‘Nuclear superiority’ and the dilemmas for strategic stability

Abstract

In 2002 the Bush administration completed a Nuclear Posture Review that introduced a ‘new triad’ based on offensive-strike systems, defences and a revitalised defence infrastructure. The new triad is designed for a new strategic threat environment, characterised not by a long-standing nuclear rivalry with another superpower, but by unstable relationships with rogue-state proliferators, alongside more ambiguous relations with nuclear-weapon powers.

Providing a historical context to these modifications to US nuclear strategy, this paper details how the new triad, which strongly emphasises the need to bolster the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and to prepare for nuclear use when deterrence fails, is founded on previous efforts to secure nuclear superiority against the Soviet Union and counter-proliferation capabilities against WMD-proliferant adversaries. It illustrates how the evolution of American nuclear strategy towards more effective counter-force capabilities, regardless of the current threat environment, has led to a host of counter-force developments. It discusses how this strategy is based on the long-standing American desire to control conflict escalation and how it may invite crisis instability with regional adversaries and disquiet among established nuclear powers. It proposes a limited approach, which could maximise the strategic advantages of the strategy and minimise the potential for strategic instability with Russia and China.

Notes

¹ Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], p. 13.

² Bush, ‘Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy’, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 June 2002. The 2002 NSS would use the phrase ‘we must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge’. National Security Strategy, p. 29. For more on the revolutionary nature of the Bush administration's strategy, see Gaddis, ‘A Grand Strategy of Transformation’, Foreign Policy, no. 133, November/December 2002, pp. 50–57.

³ Posen, ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony’, International Security, vol. 28, no. 1, Summer 2003, p. 6. For more on the post-Cold War debate on American grand-strategy options, see Posen and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy’, pp. 5–53; Douglas A. Ross and Christopher N.B. Ross, ‘From “Neo-Isolationism” to “Imperial Liberalism”: “Grand Strategy” Options in the American International Security Debate and the Implications for Canada’, in McDonough and Douglas A. Ross, eds, The Dilemmas of American Strategic Primacy: Implications for the Future of Canadian–American Cooperation (Toronto, ON: Royal Canadian Military Institute, 2005), pp. 165–217.

⁴ For more on ‘imperial overreach’, see Graham E. Fuller, ‘Strategic fatigue’, The National Interest, vol. 84, Summer 2006, pp. 37–42. Primacy may have been the strategy of choice for Republican neoconservatives, but it was also an element of the Clinton administration's own policies that became, under the leadership of more hawkish Democrats, such as then- Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and diplomat Richard Holbrooke, progressively stronger in Clinton's second term. These ‘national security Democrats’, a term introduced by Holbrooke, now dominate the perceived Democratic front-runners for the presidential nomination in 2008 (including Senators Joseph Biden and Hillary Clinton). For more on this trend, see Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Unbranding’, The New Yorker, 21 March 2005 and Ari Berman, ‘The Strategic Class’, The Nation, 29 August 2005.

⁵ The Defense Special Weapons Agency noted that the international environment had changed from a ‘weapons-rich environment’ into a ‘target-rich environment’. Kristensen, ‘Targets of Opportunity’, pp. 22–8.

⁶ Wade L. Huntley, ‘Threats all the way down: US strategic initiatives in a unipolar world’, Review of International Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, January 2006, p. 64.

⁷ See Frank Harvey, ‘The future of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence’, International Journal, vol. 58, no. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 321–46. For more on the second nuclear age, see Paul Bracken, ‘The Second Nuclear Age’, pp. 146–56 and Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

⁸ Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, p. 31.

⁹ See Edward Rhodes, ‘Conventional Deterrence’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 19, no. 3, July–September 2000, pp. 221–53.

¹⁰ See Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions’, International Security, vol. 30, no. 2, Fall 2005, p. 103.

¹¹ Robert E. Harkavy, ‘Triangular or Indirect Deterrence/Compellence: Something New in Deterrence Theory’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 17, no. 1, January–March 1998, p. 64.

¹² This point is reiterated in Paul Bracken, ‘The Second Nuclear Age’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 146–56.

¹³ For a critical examination of American resolve during scenarios of regional deterrence, see Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), ch. 1.

¹⁴ Gray, ‘Deterrence and Regional Conflicts: Hopes, Fallacies, and Fixes’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 17, no. 1, January–March 1998, p. 57.

¹⁵ For more on the problems with deterring rogue states in the post-Cold War period, see Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, esp. ch. 2.

¹⁶ Glaser and Fetter, ‘Counterforce Revisited’, p. 53.

¹⁷ For a recent example, see Seymour Hersh, ‘The Iran Plans’, The New Yorker, 17 April 2006.

¹⁸ Scenarios that are used include: an adversary intending to use WMD against American forces or allies; imminent attack from an adversary's biologicalweapon capabilities; attacks on facilities (HDBTs, C3) that are required for an adversary to execute a WMD attack; and to demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence. See JCS, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12), Final Coordination [2] Draft, 15 March 2005: http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-12_05draft.pdf. This document, the contents of which were highlighted in Arms Control Today and the Washington Post, would later be removed from the Pentagon website and cancelled. Also see Kristensen, ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 7, September 2005.

¹⁹ Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, p. II-10.

²⁰ See Ball and Toth, ‘Revising the SIOP’, pp. 75–6.

²¹ Bruce Blair, ‘We Keep Buiding Nukes for All the Wrong Reasons’, Washington Post, 25 May 2003: http://www.cdi.org/blair/new-nukes.cfm.

²² See Glaser and Fetter, ‘Counterforce Revisited’, pp. 96–7.

²³ Cirincione, ‘A Deeply Flawed Review’, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 16 May 2002: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=988. For another sceptical perspective, see Richard Sokolsky, ‘Demystifying the US Nuclear Posture Review’, Survival, vol. 44, no. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 133–48.

²⁴ Lieber and Press, ‘The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of US Primacy’, International Security, vol. 30, no. 4, Spring 2006, p. 30.

²⁵ Such an approach would also have the benefit of minimising the impact on Russian or Chinese threat perceptions. TMDs can be tailored not to affect a country's nuclear deterrent either, while a thin area defence could be easily saturated and might even be used as a means of protecting retaliatory forces and C3 systems, which would further assure a second-strike capability. See Glaser and Fetter, ‘National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy’, International Security, vol. 26, no. 1, Summer 2001, pp. 40–92 and Douglas A. Ross, ‘American Missile Defence, Grand Strategy and Global Security’, in McDonough and Ross, eds, The Dilemmas of American Strategic Primacy, pp. 35–66.

²⁶ See Glaser, ‘Nuclear Policy without an Adversary: US Planning for the Post- Soviet Era’, International Security, vol. 16, no. 4, Spring 1992, pp. 34–78. For a compatible and nuanced perspective of MAD, see Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. ch. 3.

²⁷ For more on arms racing and the potential for sub-optimal outcomes, see Glaser, ‘When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational vs. Suboptimal Arming’, International Security, vol. 28, no. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 44–84.

²⁸ Glaser, ‘Nuclear Policy without an Adversary’, p. 41.

²⁹ A counter-force second-strike capability was rationalised by the need to have accurate and high-yield counter-force weapons that would be both survivable against a Soviet first strike and capable of neutralising the Soviet reserve force. This would prevent the Nitze scenario's fears of a Soviet advantage in the ratio of residual forces. For a nuanced argument for a limited counter-force second-strike capability, see Sagan, Moving Targets, ch. 2.

³⁰ See Stephen Fruhling, ‘“Bunker Busters” and Intra-War Deterrence: A Case for Caution and Two Solutions’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 24, no. 4, October/November 2005, pp. 327–341.

³¹ See Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, ch. 4.

³² The Nitze deployment criteria were diffi- cult to meet against the Soviet Union, but it is certainly much more questionable whether rogue states would have suffi- cient technological capability or resources to initiate sufficient off-setting countermeasures and defence-suppression capabilities. As such, defensive deployments would be much more rational and justi-fied against rogue states as opposed to a potential major-power adversary.

³³ Glaser and Fetter, ‘Counterforce Revisited’, p. 86. This is, of course, dependent on the successful development of nuclear EPWs. See Robert W. Nelson, ‘Low-Yield Earth- Penetrating Nuclear Weapons’, Science and Global Security, vol. 10, no. 1, January 2002, pp. 1–20

³⁴ See Glaser and Fetter, ‘Counterforce Revisited’, p. 112.

³⁵ See Baram, ‘An Analysis of Iraq's WMD Strategy’, pp. 25–39 and ‘The Commitment Trap’, pp. 107–10. For more on the ‘faildeadly’ dangers posed by a ‘delegative’ command-and-control system, see Peter D. Feaver, ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations’, International Security, vol. 17, no. 3, Winter 1992–1993, pp. 160–87. For an interesting examination of Iraqi deterrent options in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, see Avigdor Haselkorn, ‘Iraq's Biowarfare Options: Last Resort, Preemption, or a Blackmail Option?’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, vol. 1, no. 1, March 2003, pp. 19–26.

³⁶ See Feaver, ‘Command and Control’, pp. 160–87 and Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation’, pp. 66–107. For a neooptimist perspective, see David J. Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’, International Security, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 87–119.

³⁷ Cruise missiles have a number of advantages compared to ballistic missiles or aircraft. For example, the delivery platforms use relatively low-cost and widespread technology, have significant advantages against either air defence or any future workable missile-defence system and would be compact enough to be forward deployed in a commercial ship. Moreover, the aerodynamic stability and low-flying trajectory of cruise missiles makes these weapons a far more reliable means of storing and disseminating CB agents. See Dennis M. Gormley, ‘Cruise Control’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 62, no. 2, March/April 2006, pp. 26–33 and Col Rex R. Kiziah, ‘The Emerging Biocruise Threat’, Air and Space Power Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 81–94.

³⁸ Prepositioned WMD may be a high-risk strategy, given the possible consequences of being caught. But if multiple WMD devices could be successfully prepositioned in the United States, especially strategic capabilities such as nuclear devices and biological agents with effective dissemination systems, a rogue state would be in a far stronger position for coercion. Such capabilities would be invulnerable to counterforce and/or decapitation attacks and would be exceedingly difficult to locate and neutralise. It would also be impossible to know fully the total number of prepositioned devices. A rogue state could thereby undertake a limited demonstration attack and threaten sequential attacks in the event that its demands are not met. See Stan Erickson, ‘Nuclear Weapon Prepositioning as a Threat Strategy’, Journal of Homeland Security, July 2001: http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Erickson.html.

³⁹ See Lieber and Press, ‘The End of MAD?’ pp. 7–44.

⁴⁰ See Jeffrey Lewis, ‘The Ambiguous Arsenal’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, no. 3, May/June 2005, pp. 52–9 and Norris and Kristensen, ‘Chinese nuclear forces, 2006’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 62, no. 3, May/June 2006, pp. 60–63.

⁴¹ See McDonough, ‘The US Nuclear Shift to the Pacific’, pp. 64–8.

⁴² The deployment of TMD systems in the Pacific, especially sea-based systems in the context of joint US–Japan development, would also be seen as possibly heralding further Japanese remilitarisation, e.g. a ‘shield’ to protect the Japanese ‘sword’, and the deployment of an area-defence capability for Taiwan. See Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the US–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’, International Security, vol. 23, no. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 49–80.

⁴³ Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], pp. 16–17.

⁴⁴ For more on escalation dominance in the US–China relationship, see Robert S. Ross, ‘Navigating the Taiwan Straits: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and US–China Relations’, International Security, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 2002, pp. 48–85.

⁴⁵ Jing-dong Yuan, ‘Chinese Response to US Missile Defense: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 10, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 88.

⁴⁶ Douglas A. Ross, ‘American Missile Defence, Grand Strategy and Global Security’, pp. 44–45. The destruction of these ‘soft’ targets could potentially neutralise American defensive capabilities and, if based on a conventional pre-emptive attack, could be sufficiently limited so as not to warrant a nuclear response. Such an attack might be seen as a potentially feasible means of obtaining a bargaining advantage during a crisis. Vulnerable missile-defence systems could, therefore, inject a destabilising escalation level in any crisis scenario.

⁴⁷ See Phillip D. Saunders and Yuan, ‘Chinese Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications for the United States’, in Michael Barletta, ed., Proliferation Challenges and Nonproliferation Opportunities for New Administrations, Occasional Paper No. 4 (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, September 2000), pp. 40–46. For more on limited deterrence, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China's New “Old Thinking”: The Concept of Limited Deterrence’, International Security, vol. 20, no. 2, Winter 1995/96, pp. 5–42.

⁴⁸ Norris and Kristensen, ‘Russian nuclear forces, 2006’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 62, no. 2, March/April 2006, pp. 64–7.

⁴⁹ Lieber and Press, ‘The End of MAD?’, pp. 7–44. This model is based on a disarming strike against Russia's strategic forces. A decapitation strategy may, however, be even more feasible given the centralised nature of the Soviet C³ system.

⁵⁰ For a critique of the Lieber and Press first-strike model, see Valery Yarynich and Steven Starr, ‘“Nuclear Primacy” is a Fallacy’, Intelligent.ru: http://english.intelligent.ru/articles/scenarios.htm. This article was originally published in Russian on 26 May 2006 by the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies.

⁵¹ Gaps in Russia's early warning radar coverage, particularly the termination of the Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk) in the northeast and Skrunda in the northwest, have opened potential ‘attack corridors’ for American strategic forces. Meanwhile, its inability to replace ‘Oko’ satellite constellations quickly have left US ICBM fields without periodic coverage, while the slow speed of Prognoz satellite deployments have prevented crucial warning capability against the lethal American force of SLBMs. See Pavel Podvig, ‘History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System’, Science and Global Security, vol. 10, no. 1, January 2002, pp. 21–60.

⁵² Glaser, ‘Nuclear Policy Without an Adversary’, pp. 42–3.

⁵³ See Norris and Kristensen, ‘Russian nuclear forces, 2006’, pp. 64–7.

⁵⁴ This claim is based on Congressional testimony by Col Stanislav Lunev, the highest-ranking GRU military intelligence officer to defect to the United States, and remains uncollaborated. There is, however, evidence that the Soviets did develop tactical ‘suitcase’ bombs and, according to the former KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin, special-operations units were active in placing conventionalweapon caches among NATO countries. This lends credibility to the proposition that the Soviets did undertake a nuclearprepositioning strategy, probably for the decapitation of the American leadership, during the Cold War. See Transcript of the House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee meeting, 4 August 1998: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has216010.000/has216010_0f.htm; Transcript of the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Military Research and Development Subcommittee meeting, 26 October 1998: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1999_h/has299010_0.htm.

⁵⁵ For more on the possibility of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war, see Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995) and David E. Mosher, Lowell H. Schwartz, David R. Howell and Lynn Davis, Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and US–Russian Relations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), ch. 2.

⁵⁶ The Perimetr system is only quasiautomated, as it does require giving preliminary authorisation to a command crew located in a super-hardened facility, who would be able to launch the Perimetr command missiles manually. Once launched, however, these missiles would transmit radio signals to the launchers themselves, which would bypass lower command levels in order to launch the ICBM force automatically. There is still some debate on whether such a system would be destabilising. For contrasting views, see Blair, ‘Russia's Doomsday Machine’, New York Times, 8 October 1993 and Yarynich, ‘The Doomsday Machine's Safety Catch’, New York Times, 1 February 1994, p. A17. Further information on Perimetr can be found in Yarynich, C₃: Nuclear Command, Control and Cooperation (Washington DC: Center for Defense Information, 2003), ch. 4.

⁵⁷ Further geostrategic competition would likely stimulate further Russian interest in LUA, especially if its efforts to increase the survivability of its strategic arsenal were successful. This could lead to the development of a fully automated ‘dead hand’ system that was explored in the 1980s. For more on this system, see Pavel Provlig, ‘Dr. Strangelove Meets Reality’: http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/04/dr_strangelove_meets_reality.shtml.