Chapter two: Proliferation pathways

Abstract

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability.

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Notes

¹ Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, p.231.

² Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, p.70.

³ See ‘Libya: A Country Study’, The Library of Congress Country Studies; Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, p.68; ‘Annex 8: Nuclear Infrastructures of Argentina and Brazil’, Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Policies, Issue 2, 2001: http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/digest_2_2001.html; Richard Kessler, ‘Peron Widow's Libyan Visit Revives Talk of Nuclear Link’, Nucleonics Week, 8 September 1988, pp.6–7.

⁴ ‘ANSTO Briefing: Response to Issues Raised’, (Lucas Heights, NSW: Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation [ANSTO], 8 June 2000).

⁵ Libya continued its investigations into exploitable uranium reserves during the 1980s. The IAEA approved two technical cooperation projects with Libya in 1979 and 1980 on prospecting for nuclear raw material deposits, which were completed in September 1982 and October 1987, respectively. Indeed, up to four potential uranium deposits were under active exploration during the mid-1980s although it does not appear that any of them proved to be exploitable. Belgatom, Belgonucleaire, Union Mirac and Brazil's Mineral Resources Prospecting Company reportedly provided technical assistance for the exploration of uranium deposits in Libya during the early to mid-1980s. Project Number LIB/3/003, Nuclear Raw Materials, approved for the first time in 1979, was completed on 28 November 1983. The project involved the National Scientific Research Council; Department of Exploration. See Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Authority: http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp; Project Number LIB/3/004, Nuclear Raw Materials, first approved 1980, completed 26 October 1987. The project involved the National Scientific Research Council, Department of Prospecting and Mining. See Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Authority, http://wwwtc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp; Tripoli Television, 0810 GMT 6 May 1985, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 1985, Part 4: The Middle East, Africa and Latin America, Weekly Economic Report, ME/W1339/A1/6; Spector, Going Nuclear: the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1986–87 (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), p.157; Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp.175–85; OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East (Washington DC: US Congress, September 1984), OTA-1 SC-173, p.380: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html; Sergio Dani, ‘Mining Activities with Libya’, Gazeta Mercantil (São Paulo), 6 November 1984, p.14, in FBIS Worldwide Report, 14 January 1985, p.41, via NTI Nuclear Database: http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear/1985/n8500212.htm.

⁶ Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, pp.65–7.

⁷ Ann MacLachlan and Mike Knapik, ‘Belgium and Libya will Sign an Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation’, Nucleonics Week, vol.25, no.21, 24 May 1984, p.5. According to Cooley, the White House intervened in addition to the State Department. Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, p.231.

⁸ Ibid., p.230.

⁹ See Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, p.68; Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb, pp.98–9. On the failed Libyan–French deal, see also Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, pp.63–5; Roger F. Pajak, ‘Nuclear status and policies of the Middle East countries’, International Affairs, vol.59, no.4, Autumn 1983, pp.600–601.

¹⁰ ‘Nuclear Chronology, 1968–1979, Libya’, NTI Nuclear Database, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/4132.html.

¹¹ Ischebeck, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Policies, Achievements and Potential for National Development’, in Ishebeck and Götz Neuneck, eds, Cooperative Policies for Preventing and Controlling the Spread of Missiles and Nuclear Weapons: Policies and Perspectives in Southern Asia (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 1996), p.67.

¹² Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, pp.232–3; OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, p.397; Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp.175–85.

¹³ Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, p.176; Ischebeck, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Programme’, p.67.

¹⁴ Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp.175–85; Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, p.152.

¹⁵ Gloria Duffy, Soviet nuclear energy: domestic and international policies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December 1979), pp.84–5. This work was prepared for the US Department of Energy. See also OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, p.395.

¹⁶ MacLachlan, ‘Libyans Are Seeking Abroad International Cooperation in Nuclear Area’, Nucleonics Week, vol.25, no.39, 27 September 1984, p.1.

¹⁷ Atomstroyexport comes under MINATOM. ‘Atomstroyexport’, Russia, NIS Profiles, NTI Nuclear Database:, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/reactor/research/without/atomstro.htm.

¹⁸ See ENS Nucnet, 6 February 1992, via ‘Russia: Kurchatov Institute (Russian Research Center)’, NTI Database: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/reactor/research/with/kurchato.htm. See also R. Adam Moody, ‘Armageddon for Hire’, Jane's International Defense Review, vol.30, February 1997, p.21.

¹⁹ Claudia Wright, ‘Libya and the West’, pp.38–41.

²⁰ See ‘Libya: IRT-1’, Research Reactor Database, IAEA.

²¹ Pajak, ‘Soviet Arms Aid to Libya’ p.86.

²² Pajak, ‘Nuclear status and policies of the Middle East countries’, pp.600–601.

²³ Mohamed M. Megahed, ‘Nuclear Desalination: History and Prospects’, Desalination, no.135, 2001, pp.169–85: http://www.desline.com/articoli/4047.pdf. See also Cirincione with Wolfstahl and Rajkimar, Deadly Arsenals, p.311.

²⁴ See Mark, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Libya’, p.8; Jonathan Bearman, ‘The Conflict in Chad’, in Qadhafi's Libya (London: Zed Books, 1986), pp.203–6.

²⁵ ‘Relations with Chad’, ‘External Affairs: Libya’, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments 9 November 2001: http://sentinel.janes.com/public/sentinel/index.shtml.

²⁶ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, p.2.

²⁷ Ibid., p.2.

²⁸ Ibid., p.2.

²⁹ See for example Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, pp.202–4; Claudia Wright, ‘Libya and the West’, p.33; OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, p.386.

³⁰ Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, pp.151–3; Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb, p.104; ‘WMD Around the World: Libya’, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/; Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp.175–85; W.P.S. Sidhu, ‘Pakistan's Bomb: A Quest for Credibility’, Jane's Intelligence Review, vol.8, no.6, June 1996, p.278.

³¹ See Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, pp.151–3; Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, pp.229–39.

³² Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, pp.64–71; Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp.175–85; See ‘WMD Around the World: Libya’, Federation of American Scientists; ‘Libya: A Country Study’, The Library of Congress Country Studies; Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, pp.229–39; Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, pp.151–3.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Rodney W. Jones, Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the Bomb, and South Asia, Washington Papers, no.82 (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1981), pp.48–9.

³⁵ Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, pp.97–8.

³⁶ Ibid. pp.64-71; Ischebeck, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Programme’, pp.85, 78.

³⁷ Ibid., pp.85, 78.

³⁸ Sidhu, ‘Pakistan's Bomb’, p.279.

³⁹ Maj.–Gen. D.K. Palit, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), pp.23–44.

⁴⁰ See Ischebeck, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Programme’, pp.85, 78; Mycle Schneide, Politis-Le-Citoyen (Paris), 22–28 February 1990, pp.50–55, in FBIS Nuclear Developments, 18 July 1990, pp.26–30, NTI Nuclear Database, http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear/1990/n9004558.htm.

⁴¹ Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, pp.64–71.

⁴² Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, pp.151–3; Sidhu, ‘Pakistan's Bomb’, p.278.

⁴³ Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, p.232.

⁴⁴ Jones, Nuclear Proliferation, pp.48–49.

⁴⁵ See: Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, pp.64–71; Claudia Wright, ‘Libya and the West’, p.41; Cooley, Libya Sandstorm, pp.229–39; Jones, Nuclear Proliferation, pp.48–49.

⁴⁶ Libya's efforts to build ballistic missiles during the same period contributed to international concerns about the country's nuclear ambitions. The regime's missile efforts, similar to the nuclear arena, were notable because of their reliance on foreign assistance. For example, in 1979 the West German firm OTRAG established operations in Libya and began developing an ostensibly civilian sounding rocket with a reported range of 300–500km in a surfaceto- surface mode. Despite its claim to be a commercial space launch entity, OTRAG left in August 1981 under pressure from the West German government. This coincided with Israeli reports that Syria had signed a contract with OTRAG for 300 and 2,000km range ballistic missiles. See: ‘Libyans get nuclear missile system’, Guardian, 21 March 1981; ‘Rocket Fired by Libya’, Daily Telegraph, 7 March 1981; J. Vinocur, ‘Launching of Suborbital Rocket in Libya by West Germany’, International Herald Tribune, 13 March 1981; D. Fairhill, ‘Missile Fears Denied’, Guardian, 1 June 1981; ‘West German Rocket Firm Quits Libya’, Daily Telegraph, 30 December 1981.

⁴⁷ OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, p.386.

⁴⁸ A further 48 targets were irradiated in the IRT-1 but were not processed. Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 20 February 2004, p.6.

⁴⁹ ‘Annex 8: Nuclear Infrastructures of Argentina and Brazil’, Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Policies, Issue 2, 2001.

⁵⁰ According to Henry S. Rowen and Richard Brody, their estimate was based on reactor operations designed for the most efficient generation of electricity. Moreover, they contended that while the resultant ‘high burnup plutonium’ would contain ‘a substantial proportion of the isotope Pu- 240’, it would still be usable in a nuclear weapon with 1–20 kilotonne yields. It was also noted that weapons-grade plutonium with a higher explosive yield could be produced in power reactors by extracting fuel rods after short periods of irradiation. See Rowen and Brody, ‘Nuclear Potential and Possible Contingencies’, in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and US Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings, 1980), p.208.

⁵¹ Project Number LIB/9/005, Siting of Nuclear Power Plant, first approved 1983, completed 23 December 1985. The project involved Libya's National Scientific Research Council. See Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Agency: http://wwwtc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp.

⁵² Project Number LIB/4/005, Nuclear Power Plant, first approved 1984, cancelled 30 June 1986. The project involved the National Scientific Research Council, Department of Power. See Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Agency: http://wwwtc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp.

⁵³ ‘Libya Abandons Plans for First Unit’, Nuclear Engineering International, April 1986, p.6; ‘Moscow Retreats from Libyan Nuclear Scheme’, MidEast Markets, 3 August 1987; Nuclear Engineering International, December 1987, cited in ‘Other Proliferation Developments’, PPNN Newsbrief, no.1, March 1988, p.2: http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/nb01.pdf; K.D. Kapur, Soviet Nuclear Non- Proliferation Diplomacy and the Third World (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993), p.148; ‘WMD Around the World: Libya’, Federation of American Scientists.

⁵⁴ ‘WMD Around the World: Libya’, Federation of American Scientists. The same account is given in Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb, pp.98–9; MacLachlan and Knapik, ‘Belgium and Libya’, p.5.

⁵⁵ OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, p.380.

⁵⁶ MacLachlan and Knapik, ‘Belgium and Libya’, p.5; ‘WMD Around the World: Libya’, Federation of American Scientists; Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp.175–85. See ‘Soviets Draw Back From Helping Libyan Programme’, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1987, p.27.

⁵⁷ ‘WMD Around the World: Libya’, Federation of American Scientists; Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb, pp.98–9.

⁵⁸ MacLachlan and Knapik, ‘Belgium and Libya’, p.5.

⁵⁹ Highly enriched uranium metal can also be prepared using this process for nuclear weapons.

⁶⁰ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, p.4.

⁶¹ Ibid. pp.4–5; ‘Japanese Parts Used in Libya's Nuke Program’, Herald Asahi, 13 March 2004.

⁶² For natural uranium-fuelled reactors the U3O8 concentrate is basically refined and converted to uranium dioxide. No enrichment of the uranium is necessary.

⁶³ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, pp.3–4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp.3–4.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.4.

⁶⁶ Spector, Going Nuclear, p.157; Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp.175–85; Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, pp.151–3.

⁶⁷ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, pp.3–4.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp.4–5; ‘Japanese Parts Used in Libya's Nuke Program’, Herald Asahi, 13 March 2004.

⁶⁹ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, p.5; According to the Los Angeles Times, the foreign expert was a German flight engineer. Douglas Frantz and Josh Meyer, ‘For Sale: Nuclear Expertise’, Los Angeles Times, 22 February 2004.

⁷⁰ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, pp.5–6.

⁷¹ Frantz and Meyer, ‘For Sale’.

⁷² Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, pp.5–6.

⁷³ ‘Annex 8: Nuclear Infrastructures of Argentina and Brazil’, Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Policies, Issue 2, 2001.

⁷⁴ Nothing significant appears to have occurred during the first part of the 1990s apart from various reports about Libya capitalising on the dissolution of the Soviet Union by seeking to acquire nuclear technology and materials, and to recruit scientists.

⁷⁵ Interestingly, Tripoli and Moscow commenced talks on renewed nuclear cooperation in January and November 2000, focusing on the refurbishment of the TNRC. See ‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through 30 June 2001’, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2001.htm; Statement by Spector, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services of the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 6 June 2002: http://www.senate.gov/∼govt-aff/060602specter.pdf.

⁷⁶ ‘Report to the President of the United States’, (Washington DC: The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,, 31 March 2005), p.257: http://www.wmd.gov/report/.

⁷⁷ Ambassador Donald Mahley, ‘Dismantling Libyan Weapons: Lessons Learned’, The Arena, no.10, November 2004, p.5.

⁷⁸ Bill Gertz, ‘Libyan sincerity on arms in doubt’, Washington Times, 9 September 2004.

⁷⁹ Royal Malaysia Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme’, 20 February 2004: http://www.rmp.gov.my/rmp03/040220scomi_eng.htm; Gertz, ‘Libyan sincerity on arms in doubt’.

⁸⁰ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, p.7.

⁸¹ National Board for Scientific Research, Libya: http://www.nasrlibya.net/english.html.

⁸² See Royal Malaysia Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector General of Police’; Gertz, ‘Libyan sincerity on arms in doubt’.

⁸³ Interview in Der Spiegel quoted by Ian Traynor in ‘Nuclear chief tells of black market in bomb equipment’, Guardian, 26 January 2004, p.14.

⁸⁴ Traynor, ‘Nuclear chief tells of black market in bomb equipment’, p.14; Anwar Iqbal, ‘Khan network supplied N-parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia’, Dawn (online edition), 14 October 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/10/14/top9.htm.

⁸⁵ ‘A.Q. Khan & Libya’, GlobalSecurity.Org.

⁸⁶ Stephen Fidler and Mark Huband, ‘Turks and South Africans helped Libya's secret nuclear arms project’, Financial Times, 10 June 2004, p.11.

⁸⁷ Iqbal, ‘Khan network supplied N-parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia’.

⁸⁸ Andrew Koch, ‘The nuclear network: Khanfessions of a proliferator’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 February 2004.

⁸⁹ Centrifuges incorporate some 100 or so separate components including, for example, rotors, ring magnets, pipes, valves, baffles and vacuum pumps.

⁹⁰ Raymond Bonner, ‘Did Tenet Exaggerate Malaysian Plant's Demise?’, New York Times, 9 February 2004, p.4; Agence France-Presse, ‘Libyan nuclear workers trained in Malaysia: official’, 29 May 2004, via Channel News Asia, Singapore.

⁹¹ Bonner, ‘Did Tenet Exaggerate Malaysian Plant's Demise?’, p.4.

⁹² Ibid., p.4; Gertz, ‘Libyan sincerity on arms in doubt’.

⁹³ Anwar Iqbal, ‘Khan network supplied Nparts made in Europe, Southeast Asia’; Fidler and Huband, ‘Turks and South Africans helped Libya's secret nuclear arms project’, Financial Times, 10 June 2004, p.11.

⁹⁴ Ibid. p.11; Royal Malaysia Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector General of Police’.

⁹⁵ Illicit trade networks have long exploited the UAE as a key transhipment point for material such as sensitive technologies and drugs. In 2003, electronic and machinery products accounted for 21% of re-exports in the UAE. ‘UAE Economic Overview and Guide to Doing Business’, UK Trade and Investment: https://www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk.

⁹⁶ Fidler and Victoria Burnett, ‘Connections Across the World Were Involved in Offering Sensitive Technology to at Least Three Countries’, Financial Times, 7 April 2004.

⁹⁷ Agence France Presse, ‘Libyan nuclear workers trained in Malaysia’.

⁹⁸ Bonner, ‘The Two Faces of Nuclear Suspect in Malaysia’, International Herald Tribune, 20 February 2004, p.1.

⁹⁹ Elizabeth Nash, ‘Spanish Firms in Secret Arms Trade to Libya’, Independent, 12 February 2004.

¹⁰⁰ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, p.6; Fidler and Huband, ‘Turks and South Africans helped Libya's secret nuclear arms project’, p.11.

¹⁰¹ David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered’, Institute for Science and Intenational Security, 1 March 2004, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya/cent_procure.html; Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components, Issue Brief’, NTI Database, March 2005: http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_60a.html.

¹⁰² Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 20 February 2004, p.5; Iqbal, ‘Khan network supplied N-parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia’.

¹⁰³ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 20 February 2004, p.5; Iqbal, ‘Khan network supplied N-parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia’.

¹⁰⁴ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, p.5.

¹⁰⁵ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 20 February 2004, p.5.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.5.

¹⁰⁷ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, p.5.

¹⁰⁸ Paul Kerr, ‘IAEA: Questions Remain About Libya’, Arms Control Today, July/ August 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/IAEAandLibya.asp.

¹⁰⁹ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, pp.5–6.

¹¹⁰ Albright, President and Founder, Institute for Science and Security, ‘International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation Initiatives’, statement before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 23 June 2004: http://www.senate.gov/∼govtaff/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=185&WitnessID=673.

¹¹¹ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, pp.5–6.

¹¹² Ibid. Annex 1, pp.5–6.

¹¹³ Ibid. Annex 1, pp.5–6.

¹¹⁴ John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, ‘Pakistan Confesses to Aiding Nuclear Efforts’, Washington Post, 2 February 2004.

¹¹⁵ David Sanger and William J. Broad, ‘Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium’, New York Times, 23 May 2004.

¹¹⁶ See for example Seymour Hersh, ‘The Deal: Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan's nuclear black marketers?’, The New Yorker, 8 March 2004.

¹¹⁷ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 20 February 2004, pp.6–7.

¹¹⁸ Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, ‘Probe of Libya Finds Nuclear Black Market’, Washington Post, 24 January 2004; Broad, Sanger and Bonner, ‘A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network’, New York Times, 12 February 2004, p. A1; Owen Bowcott, John Aglionby and Traynor, ‘Atomic Secrets: Businessman Under Scrutiny 25 Years Ago After Ordering Unusual Supplies’, Guardian, 5 March 2004.

¹¹⁹ Iqbal, ‘Khan network supplied N-parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia’.

¹²⁰ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 20 February 2004, pp.6–7.

¹²¹ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, pp.4–5.

¹²² Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 20 February 2004, p.4; Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, Annex 1, p.3.

¹²³ Sanger and Broad, ‘Evidence is Cited Linking North Koreans to Libyan Uranium’.

¹²⁴ Dafna Linzer, ‘US Misled Allies About Nuclear Export North Korea Sent Material To Pakistan, Not to Libya’, Washington Post, 20 March 2005, p. A1.

¹²⁵ Sanger and Broad, ‘Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea’, New York Times, 2 February 2005; see also Traynor, ‘North Korean nuclear trade exposed’, Guardian, 24 May 2004, p.12.

¹²⁶ Broad and Sanger, ‘Khan was selling a complete package’, International Herald Tribune, 22 March 2005; Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, p.7.

¹²⁷ Andrew Koch, ‘The nuclear network’; ‘Chinese Warhead Drawings Among Libyan Documents’, Los Angeles Times, 16 February 2004; Broad and Sanger, ‘Khan was selling a complete package’. See also: ‘Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb’, Wall Street Journal, 23 February 2004; ‘Libya nuke prints from China’, Associated Press, 15 February 2004; Warrick and Slevin, ‘Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China’, Washington Post, 15 February 2004, p. A1.

¹²⁸ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, p.3.

¹²⁹ Broad and Sanger, ‘Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project To Pakistan Figure’, New York Times, 3 February 2004; Frantz and Meyer, ‘For Sale‘.

¹³⁰ Director General, IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, 28 May 2004, p.3.

¹³¹ Ibid., p.7.

¹³² Mahley, ‘Dismantling Libyan Weapons’, p.2.

¹³³ Richard Stone, ‘Agencies Plan Exchange With Libya's Former Weaponeers’, Science, vol.308, no.5719, 8 April 2005, pp.185–6.

¹³⁴ Mahley, ‘Dismantling Libyan Weapons’, p.7.

¹³⁵ ‘Report to the President of the United States’, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, pp.259–60.

¹³⁶ Mahley, ‘Dismantling Libyan Weapons’, pp.7–8.