2012, 54–65).

⁹ See Khamenei’s speeches and statements on his official website: https://english.khamenei.ir/, which also includes a detailed explanation of the meaning and use of the term “arrogance”: https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8190/What-does-Arrogance-mean-in-Imam-Khamenei-s-statements.

¹⁰ According to Rouhani (2013d), constructive engagement means that “[i]n a world where global politics is no longer a zero-sum game, it is – or should be – counterintuitive to pursue one’s interests without considering the interests of others. A constructive approach to diplomacy doesn’t mean relinquishing one’s rights. It means engaging with one’s counterparts, on the basis of equal footing and mutual respect, to address shared concerns and achieve shared objectives. In other words, win-win outcomes are not just favourable but also achievable. A zero-sum, Cold War mentality leads to everyone’s loss”.

¹¹ Rouhani (2013d).

¹² The Arab Opinion Index 2019–2020 shows that 58 per cent of respondents have negative views of Iran’s Arab policies (40 per cent negative, 18 per cent negative to some extent). Sixty-seven per cent of the respondents expressed the belief that Iranian policies threaten the security and stability of the region (49 per cent certainly, 18 per cent yes to some extent) (ACRPS 2020).

¹³ Forbidden by Islamic law.

¹⁴ Perception in the Arab world of Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria as “bad”/”very bad”: 63 per cent (2016); 60 per cent (2017–18); 60 per cent (2019–20). Perception in the Arab world of Iran’s foreign policy towards Yemen as “bad”/”very bad”: 62 per cent (2016); 60 per cent (2017–18); 61 per cent (2019–20) (ACRPS 2020, 15).

¹⁵ Zarif (2014).

¹⁶ Ironically, not long before the 1979 revolution, Jimmy Carter used a similar metaphor, calling Iran an “island of stability” during New Year’s Eve 1977 in Tehran (Gil Guerrero 2016).

¹⁷ The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant by its English and Arabic acronym respectively.

¹⁸ Based on the concept of “othering”, where a Muslim accuses a fellow Muslim of not being a true believer, that is, of being an apostate. In this context, Takfiri ideology relates to the ideology of ISIS-DAESH.

¹⁹ In fact, there is no agreement on the name of the body of water between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic Republic typically refers to it as the “Persian Gulf”, whereas most of its Arab neighbours call it the “Arabian Gulf”.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP): [Grant Number 2018 RICIP 00011].

Notes on contributors

Olivia Glombitza

Olivia Glombitza is an Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) and the Open University of Catalonia (UOC), both in Barcelona, Spain, and a fellow for the project “Reconfiguration of Transnational Actors & Elites in the MENA Region”, based at UAB and the project “Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianization” (SEPAD) based at Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom.

Luciano Zaccara

Luciano Zaccara is Research Assistant Professor in Gulf Politics at Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Center, Doha, Qatar. He is also a Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and the Director of the Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Arab and Muslim World (OPEMAM), Spain. Email: https://[email protected]. Twitter: https://@LucianoZaccara