Introduction

Abstract

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability.

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Notes

¹ ‘Libyan WMD: Tripoli's statement in full’, BBC News Online, 20 December 2003: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3336139. stm. Libya possessed more than 3,300 aerial bombs designed for dispersing chemical warfare agent. These bombs were ‘irreversibly destroyed’ in late February and early March 2004 in a process verified by the OPCW. On 5 March 2004, Libya provided the OPCW with a declaration stating that 23 tonnes of mustard gas had been produced in a chemical weapons facility at Rabta. The Libyans also declared the existence of two chemical-related storage facilities and the presence of 2.9m pounds of precursor materials that could potentially have been used in the manufacture of Sarin nerve agent. Libya has until April 2007 to destroy its 23 tonnes of mustard gas and the US government is currently assessing whether to provide material and financial assistance in the destruction process: ‘Libya Completes the First Phase of Chemical Weapons Destruction’, Press Release, OPCW, The Hague, 4 March 2004: http://www.opcw.org/html/global/press_releases/2k4/PR7_2004.html; ‘Libya Timeline: Key events in the lead up to and the aftermath of the Iraq war’, Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/roundtables/RT4/Libya-Timeline.htm; ‘US may help destroy Libya weapons’, BBC News Online, 31 March 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4863872.stm. Despite widespread suspicion prior to December 2003 that Libya had an active biological weapons programme, British and American inspectors only found ‘a limited research and development’ project in the biological area; ‘Libya Profile: Biological Overview’, Nuclear Threat Initiative Database: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/3941.html. In the missile field, Libya agreed to limit its existing capability to systems with a range of 300km or less and a payload capability of no more 500kg in line with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal suppliers group which coordinates controls on the export of ballistic and cruise missiles and associated technology. This entailed the handing over for removal to the United States of five 800km range Scud-C missiles, produced with North Korean assistance, and Libya's agreement to eliminate its much larger inventory of Soviet-supplied Scud-B systems estimated at around 80 launchers and up to 240 missiles. ‘Libya Timeline’, Iraq Watch; Carol Giacomo, ‘Libya may be allowed to keep some Scud missiles’, Reuters, 9 March 2004.

² The approach was reportedly made by Major Abdel Salam Jalloud, the then deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of Libya. Jalloud also reportedly approached Egypt's President Nasser for help in acquiring a weapon from China in 1970 and Libya may have wanted a tactical nuclear capability. See John Wright, Libya: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p.204; John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm: the Complete Account of Qaddafi's Revolution (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), pp.229–39; Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp.14–15, 30–31, 50–51; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), pp.76–7; Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (London: Brassey's UK, 1991), pp.151–3.

³ Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1988), p.67.

⁴ Clyde R. Mark, Congressional Research Service, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Libya’ (Washington DC:, The Library of Congress, May 2002), p.4.

⁵ Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp.63–5.

⁶ In 1976 the regime reportedly placed US$1m in gold into a Swiss bank account. The deposit was designed to be a payment for anyone who could supply Tripoli with a nuclear weapon. Another story involved Libya's reported attempt to secure fissionable material from a former CIA officer who reportedly told the Gadhafi regime that he had access to nuclear weapons on the black market and offered to sell them, his offer turned out to be a scam. See Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, pp.64–71; Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), pp.175–85.