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ABSTRACT
The United States (US) cannot reach an agreement with North Korea because US domestic politics will not support the magnitude of concessions that would be required to turn Pyongyang into a denuclearised yet satisfied regional power. While domestic constraints on the US side are not the only (or even the primary) reason for the non-materialisation of a peace agreement between the US and North Korea, they are an overlooked contributing factor. If future attempts are made to mollify the North Korean regime, they will have to be instigated by US regional allies, with Washington playing a supporting role at most.
Notes
1 We use the verb ‘appease’ as synonymous with ‘satisfy’. Following Stephen F. Rock (Citation2000, 12), we maintain that, properly understood, appeasement can be defined as “the policy of reducing tensions with one’s adversary by removing the causes of conflict and disagreement”, and “is not incompatible with compromise, reciprocity, and mutual accommodation. It does not require that one make unilateral concessions”. From this perspective, it is possible to imagine in the abstract a bargain between Washington and Pyongyang that would result in a satisfied (appeased) yet denuclearised North Korean state. In this article, however, we argue that any such bargain would be impossibly difficult for US leaders to negotiate and implement in practical terms.
2 These criticisms had tangible consequences. President Trump suffered the resignation of his well-respected Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, in response to the decision to withdraw from northern Syria, as well as condemnations from lawmakers in his own party. President Biden experienced a significant drop in his approval rating amid the tumultuous Afghan exit, with some members of Congress even calling for his resignation or removal from office.
3 As Rüdiger Frank (Citation2018) notes, North Korea has been subjected to one form of sanctions regime or another ever since its founding.
4 Nor would the US’ regional allies. Although the interests of US allies are not our focus here, it is important to acknowledge that domestic constraints are not the only impediment to a US-North Korean grand bargain.
5 For a detailed overview of the 1993-1994 crisis, see Wit et al. (Citation2004).
6 In fact, US leaders were never enthusiastic about implementing the terms of the Agreed Framework in the first place (Smith Citation2019; Kang Citation2003, 321).
7 One of Trump’s most popular lines of attack against his predecessor, President Obama, related to Obama’s decision to ease sanctions against Iran in 2015 as part of the deal struck with Tehran. Trump accused Obama of sending “pallets” or “barrels” of cash to Iran (Voorhees Citation2016). It stands to reason that Trump would wish to avoid similar charges being made against his Administration for any economic relief offered to Pyongyang.
8 For the purposes of this article, we assume that denuclearisation will remain the goal of the US. However, we note that there are strong arguments in favour of accepting North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state. See, for example, Brewer and Terry (Citation2021).
9 In the past, US leaders had always used the prospect of a formal summit as a carrot to entice North Korea to make some concessions of its own (Ryan Citation2018). By contrast, Trump agreed to meet with Kim without asking for anything in return.
10 North Korea may also simply be prone to making mistakes, like all regimes (Abrahamian Citation2019).
11 On the difficulty that individual leaders face when it comes to establishing credibility, see the literature discussed in Lupton et al. (Citation2017).
12 Some scholars disagree, arguing that a middle power like South Korea is unlikely to have much success engaging North Korea. See, for example, Kim (Citation2018).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Meriel Hahn
Meriel Hahn is a graduate student of Political Science at Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected]
Peter Harris
Peter Harris is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA.