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Abstract
By situating Wittgenstein's handwritten manuscripts in the Socratic tradition of philosophy, I argue that contrary to Wittgenstein's misjudgement about the role and impact of the Socratic conception of philosophy, his own way of doing philosophy has much in common with that of philosophers in the Socratic tradition in terms of orientation and rhetorical style. Focusing on Movements of Thought, the latest edition of Wittgenstein's Koder Diaries, I argue that the convergence of philosophical and personal remarks in Wittgenstein's handwritten manuscripts is the result of writing in the form of hypomnemata or private notes or exhortations to the self with the intention of capturing the movements of thought and working on oneself.
Reading the Socratic dialogues, one has the feeling: what a frightful waste of time! What's the point of these arguments that prove nothing & clarify nothing. (Wittgenstein Citation1980: 14; Citation1998: 21)
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude to anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. I presented a preliminary version of this paper at the 44th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria.
Notes
1 See, for example, Hadot (Citation1995: 279; Citation2020: 33); Nehamas (Citation1998: 4); Sharpe & Ure (Citation2021: 10, 324).
2 The terms ‘philosophy as spiritual exercises’, the ‘Socratic tradition of philosophy’ or the ‘Socratic conception of philosophy’ could all be used interchangeably since they refer to the ideal of philosophy as exercising ‘care of the soul’ (Laches, 186e3). In what follows, the term ‘Socratic philosophers’ is used because Socrates’ emphasis on a total transformation of our inner lives is a defining feature of the common practices and activities among philosophers who would consider philosophy an ongoing exercise, ‘a way of life’ (Hadot Citation1995) or an ‘art of living’ (Nehamas Citation1998).
3 Rudolph Koder was a close friend of Wittgenstein. After Wittgenstein’s death, his sister gave one of his notebooks to Koder. It remained unknown until 1977. Ilse Somavilla published it in German in 1997 as Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher, 1930–1932/1936–1937.
4 Cf. Conant (Citation2001: 23–28; Citation2019: 244); Sunday (Citation2015). Sunday focuses on the overall affinities between Wittgenstein’s and Socrates’ conceptions of philosophy and their implications for the way we understand each other and the world (Sunday Citation2015: 213).
5 Wittgenstein ([1953] 2009: §11). See also §109, §133, §309.
6 Wittgenstein (Citation2023: 41); see also page 62. Hereafter all references to Movements of Thought will be provided parenthetically in the text.
7 All references to Plato's works are from Plato's Complete Works (Citation1997).
8 As he writes in his diaries, ‘It occurred to me today as I was thinking about my work in philosophy & said to myself: “I destroy, I destroy, I destroy—"’ (1998: 19). The translation in the first edition is slightly different. See 1980: 21.
9 See also Hadot (Citation2011: 32–33, 58–60).
10 Compare with the following remarks in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: ‘The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions’ ([1921] 2001: §6.53).
11 Quoted from Monk (Citation1990: 151).
12 Cf. Manzi (Citation2024: 151).
13 Consider, for example, Emerson’s Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks (16 volumes), Thoreau’s journals (14 volumes) and Wittgenstein’s Nachlass (20,000 pages).
14 For more on Emerson and the question of style, see Hosseini (2019).
15 See, for example, footnote 90, page 46.
16 Wittgenstein uses the same expression five times in the space of one month in his diaries, from 19/2/37 to 22/03/37. All italics in Wittgenstein’s quotes are in the original text.
17 Compare with this passage in Arthur Schopenhauer’s book, The World as Will and Representation:
[A] happy life in time, given by chance or won from it by shrewdness, amid the sufferings of innumerable others, is only a beggar's dream, in which he is a king, but from which he must awake, in order to realize that only a fleeting illusion had separated him from the suffering of his life. (Schopenhauer [Citation1818] Citation1969: 353)
18 Cf. Conant Citation2019: 254, n17. As Conant suggests, it is difficult to translate what Wittgenstein means by the German word ‘Anständigkeit’, often translated as ‘decency’. One might suggest it refers to a wholesome quality of living or standing right in the world based on an innate sense of justice and rightness.
19 For more on the appeal of simple life and its impact on creating a sense of belonging to community, see Bouwsma (Citation1986: 39).
20 See, for example, pages 34, 75, 80.
21 In Walden, Henry Thoreau provides a similar account of ‘reading’ as an exegetical exploration of the world in search of old truths. ‘There are the stars, and they who can may read them’ (Thoreau [1854]Citation2007:84).
22 See, for example, Wittgenstein’s entries on pages 72, 74.
23 Cf. Wittgenstein’s remarks about Kierkegaard in his Saturday discussions and his own exegetical approach to understand his way of seeing: ‘Kierkegaard said something to the effect that the best proof he knew for the existence of God was that his father told him so’ (Wittgenstein Citation2003: 404). Kierkegaard’s point, Wittgenstein notes, was not to stress how competent or wise his father was. Rather, ‘[i]t would seem that he was pointing to the general and traditional belief of humanity, to the fact that most people believe. If our fathers had not told us then we would not know, but when told the idea is accepted readily. This may be compared to being taught how to speak and act’ (Citation2003: 404).
24 We could also ask, if philosophical problems are like an ‘illness’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §255), then, should we conclude that perhaps we would be better off if we never experienced them in the first place? It seems to me that when we ask such questions, as Emerson puts it, it is already ‘too late to be helped’ (Emerson Citation1983: 487). See also Klagge (Citation2021: 138–140).