Abstract
Regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific have been of limited efficacy. Asian members of organizations such as ASEAN and APEC have insisted that these institutions not infringe upon their sovereign rights. The basic norms, rules, structures and practices supporting these organizations have, to varying degrees, reflected this concern. A number of factors contribute to explaining this regional reluctance to create effective multilateral institutions. This paper argues that the single most important factor is the concern of most East Asian states with domestic political legitimacy. Drawing on the work of Muthiah Alagappa and Mohammed Ayoob, the paper demonstrates that a significant majority of the states of East Asia see themselves as actively engaged in the process of creating coherent nations out of the disparate ethnic, religious and political groups within the state. As a result, these states are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty to any outside actors. Indeed, the regional attitude towards multilateral institutions is that they should assist in the state-building process by enhancing the sovereignty of their members. As an exceptional case, Japan has encouraged regional institutionalism, but it has also been sensitive to the weaknesses of its neighbours, and has found non-institutional ways to promote its regional interests. The incentives to create effective regional structures increased after the Asian economic crisis, but Asian attempts to reform existing institutions or create new ones have been undermined by the issues connected to sovereignty. East Asian states recognize that they can best manage globalization and protect their sovereignty by creating and cooperating within effective regional institutions. However, their ability to create such structures is compromised by their collective uncertainty about their domestic political legitimacy. In the emerging international environment, being a legitimate sovereign state may be a necessary prerequisite to participating in successful regional organizations.
Notes
1 ASEAN encompasses all the states of its self-defined ‘Southeast Asia’. These are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
2 This understanding of the relationship between ‘state capacity’ and strong vs weak states draws on Buzan's distinction between strong states and strong powers. Buzan emphasizes political legitimacy as a defining quality of strong states; strong powers may possess the capacity to oppress and control society without enjoying popular legitimacy. Migdal equates strong states with the state's ability to control society, though he also argues that a state's strength ultimately lies in its ability to shape the norms and rules of society (CitationMigdal 1998: 26).
3 For a critical evaluation of subaltern realism, see Barnett (2002: 49–62).
4 Interestingly, Peter Drucker notes that Japanese do not see their society as being as strong as outsiders do. The Japanese remember their experience with Commodore Perry's incursion in 1853. That experience led to the Meiji Restoration. They also remember being conquered after the Second World War. To them, Japanese society is fragile, and requires the protection and support of the state (CitationDrucker 1998).
5 However, weak capacity has no necessary connection to legitimacy. Migdal notes the durability of states with very little capacity (CitationMigdal 1998). Singapore stands out as a state with considerable capacity but uncertain legitimacy.