Time for a New Atlanticism: The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and the International Order

ABSTRACT

There has been no shortage of critiques of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) signed on 30 December 2020. Many have perceived the CAI as a snub in the face of the Biden administration, which has the potential to jeopardise one of the most important strategic goals of the transatlantic alliance: setting aside four years of Trump’s populist economic policy and working in close coordination with a view to developing a united front to contain China. While the CAI does indeed indicate that the EU considers itself a fully autonomous international economic player, however, such a display of autonomy need not be incompatible with a stronger transatlantic alliance. In fact, the CAI may be an opportunity for the transatlantic alliance to evolve into a partnership among equals that is necessary to successfully navigate the uncharted waters of the coming global (dis)order.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• China
• United States
• investments
• global governance

Notes

1 See, for example, the reactions reported in Ghiretti (2022).

2 See Mears and Leali (2020).

3 The European Parliament has temporarily suspended ratification due to Chinese sanctions against some of its members, while technical preparation is ongoing (Van der Loo 2021). Although a discussion of whether the agreement will be finally ratified is beyond the scope of this essay, notably, Chancellor Olaf Scholz expressed the hope that the CAI “will take effect as soon as possible” (in Euobserver 2021).

4 For a long-term perspective on US relations with Russia, see Natalizia and Valigi (2020). On the unintended effects of the European Neighbourhood Policy on relations with Russia, see Casier (2019).

5 On the increasingly closer Sino-Russian relations, see President of Russia (2022).

6 See Gilpin (1981, 3) and Luard (1988, 1) for classic views of the difficulty of defining power in international relations.

7 For a comprehensive view of the EU’s foreign policy, which goes beyond the focus on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy, see Keukeleire and Delreux (2022).

8 ‘It is very likely that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will convince NATO members to spend more than 2 per cent of their GDP in defence. In other words, with its unprovoked attack on Ukraine, Russia will likely attain what former President Trump failed to accomplish for four years.

9 Moreover, when European states displayed autonomy from the US, they did so in a spectacularly divided way, such as when France and Germany opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, with Italy and Spain instead joining the military operation; or when in 2011, Germany decided not to participate in Operation Unified Protector against Gaddafi’s regime. In other words, European autonomy from the US has often meant European disunity.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Arlo Poletti

Arlo Poletti is an Associate Professor of International Political Economy at the University of Trento, Trento, Italy.

Lorenzo Zambernardi

Lorenzo Zambernardi is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy. Email: [email protected]

Dirk De Bièvre

Dirk De Bièvre is a Professor of International Politics and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium. Email: [email protected]