Sustainable Development: A Common Denominator for the EU’s Policy Towards the Eastern Partnership?

ABSTRACT

The heterogeneity of the Eastern Partnership countries’ cultures, political regimes and foreign policy aspirations has been a challenge to the EU’s formulation of a coherent umbrella policy towards the region since the 2004 enlargement. Document analysis with a focus on region-level documents and the cases of Ukraine and Azerbaijan demonstrates the EU’s tendency to shift from an emphasis on European integration and common values to the sustainable development concept in order to address this challenge. By also taking into account the context of this tendency, this analysis highlights the need to balance sustainable development, integration efforts and democratisation in the Eastern Partnership amidst increasing differentiation between target countries and geopolitical pressures.

KEYWORDS:

• Eastern Partnership
• sustainable development
• common values
• European integration
• Ukraine
• Azerbaijan

Launched in 2009, the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative represents “a specific Eastern dimension” (European Commission 2008, 2) of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP’s aim is to “share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned” (European Commission 2004, 4). The EaP, in turn, aims to “strengthen and deepen the political and economic relations” between the EU and six ENP countries in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (European Commission 2008). Such a broad formulation of the EaP’s objective can be seen as fitting the policy’s umbrella nature and the EU’s sustained commitment to using it as a framework for multilateral cooperation (Deen et al. 2021, 9-10). The region’s heterogeneity is, however, a challenge for sustaining the EaP as a framework for the EU’s cooperation with partner countries and the multilateral track specifically (Ibid.; Korosteleva et al. 2020; Incaltarau et al. 2021). Over the last decade, existing heterogeneity has been exacerbated, with the ‘Association Trio’ of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia becoming closer to the Union and Belarus’ declared walkout from the EaP in the summer 2021. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the EU’s multi-aspect response, including granting Ukraine the status of candidate country and the deployment of the EU Peace Facility to help supply weapons, are highly likely to become a game-changer for the EU’s policy in the region (Rabinovych 2022), leading to the reconsideration of policy priorities and contents.

It is, however, highly plausible that the EaP will sustain its umbrella nature and multilateral structures, as this offers several important benefits for the EU and partner countries. They include having a ‘source of reference’ and a commitment to address regional challenges in cooperation, including energy and connectivity, which are critical for the EU; leaving non-associated countries with a chance to (re-)gain prominence on the EU agenda and, overall, adapting to a region in a state of flux (Deen et al. 2021, 11-2). For the EU, preserving the EaP as a framework amid the ever-stronger differentiation of partner countries’ priorities and paths can be seen as a constant effort to (re-)construct the ENP/EaP based on policy learning and the assessments of trends to come. A dilemma, in this vein, deals with promoting democratic reform in the EaP countries amidst geopolitical realities (5). The EU’s strong focus on reform achievements by partner countries may make it vulnerable to geopolitical competitors. On the other hand, “compromising on values out of short-term geopolitical considerations regarding sovereignty and stability risks” undermines the EU’s identity and its democratisation agenda (Ibid.; Liik 2017).

Against this background, this article explores the concept of Sustainable Development (SD) as an emerging common denominator for the EU’s policy towards the Eastern partnership countries, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It uses the SD concept, as offered by the United Nation’s (UN) 2030 Agenda, which sees it as bringing together economic development, environmental considerations and social wellbeing, as well as stressing peace, justice and inclusive societies as a foundation for SD (UNGA 2015). We argue that the EU’s shift from the focus on partner countries’ integration and common values to sustainable development in its policies towards its Eastern neighbours has occurred in a context shaped by the confluence of several developments at the global level, within the EU and its Member States, and in the partner countries. These are the increasing contestation of the liberal international order and the values it is founded on (for example, Lucarelli 2018), the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Libya, the EU’s commitment to be ‘a frontrunner’ in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the demand for development assistance in the Eastern neighbourhood during the COVID-19 pandemic.

With this, SD can be seen as a (relatively) safe, depoliticised and difficult-to-contest solution for such a heterogeneous region facing multi-aspect development, political and geopolitical challenges. To unpack the shift to SD in the ENP/EaP context and the peculiarities of its application, we analysed ENP/EaP policy documents, financial regulations and region-level programming of cooperation and assistance, as well as the EU’s multi-annual and annual programmes for Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Such a selection allows us to both capture policy documents on the regional scale and substantiate them with evidence from relevant countries. Pre-war Ukraine and Azerbaijan were selected as most different cases, as Ukraine has an ambitious Association Agreement (AA) with the EU and seeks membership, while Azerbaijan refused EU association and is merely interested in pragmatic cooperation.

The article is structured as follows. It starts with the introduction of the SD concept and its application in EU policies. Next, the methodology of the study is explained. The empirical part of the article introduces the context of the shift from European integration and common values as leitmotifs of the early ENP/EaP to the consolidation of SD as a common denominator of the policy and demonstrates the way this shift manifested in the policy documents under discussion.

It is argued that, while the SD concept offers an important common denominator for the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbours, it also poses threats regarding the aforementioned ‘common values vs geopolitical considerations’ dilemma, as it may lead to the consolidation of autocratic regimes and reform backsliding due to the lack of new political incentives. Therefore, the formulation of the EU’s new approaches to the relations with Eastern neighbours amid and following Russia’s war against Ukraine requires rethinking the balance between sustainable development, integration efforts and democratisation.

The concept of sustainable development

Origins of the concept and the 2030 agenda

Over recent years, SD has become “the catchphrase for international aid agencies” (Mensah 2019, 1). Today the focus on SD’s substance and its evolution over time is of special relevance in the context of the 2030 Agenda that places a strong emphasis on an integrated approach to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNGA 2015). Therefore, this part of the article will briefly highlight the origins of the SD concept and map its substance according to the 2030 Agenda and the EU documents designed to implement the agenda.

Historically, the SD concept is connected to two interlinked lines of debate. A more specific explanation comes from sustainable forestry ideas, in particular the so-called ‘sustainable yield’ of natural resources (for example, timber or oil) that only tackles a resources’ surplus, rather than their basis (OECD 2022). A more general and well-known line of debate concerns the question as to whether the Earth’s limited natural resources can sustain a population increase. The second approach is exemplified by the 1972 “Limits to Growth” report (Meadows et al. 1972) and the 1987 “Our Common Future” report (known as the “Brundtland Report”), produced by the World Commission on Environment and Development (United Nations 1987). The latter not only pointed to the challenge of meeting the needs of both current and future generations but called for trade-offs between industrial growth and environmental protection, and stronger global cooperation for SD (Ibid.). As outlined in the 1992 “Rio Declaration,” “Agenda 21” and the “Rio + 20 Agenda,” the key trends of the SD concept’s evolution before the adoption of the 2030 Agenda had been the consolidation of its three-aspect definition (including economic, social and environmental aspects) and the focus on the means of its implementation and global cooperation for SD (UNCED 1992; UNGA 2012).

The focus on the interlinkages between various aspects of SD, the means of implementation and cooperation for SD is also salient in the 2030 Agenda. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) described the 2030 Agenda and the 17 SDGs, launched in September 2015, as a “plan of action for people, planet and prosperity” (UNGA 2015, 1). Apart from an overall governance approach, the 2030 Agenda is marked by several thematic innovations concerning the SD concept. First, there are many ways in which the Agenda links the economic, social and environmental dimensions of SD, such as the interlinkages between the goals and their integrated and indivisible nature. Moreover, the 2030 Agenda is marked by supplementing the substance of the SD concept with the “governance dimension” that concerns both Goal 16 “Peace, justice and strong institutions” and Goal 17 “Partnership for the Goals” (UNGA 2015, 25-7), which is regarded by Western scholars as a revolutionary framework for global governance, yet contested by emerging powers (Arajärvi 2018; Hope 2019). Further criticism of the 2030 Agenda and questions about its transformative potential are based on the arguments of the agenda’s excessive focus on the Western neo-liberal paradigm and its failure to overcome colonial legacies (for example, Struckmann 2018; Novovic 2022).

The EU’s approach to sustainable development

The European Commission was one of the first international actors to announce the commitment “to be a frontrunner” in implementing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs (European Commission 2016). This commitment, announced in 2016, significantly impacted the scope and structuring of both the EU’s internal and external policies (Ibid.). This statement can be illustrated by the 2017 “New European Consensus on Development,” which acknowledged the 2030 Agenda and, subsequently, the three-aspect SD concept it offers as a framework for the EU’s action in the development domain (Council of the EU 2017). In its 2016 “Next steps for a Sustainable European Future. European Action on Sustainability” communication, the Commission also highlighted the contribution the ENP/EaP makes to fostering SD in third countries, inter alia, by promoting security, resilience, the rule of law and good governance (European Commission 2016). As illustrated later, the ENP/EaP policy documents and programming produced after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda are marked by a stronger emphasis on SD and a more nuanced mapping of the concept when compared to early ENP/EaP policy documents.

Since the EU’s commitment to the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs is not legally binding, these documents do not immediately influence the substance of the SD concept in EU primary law (Rabinovych 2019, 187-8). EU primary law does not offer a definition of SD but stipulates its role as one of the binding objectives of the EU and a principle around which policy integration shall take place (van Hees 2014, 63). The intentionally vague legal concept of SD thus offers EU institutions space to adapt policies to international trends in the SD concept’s evolution, which has regularly occurred in practice. Apart from the new “European Consensus for Development” mentioned above, the 2001 original and 2006 reviewed “EU Sustainable Development Strategies” employed definitions of SD that were largely based on the 1987 “Brundtland Report” and the 1992 “Rio Declaration” (UNCED 1992; European Commission 2001; 2005).

Besides, the 2030 Agenda and, subsequently, the “European Consensus on Development” are marked by the focus on the means of implementation, that is, policies and tools conducive to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Under the 2030 Agenda, such means include, inter alia, the revitalisation of the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, development-oriented international public finance and a viable UN system (UNGA 2015, 10-1). The EU is, in turn, committed to multilateralism as a foundation for development, in general, and playing a leading role in the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, specifically (European Commission 2016).

In sum, the evolution of the SD concept, its contemporary consolidation within the 2030 Agenda and its application by the EU as a policy framework demonstrate three interrelated trends, complementing the concept’s scope with its governance, institutional development and the rule of law aspect; the focus on interlinkages, synergies and trade-offs between the goals and attention to the means of implementation.

Methodology

Methodologically, our article is based on document analysis and secondary sources. We designed and conducted the document selection procedure in accordance with our ambition for a strong regional focus and an insight into SD as a common denominator for the policy. To fit this purpose, we analysed 15 documents with a clear regional focus, namely i) all milestone policy documents, ii) legal documents establishing EU funding instruments and iii) the programming of region-level assistance. Given the considerable number of country-specific programming documents produced under the ENP/EaP, we complemented this analysis with an examination of the EU’s action plans and country-level programming for Ukraine and Azerbaijan. We selected these cases because, being most different, they represent the two ends of the spectrum in terms of EU-partner country relations under the EaP. Ukraine has ambitious European integration aspirations based on its AA with the EU, and the EU has been distributing high volumes of assistance to this country. Azerbaijan, in contrast, does not have an AA with the EU and is interested in pragmatic cooperation based on the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), rather than European integration. We analysed 19 programming documents for Ukraine and 23 for Azerbaijan, giving preference to programmes, (i) clearly connected to the aforementioned region-level documents and (ii) of a multiannual nature. Differences in the number of analysed documents are determined by the availability of multiannual or annual programming and varying numbers of annexes to programmes, which we counted as separate documents for coding purposes. All documents in both categories were analysed in full. In total, 15 region-level and 42 country-level documents were analysed. The analysis covers the timeframe from 2003 to 2022.

A close reading and coding of the documents were performed with the help of the Nvivo 12 programme. This process corresponded closely to structuring content analysis whereby the researcher aims to “filter out particular aspects of the material, to give a cross-section through the material according to pre-determined ordering criteria, or to assess the material according to certain criteria” (Mayring 2014, 64). The coding categories were defined based on the SD concept, including its four dimensions (the economic, environmental, social and governance dimensions), and the notions of “European integration”, “common values”, “nexuses” and “enabling environment”.¹ We utilised the understanding of the SD concept and the substance of its dimensions, nexuses between them and the enabling environment, as presented in the 2030 Agenda, its targets and indicators (see Table 1). The coding was used to filter out emphases on these categories contained in the documents. Importantly, we did not only code the mere mentioning of the four SD dimensions, but also how well they are explicitly connected to a broader SD approach. We also coded the mere mention of ‘sustainable development’ with no connections.

Table 1. Delimitation between various aspects of sustainable development, European integration and common values

Dimension	Example of notions, coded under the respective dimension
Common values	“Shared values”, “democracy”, “democratic development”, “human rights”, “the rule of law”, “stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law””, “the cross-cutting issues of good governance and human rights”.
European integration	“Intensification of political, economic and cultural relations”, “increasingly close mutually beneficial relationship”, “going from cooperation to a significant degree of integration”, “enhanced cooperation”, “visa facilitation”, “trade liberalisation”.
Economic dimension	“Economic growth”, “prosperity”, “economic development”, “poverty reduction”, “welfare”, “establishment of a fully functioning market economy”, “economic and institutional reforms”, “to enhance trade, investment and growth”, “to enhance agricultural production and rural development”, “promote trade and investment flows”, “support for socio-economic reform”, “economic competitiveness”, “implementation of reforms in the areas of trade and investment climate”, “economic and social cohesion”, “social and environmental viability of growth strategies”.
Social dimension	“Welfare”, “social protection”, “reform the social security system”, “health”, “support for socio-economic reform”, “strengthening social reform”, “social stability”, “improve health and living conditions”, countering “poverty and social exclusion”, “economic and social cohesion”, “social and environmental viability of growth strategies”.
Environmental dimension	“Prevention of deterioration of the environment”, “environmental protection”, “waste management”, “biodiversity and sustainable management of forest resources, and climate change”, “integrated management of water resources”, “sustainable management of natural resources”, “environment and climate change”, countering “water, land degradation, waste, and urban development”, “social and environmental viability of growth strategies”.
Governance dimension	“Implementation of reforms in the areas of trade and investment climate”, “support for legislative and economic reforms”, “the cross-cutting issues of good governance and human rights”, “fight against corruption”, “administrative capacity-building”, “public administration reform and public financial management”.
Economic-environment nexus	“Protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development”, “social and environmental viability of growth strategies”.
Economic-social nexus	“Welfare”, “support for socio-economic reform”, “poverty reduction”, “economic and social cohesion”, “social and environmental viability of growth strategies”.
Economic-governance nexus	“Implementation of reforms in the areas of trade and investment climate”, “Improving the investment climate, through non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable business conditions”.
Environment-social nexus	“Protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development”, “social and environmental viability of growth strategies”.
Environment-governance nexus	“Good environmental governance”, “improved institutional/administrative capacity, accountability and transparency in the environment sector”.
Social-governance nexus	“Developing a modern state oriented towards satisfying the needs of citizens”, “better quality of public services demonstrated by service delivery surveys”.
Enabling environment	“Developing financial sector and information society”, “transport sector development”, “connectivity”, “digitalisation of economy”.

We argue that a qualitative focus is conducive to developing an in-depth understanding of the documents’ key focal points and the manner and extent to which they reflect the SD concept and its components. On the one hand, merely counting the reference to ‘poverty reduction’, for example, does not tell us whether the EU addresses it as a stand-alone issue or as one aspect within a broader SD approach. On the other hand, references to the interconnectedness of SD dimensions or SD and European integration, for example, are often implicit and therefore require interpretation.² During the process, considerable attention was paid to coding notions that can be interpreted as belonging to several categories, such as the rule of law, which is often mentioned in the context of common values but also the governance dimension of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. In such cases, we relied on the context in which the notion was mentioned and, as indicated above, distinguished between the notions referred to within and outside the SD concept. Analysis of full documents, qualitative reading with an account of the context and the elaboration of nuanced definitions of and delimitation between concepts, are the key techniques we used to avoid bias and overlaps during the coding. If a concept fell under two categories (for example, “socio-economic development” and “environment-friendly economic development”), we coded it into both relevant categories, as well as the nexus between the two. We also coded “rule of law” and “good governance” both to the “governance dimension” of SD and “common values”, when the context was unclear. Table 1 offers examples of our delimitation between the coding categories.

Based on the coding, we assessed the emphasis of the categories using qualitative methods (see Tables 2 and 3 below as well as Online Annexes II and III). We do not define quantitative thresholds but again rely on a qualitative assessment. We count a category as receiving no emphasis when it is not mentioned at all or rather ‘in passing’, without any elaboration. A category is deemed to receive some emphasis when it is mentioned a couple of times but with limited elaboration. Strong emphasis means that the document shows an attempt to go into some depth about the issue, which can include providing a definition, an overview of the problem and/or a justification of the suggested solution.

Table 2. Early ENP/EaP policy documents and the SD concept before 2015

	European integration	Common values	Reference to SD	Economic dimension	Environmental dimension	Social dimension	Governance dimension	Linkages between the aspects	Enabling environment
Region-level policy documents	++(+)	++	+	++(+) -(*)	+ -(*)	+(+) -	++ -	Economic-social +(+) Economic- environment + Economic-governance + Environment-governance +	++ Integration Trade Regulatory approximation Finance Сapacity-building
Region-level financial and programming documents	++(+)	++	+	++(+) -(*)	++(+) -(*)	+(+) -	+(+) -	Economic-environment + Environment-governance +(+) Social-governance + Environment-governance + Economic-social +	++ European integration Regulatory approximation EU assistance + Trade and infrastructure
Ukraine action plan and country programming	++(+)	++(+)	+(+)	++ *	+(+) *	+(+) -(*)	++(+) -	Economic-governance +(+) Environment-governance +(+) Social-governance + Environment-social +(+) Economic-environment + Economic-social +(+)	++ European integration Regulatory approximation Trade, trade facilitation, transport and infrastructure
Azerbaijan action plan country programming	+++	++	+(+)	++(+) *	+ *	+(+) *	+++ -(*)	Economic-governance ++ Economic-social +(+)	+++ European integration Trade

Note: authors’ own elaboration. + means ‘no/weak emphasis’, ++ means ‘medium emphasis’, +++ means ‘strong emphasis’ of the dimension; - means ‘no/weak relation of the issue to SD’; * means ‘medium relation of the issue to SD, mainly referring to SD in a general sense’; ** means ‘strong and elaborated relation of the issue to SD, including references to individual SDGs’. The full version of the table is available in Online Annex II. Aggregated values were calculated by adding all values from the larger table and dividing them by the number of documents. When an uneven number resulted, we used the number before the comma as main result, but indicated the originally higher result with an additional + or * sign in brackets. Nexuses that were not mentioned at all are not reported in the table.

Table 3. ENP/EaP 2015-2022 and the SD concept

	European integration	Common values	Reference to SD	Economic dimension	Environmental dimension	Social dimension	Governance dimension	Linkages between the aspects	Enabling environment
Region-level policy documents	+(+)	+(+)	+	+++ *	++ -(*)	+(+) -	++(+) -(*)	Economic-social ++(+) Social-governance +(+) Economic-environment + Economic-governance +(+)	+(+) Transport Connectivity Digital
Region-level financial and programming documents	+	++(+)	+++	+++ **	++ **	++(+) **	++ **	Economic-social ++ Economic-environment ++ Environment-social + Environment-governance + Social-governance +	++ Digital transformation Connectivity People-to-people links
Ukraine country programming	++	+	++(+)	++(+) **	+(+) **	++(+) **	++(+) **	Economic-social ++(+) Economic-governance +(+) Social-governance +(+)	++ Trade Digitalization Connectivity
Azerbaijan country programming	+(+)	+	++	+++ *(*)	+(+) *(*)	++(+) *(*)	++ *(*)	Economic-governance +(+) Economic-social +(+) Social-Governance +	++ Energy Connectivity Digitalisation

Note: The same scale as in Table 2 applies. The full table is available in Online Annex III

SD as an emerging common denominator for the ENP/EaP

Our key argument is that, though SD was part of the ENP/EaP pivotal policy documents and programming over the first decade since the ENP’s launch, it has gradually turned to the policy’s common denominator or leitmotif over the period 2015-22. This argument is supported by four key observations presented below. Notably, by closely examining these developments, we focus on the context of the trend we describe, that is, correlation rather than causation between the trends and the researched phenomenon. In other words, we do not aim to determine the extent to which each of the following phenomena has contributed to the policy shift under study.

The crisis of liberal international order and legitimacy of the EU’s democracy promotion

Europe and especially the EU have long represented “a pillar and a laboratory of the liberal order” (Lucarelli 2018, 1). Logically, the EU’s self-representation in the world is thus largely founded on its self-identification as an area of liberal democracy, human rights and the rule of law that transcends the same values abroad. The value-based focus of the EU’s self-representation in the ENP/EaP region can be illustrated by its aims to “create an enlarged area of political stability and the rule of law” or “enhanced relations with its neighbours based on shared values” (European Commission 2003). Therefore, the crisis of liberal international order (Götz 2021), which gradually became salient during the second decade of the 21^st century, inevitably made the EU rethink its foreign policy discourses and strategies. Challenges to the liberal international order stem from contestation by rising powers and opposition within liberal democracies that have resulted in a more fragmented, competitive and regionalised world order (Ibid.), questions regarding its legitimation, and the emergence of multiple contestation strategies in response to ‘liberal intrusiveness’ (Börzel and Zürn 2021, 282).

With its 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS), the EU responded to the ‘existential crisis’ that increases insecurity and instability in wider Europe by stressing the security of the EU and contributing to state and societal resilience in the East and the South (European Union 2016). Resilience can be understood as tackling political, economic, social and climate/energy fragility at the state but also societal and community levels (European Commission 2017, 3). The EUGS introduced the controversial ‘principled pragmatism’ concept, whereby the EU tried reconciling self-interest and the commitment to fundamental values (Juncos 2017). Furthermore, the focus on resilience shifted EU foreign policy-makers’ attention to areas falling within the scope of SD, such as a functioning economy, reliable energy sources, environmental protection, and fostered attention to the interlinkages between issue areas and challenges (for example, SDG 8 “Decent work and economic growth”, and SDG 7 “Affordable and clean energy”). Moreover, similar to SD, the resilience concept incorporates participatory, accountable and transparent institutions as one of the means, rather than the ideational leitmotif of action. The shift away from the dominant ‘common values’ discourse and an emphasis on the substance of partner countries’ resilience can be seen as a background of the depoliticisation of the ENP/EaP and the rise of SD as a ‘common denominator’ for the region. Such a shift, however, contributed to the emergence of the ‘common values vs geopolitical considerations’ dilemma in the ENP/EaP discussed above. In other words, the crisis of liberal order and the contestation of EU’s values by both internal and external actors raised the question of whether and to what extent the EU may compromise its values and depoliticise cooperation with Eastern partners for the sake of fostering regional security and stability while facing the geopolitical pressures stemming from Russia and China (Deen et al. 2021, 5; Cadier 2019).

Changes to the ENP/EaP following crises in Ukraine, Syria and Libya

Alongside the crisis of liberal international order, EU foreign policy had been shaped by the 2013-14 Ukraine crisis and wars in Syria and Libya, which broke out in 2011 and 2014, respectively. Under both the 2015 ENP review and the 2016 EUGS, the EU prioritised stabilisation and conflict management in the neighbourhood over reform, thus lowering its transformative ambitions vis-à-vis partner countries (European Commission and High Representative 2015; Crombois 2019). These changes precluded the EU from introducing any significant integration plans for any of its neighbours prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Combined with the decreased emphasis on common values, the lack of new integration initiatives from the EU created the demand for rethinking the ENP/EaP substance and a new common denominator for cooperation (Deen et al. 2021).

Similar to the resilience framework, the conceptualisation of the EU’s approach to conflicts and crises stresses the EU’s aspiration to contribute to the achievement of SDGs, in particular Goal 16 “Peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development” (Council of the EU 2018). The substance of this approach is consonant with the substance of SD in terms of the operationalisation of nexuses between issues and utilising trade, development and financial cooperation to achieve peace. Thus, the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Libya in the middle of the past decade made the EU search for novel, less ambitious but more complex and internally coherent solutions for the ENP/EaP design.

The EU’s commitment to the 2030 Agenda and respective policies’ reformulation

While the crisis of liberal international order and conflicts in the region pushed the EU to seek out new policy solutions for the ENP/EaP, their design was inspired by the EU’s commitment to the 2030 Agenda (European Commission 2016). This commitment is reflected in a broad range of EU framework policy documents, such as the 2017 “New European Consensus on Development” and the 2017 communication “Strategic Approach to Resilience in EU External Action” (Council of the EU 2017; European Commission 2017). In turn, the reconsideration of EU policies based on the 2030 Agenda presented in the 2016 Commission’s staff working document “European Action for Sustainability”, outlined the ENP’s contribution to each of the SDGs (European Commission 2016). This mapping exercise also enabled the Commission to single out those aspects of SD that required strengthening and focus on nexuses between different goals and the way to address them through reforming the ENP/EaP. Thus, in addition to negative stimuli, such as crises and conflicts, the shift of attention from integration and common values to SD under the ENP/EaP took place in a context in which the 2030 Agenda and SDGs became an overarching framework for a broad range of EU internal and external policies and their stronger interplay.

Growing demand for development cooperation in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood due to the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has been more than a health crisis, as “it is affecting economies and societies at their core” (UNDP 2022). Due to its impact on poverty and inequalities, the COVID-19 pandemic made the achievement of SDGs, in general, and fostering the social dimension of SD, in particular, challenging (Ibid.). Since the early stages of the pandemic, analysts have pointed to EaP countries’ vulnerable position in tackling the COVID-19 crisis and its socio-economic effects due to weak and chronically underfinanced health systems and social security programmes (for example, Brugner and Schuch 2020). For the EU, showing solidarity with neighbours and assisting them in countering the consequences of the coronavirus crisis was essential not only from the perspective of cohesion and good neighbourliness but its focus on multi-aspect resilience of Eastern neighbours as a prerequisite of the EU’s security (Kosmehl 2020). Besides, the EU’s focus on the social aspects of SD in its subsequent SD programming is also a response to the demand for development cooperation and the focus on SD’s social dimension by partner countries.

Keeping these developments in mind, we will now proceed with the empirical analysis of the ENP/EaP’s shift from its initial foci on partner countries’ European integration and values to fostering SD.

The ENP/EaP and sustainable development before 2015

Tracing the extent to which the ENP/EaP has incorporated the SD concept requires an in-depth insight into the original policy documents and programming of assistance instruments. We argue that prior to the ENP Review and the Commission’s declaration of the EU’s leading role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the ENP and, later, the EaP have been dominated by the themes of European integration and common values. Although these foci incorporated considerable room for fostering the economic and environmental dimensions of SD, lesser attention was paid to the social and governance aspects of the concept. To substantiate this argument, we will first discuss European integration and common values as leitmotifs of the EU’s ENP/EaP policies prior to 2015.

European integration as a leitmotif of early ENP/EaP policy and SD

As confirmed in the 2003 Commission’s “Wider Europe” communication, the shift of the EU’s border towards the East after the 2004 enlargement was perceived by the Commission as a chance to “draw […] closer to the 385 million inhabitants of the countries who will find themselves on the external land and sea border [of the EU]” (European Commission 2003, 3). The communication thus set three objectives for the EU’s policy towards their new neighbours, namely “to avoid new dividing lines in Europe”, “to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” and establish “enhanced relations” with Eastern neighbours “to be based on a long-term approach promoting reform, sustainable development and trade” (4). By openly distinguishing the policy vis-à-vis Eastern neighbours from its broader enlargement policy, the EU’s ‘“enhanced relations” concept creates significant scope for the integration of its neighbours (10). The communication refers to “deeper integration” with the EU as a means to promote not only security and stability but also SD, yet without defining this concept (4). A closer reading of the text reveals its focus on economic and – to a lesser extent – social and environmental aspects of SD in terms of the “Prosperity and Poverty” priority. Under this priority, the communication stresses the linkage between the EU–neighbours enhanced relations and action to tackle “the root causes of political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflict and poverty and social exclusion” (6). Particular attention is paid to economic growth and employment as the key cooperation objectives, while trade, finance investment and regional and intra-regional cooperation are seen as components of an enabling environment for reaching these objectives.

Like the “Wider Europe” communication, the 2004 ENP strategy paper puts a strong emphasis on neighbours’ integration with the EU. It argues that the added value of the ENP’s implementation is that it “brings with it the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration […], including through a stake for partner countries in the EU’s Internal Market” (European Commission 2004, 8). Despite an ambitious take on integration, the strategy paper also stresses the factors that can impede it, such as the EU’s concerns about the common values situation in Belarus and Azerbaijan and the neighbours’ performance in implementing the country-specific action plans. Though the strategy paper contains only tangential references to SD, it stresses the policy’s ability to contribute to the economic and social aspects of development in the neighbourhood. In contrast to the “Wider Europe” communication, the strategy paper brings to the forefront an array of social issues, such as poverty reduction, adherence to core labour standards and improved efficiency of social assistance, and “the promotion of good environmental governance” (18). Trade, market integration and regulatory approximation with the EU are presented as components of the enabling environment for SD, especially when it relates to its economic and social aspects.

According to the 2008 European Commission’s “Eastern Partnership” communication, the newly launched partnership shall be based “on the principles of market economy and sustainable development” (European Commission 2008, 3). Like the policy documents cited above, it does not, however, define SD. The 2008 communication is marked by a strong nexus between Eastern neighbours’ deeper integration into the EU and the economic dimension of SD. This specifically concerns the proposed “deep” bilateral engagement in terms of the AAs and the multilateral cooperation platform “Economic Integration and Convergence with EU policies” (11). Both formats also incorporated the environmental dimension of SD, including climate change mitigation and adaptation, environmental governance and the financing of environmental investments. In contrast, SD’s social dimension was far less pronounced. The EaP communication predominantly associates it with countering regional disparities and promoting regional development, rather than the support for labour and welfare system reforms (9). With this, the SD mapping under the 2008 EaP communication places stronger emphasis on the economic and environmental, rather than the social dimension of SD.

Finally, while the ENP and EaP policy documents offer various perspectives and emphases concerning SD, the scope of the EU’s assistance to its neighbours under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is exceptionally wide (European Parliament and Council 2006). SD is mentioned as one of over thirty assistance priorities, yet support for neighbours’ integration with the EU, economic development, social aspects and environmental protection are listed as separate priorities. The sheer number of priorities has given the EU scope to emphasise various dimensions of SD under regional and country-specific programming instruments. As demonstrated in Table 2 (and Online Annex II which presents the table in full), country-specific action plans and programming for both Ukraine and Azerbaijan have predominantly focused on European integration, regulatory approximation and the economic dimension of SD, while environmental protection and solving the region’s pressing environmental challenges (for example, improving water governance) came as a priority under region-wide programmes and projects (as regards the references in the documents, not necessarily the allocated funds). Though respective country programming mentions SD on various occasions, for instance, with respect to poverty reduction in Azerbaijan, neither of the documents in question offered a holistic vision of SD and the interplay between its various dimensions, with the EU and intra-region integration lying at the heart of the ENPI regional and country-specific indicative programmes.

Common values

Alongside EU integration, common values represent another ‘golden thread’ of the early ENP/EaP policy documents. We argue that the scope of the EU’s value-promotion activities under the early ENP/EaP policy documents goes far beyond the governance dimension of SD, seen from the Goal 16 perspective. However, though common values are widely claimed to be foundational for the EU’s cooperation with its neighbours, the documents in question lack a detailed vision of the linkages between the economic, environmental and social aspects of cooperation, on the one hand, and common values on the other.

The former statement can be illustrated by three examples. First, in contrast to the contemporary understanding of the SD’s governance dimension, all the documents bear a strong focus on liberty and democracy, including, inter alia, ensuring civil liberties and civil society support. The EU’s emphasis on democracy has been particularly strong in the 2004 Action Plans for Eastern Neighbours, providing for institutional reforms, accountability through and freedom of elections, and measures to ensure the freedom of the media (EU-Ukraine 2004, 5-8; EU-Azerbaijan 2004, 4). It can also be illustrated by the reference to the 2008 EaP communication, whereby the multilateral cooperation track includes the “Democracy, Good Governance and Stability” platform with a strong institution-building focus (European Commission 2008, 11). Secondly, compared to SD’s governance dimension, early ENP/EaP policy documents and programming place a stronger emphasis on the rule of law, especially when it comes to judicial reforms and the reforms of law enforcement agencies (EU-Ukraine 2004, 5-9; EU-Azerbaijan 2004, 8-9). Furthermore, though the contemporary SD concept is linked to numerous human rights and human rights treaties, it barely offers any specific avenues to reinforce human rights, such as civil society support. In contrast, the ENP/EaP policy documents emphasise opportunities for civil society to implement common values-related initiatives (for example, EU-Ukraine 2004, 5-8; EU-Azerbaijan 2004, 4, 14).

The broad, yet vague nature of formulations concerning the linkage between common values and the economic, environmental and social aspects of the ENP/EaP can be illustrated by the 2003 “Wider Europe” communication, which refers to common values as “essential prerequisites for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained social and economic development”, yet it does not elaborate on specific linkages between such values and specific SD aspects (European Commission 2003, 7). Though similarly not specifying the links between common values and SD, the 2004 ENP strategy paper makes “the level of the EU’s ambition in developing links with each partner through the ENP” conditional on the degree to which partners adhere to common values (European Commission 2004, 3). This approach is shared by the 2008 EaP communication that tends to mention common values alongside SD, rather than highlight the linkages between the two (European Commission 2008, 3). Similarly, the programming of the EU’s assistance both at regional and country levels channelled through the ENPI tends to delineate between action aimed at the promotion of fundamental values and development-oriented action.

Overall, it has been demonstrated that, though the early ENP/EaP policy documents and programming have predominantly concentrated on the Neighbours’ integration with the EU and the promotion of common values, the substance of the ENP/EaP has included various SD aspects. Importantly, these statements are true for both Ukraine and Azerbaijan, whose government at the time still considered an AA as an option for deepening EU-Azerbaijan relations.

As illustrated in Table 2 (and its full version in Online Annex III), the EU, however, only loosely connected the European integration and common values leitmotifs to the overarching SD framework. The connections between various SD dimensions are, nevertheless, stronger than their connection to the SD framework. EU integration, particularly Single Market integration, trade and regulatory approximation, are stressed as the factors that can foster the economic dimension of SD and, to a lesser extent, its environment, governance and social dimensions. With this, we argue that, despite the extensive presence of the SD components and traceable linkages between them, the documents under study do not offer a holistic picture of the SD concept.

The consolidation of SD in the ENP/EaP 2015-22

We show that, in the context mentioned above, the focus on SD became more consolidated and important for the ENP/EaP over recent years, especially following the launch of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe) in 2021 (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2021). The trend towards decreasing prominence of the European integration and common values themes became salient even earlier with the adoption of the 2015 ENP review (European Commission and High Representative 2015).

Though expressing the EU’s commitment to the advancement of shared values in partner countries, the 2015 ENP review prioritises stabilisation and portrays the economic development and governance objectives as intermediary goals on the way to stabilisation and resilience (European Commission and High Representative 2015, 3, 5, 7). Adopted immediately following the 2014/15 Ukraine crisis and during the wars in Libya and Syria, the ENP review considerably lowers the EU’s transformative expectations vis-à-vis its neighbours. It does not, however, portray SD as an alternative to European integration based on shared values. Amid the absence of new integration initiatives and the focus on values as a stabilisation tool, SD under the 2015 ENP Review remained a ‘buzzword’. As in the case of the early ENP/EaP strategy and programming documents, a closer reading of the review reveals its preoccupation with economic development (for example, ‘inclusive growth’, ‘promoting prosperity’, ‘economic modernisation and entrepreneurship’) and governance (‘democratic, accountable and good governance’, ‘rule of law and independent and effective justice systems’) aspects of SD (European Commission and High Representative 2015, 2-3, 7-8). Besides, the review is marked by a considerable emphasis on the economic-social development nexus, while the linkages between other aspects of SD are less pronounced.

In absence of references to SD, economic development and governance constitute the focal points of the EaP joint initiative “20 Deliverables for 2020: Bringing Tangible Results for Citizens” (Eastern Partnership 2017). Though less prominently, the initiative encompasses environmental and social aspects of development. “20 Deliverables for 2020” also emphasises stronger connectivity as an aspect of enabling environment for economic and social development and environmental resilience. Similar to the ENP review, the initiative features the economic-social development nexus, as well as the nexus between social development and governance. As suggested by the initiative’s pragmatic focus on tangible objectives, reachable in a short-term perspective, the EU put relatively low weight on the European integration theme in the texts of the relevant policy and reporting documents (Eastern Partnership 2017; see also Petrova and Delcour 2020).

The 2020 joint communication on the EaP beyond 2020 introduces a key discursive change, by focusing on resilience or, put differently, on societies and communities, and local ownership, rather than transplanting EU norms and structures (European Commission and High Representative 2020). While scholars argue this has been a solely discursive, rather than a substantive change (Petrova and Delcour 2020), we claim that the focus on resilience contributed to shifting the emphasis of EU-EaP cooperation from integration to a more balanced approach promoting SD. Though the wording of the communication still lacks a strong focus on SD in line with the 2030 Agenda, a textual analysis demonstrates virtually equal attention to all four dimensions of SD and nexuses between them. Like such, economic and governance aspects manifest the strongest linkage to SD as a framework. Like the ENP review and “20 Deliverables for 2020”, the joint communication refers to shared values, yet in a more pragmatic manner, whereby, for instance, the rule of law is seen as a prerequisite of resilience and economic development, rather than an abstract ideal (for example, European Commission and High Representative 2020, 4-5).

While proving the policy documents’ connection to SD requires an in-depth textual analysis with a particular focus on the nexuses between various aspects of the concept, the “Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument Regulation” and related programming both at the regional and the country level, clearly refer to the 2030 Agenda and SD as an umbrella “transformative framework” for the EU-funded action (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2021a, 3). This statement is exemplified by the NDICI regulation, whose structure resembles the five-prong configuration of the 2030 Agenda (people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership) and which uses SDGs as benchmarks for monitoring and reporting (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2021a; European Parliament and Council of the EU 2021b; European Parliament and Council of the EU 2021c). As indicated in the Table 3, despite Ukraine’s and Azerbaijan’s different statuses under the ENP/EaP (associated vs non-associated country), both the NDICI and even earlier programming for these countries placed a considerable emphasis on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Accompanied by a significantly smaller focus on European integration and common values in these highly different cases, the emphasis on the SDGs in both cases testifies to the EU’s tendency to use it as a universal framework for action that can be targeted for different contexts.

Conclusion

The analysis has demonstrated an increasingly salient role of the SD concept in the ENP/EaP over the 2015-22 period, prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Simultaneously, we traced the decreasing prominence of European integration and common or shared values, especially when it comes to the programming of EU assistance both in the case of an associated (Ukraine) and a non-associated country (Azerbaijan). The decrease in references to European integration and common values compared to those on SD and its components and nexuses between them, took place in a context characterised by the confluence of several developments, ranging from an increasing contestation of the liberal international order to conflicts and crises in the neighbourhood during the last decade and the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Quite naturally, the rising emphasis on SD is linked to the EU’s commitment to becoming a frontrunner in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the ENP’s important role in turning this commitment into a reality.

The study enabled us to distinguish several features of the SD concept in the ENP/EaP context. First, the focus on SD is not novel for the ENP’s Eastern dimension. In recent years, however, it became more consolidated and paradigmatically important for the policy and related assistance. Second, while early ENP/EaP documents predominantly featured the economic and environmental aspects of development, the most recent policy frameworks and programming are marked by the prominence of the social aspect and nexuses between various aspects of SD. The rule of law and institutional development issues also play a more pragmatic role as a part of the governance agenda, tightly interlinked with the economic, social and environmental development, rather than relatively abstract ‘common values’. The focus on SD may thus be viewed as partly compensatory for the EU’s weaker emphasis on fundamental values and partner countries’ European integration amid the crisis of international liberal order and conflicts and crises in the neighbourhood.

SD is definitely an important common denominator for the EU’s policy towards and cooperation with its Eastern neighbours, and the EU’s increasing attention to the social aspect of SD and the interlinkages between different aspects of the concept is a positive development. The focus on SD, nevertheless, also poses threats, especially when it comes to the ‘values vs geopolitical considerations’ dilemma, referred to throughout the article. The main consequences of the policy’s excessive depoliticisation and focus on neutral development issues may include reform backsliding in the neighbourhood, as well as autocratic regimes’ exploiting EU development efforts for their own ends. The policy should, therefore, not entirely depart from its original democratisation objectives. The formulation of the EU’s new approaches to the relations with its Eastern Neighbours amid and following Russia’s war against Ukraine thus requires rethinking the balance between sustainable development, integration efforts and democratisation under the ENP/EaP.

To conclude, our study opens up various avenues for future research. First, it will be of interest to look into whether the EU will apply a ‘common denominator’ to the region in the future at all. Previous research has shown that EU value promotion is different for countries that have a (distant) membership perspective (Wetzel and Orbie 2015). It can thus be expected that, after having granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, the EU will return to a stronger emphasis on ‘integration’ and ‘common values’ vis-à-vis these two countries. However, this does not prevent the EU from preserving the more coherent focus on SD in its Eastern neighbourhood at large. Future research could therefore compare the substance of SD in EaP countries with and without a membership perspective. This would also allow deeper discussion on the question of what practical consequences a more ‘instrumental’ focus on issues such as the rule of law and governance has compared with more idealistic ‘common values’.³ Finally, it would be worthwhile studying in more detail which factors explain the gap in emphasis on SD between policy and programming documents.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Research Council of Norway. An earlier version of the article was presented at the Interdisciplinary Trans-Nordic Conference on European Differentiated Integration in Kristiansand, 1-2 June 2022. We are grateful for comments from the discussant Nicholas Cendrowicz from the European Commission and from the audience. We would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Maryna Rabinovych

Maryna Rabinovych is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway. Email: [email protected]

Anne Pintsch

Anne Pintsch is an Associate Professor at the University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway. Email: [email protected]

Notes

1 For the codebook, see Online Annex IV.

2 One example of such an implicit connection is the following sentence: “Enhanced environment protection will bring benefits to citizens and businesses both in the Union and in partner countries.” (European Commission 2004, 18)

3 We thank one anonymous reviewer for bringing up this question.