Differentiated Cooperation in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy: Effectiveness, Accountability, Legitimacy

ABSTRACT

European Union (EU) treaties have introduced legal frameworks for differentiated integration in European foreign and security policy, but they have rarely been used. Instead, member states have engaged in informal practices of differentiated cooperation. Based on an analysis of effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy of differentiated cooperation in the Western Balkans, the Middle East Peace Process, negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and the Ukraine crisis, we argue that differentiated cooperation has had positive outcomes when it has adhered to common EU values and positions. When this has not been the case, differentiation has undermined EU foreign and security policy.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• differentiation
• foreign policy
• security policy
• diplomacy

Differentiation is an essential aspect of the European Union (EU)’s foreign and security policy. In this article, we broadly define differentiation as “any modality of integration or cooperation that allows states (members or non-members) and sub-state entities to work together in non-homogenous, flexible ways” (Lavenex and Križić 2019, 3). This definition encompasses instances of integration – meant as pooling sovereignty at the EU level – and of looser, intergovernmental cooperation. In the realm of EU foreign policy, it is usually more accurate to speak of “differentiated cooperation” rather than of “integration” because differentiation often occurs in the margins of or outside EU institutional structures or legal frameworks (Grevi et al. 2020, 4). This distinguishes the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is based predominantly on intergovernmental decision-making, from other policy areas where supranational decision-making prevails and where differentiation thus sees greater involvement of EU institutions. Moreover, member states do not see differentiated foreign policy cooperation as a vector towards integration, but rather as a way of complementing the initiatives of EU institutions and of compensating for the shortcomings of unanimity-based decision-making in EU foreign policy (Alcaro and Siddi 2020). For example, a restricted number of member states has recurrently joined forces and informally cooperated in ad hoc contact groups or lead groups to enable a European response in the context of urgent conflict management or complex international negotiations.

A relatively small but recently growing body of scholarly literature exists on differentiation in EU foreign and security policy. As we shall illustrate below, these works tend to focus on the treaty-based and informal mechanisms of differentiation (see Wessel 2021; Aggestam and Bicchi 2019; Biscop 2008; Blockmans 2014; 2017). This article contributes to and complements this literature by discussing the accountability, legitimacy and, most notably, by assessing the effectiveness of differentiation in European foreign and security policy. It argues that differentiated cooperation usually has a positive impact on EU foreign policymaking. It generates internal consensus, spurs the Union into action on specific issues and thus contributes to the effectiveness of EU foreign policy.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we analyse the concepts of accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness, and illustrate the research design adopted in the article. We then provide an overview of the existing scholarly literature on differentiation in EU foreign and security policy. We highlight the need to focus on policy effectiveness, a topic that has not been researched extensively thus far. We also review the different formal and informal mechanisms of differentiated cooperation in EU foreign policy. In the central part of the article, we present the main empirical findings through an analysis of case studies, including EU differentiated cooperation in addressing the Middle East Peace Process and conflicts in the Western Balkans, as well as EU lead groups in negotiations concerning Ukraine and Iran. We compare and contrast the empirical findings of the case studies and assess the benefits and drawbacks of differentiation in EU foreign and security policy in terms of accountability, legitimacy and particularly effectiveness. While accountability and legitimacy are important aspects of differentiation (and are partly interlinked with effectiveness), the main focus of the empirical section is on effectiveness because it is arguably the main determinant of success or failure for differentiated structures.¹ The concluding section draws a general outcome-focused assessment of differentiation in the EU’s CFSP and suggests avenues for further research.

Concepts and research design

Assessing accountability and legitimacy in differentiated cooperation is important because differentiation causes an incongruence between those who take decisions and those who are affected by them. Citizens and sometimes even governments may have only marginal control over policies that affect them because their countries can be underrepresented or absent in the differentiated structures that make decisions (Nguyen 2020, 3). Hence, differentiation raises questions regarding both the accountability of decision-makers to the broader, affected political body, and the legitimacy of the decision-making process. Accountability can be defined as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens 2007, 450). In the context of EU foreign policy, a differentiated structure may need to justify its conduct to EU institutions and occasionally – as foreign policy rarely becomes a key issue in broader societal debates – to the European citizenry. Even if informal cooperation occurs mostly or exclusively at the inter-state (rather than EU) level, member states often feel the need to justify their actions to EU institutions because they claim to act on behalf of the Union as a whole.

Legitimacy is a closely related concept to accountability, as it partly depends on the good functioning of accountability mechanisms. Following Jonas Tallberg and Michael Zürn (2019, 585), legitimacy is defined as the “beliefs within a given constituency or other relevant audience that a political institution’s exercise of authority is appropriate”. Assessing this in the context of foreign policy is particularly difficult because, as argued, relevant decisions are often confined to deliberations among political and diplomatic elites and are only occasionally the subject of broader public discussion (Sjursen 2018). Legitimacy depends on several factors, including the authority of an institution, namely the recognition that it has the right to make decisions in a particular policy area, and its respect of procedural standards in decision-making processes (Tallberg and Zürn 2019). In EU foreign policy, the recognition of authority to make decisions is reflected in the support or the consent of member states to a particular policymaking structure and the set of decisions it takes.

The legitimacy of the EU in foreign policy is also tied to its capacity to deliver effective problem-solving, and thus to its effectiveness. Before turning to a more specific definition of effectiveness, it is important to stress that, in an EU policy context, effectiveness does not always lead to greater legitimacy. For example, if effectiveness is achieved as a result of political pressure from a restricted group of larger member states, it can have an inverse effect on legitimacy because it may create the impression of hegemonic coercion among the political establishment and the citizens of other members (Lavenex and Križić, 2019, 20). Furthermore, the legitimacy of EU policies may also be affected by the actions undertaken by third countries, particularly great powers that have the means and connections to influence political actors and public opinion in the EU (Ibid.).

Effectiveness is conceptualised and evaluated based on two main aspects identified by Sandra Lavenex and Ivo Križić (2019, 13-4), that is, attribution and assessment. Attribution concerns the relative policy change (improvement, worsening or no change) caused by differentiation compared to a hypothetical state of affairs without differentiation. In other words, can any identified improvement or worsening in foreign policy outcomes be attributed to the presence of differentiated cooperation? The second aspect, assessment, involves an evaluation of the problem-solving role of differentiation in more absolute terms: does the policy impact of differentiation constitute an appropriate or even ideal solution to the underlying foreign policy issue? Defining appropriate or ideal solutions in foreign policy is not straightforward and can be subject to different perspectives. Here, we generally identify an ideal solution with the resolution of an issue or a conflict; improvements and worsening in foreign policy outcomes are gauged based on whether progress is made towards such resolution, taking into account also context-specific factors (which are outlined in each case study).

The concepts of accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness are applied to the investigation of four case studies concerning EU differentiated cooperation in addressing the Middle East Peace Process and conflicts in the Western Balkans, and EU lead groups in negotiations concerning Ukraine and Iran. The empirical material comes primarily from the analysis conducted within two papers on EU foreign policy that were published in the context of the EU IDEA project² (Alcaro and Siddi 2020; Grevi et al. 2020). These studies draw on both secondary literature and 13 anonymous interviews with policy-makers working in EU institutions and national foreign ministries.³

The four case studies are presented in two different sections (each having two sub-sections, one per case study) due to the different nature of differentiated cooperation at play. Differentiated cooperation in the Western Balkans and the Middle East Peace Process occurred in different formats and modalities (that is, regional groups, contact groups, multinational initiatives; see below). In negotiations concerning Iran and Ukraine, instead, differentiated cooperation took place exclusively through lead groups. The breadth of the case studies, in terms of both geography and different political contexts, allows us to draw a comprehensive assessment of differentiated cooperation in EU foreign policy. On the other hand, due to space constraints, we refer to secondary literature for more background on each case study.

Based on this research, the article argues that differentiated cooperation usually has a positive impact on EU policymaking in relative terms, both by generating internal consensus – and hence, legitimacy – and by spurring the Union into action on specific issues. In particular, this happens when differentiation initiatives adhere to common European values and identity (as expressed in the established EU foreign policy discourse) and build on long-standing common EU positions. Consistency with EU values and previous foreign policy positions also enables a framework for accountability to EU institutions and buttresses the legitimacy of differentiation initiatives within such institutions. The latter act as the forum where differentiated structures “explain and justify” their conduct (see Bovens 2007, 450) and are therefore held accountable to the broader EU polity. Consistency with EU values and established positions is also functional to the credibility of EU foreign policy in the eyes of other international actors.

However, when formats of differentiated cooperation depart from the common base of European values, identity and long-established positions, they can undermine EU foreign and security policy. Furthermore, differentiated cooperation appears less effective when it is assessed in absolute terms, based on whether it provides an appropriate or ideal solution to a foreign policy issue. In this regard, limitations in the material and power capabilities of the EU and its member states are often serious constraints.

Analysing differentiation in EU foreign and security policy

Relatively few scholars have studied EU foreign and security policies through the prism of differentiation, and only a handful of recent publications focus specifically on differentiation in EU CFSP. This shortcoming is striking given that differentiation became a focus of analysis in European Studies already in the 1990s and has attracted growing academic attention lately. The existing debate on differentiation in CFSP has revolved around mapping and assessing treaty-based mechanisms, informal flexible cooperation such as EU lead groups and external differentiation with non-members.

The main focus of these studies has been on whether differentiation is and will be a feature of the EU’s CFSP. Some scholars have highlighted that differentiated cooperation in foreign policy raised objections from its inception (Wessel 2007). However, recent scholarship is unanimous in arguing that differentiation is deeply rooted in the foreign and security policy of the EU (see Aydın-Düzgit et al. 2021; Grevi et al. 2020; Koutrakos 2017). Differentiation is found as an innate element of foreign policymaking in the Union, characterising the process in which CFSP developed from the beginning. Recent publications have argued that differentiation in EU foreign policy is likely to further increase in the near future (Bassiri Tabrizi 2018).

An interest in assessing the desirability of differentiation in CFSP traverses the relevant literature. Especially early works on the topic viewed coherence and consistency potentially at risk if too much differentiation was allowed in EU policymaking (Wessel 2007, 247). Subsequent publications have more often argued that differentiation can add visibility, legitimacy and effectiveness to EU CFSP as long as principles such as consistency are followed (see, for example, Blockmans 2014, 56). Some regard differentiation as the most feasible (or only) way forward in CFSP (Kempin and Scheler 2015).

From a different perspective, scholarly literature has analysed extensively the legal dimension of differentiation in the EU framework (Lavenex and Križić 2019). The treaty-based mechanisms for differentiation in CFSP provided several case studies (see Koutrakos 2017; Jokela 2014; Blockmans 2014; Törő 2014; Cremona 2009). Most authors have concurred that, despite the extensive legal framework, differentiation in CFSP typically takes place informally, outside treaty-based arrangements (see Grevi et al. 2020; Koutrakos 2017; Delreux and Keukeleire 2017). The relevance and added value of informal groups of member states for EU foreign policy have been one of the main topics of interest (Aggestam and Bicchi 2019; Bassiri Tabrizi 2018; Alcaro 2018; Delreux and Keukeleire 2017; Törő 2014). Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi (2018) contends that cooperation between informal groups of states will become a more frequent practice in the EU after Brexit because it enables ad hoc cooperation between the EU and the UK. According to her, the performance of the E3⁴/EU in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear deal increased the appreciation of informal groups of states as a form of EU foreign policy action. Lisbeth Aggestam and Federica Bicchi (2019) suggest that “Europe” might be increasingly constructed by member states rather than by supranational processes. This scenario would see the prevalence of centrifugal tendencies within EU foreign policy, with member states eschewing accountability to EU institutions and the quest for legitimacy for their decisions at the European level.

Finally, some recent works have explored mechanisms of external differentiation in CFSP, namely cases in which non-member states joined EU policies and frameworks (for example, Wessel 2021). Most of them focus on the engagement of neighbouring countries such as Turkey (Müftüler-Baç 2017) and Norway (Hillion 2019). Several analyses reflect on the UK’s post-Brexit role in CFSP in terms of (external) differentiation (Svendsen 2020; Martill and Sus 2018; Schimmelfennig 2018).

While most of the existing literature focuses on the technicalities and coherence of formal and informal mechanisms of differentiation in CFSP, the issues of policy effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy have not received sufficient attention. Several authors have explored effectiveness in EU foreign policy more broadly, but not in relation to differentiation (Bickerton 2015; Edwards 2013; Niemann and Bretherton 2013; Thomas 2012). A few scholars did explore the effectiveness of differentiated cooperation in CFSP, but mostly from a conceptual and abstract perspective rather than through empirical case studies. For instance, Stephan Keukeleire (2006) argued that, under certain conditions, more effectiveness and legitimacy in EU foreign policy could be achieved through specialisation and division of labour among member states. He also maintained that EU core groups can increase the potential of the EU to be an effective foreign policy player because they allow bringing together relevant actors, the creation of “a small, informal and flexible framework” (14) and increased vertical and horizontal consistency. Similarly, Steven Blockmans (2014) contended that coalitions of member states contribute to the effectiveness of CFSP if they act consistently with EU interests and objectives, and Tom Delreux and Stephan Keukeleire (2017, 1483-4) argued that an informal division of labour in EU foreign policy strengthens effectiveness.

In parallel, the issues of accountability and legitimacy in EU CFSP have gained relevance in European Studies literature (Chelotti and Gul 2015), especially in relation to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions (Moser 2020), but they have not been investigated in the context of differentiated CFSP cooperation. The potential legitimacy deficit of informal groups of states has received some attention (Bassiri Tabrizi and Kienzle 2020; Alcaro 2018; Delreux and Keukeleire 2017). Especially the link between accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness has not been explored sufficiently, even though many scholars refer to an assumption that informal CFSP cooperation features a trade-off between effectiveness and legitimacy (Delreux and Keukeleire 2017, 1474). In contrast to this assumption, Delreux and Keukeleire (2017) have argued that increased legitimacy can also coincide with increasing effectiveness. A recent study by Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Benjamin Kienzle (2020) analyses strategies for legitimating lead groups by drawing on the example of the E3 group in the Iranian nuclear negotiations. Tabrizi and Kienzle conclude that it is possible, yet difficult, for a lead group to overcome the efficiency-legitimacy dilemma, also in the eyes of third states.

Despite the contribution made by these analyses, the link between accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness seems inherently complex and non-linear, and in need of further enquiry. This article addresses this gap by examining the policy effectiveness of differentiation in CFSP through an investigation of highly relevant case studies and by relating it to the legitimacy and accountability of differentiation initiatives in EU foreign policy. Indeed, legitimacy and accountability are central to the debate on differentiation and can play a role in the effectiveness of differentiation in CFSP. We argue that a comprehensive assessment of effectiveness can only be conducted by means of a focused analysis of policies and empirical case studies. As we shall see below, this analysis cautions us against making overly generalised claims about the effectiveness of differentiation. It shows that differentiation can lead to effective or ineffective outcomes in CFSP depending on context-specific factors, the policies pursued by proactive EU members and, most notably, their stance vis-à-vis established EU positions, if there are any.⁵

Differentiation in CFSP

Before assessing the effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy of differentiation in EU foreign and security policy, it is necessary to briefly review the various forms that differentiation can take in this policy field. To begin with, we can distinguish between two main types of arrangements: those that are based on EU treaties and those that are not. Constructive abstention, enhanced cooperation and – in the defence field – permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) are the main treaty-based mechanisms enabling differentiation.

The mechanism of constructive abstention allows the European Council to adopt a decision in CFSP even if there is no unanimity and one or more EU member states (up to a third of them) abstain in a vote.⁶ Abstaining members are not obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union and “refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision” (Art. 31.1 of the Treaty on European Union [TEU]).

Furthermore, Arts. 20 TEU, 326 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and 334 TFEU allow a group of at least nine member states to proceed with enhanced cooperation in areas of non-exclusive competence of the Union, thus including CFSP, provided that their initiative remains open to other members. Enhanced cooperation must be authorised by a unanimous decision of the Council and should only be adopted as a last resort, when “the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole” (Art. 20 TEU).

PESCO can be established by member states “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another” in the area of defence (Art. 42.6 TEU). These member states intend to develop their defence capacities more intensively in cooperation with other EU members, most notably through participation in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes and in the activities of the European Defence Agency (Art. 46 TEU and Protocol 10 of TEU). Providing a comprehensive assessment of PESCO’s effectiveness is premature at this stage, as it was launched recently and its binding commitments and capability development projects are expected to produce tangible outcomes in a longer-term perspective (Biscop 2020; Howorth 2019; see also Blockmans 2021). It is therefore beyond the scope of this article.

Due to the tight procedural requirements outlined in the treaties and their disconnect from policy practice, treaty-based differentiation arrangements have almost never been used in CFSP. Enhanced cooperation was never implemented in this policy area. Constructive abstention was used only once by Cyprus in the decision to establish the EULEX mission in Kosovo in 2008 (Grevi et al. 2020, 7).

Most instances of differentiated cooperation in CFSP have taken place through informal mechanisms that are not based on EU treaties. Drawing on Giovanni Grevi et al. (2020), five modalities of such differentiated cooperation can be identified. First, member states have established regional groups where they regularly meet to discuss foreign policy at large; examples include the Benelux and the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Second, ad hoc contact groups or multinational initiatives including EU members and third countries have been formed to tackle international crises such as those in the Western Balkans and the Democratic Republic of Congo. A third category encompasses lead groups of member states that take a prominent role in key issues of the international agenda, such as the E3 in the Iranian nuclear negotiations and the Franco-German duo in the Normandy format talks on Ukraine. Lead groups advance EU foreign policy objectives with the support of European institutions and the broad consent of other members (Alcaro and Siddi 2020).

A fourth instance of differentiated cooperation occurs in international fora where only a few EU members are represented, such as the G7 and the G20, or between France and EU members holding a rotating seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, differentiated cooperation happens when the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy tasks the foreign ministers of one or more member states to perform a specific diplomatic task. For example, in November 2019, Finnish foreign minister Pekka Haavisto was tasked to lead the EU delegation and deliver a speech on behalf of the EU High Representative at the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (Grevi et al. 2020, 8).

While differentiated cooperation in CFSP can occur in various formats, a few preconditions are important to ensure that it is effective and that it makes a positive contribution to EU foreign policy. As will be shown in the following sections, cooperation needs to adhere to common European values and identity as expressed in established EU foreign policy discourse and build on long-established common EU positions.

Effective differentiation? Contrasting evidence from the Western Balkans and the Middle East Peace Process

An analysis of EU foreign policy in the Western Balkans and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) illustrates how differentiated cooperation can be effective or ineffective depending on whether member states adhere or not to common EU values and identity, as expressed in established EU foreign and security policy discourse, and to long-standing common positions. Adherence to these aspects is also functional to securing the consent of other member states – and thus to the intra-EU legitimacy of a differentiation initiative – and to obtain the support of EU institutions. In both contexts, EU member states engaged in various types of differentiated cooperation – ad hoc and contact groups, regional groups and (in the Western Balkans) multinational initiatives (Grevi et al. 2020, 9-18). Both in the Western Balkans and the MEPP, the EU aimed at profiling itself as a key player in stabilising and solving the conflicts and facilitating regional economic development. In its policy towards the Western Balkans, where it arguably has greater leverage and interests, the EU also intended to facilitate the gradual integration of the region into the Union.

The Western Balkans⁷

In the Western Balkans, differentiated cooperation occurred especially through the agency of larger EU members – France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy – that participated in multinational initiatives such as the Balkan contact group (together with the US and Russia) and the Quint ad hoc group (with the US) from the 1990s. The involvement of the four largest member states (at a time when the EU still had 15 members) and their cooperation with key external powers bolstered the legitimacy of these differentiation initiatives within the EU. Since the 2000s, and following the EU’s Eastern enlargement of 2004-2007, regional groups of smaller EU members have also contributed to EU foreign policy goals in the region. For example, the Visegrad Four have been among the main advocates of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Furthermore, in 2014, Germany launched the Berlin Process, an informal framework to enhance regional cooperation including nine EU members, the UK and the six Western Balkan countries. The Berlin Process has been an effective complement to the EU’s policies by engaging Western Balkan countries and promoting regional cooperation (Nechev et al. 2018). The flexibility of this intergovernmental framework has allowed various EU countries to join and actively contribute over the years, which in turn made the Process accountable to a broader group of member states and strengthened its legitimacy within the EU.

Overall, differentiated cooperation between EU members in the Western Balkans has complemented and catalysed EU external action in the region. While progress in internal reforms and regional cooperation has been modest, differentiated cooperation has been effective and led to some positive change in relative terms. For example, it has contributed to the stabilisation of the region and to its gradual approximation to the EU; with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, all Western Balkan countries have achieved the status of candidates for EU membership. This was possible because the initiatives of proactive member states have built on shared EU values (such as the promotion of peace and the rule of law) and long-standing EU policies and common goals, while other members have either supported them or abstained from intervening (Grevi et al. 2020, 13).

When assessed in absolute terms, namely against an ideal solution, differentiated cooperation in the Western Balkans appears less effective. An ideal outcome would have encompassed the settlement of regional conflicts and the accession of Western Balkan states to the EU. Instead, the enlargement process has stalled, particularly after a group of EU members led by France opposed EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania in October 2019 (Peel 2019). Although over twenty years have elapsed since the end of the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, EU-induced reforms in both countries have been modest and slow, and internal conflicts have not been solved.⁸ Differentiated cooperation has not made a substantial contribution in this respect.

The Middle East Peace Process

Differentiated cooperation has been much less effective, in both relative and absolute terms, in the context of the MEPP – namely the discussions held to seek a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the 1990s, the EU has sought to increase its influence in the MEPP. The Quint group of member states – an ad hoc group including France, Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy – was created in the early 1990s to support the Peace Process and the EU’s stance in it. Initially, in an EU of 15 member states that generally agreed on a common line (support for a two-state solution), this relatively broad group enjoyed EU-wide legitimacy and appeared as an effective instrument to advance the Union’s stance and values – most notably, peaceful settlement of the conflict within the respect of human rights. However, since the 2010s in particular, gridlock in the European Council has prevented the adoption of common declarations and pushed Quint countries to go ahead on their own (Grevi et al. 2020, 16). The initiatives of some member states have undermined common EU positions and the effectiveness of EU external action. Differentiated cooperation in regional groups has exposed differences among EU members.

The Visegrad Four provide the clearest example. The group has taken the most outspoken pro-Israeli positions and even invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to join their meetings (Gotev 2019). Members of the Visegrad Group also prevented the adoption of common EU positions in line with established support for a two-state solution. For example, in May 2018, the Czech Republic and Hungary – together with Romania – blocked an EU resolution stating that Jerusalem should be the capital of both Israel and Palestine and condemning the US decision to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem (Fulbright 2018). These initiatives and policy positions of the Visegrad Four have not aimed at acquiring intra-EU legitimacy, and most other EU members see them as national positions that are not accountable to EU institutions and do not further the common EU interest. If their goal was improving relations with Israel, they have had dubious success, as highlighted, for example, by recent political crises between Tel Aviv and Poland, the largest of the Visegrad Four (Lazaroff 2019). They have, however, been highly disruptive to EU foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and have therefore contributed to the impasse of the international community before the repeated escalations of the conflict.

Greece and Cyprus have also taken an increasingly pro-Israeli stance as a result of the geopolitical competition over the control of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean (Grevi et al. 2020, 15). Conversely, a different group of countries, including France, Spain and several smaller members from Western and Northern Europe, such as Ireland and Sweden, have been somewhat more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. However, this is a looser group that originated partly as a result of frustration with the failure of the EU to take common positions and partly as an attempt to provide a counternarrative to the pro-Israeli positions of other member states (17).

Therefore, differentiated cooperation between EU members in the context of the MEPP has been ineffective and, in some cases, it even undermined EU foreign policy. While the diplomacy of the Quint group can be seen as conveying long-standing EU positions and values, regional groups such as the Visegrad Four have departed from these positions and openly backed decisions taken by Israel and the Trump administration that are incompatible with previous EU policy (Grevi et al. 2020, 14-7). These instances of differentiated cooperation have affected EU foreign policy negatively and complicated the path to achieving the ideal solution of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Lead groups on Iran and Ukraine: effective, but no ideal solution

EU lead groups in negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme and the Ukraine crisis provide examples of how differentiated cooperation between groups of member states can spur the EU into diplomatic action and create a new policy that enjoys intra-EU legitimacy and is accountable to European institutions. The two lead groups under analysis highlight how the engagement of the larger EU members in major international crises can lead to positive policy change, at least in relative terms. This is possible when lead countries follow an established EU policy line, act with the broad consent of other members and cooperate with external partners in the multilateral arena. At the same time, the two case studies show that, due to limited power and capabilities, EU lead groups cannot achieve an ideal solution on their own in such complex international contexts. For the latter purpose, cooperation with and willingness of other major powers is essential.

The E3/EU and Iran’s nuclear programme

In 2003, the European lead group on Iran – including Germany, France and the UK (the E3) – created the diplomatic framework for negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme, which was joined by the United States (US), China and Russia in 2006. The Union’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR) was also invited to join the negotiations and became the chief interlocutor of the Iranians on behalf of the other participants in the format (Alcaro and Siddi 2020, 8). The inclusion of the HR has been important also in that it has strengthened the accountability of the lead group to the EU Council, which the HR is mandated to inform about progress (Alcaro 2018, 161-4). While the US was the main driver of the negotiations leading to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, the E3 and HR played an essential role by shaping and supporting the decision of the UN Security Council to adopt a ‘dual-track’ approach that combined sanctions with diplomacy. The signing of the JCPOA testified to the effectiveness of a diplomatic effort initiated and sustained by the E3 for over a decade.

Rather than on the greater resources of the E3, the intra-EU legitimacy of the E3/EU’s diplomacy towards Iran depended on its consistency with an established normative framework that focused on values broadly shared within the Union, such as the quest for a peaceful resolution to the dispute through negotiations. The E3’s continuous reassertion of their intra-EU leadership on the Iran nuclear file, while other members showed no willingness to take over such a complex task, was also an important factor (Alcaro and Siddi 2020, 9). The participation and cooperation of Russia, China and especially the US (until 2016) in the framework created by the E3 further strengthened the legitimacy of the E3’s diplomacy through international political endorsement.

However, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA during the Trump presidency revealed that the effectiveness of EU foreign policy towards Iran is heavily dependent on Washington’s stance. Following Trump’s reintroduction of US sanctions against Tehran in November 2018, Iran’s external trade collapsed, and the Iranian economy fell into a severe recession. US sanctions had extraterritorial effect as they also targeted companies based in other countries (including the EU) that conducted trade with Iran. Moreover, the Trump presidency attempted to undermine intra-EU unity through bilateral channels with member states. For instance, in early 2019, the US persuaded Poland to co-host a US-sponsored conference that was widely perceived to be an anti-Iran event (Harper 2019). However, the E3 managed to maintain intra-EU unity through the formulation of a position stressing Europe’s concerns about Iran’s human rights records, regional activities and ballistic missile programme while at the same time expressing firm commitment by all EU member states (including Poland) to the JCPOA (Alcaro and Siddi 2020, 9).

European attempts to circumvent US sanctions through a barter system called Instex largely failed. Since mid-2019, Iran responded to the sanctions by decreasing its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA (Katzman 2021). However, European diplomacy played a role in Iran’s decision not to quit the agreement altogether, and thus preserved an important diplomatic framework for restarting cooperation after the end of Trump’s presidency (Alcaro and Siddi 2020, 10). Hence, differentiated cooperation of the E3 was effective in relative terms because it contributed to achieving the JCPOA and ensured its survival when the US quit the agreement. The ideal outcome of settling the dispute on Iran’s nuclear programme was not achieved due to Washington’s stance and the E3/EU’s failure to persuade Tehran to remain fully compliant with the JCPOA despite the withdrawal of the US.

The Franco-German duo in the Normandy format

The Normandy format for negotiations on the conflict in Eastern Ukraine was also the outcome of efforts conducted by European, particularly German and French, diplomacy. The Normandy framework was created in June 2014 and includes the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Following several failed international attempts to de-escalate the conflict in the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande conducted shuttle diplomacy with Moscow and Kiev, leading to the signing of the Minsk II agreement in February 2015. Other EU members supported this achievement of Franco-German diplomacy by agreeing that EU sectoral sanctions on Russia (imposed in the summer of 2014) would be tied to the implementation of Minsk II (Alcaro and Siddi 2020, 11).

The Franco-German duo paid close attention to making their actions in the Normandy format accountable to EU institutions. They reported extensively to European Council meetings on the progress of negotiations and gave their assessment of the way forward. Although EU diplomatic actors did not play a role in the Normandy format, the Franco-German lead group needed the support of EU institutions and networks for the internal coordination of European diplomacy, especially on sanctions (Natorski and Pomorska 2016). The accountability of the Franco-German duo to EU institutions also contributed to its intra-EU legitimacy. Eastern members, particularly Poland, occasionally voiced some criticism of the Normandy format, but no member state seriously questioned the authority of France and Germany to negotiate on behalf of the EU. Their legitimacy was boosted by the fact that the parties to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine, as well as the US, also recognised Berlin and Paris as the appropriate European interlocutors in the crisis (Alcaro and Siddi 2020, 12; 2021, 154-61).

To be sure, the Minsk II agreement has not solved the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and most of its provisions have not been implemented. Hence, the ideal solution of resolving the Donbass conflict has not been achieved. However, the agreement did contribute to de-escalating military conflict. This is no insubstantial feat for the EU lead group, particularly if the failure of earlier attempts at de-escalation led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the US are taken into account. At least in relative terms, the diplomatic action of the Franco-German duo was effective. It led to a relative improvement of the situation on the ground, which evolved from large-scale battles in winter 2014-2015 to lower-intensity clashes in subsequent months. All mediators and parties involved in the conflict continue to refer to the implementation of Minsk II as the only way to solve the crisis, even though perspectives differ on how implementation should take place (see, for example, International Crisis Group 2017).

The main criticism directed at the EU lead groups on Ukraine and Iran concerns their legitimacy and emphasises that they can turn into directoires where larger EU members make decisions on behalf of smaller members (Alcaro and Siddi 2020, 15-6). However, these lead groups continue to enjoy the broad consent of other members, not least because alternative formats of European diplomacy appear highly unlikely to achieve better outcomes. Leading countries regularly brief other EU members and usually coordinate their diplomatic action within EU institutions, which contributes to the sustainability of lead groups (Natorski and Pomorska 2016, 64). On the other hand, the main challenge to the effectiveness of lead groups stems from their limited economic and/or political power vis-à-vis major external players such as the US and Russia. The cases of the Iranian nuclear deal and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine illustrate that the diplomacy of EU lead groups cannot be fully effective if it is challenged by these actors.

Conclusion

This article had two main objectives. First, it reviewed existing scholarship on differentiation in EU foreign and security policy. Against this backdrop, it provided empirical evidence for Blockmans’s (2014) argument that coalitions of member states can contribute to CFSP if they act consistently with EU interests and goals. Second, the article analysed the accountability, legitimacy and, in particular, effectiveness of differentiation in this policy field by drawing especially on the empirical findings of two EU IDEA policy papers. This concluding section summarises the key findings and connects them with the broader policy and scholarly discussion on different modalities of differentiation in EU CFSP.

The empirical findings, covering four highly relevant cases of EU foreign policy, point to a relatively positive general assessment of differentiation in this field. The cases highlighted that differentiation in CFSP takes place in informal groupings of member states and is characterised by intergovernmental decision-making, rather than by formal treaty-based or supranational structures. Different modalities of informal differentiated cooperation among EU member states have had a predominantly positive impact on the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU foreign and security policy. Differentiated cooperation generated internal consensus and spurred the EU into action on specific foreign policy files concerning, for instance, the Western Balkans, Iran and Ukraine. The positive impact has been strongest when differentiated cooperation has adhered to common European values and identity (as expressed in established EU foreign policy discourse) and built on long-standing common EU positions. However, when differentiated cooperation has departed from this common base (as in the case of the MEPP), it has undermined EU foreign policy, making it ineffective. Cooperation with (or opposition by) other major powers, particularly the US, has also been an important driver of (or challenge to) effectiveness. Furthermore, differentiated cooperation appears less effective when it is assessed in absolute terms, that is, based on whether it provides an appropriate or ideal solution to a foreign policy issue. In this regard, limitations in the material and power capabilities of the EU and its member states are often serious constraints in the pursuit of an ideal solution.

This assessment comes with some caveats, however. Foreign and security policymaking often empowers executive offices and operates within limited transparency and accountability mechanisms typical of ‘high politics’ matters. While these are recurrent aspects of foreign policy conduct, informal differentiated cooperation in this area raises some questions on the access of non-participating member states to information, policy planning and policymaking. This is the case especially when differentiated cooperation takes place in exclusive formats such as the lead groups. To overcome these potential challenges, member states could connect informal modalities of differentiated cooperation to the formal EU foreign and security policy structures. The E3/EU format in the case of Iran provides a good example that could be followed in other formats. Inclusion of the office of the EU HR/VP in various formats would provide a useful tool to ensure that informal differentiated cooperation feeds into the agendas of the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council and adheres to EU’s common values and established common positions.

Finally, the article has sought to conceptualise differentiation broadly, encompassing (informal) differentiated cooperation. This is because EU CFSP is a less integrated policy area compared, for example, to the Single Market. It also impinges on core state powers, which largely explains why the member states have desired to remain in the driver’s seat. Given the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in CFSP, differentiated cooperation between member states on foreign and security policy is hardly surprising. In order to shed light on its implications, the article focused especially on the effectiveness of differentiated cooperation in selected case studies with high policy relevance. While this approach proved valuable, it also revealed some limitations that highlight the need for further research.

Our empirical analysis was based on a limited number of case studies. Future studies could expand the scope by assessing the effectiveness as well as accountability and legitimacy of differentiation in CFSP in other scenarios. Moreover, the ongoing implementation of PESCO projects calls for an assessment of differentiation in EU defence policy. Member states have made 20 binding commitments within PESCO (Biscop 2020). In practice, PESCO is put into action through 47 capability projects, involving in varying degrees 25 EU members and 3 non-members. The effectiveness of PESCO could be analysed accordingly once the concrete results of the projects are available.

Furthermore, our investigation of informal differentiated foreign policy cooperation could be extended to the various European defence policy initiatives that take place outside or in the margins of EU structures. These include the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) led by France, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), Germany’s Framework Nation Concept and the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) of five Nordic states. Investigating these initiatives in terms of effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy could provide a valuable approach for the analysis of differentiated European defence cooperation.

Acknowledgments

This article, as well as the Special Issue in which it is included, is one of the outputs of research conducted in the framework of the EU IDEA research project – Integration and Differentiation for Effectiveness and Accountability – which received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 822622. This article, and the Special Issue as a whole, reflect only the views of the authors, and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Marco Siddi

Marco Siddi is Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, and Montalcini Assistant Professor at the University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy.

Tyyne Karjalainen

Tyyne Karjalainen is Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland. Email: [email protected]; Twitter: @TyyneKarjalain

Juha Jokela

Juha Jokela is Director of the European Union Research Programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland. Email: [email protected]; Twitter: @JuhaJokela1

Notes

¹ Moreover, an exhaustive empirical analysis of all three concepts is not possible due to space constraints.

² https://euidea.eu/.

³ Interviews were conducted with six diplomats of current and former EU member states (Germany, France and the United Kingdom), one Ukrainian diplomat, four diplomats of the European External Action Service and two other EU officials. All interviews were conducted with informed consent.

⁴ The E3 are France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

⁵ If an EU common position has not been agreed upon previously or remains unclear, a differentiated cooperation format is more likely to encounter difficulties; its objectives are not clearly defined, and its effectiveness and legitimacy are more difficult to assess.

⁶ However, a decision is not adopted if abstaining members represent at least one-third of the member states comprising at least one-third of the population of the Union.

⁷ The expression Western Balkans refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Slovenia and Croatia were considered part of this geographical/political construct until they joined the EU, in 2004 and 2013 respectively.

⁸ Moreover, five EU member states – Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania and Greece – have not recognised Kosovo’s independence.