ABSTRACT
Analyses of the Libyan conflict from the 2011 revolt onward have tended to define it as a ‘proxy war’, especially because of the relevant role played by foreign actors and their intermingling with various local factions. However, this definition does not stand up to closer examination and definitely does not fit with the specifics of the Libyan case. Through a combined analysis of the three theoretical concepts of ‘areas of limited statehood’ (ALS), ‘rentier state’ and ‘proxy war’, after an examination of the role played by militias, economic institutions and external actors in the conflict, it is argued that the classic concept of proxy war does not fully apply to the war in Libya.
Notes
1 The CBL was institutionalised under the Sanussi monarchy.
2 The NOC was created in the 1970s under Qadhafi from the ashes of the Libyan Petroleum Corporation.
3 The LIA is the government-controlled entity that has managed the Libyan sovereign wealth fund since 2006.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Alessia Melcangi
Alessia Melcangi is Associate Professor of Contemporary History of North Africa and the Middle East at the Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC, USA.
Karim Mezran
Karim Mezran is Director of the North Africa Initiative and Resident Senior Fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC, USA. Email: [email protected]; Twitter: @MezranK