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Abstract
Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn.
Notes
1 Even though a large body of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion (e.g., Frazer Citation2006; Bamford Citation2007; Von Tevenar Citation2007; Panaïoti Citation2013; Harris Citation2017), his theory of empathy has by and large received a scant attention.
2 In the secondary literature, some emphasized the ‘methodological’ aspect of Nietzsche’s naturalism (Leiter Citation2002), and others its ‘artful’ aspect (Acampora Citation2013). Here I do not take any substantial position on the subject. For the purposes of this paper, I (minimally) assume that Nietzsche appeals to naturalism primarily as a critical tool by which to counter metaphysical assumptions.
3 Thanks to Matthew Meyer who pressed me on this point concerning the methodology and aim during the 2021 Central APA where I presented a shorter version of the material as a symposium paper.
4 Considerable empirical evidence supports Nietzsche’s claim. As the primatologist Frans de Waal notes, ‘Alliances (either to defend oneself against aggression or to collectively defeat or overthrow rivals) are among the best documented forms of cooperation in primatology, involving many studies and thousands of observations’ (Citation2015, 66).
5 In Citation1835, the physiologist Johannes Müller coined the term ‘Mitempfindung’ to describe the phenomenon in which a stimulus applied in one area of the body is felt as an itch in a different area of the body—a term still used both in English and non-English published medical literature. Müller defines this phenomenon as follows: ‘Sometimes one sensation excites another, or the sensations spread morbidly further than the affected parts. These phenomena, which I call Mitempfindungen, are not rare in healthy life’ (Handbuch der Physiologie, Vol. 1, 680; my translation). Nietzsche was familiar with this seminal work (possibly through Friedrich Albert Lange). Yet, it is not certain whether he appropriated the term from Müller. According to the historian Ute Frevert (Citation2011, 176–177), the term was reintroduced in the 1847 edition of the German Brockhaus as the ‘spontaneous imitation of somebody else’s sentiment’, and this basic definition has remained the same over the years.
6 See Stellar et al. Citation2017 for an illuminating account of this concept.
7 The following discussion on how we come to grasp the reason for another’s emotional response incorporates the written critical comments and suggestions of Paul Katsafanas.
8 In this paper, I give a very broad characterization of empathy and empathic concern. For Nietzsche, our natural empathic dispositions can develop and be expressed either in unhealthy ways, on the basis of some shared, false beliefs and conceptions about ourselves (one may call this ‘herd-perspective’), or in healthier ways. Nietzsche, I think, operates implicitly with the distinction between ‘herd-empathy’ (or what he calls Mitleid or compassion) and healthier expressions of empathy that ultimately provide the possibility of a heightened awareness of one’s self in relation to others through gaining greater control over one’s emotional responses. And this healthier kind of empathy, for Nietzsche, stands in the service of human freedom; such empathy leads to self-understanding and understanding of others, which in turn helps us connect with a higher human culture. I call such empathy ‘anticipatory empathy’ and have argued for its significance for Nietzsche in a different paper (see my ‘Nietzsche’s Compassion’, forthcoming in Nietzsche-Studien).
9 Nietzsche’s specific emphasis on women’s tendency to mimic others or catch others’ emotional facial expressions does not sound flattering to me. One may, nevertheless, suggest that Nietzsche is implicitly admonishing women to strategically exploit their prowess in mimicry to get ahead in a prevailingly sexist culture. For the purposes of this paper, I remain silent on how best to understand Nietzsche’s sexist or seemingly sexist remarks about women.
10 For the parallels between Nietzsche’s theory and modern theories of empathy, see Preston (Citation2007, 428–33). According to Preston (Citation2007, 429), Lipps (1903) was apparently the first to propose the idea that shared representations provide the cognitive basis for perceiving and generating action. Yet, I maintain, the elements of a perception–action model are already present in Nietzsche’s theory of Mitempfindung. I believe that I am the first to recognize the connection between Nietzsche’s theory and the contemporary perception–action model.
11 Contemporary psychological studies support the hypothesis that the greater an individual’s imagination, the more empathy the individual will show. See, for instance, Rabinowitz and Heinhorn (Citation1985). In a similar vein to Nietzsche, Eva-Maria Engelen (Citation2011) suggests that empathy ‘involves adopting the perspective of the other’s emotional state’, which ‘means that empathetic activity is always already an activity of the imagination’.
12 It has been suggested that certain forms of consolation behavior in animals are influenced by an empathic understanding of other individuals’ feelings (see De Waal Citation2015).
13 Here Nietzsche is possibly influenced by Schopenhauer, who attributes a lower-level associative reasoning to animals on the basis that ‘the knowledge of cause and effect … is a priori inherent in animals’ (WWR I 23). He says, ‘all animals, even the most imperfect, have understanding, for they all know objects, and this knowledge as motive determines their movements’ (WWR I 21). Yet he acknowledges that ‘the degree of acuteness of [such] understanding varies a great deal … between the different species of animals’ (WWR I 23). As an example, he mentions the case of an ‘elephant which, after crossing many bridges on his journey through Europe, once refused to go on one, over which he saw the rest of the party of men and horses crossing as usual, because it seemed to him too lightly built for his weight’ (WWR I 23). Another ‘special proof’ of the manifestation of understanding in animals, Schopenhauer observes, is that ‘even a quite young dog does not venture to jump from the table, however much he wants to, because he foresees the effect of the weight of his body, without, however, knowing this particular case from experience’ (WWR I 23). He closes his discussion with a crucial caveat, ‘in judging the understanding of animals, we must guard against ascribing to it a manifestation of instinct’ (WWR I 23).
14 A large body of empirical research supports Nietzsche’s contention about the pro-social effects of affective mimicry and physiological synchronization. In an experimental work (Maurer and Tindall Citation1983) focusing on the effects of mimicry on perceived empathy in counselor–patient relationship, the results indicated that when counselors mimicked the non-verbal behavior of their clients, they were perceived as expressing more empathy and concern compared to when the counselors did not mimic their clients (qtd. in Van Baaren et al. Citation2009, 33). In line with this work, other psychologists (Bavelas et al. Citation1987, 325) proposed a model of elementary mimicry as a non-verbal communicative act, which is analogous to verbal expression of ideas, thoughts, and feelings through speech and conversation. Put simply, any behavior that occurs in a social context is potentially communicative. There is always another individual in the situation when motor/affective mimicry occurs. This suggests that mimicry is not to be understood simply as non-verbal behavior, or only expressive of one’s own subjective state in response to the perceived emotional experience of the other person; it is expressive to the other person as well. Specifically, it is a way of showing the one who is mimicked, ‘I feel as you do’, and thereby conveying fellow feeling to the other person. In a more recent experiment (Guéguen et al. Citation2011), in which a student-assistant mimicked or failed to mimic a participant during a discussion session about paintings, and after the event solicited the participant for a written feedback about an essay, it was found that mimicry increased compliance to the assistant’s request. More specifically, mimicry served in fostering a closer relationship and was associated with greater liking of the assistant. According to the researchers, this promises an explanation of the effect of mimicry on pro-social behavior, i.e., the link between mimicry and other-oriented concern. Put simply, helping another person is a good strategy in fostering other-oriented prosocial behavior, and as the previous studies (Burger et al. Citation2004) indicate, we are more likely to help people we like, or people with whom we perceive ourselves to share a commonality of experiences (qtd. in Guéguen et al. Citation2011, 3). The research then suggests that ‘if mimicry leads to more positively perceiving someone and if mimicry is interpreted as the desire of the mimicker to create affiliation and rapport, then this dual effect could explain why we help more favorably our mimicker’ (Guéguen et al. Citation2011, 3).
15 Here Nietzsche seems to be anticipating a version of a contemporary hypothesis about the human ability to imitate various action patterns which is simply known as ‘direct mapping’. Put simply, direct mapping is based on the proposal that the observation of an action activates a corresponding motor behavior in the observer. Observed actions are automatically mapped from the visible movements of another to the perceptual and motor representations of the observer during imitation. Some psychologists such as Perra and Gattis have asserted that this hypothesis ‘appears consistent with behavioral evidence that infants can selectively match the gestures of an adult model very early in life’ (Citation2008, 134).
16 Brobjer cites Féré as one of the chief influences on Nietzsche’s physiologically laden discourses in the late 1880s (‘Nietzsche’s Reading and Knowledge of Natural Science: An Overview’, 45). To my knowledge, no commentator has ever analyzed the parallels between Nietzsche’s and Féré’s views on empathy and sympathy.
17 For Féré’s own description of this phenomenon, see Sensation et mouvement, 15–16.
18 It should be noted, however, that pleasure plays a much smaller role starting in The Gay Science.
19 I am especially grateful to Scott Jenkins for his extensive comments on various drafts of this paper. I extend my gratitude to Matthew Meyer and Paul Katsafanas for their astute remarks and suggestions for improving this paper. I also thank all my reviewers for carefully reading my paper and for their suggestions.