The proliferation security initiative

Abstract

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by US President Bush in May 2003, is intended to prevent traffic in elements of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Most WMD traffic moves by sea, and the focus of the PSI is on maritime interdictions and seizures. Although the PSI has had some significant successes, it has been criticised for lacking sufficient public accountability, stretching international law to the limits, undermining the UN system, potentially limited effectiveness and being politically divisive. Moreover, Asian countries that are key to PSI's successful implementation – notably China, India, Indonesia and South Korea – have deferred active involvement despite US pressure. Options for increasing PSI participation and enhancing its effectiveness include changes to existing international law; expanding existing conventions or developing a new one; obtaining an unambiguous empowering UN Security Council Resolution; obtaining NATO endorsement; arguing pre-emptive self-defence; and building a coalition of countries willing to perform such interdictions on each other's ships and aircraft on or over their territorial seas. However, each of these options would face obstacles and limitations that must be overcome for the PSI to be fully effective.

Notes

¹ The White House, ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’, December 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf

² ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative’, http://USinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2005/May/27-62150.html.

³ Dan Smith, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Challenge Too Narrow’, Foreign Policy In Focus Policy Report, October 2003, http://www.fpif.org/papers/prolif2003.html

⁴ Wade Boese, ‘The New Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton’, Arms Control Association, 4 November 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/PSI.asp; ‘Chairman's State-ment: Proliferation Security Initiative’, PSI Brisbane Meeting, 9–10 July 2003, at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc04.htm♯01; ‘Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles’, Paris, 4 September 2003, http://www.proliferationsecurity.info/principles.php

⁵ Michael Evans and Richard Beeston, ‘US Extends Axis of Evil to Syria, Libya, and Cuba’, The Times, 10 October 2003.

⁶ Maura Reynolds, ‘Libya Decides to Give Up its Banned Arsenal’, Honolulu Advertiser, 20 December 2003, p 1.

⁷ Shane Green, ‘Pyongyang to Face New Restrictions on Trade’, The Age, Melbourne, 28 October 2003.

⁸ Wade Boese, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton’. Some analysts claim Robert Joseph, John Bolton's successor at the State Department, was the central figure in creating and building the PSI. Tom Barry, ‘Meet John Bolton's Replacement’, CounterPunch, 15 June 2005.

⁹ Brisbane Meeting, 9–10 July 2003, ‘Chairman's Statement’, http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/psi/index.html

¹⁰ ‘U.S. State Department Outlines Proliferation Initiative’, 29 December 2004, http://www.allamericanpatriots.com/

¹¹ Chang Z., ‘No Legal Grounds for Stopping Ships’, The Korea Herald, 14 July 2003.

¹² John R. Bolton, ‘Legitimacy in Inter-national Affairs: the American Perspective in Theory and Operation’, Remarks to the Federalist Society, Washington DC, 13 November 2003, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/26143.htm

¹³ ‘Countries Reach Agreement on Interdicting Suspect Cargo’, http://www.unwire.org/, 5 September 2003.

¹⁴ ‘North Korea Ships Face More Scrutiny’, BBC News World Edition (online), 11 June 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2980418.stm.

¹⁵ Indeed it is unclear what precisely is and is not permitted under existing international law. Wade Boese, ‘Countries Draft Guidelines for Intercepting Proliferation’, Arms Control Today, September 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_09/Proliferationinitiative.asp.

¹⁶ Remarks by National Security Adviser Dr Condoleezza Rice to the National Legal Center for the Public Interest, The Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 31 October 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031031-5.html.

¹⁷ Condoleezza Rice, ‘PSI: Countering Dangerous Proliferation Worldwide’, The Sunday Times, 12 June 2005.

¹⁸ ‘US Interdiction Poses Legal Problems’, Oxford Analytica, 30 June 2003.

¹⁹ Virginia Marsh, ‘US-led Group Takes to High Seas in First Drill Against WMD Trade’, Financial Times, 13–14 September 2003, p. 5.

²⁰ David Ensor, ‘U.S. to Seize WMD on High Seas’, CNN, 2 December 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/02/irankorea.us/

²¹ ‘Chairman's Conclusions’, Proliferation Security Initiative: London, 9–10 October, M² Presswire, 13 October 2003.

²² David Anthony Denny, ‘PSI Seeks to Reduce WMD, Increase Costs of Trafficking’, The Washington File, 19 December 2003, http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/2003/1219/epf502.htm.

²³ Doug Sample, ‘DOD to Use ‘Forward-Deployed Active-Layered Defense’ to Protect Country’, Air Force Link, December 2004, http://www.af.mil/.

²⁴ Mark J. Valencia, ‘Australia Makes Waves with New Course’, The Straits Times, 4 March 2005; Michael Wood, ‘Australian Maritime Identification System’, The Straits Times, 16 March 2005; Mark J. Valencia, ‘Thrust of Article Valid’, The Straits Times, 22 March 2005.

²⁵ ‘U.S. Reveals New Enforcement Capability for Proliferation Security Initiative’, JINSA Online, 10 February 2005; Michael Wood, ‘Australian Maritime Identification System’; Mark J. Valencia, ‘Thrust of Article Valid’.

²⁶ Michelle Wiese Bockmann, ‘Maritime Zone Plans Scrapped’, The Australian, 11 July 2005, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,15887094%255E2702,00.html

²⁷ ‘Japan Moves Forward to Hinder WMD Smuggling’, The Asahi Shimbun, 18 July, 2003; ‘Korea, Trade Top PM's Agenda’, The Sunday Mail, 16 July 2003.

²⁸ Robin Wright and Henry Chu, ‘Bush Defends Israeli Strike’, Los Angeles Times, 7 October 2003.

²⁹ ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles (adopted in Paris, September 4, 2003)’, http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726.htm♯statement

³⁰ The White House, Office of the Press Secreatary, Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, 4 September 2003, http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm

³¹ Specifically, ‘ the Principles call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to:

1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. ‘States or non-state actors of proliferation concern’ generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.

2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.

3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.

4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include: (a) not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from state or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so; (b) at their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified; (c) to seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states; (d) to take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry; (e) at their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights; (f) if their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.’ Ibid.

³² C. Raja Mohan, ‘Dismantling Core Group, US Eases India's Path to Proliferation Security’, The Indian Express, 18 August 2005, http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=76505

³³ Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Fact Sheet, Bureau of Nonproliferation, US Department of State, 26 May 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/46839.htm

³⁴ Ye Ru'an and Zhao Qinghai, ‘The PSI: Chinese Thinking and Concern’, The Monitor, vol. 10, no. 1, spring 2004, p. 23.

³⁵ Stephen G. Rademaker., Assistant US Secretary of State for Arms Control, ‘Testimony before the House Internal Relations Committee’, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation', Washington DC, 9 June 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/47715.htm

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Edward Harris, ‘Liberia OKs U.S. Ship Searches’, Associated Press, 14 February 2004.

³⁹ Wade Boese; ‘Countries Draft Guidelines for Intercepting Proliferation’; Wade Boese, ‘Key US Interdiction Initiative Claim Misrepresented’, Arms Control Today, July/August 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_07-08/Interdiction_Misrepresented.asp.

⁴⁰ Caitlin Harrington, ‘Pentagon Reveals Navy Will Board Suspected Terror Ships’, CQ Homeland Security-Border Security, 26 May 2004, www.cq.com.

⁴¹ Jacquelyn S. Porth, ‘Experts Meet in Omaha to Consider Ways to Disrupt WMD Transfer’, Washington File, 21 March 2005.

⁴² Ralph A. Cossa, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’, Korea Times, 23 October 2003.

⁴³ ‘Multilateral Maritime Interdiction Exercise Begins’, http://www.news.navy.mil/index.asp, 16 October 2003.

⁴⁴ ‘Japan to Send Observers to International Maritime Inspection Drill’, Financial Times, 21 November 2003.

⁴⁵ John R. Bolton, ‘Remarks at Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting’, Paris, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801pF.htm, 4 September 2003 http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm

⁴⁶ There are three types of PSI meetings:

1. Plenary meetings of all PSI core participants (Bolton maintains there is no ‘membership’ as such because there is no organisation to belong to);

2. Exercises attended by only some of the core participants and sometimes by non-declared participants; and

3. Meetings of Operational Group of Expersts (OEG).

⁴⁷ ‘London Talks Study Beefing Up Fight Against Traffic in WMD’, Agence France Presse, 10 October 2003.

⁴⁸ Greece, New Zealand and Thailand joined the PSI in 2005. Jacquelyn S. Porth, ‘Experts Meet in Omaha to Consider Ways to Disrupt WMD Transfer’. In April 2004, the Czech Republic formally joined the PSI. Yann-hui Song, ‘An Overview of Regional Responses in the Asia-Pacific to the PSI in Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative’, Issues and Insights, vol. 4, no. 5, Pacific Forum CSIS, July 2004, pp. 7–31. In a 16 September 2005 speech to a UNSC summit, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal declared Philippine support for the PSI. Michaela P. del Callar, ‘Gloria, with Big Mike Around, Courts US Support in UN Meet’, The Daily Tribune On the Web! (Manila), http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20050916.head04.html

⁴⁹ ‘Four New Nations to Join US-led Non-proliferation Scheme’, 2 December 2003, Agence Presse-France, cited on http://www.spacewar.com/2003/031202225431.7m405hmo.html.

⁵⁰ ‘Gaining Momentum: Plan to Seize Weapons in Transit’, Straits Times Interactive, 19 December 2003; Barry Schweid, ‘Officials Work to Block Weapons Transfers’, The Associated Press, 17 December 2003.

⁵¹ ‘U.S. to Practice Weapons Interdiction Near North Korea Missile Seizure Site’, Associated Press, 19 December 2003.

⁵² ‘Anti-WMD Interdictions Reach Three’, http://www.news.com.au/, 16 January 2004.

⁵³ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, Fact Sheet’.

⁵⁴ ‘US to Host International WMD Drill’, http://www.abc.net.au/news/, 11 July 2004.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ ‘Proliferation Security Initiative Marks Second Anniversary’, http://i-newswire.com/, 1 June 2005; ‘U.S. Intercepts Two Deliveries of Nuclear Material for North Korea’, The Korea Herald, 2 June 2005.

⁵⁷ Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker, 'Testimony Before the House International Relations Subcommittee on International, Terrorism and Nonproliferation, 9 June 2005.

⁵⁸ ‘Bulgaria Joins Proliferation Security Initiative’, Sofia News Agency, 2 June 2005.

⁵⁹ Eric Watkins, ‘Japan Urges Malacca Straits Shipping Safety,’ Oil and Gas Journal, 21 January 2005.

⁶⁰ Jacquelyn S. Porth, ‘Experts Meet in Omaha to consider ways to Disrupt WMD Transfer’.

⁶¹ ‘19 Navies Test Command System in Singapore’, The Malaysian National News Agency, http://bernama.com/, 18 May 2005.

⁶² Dominique Loh, ‘Proliferation Security Exercise Ends with Inspection of Suspected Vessel’, Channel News Asia, 18 August 2005, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/163885/1/.html; Mia Shanley, ‘Singapore, Allies Stage Security Drill in South China Sea’, 17 August 2005, http://in.news.yahoo.com/050817/137/5zr7i.html

⁶³ Melinda Larson and Kathryn Whittenberger, ‘U.S., Southeast Asia Navies Work Toward Common Goal During SEACAT’, www.news.navy.mil, 1 June 2005.

⁶⁴ Juliana Gittler, ‘U.S. Begins High-Seas Anti-Terrorism Games’, Stars and Stripes, 6 June 2005.

⁶⁵ Alexander Pojedinec, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative: Two Years and Counting’, Center for Defense Information Report, 1 August 2005, http://www.poni-csis.org/file.asp?F=PSIReport%2Epdf&N=PSIReport%2Epdf&C=articles. The estimate of 64.5 incidents a year includes only materials related to nuclear weapons programmes and not chemical or biological weapons and only known incidents. Thus, the average may be much higher, making the eleven successful interdictions minuscule by comparison.

⁶⁶ Toby Warrick, ‘On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory’, Washington Post, 14 August 2003, p A1.

⁶⁷ ‘US Interdiction Poses Legal Problems’, Oxford Analytica.

⁶⁸ Jason Chudy, ‘NATO Group Exercise Included USS Taylor’, Stars and Stripes, 29 May 2005.

⁶⁹ Martin Bright et al., ‘Hunt for 20 Terror Ships’, Observer (London), 23 December 2001. p 1.

⁷⁰ ‘U.S. Warning: Navy Will Attack Any ‘Hostile Ship’ ’, Lloyd's List, 21 March 2003.

⁷¹ ‘Indian-US Joint Naval Exercises Begin’, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6 October 2003.

⁷² Brian Reyes, ‘Show of Force: NATO Troops Monitor Maritime Traffic in the Mediterranean to Prevent Terrorists Using Ships’, Lloyd's List, 3 June, 2003; Brian Reyes, ‘Security – NATO Forces Board Two Ships in Mediterranean’, Lloyd's List, 7 May 2003.

⁷³ ‘Canadian Ship to Join Campaign Against Terrorism in Arabian Gulf’, Canada News Wire Group, 9 March 2005.

⁷⁴ White House Press Office, ‘Text of Letter from President Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate’, Press Release, 20 May 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050520-8.html

⁷⁵ ‘Al Qaeda's “Navy” – How Much of a Threat’, Center for Defense Information, 20 August 2003, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1644

⁷⁶ David Sanger and Thom Shanker, ‘Reluctant U.S. Gives Assent for Missiles to Go to Yemen’, New York Times, 12 December 2002, pp. A1 and A20; William McMichael, ‘Coalition Crews Intercept Ship with Hidden Warheads’, Navy Times, 23 December 2002, pp 24–25.

⁷⁷ Press Briefing by Ari Fleisher, 11 December 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021211-5.html.

⁷⁸ J. Ashley Roach, ‘Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security at Sea’ in Mark J. Valencia and Kazumine Akimoto (eds), ‘Military and Intelligence Activities in Exclusive Economic Zones: Consensus and Disagreement’, Marine Policy, Special Issue, vol. 28, no. 1, January 2004, pp. 41–66; Ruth Wedgewood, ‘A Pirate is a Pirate’, Wall Street Journal, 16 December 2002, p A12; also see Frederic L. Kirgis, ‘Boarding of North Korean Vessel on the High Seas’, ASIL Insights, 12 December 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh94.htm.

⁷⁹ Safa Haeri, ‘WMD Transport Targeted on High Seas’, Asia Times, 12 September 2003.

⁸⁰ CNNcom./WORLD,24 June 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/06/23/greece.ship/

⁸¹ Helena Smith,' Nato “Terror” Tip Off on Explosives Ship Sailing to Sudan', Guardian, 24 June 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,12469,983876,00.html

⁸² Yoo Yong-won, ‘Spain Seized Arms Shipment Called Legal’, Digital Chosen, 2 July 2003; Yoo Yong-won, ‘Spain Suspects Gun Find Destined for Ivory Coast’, Reuters, 2 July 2003.

⁸³ ‘S. Seeks Further Taiwan's Cooperation for Regional Security’, Kyodo News Service, 26 August 2003.

⁸⁴ Barry Schwied, ‘U.S. Blocked Centrifuge Parts for Libya’, Associated Press, 31 December 2003; Robin Wright, ‘U.S. Details Seizure of Libya-bound Cargo’, The Washington Post, 1 January 2004; David E. Sanger, ‘Month of Talks Fails to Bolster Nuclear Treaty’, The New York Times, 28 May 2005; Michael Roston, ‘Polishing Up the Story on the PSI’, In The National Interest, 9 June 2004.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mark J. Valencia

Mark J. Valencia is a maritime policy analyst with a special interest in Asia.