Conclusion

Abstract

In 2002 the Bush administration completed a Nuclear Posture Review that introduced a ‘new triad’ based on offensive-strike systems, defences and a revitalised defence infrastructure. The new triad is designed for a new strategic threat environment, characterised not by a long-standing nuclear rivalry with another superpower, but by unstable relationships with rogue-state proliferators, alongside more ambiguous relations with nuclear-weapon powers.

Providing a historical context to these modifications to US nuclear strategy, this paper details how the new triad, which strongly emphasises the need to bolster the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and to prepare for nuclear use when deterrence fails, is founded on previous efforts to secure nuclear superiority against the Soviet Union and counter-proliferation capabilities against WMD-proliferant adversaries. It illustrates how the evolution of American nuclear strategy towards more effective counter-force capabilities, regardless of the current threat environment, has led to a host of counter-force developments. It discusses how this strategy is based on the long-standing American desire to control conflict escalation and how it may invite crisis instability with regional adversaries and disquiet among established nuclear powers. It proposes a limited approach, which could maximise the strategic advantages of the strategy and minimise the potential for strategic instability with Russia and China.

Notes

¹ Ellis, ‘The Gravest Danger’, pp. 6–7.

² To borrow from Glaser's argument, nuclear primacy could lead to both a ‘sub-optimal’ outcome among great powers and a ‘rational’ outcome – even if potentially destabilising – among rogue states. See Glaser, ‘When Are Arms Races Dangerous’, pp. 44–84.

³ Territorial boost-phase interception is an especially promising means of strategic defence, in that any interceptors would have to be placed close to the target and could not feasibly threaten all the launch sites of a major power. See Wilkening, ‘Airborne Boost-phase Ballistic Missile Defense’, Science and Global Security, vol. 12, no. 1–2, January–August 2004, pp. 1–67.

⁴ It is more debatable whether new lowyield weapons would provide any militarily useful deterrent capability aside from their usability. Any strategically vital HDBTs that conventional counterforce weapons are unable to neutralise will, more than likely, require highyield nuclear warheads for their neutralisation. Low-yield weapons would, moreover, still have too large a radius of destruction to be feasibly employed as ADWs. See Glaser and Fetter, ‘Counterforce Revisited’, pp. 84–126.

⁵ This posture is similar to Sagan's argument for a ‘second-strike counterforce’ posture. See Sagan, Moving Targets, ch. 2.

⁶ See George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, ‘Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 1, no. 1, Fall 1993, pp. 11–21; Bunn, ‘The Legal Status of US Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 3, Spring–Summer 1997, pp. 1–17.