A Nuclear Legacy

Abstract

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world.

Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Notes

This paper was funded by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust.

¹ In the early years of the nuclear age, the word ‘atomic’ was most commonly used. After the detonation of the first fusion (‘thermonuclear’) bombs in the 1950s, the word ‘nuclear’ became widespread, ‘atomic’ referring to the earlier fission weapons. However, ‘nuclear’ is today used to describe both fission and fusion weapons, and also nuclear reactors, both civil and military, all of which entail fission reactions.

² For a full account of Britain's wartime role in the development of the first atomic bombs, see Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964).

³ The story of the development of the first British bomb is told in the official history by Gowing, Independence and Deterrence (London: Macmillan, 1974) and in Brian Cathcart, Test of Greatness (London: John Murray, 1994).

⁴ Quinlan, ‘The British Experience’, in Sokolski, p. 263.

⁵ National Archives CAB 131/12 D(52)26, 17 June 1952. Reproduced in John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), Appendix 6.

⁶ Humphrey Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces (London: HMSO, 1994), chapter 21.

⁷ Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p. 260.

⁸ Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, Cmnd 537 (London: HMSO, 1958): http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0406/MDA.pdf.

⁹ Claire Taylor and Tim Youngs, The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, House of Commons Library Research Paper 06/53 (London: House of Commons, 3 November 2006), p. 9: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-053.pdf.

¹⁰ Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942–2002 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 104; National Archives, AIR 8/2263 AUS (A) to PS to SofS, 1 June 1961.

¹¹ The story of the Polaris programme is told in Peter Nailor, The Nassau Connection (London: HMSO, 1988).

¹² Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p. 341.

¹³ National Archives DEFE 11/437 COS 1702/11/8/67 Annex A, 11 August 1967.

¹⁴ Stanley Orman, Faith in G.O.D.S.: Stability in the Nuclear Age (London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 35.

¹⁵ HC 986, p. 14. See also Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, pp. 148–50, and Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 47.

¹⁶ For a much fuller discussion of the significance of the Moscow ABM system, see Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, chapter 7, and Baylis, ‘British Nuclear Doctrine: The “Moscow Criterion” and the Polaris Improvement Programme’, Contemporary British History, vol. 19, no. 1, Spring 2005.

¹⁷ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983, Cmnd 8951-I, vol. 1, p. 7.

¹⁸ Taylor and Youngs, The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, p. 13.

¹⁹ Len Scott, ‘Labour and the Bomb: The First 80 Years’, International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4, July 2006, p. 690.

²⁰ Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, vol. 2, pp. 499–500.

²¹ Peter Riddell, ‘Nuclear Arms Will Keep Union Jack’, The Times, 15 March 2006.

²² Cited in Freedman, ‘British Nuclear Targeting’, in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds, Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 114.

²³ Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 296.

²⁴ Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain and France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 160.

²⁵ Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 389.

²⁶ Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 195; MoD, The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, Defence Open Government Document 80/23, July 1908, para. 33.

²⁷ Quinlan in evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee, HC 986 Ev. 12.

²⁸ Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century, p. 173.

²⁹ Taylor and Youngs, The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, p. 11.

³⁰ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Nuclear Pursuits’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003, p. 71.

³¹ Freedman, ‘British Nuclear Targeting’, p. 117.

³² C.R. Hill, R.S. Pease, P.E. Peierls and J. Rotblat, Does Britain Need Nuclear Weapons? (London: British Pugwash Group, 1995), p. 25.

³³ Christopher Watson, ‘A Time to Phase Out the UK Nuclear Deterrent?’, paper presented at Chatham House conference, Britain's Nuclear Weapons Debate, London, 10 July 2006.

³⁴ Baylis, ‘British Nuclear Doctrine’, pp. 62–3.

³⁵ MoD, Trident and the Alternatives, Defence Open Government Document 87/01, January 1987, pp. 3–4.

³⁶ Taylor and Youngs, The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, p. 13.

³⁷ MoD, The United Kingdom Trident Programme, Defence Open Government Document 82/1, March 1982, p. 6.

³⁸ Defence Open Government Document 87/01, p. 1.

³⁹ Hansard, 18 January 2005, Col.29WS.

⁴⁰ Keith Hartley, ‘The Economics of UK Nuclear Weapons Policy’, International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4, July 2006, p. 678.

⁴¹ Hansard, 10 February 2004, Col.1331W.

⁴² Malcolm Rifkind, ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons in UK Defence Strategy’, Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1994 (London: Brassey's, 1994, p. 30.

⁴³ Norman Polmar, ‘Strategic Submarine Progress’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 132, no. 10, October 2005, p. 85.

⁴⁴ Hansard, 30 July 1998, Col.449.

⁴⁵ Cm 3999, p. 19.

⁴⁶ Hansard, 30 July 1998, Col.448.

⁴⁷ Hill et al., Does Britain Need Nuclear Weapons?, p. 6.

⁴⁸ Bruno Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in Europe, Adelphi Paper 327 (London: IISS–Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 18.

⁴⁹ HC 986, p. 13.

⁵⁰ Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in Europe, p. 32.

⁵¹ Hansard, 22 November 1991, Col.543.

⁵² Rifkind, ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons in UK Defence Strategy’, pp. 31–2.

⁵³ Cm 3999, p. 18.

⁵⁴ Cm 6994, p. 23.

⁵⁵ Michael Codner, ‘Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: Keeping the Options Open’, RUSI Newsbrief, vol. 25, no. 8, August 2005, p. 88.

⁵⁶ HC 986, p. 13.

⁵⁷ Hansard, 19 March 1998, Col.724.

⁵⁸ Barnaby, ‘What is Trident? The Facts and Figures of Britain's Nuclear Force’ in Booth and Barnaby, p. 9.

⁵⁹ For example, HC 986, p. 13.

⁶⁰ MoD, UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, Memorandum submitted to House of Commons Defence Committee, 20 January 2006, Annex B, para. C.

⁶¹ Taylor and Youngs, The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, p. 14.

⁶² Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb (London: WMD Awareness Programme, 2005), p. 89.

⁶³ Hansard, 30 July 1998, Col.449.

⁶⁴ HC 986, p. 8.

⁶⁵ Cm 6994, p. 12.

⁶⁶ For example, Cm 3999, p. 19; The Future of the UK's Strategic Deterrent: government Response of the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2006-6, HC 1558, 26 July 2006, p. 3; Hansard: 8 March 2005, Col.421WH; 2 February 2004, Col.752W; 30 July 1998, Col.448.

⁶⁷ Cm 6994, pp.13, 23.

⁶⁸ Internal unclassified MoD briefing paper.

⁶⁹ MoD Directorate of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Policy 21-06-2005-094719-001, Freedom of Information response, 19 July 2005.

⁷⁰ HC 986, Ev. 36.

⁷¹ Cm 3999, p. 5–2.

⁷² Cm 6994, p. 5.

⁷³ Internal unclassified MoD briefing.

⁷⁴ Michael Clarke, ‘Does My Bomb Look Big in This? Britain's Nuclear Choices After Trident’, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 1, January 2004, p. 53.

⁷⁵ Gray, ‘An International “Norm” Against Nuclear Weapons? The British Case’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 20, July 2001, p. 235.

⁷⁶ MoD, Memorandum, UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, Annex C, para. 3.

⁷⁷ Codner, Britain's Nuclear Deterrent, p. 87.

⁷⁸ Cm 3999, p. 5-5.

⁷⁹ Cm 3999, Supporting Essay Five.

⁸⁰ Cm 5566, Vol. I, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter (London: TSO, July 2002), p. 12.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jeremy Stocker

Jeremy Stocker is a consulting Research Fellow at the IISS and a freelance defence analyst. He served as a Seaman Officer in the Royal Navy for 20 years, specialising in air defence, before transferring to the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) in 1996. Commander Stocker has seen active service in the Persian Gulf and in Afghanistan. He is now responsible for staff training in the RNR, based part-time at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. He has a BA from the University of Reading and a Masters and PhD from the University of Hull. His book Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942–2002 was published in 2004 by Frank Cass. He is a regular conference speaker and contributes to academic and professional journals on both sides of the Atlantic.