Chapter Two: Spoiler Groups and the Anti-government Insurgency

Abstract

By the middle of 2007, Afghans had become increasingly disillusioned with a state-building process that had failed to deliver the peace dividend that they were promised. For many Afghans, the most noticeable change in their lives since the fall of the Taliban has been an acute deterioration in security conditions. Whether it is predatory warlords, the Taliban-led insurgency, the burgeoning narcotics trade or general criminality, the threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan are manifold. The response to those threats, both in terms of the international military intervention and the donor-supported process to rebuild the security architecture of the Afghan state, known as security-sector reform (SSR), has been largely insufficient to address the task at hand. NATO has struggled to find the troops and equipment it requires to complete its Afghan mission and the SSR process, from its outset, has been severely under-resourced and poorly directed. Compounding these problems, rampant corruption and factionalism in the Afghan government, particularly in the security institutions, have served as major impediments to reform and a driver of insecurity. This paper charts the evolution of the security environment in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, assessing both the causes of insecurity and the responses to them. Through this analysis, it offers some suggestions on how to tackle Afghanistan's growing security crisis.

Notes

1. See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords (London: Pan Books, 2000).

2. Ali A. Jalali, ‘The Legacy of War and the Challenge of Peace Building’, in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Building a New Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press and the World Peace Foundation, 2007), p. 4.

3. Interview with C. Christine Fair, senior research associate, South Asia and terrorism, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace, 27 December 2006.

4. Tablighi Jamaat (Proselytising Group) is the main worldwide Deobandi fundamentalist missionary movement.

5. The Deobandi line of Islam in South Asia originated in the north Indian city of Deoband in 1867. Although this movement was Sufist in nature (and hence more tolerant), the Western Pakistan version of Deobandism had tremendous influence among Wahhabists and Salafists coming from Saudi Arabia and Egypt during the war against the Soviet Union. As a leading US military analyst has pointed out (interview, February 2007), one would find the Deoband madrassas in India of a more Sufist nature and truer to the roots of the movement.

6. The other components of the MMA are the Jamaat-i Islami (Party of Islam, JI), Tahrik-e-Islami (Movement of Islam), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Assembly of Pakistani Clerics, JUP) and the Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith (Followers of the Prophet's Tradition).

7. The Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa is 50km from Peshawar, in Akora Khattak. Its campus is spread across eight acres, and it hosts more than 3,000 students.

8. Rashid, Taliban, p. 91.

9. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’.

10. General Mehmud Ahmed was instrumental in the October 1999 coup that brought Musharraf to power. His reward was promotion to the head of ISI.

11. Musharraf, quoted in ‘Pakistani Intelligence Controversy’, Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor, 15 November 2006.

12. Seymour M. Hersh, ‘The Getaway’, The New Yorker, 28 January 2002, p. 36; and ‘The Problem of Pakistan’, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 15 March 2002.

13. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War On Terror (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 201–16.

14. Amin Saikal, ‘Securing Afghanistan's Border’, Survival, vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 138. When asked who was behind the 11 September attacks, Gul replied: ‘Mossad and its American associates’. Interview by Arnaud de Borchgrave with Hameed Gul, former ISI chief, United Press International, 26 September 2001.

15. Husain Haqqani, quoted in Alisa Tang, ‘Afghan President Lashes Out at Pakistan’, Associated Press, 14 December 2006.

16. ‘Pakistan Official Says India Training Baluchi Dissidents in Afghanistan’, interview with Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Islamabad, 16 April 2006, in BBC Monitoring South Asia: ‘India is gradually increasing the number of its paramilitary personnel in Afghanistan. From a few personnel, the strength of Indian troops has reached almost that of a company size force and even includes Black Cat Commandos.’ See also Mariana Baabar, ‘How India is Fomenting Trouble in Pakistan via Afghanistan’, The News, 15 April 2006.

17. Barry Schweid, ‘Pakistan Offers Afghanistan Border Fence’, AP Diplomatic Writer, 12 September 2005.

18. Landmine Monitor Report 2006, http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006.

19. Carlotta Gall, ‘Karzai Denounces Pakistan's Mining of Border’, New York Times, 28 December 2006.

20. ‘US, Pakistani, Afghan Officials Hold First Three-Way Meeting’, Agence France-Presse, 17 June 2003.

21. The intelligence centre has a staff of 24: 12 NATO officers, six officers from Pakistan and six from Afghanistan. ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan Launch Intelligence-Sharing Centre’, Janes's Intelligence Digest, 23 February 2007.

22. Michael Barry, Le Royaume de l'Insolence – L'Afghanistan, 1504–2001 (Paris : Flammarion, 2001).

23. Afzal Khan, ‘Death of Tribal Leader Reveals Tribal Borderland may be Sanctuary for Taliban, Al-Qaeda Remnants’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 22 June 2004.

24. Of the Masood tribe who replaced Nek Mohammad, together with Haji Omar of the Wazir tribe.

25. Nirupama Subramanian, ‘Backing Away from the Badlands?’, The Hindu, 13 September 2006; and ‘Historic Waziristan Peace Deal Signed’, The Nation, 5 September 2006.

26. The text reads: ‘All foreigners present in North Waziristan will leave Pakistan. For those who could not leave due to some compulsion, it would be mandatory upon them that they respect the prevailing laws and this agreement and remain peaceful’.

27. ‘Pakistan's Dangerous Afghanistan Policy’, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 3 November 2006.

28. ‘2.3 Tons Hashish, Morphine Seized’, Dawn, 9 December 2002; ‘Arms Cache Seized’, The Daily Times, 13 August 2004; and ‘Taliban Insurgency Shows Signs of Enduring Strength’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2006.

29. Dexter Filkins, ‘US Might Pursue Qaeda and Taliban to Pakistan Lairs’, New York Times, 21 March 2002.

30. Wolf Blitzer, The Situation Room, CNN, 20 September 2006.

31. ‘Bin Laden Search Hampered by Musharraf's Dilemma’, Jane's Foreign Report, 7 July 2005.

32. ‘US Ties with Pakistan Under Strain’, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 23 June 2006.

33. Bob Woodward, ‘Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role’, Washington Post, 18 November 2001.

34. ‘Internecine Struggles among Kashmiri Militants’, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 July 2000.

35. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 22 July 2004, p. 123 and p. 483, n. 74.

36. ‘Designation of Lashkar I Jhangvi as a Foreign Terrorist Organization’, US State Department, Washington DC, 30 January 2003.

37. ‘Lashkar-e-Taiba Spreads Its Tentacles’, Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor, 1 September 2004.

38. ‘The Kashmir Connection’, Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor, 13 September 2006.

39. ICG, Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, ICG Asia Report 125 (Brussels: ICG, 11 December 2006).

40. US Major-General Benjamin Freakley, in Pamela Constable, ‘Dozens Are Killed in Afghanistan Fighting’, Washington Post, 23 May 2006; Peter Bergen, ‘The Taliban, Regrouped and Rearmed’, 10 September 2006, http://www.peterbergen.com/bergen/articles/details.aspx?id=277; Barnett Rubin, Prepared Testimony for the House Committee on International Relations, CFR, 20 September 2006, and General James Jones Jr, Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) US European Command, NATO, in US Senator Richard Lugar, Hearing on Afghanistan Command Transition to the International Security Assistance Force, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing, 21 September 2006.

41. Omid Marzban and Mullah Dadullah, ‘The Military Mastermind of the Taliban Insurgency’, Terrorism Focus, vol. 3, no. 11, 21 March 2006.

42. ‘Increasing Afghan IED Threat Gives Forces Cause for Concern’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 August 2006; and Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Winning Afghanistan: Facing the Rising Threat’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 December 2006.

43. ‘US Genl: Top Afghan Insurgent Leader Operating in Pakistan’, Dow Jones International News, 13 January 2007.

44. ‘The Other Taliban; Pakistan’, The Economist, 18 March 2006.

45. Ahmed Rashid, cited in ‘US: Airstrike Kills Taliban Commander’, Associated Press, 24 December 2006.

46. ‘Bin Laden's “Close Associate” Killed in Southern Afghanistan’, Agence France-Presse, 23 December 2006.

47. Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‘Taleban's Most Feared Commander’, BBC News, 13 May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4998836.stm.

48. Statement of Peter Bergen, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, Committee on House Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2007: ‘Dadullah put Taliban forces at some 12,000 fighters, larger than a US military official's estimate to me of between 7,000 to 10,000, but a number that could have some validity given the numerous part-time Taliban farmer/fighters’.

49. ‘Factbox–Military Deaths in Afghanistan’, Reuters, 28 December 2006.

50. Jean-Luc Marret, The Evolution of Jihadi Profiles, Working Paper, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 11 December 2006.

51. David Montero, ‘Elders Losing to Extremists in Pakistan’, Christian Science Monitor, 8 June 2006; and Declan Walsh, ‘New Frontline in the War on Terror: Waziristan’, The Guardian, 4 May 2006.

52. In December 2006, a nine-page stapled pamphlet printed by the Taliban and signed by Mullah Omar was distributed in Afghanistan. The Layeha (Book of Rules) lays down 29 rules for Taliban recruits. Rules of engagement are described for ‘soft targets’, especially government schools, stating that Taliban recruits must first warn teachers to stop teaching, and only beat them up if they refuse to comply; the unit commander is to kill them if they are ‘found to be teaching against Islam’. The book also tells Taliban soldiers not to loot indiscriminately, and orders them not to kill Afghans working with ‘infidels’ if they are willing to join the movement. Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, ‘By the Book: Taliban Fighters Play By Their Own Rules’, Newsweek, 3 December 2006.

53. ‘Gates Says Cross-Border Attacks in Afghanistan a “Problem”’, Agence France-Presse, 16 January 2007.

54. Declan Walsh, ‘Eyewitness: Spin Boldak, Afghanistan: Afghans Struggle To Police Gateway to Terror’, The Guardian, 22 June 2006.

55. ‘Increasing Afghan IED Threat Gives Forces Cause for Concern’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 August 2006.

56. ‘US Commander Wants More Troops Against Taliban Surge’, Agence France-Presse, 16 January 2007.

57. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9bdo91qF08.

58. The website was until recently at http://www.alemarah.org.

59. Michael Smith, ‘SBS Behind Taliban Leader's Death’, Sunday Times, 27 May 2007.

60. Barnett Rubin, interview transcript, Frontline, 3 October 2006, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/rubin.html.

61. Evan F. Kohlmann, ‘The Real Online Terrorist Threat’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 5, September–October 2006.

62. Interview with Dr Mathieu Guidere, Centre de Recherche des Ecoles de Coëtquidan (CREC), Saint-Cyr Military Academy, France, April 2006.

63. Psychological Operations: An Overview, US Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, 5 September 2003, chapter 1.

64. Declan Walsh, ‘Afghan Schools Under Siege as Taliban Maintain Grip’, Boston Globe, 16 March 2006; and Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, vol. 18, no. 6 (C), July 2006.

65. The other main Pashtun tribal group is the Durrani.

66. The ‘Peshawar 7’: Hezb-i Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Yunus Khales branches); Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Society) of Burhanuddin Rabbani; Itehad Islami (Islamic Unity) of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf; Mahaz-i-Milli Islam (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) of Pir Sayed Ahmad Gilani; Jabha-i-Nijat-Milli (Afghan National Liberation Front) of Sibgratullah Mojaddedi; and Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Forces) of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.

67. Al-Jazeera, 6 May 2006.

68. Omid Marzban, ‘Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: From Holy Warrior to Wanted Terrorist’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 4, no. 18, 21 September 2006.

69. ‘Fourth Generation Warfare and the International Jihad’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2006.

70. Gary Bernsten and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2005), p. 308.

71. Philip G. Smucker, Al Qaeda's Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, April 2005).

72. Victor Korgun, ‘Afghanistan's Resurgent Taliban’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 1, no. 4, October 2003.

73. Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‘A Ride on the Wild Side’, Washington Times, 25 September 2005.

74. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Don't Think Al-Qaeda is on the Back Foot, it will be on the March in 2007’, Sunday Telegraph, 31 December 2006.

75. Hassan Abbas, ‘The Black-Turbaned Brigade: The Rise of TNSM in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 4, no. 23, 30 November 2006.

76. In 2005, Karzai discreetly gave his backing to Sayyaf over Yunus Qanuni, a leading Panjshiri figure, to be speaker of parliament. ‘A Place for Warlords To Meet; Afghanistan’, The Economist, 7 January 2006.

77. Have Hekmatyar's Radicals Reformed?, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, ARR no. 210, 6 April 2006.

78. For the ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan, see the CIA World Factbook, which estimates Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2% and other groups 4%, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/af.html.

79. Kenneth Katzman, Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses, CRS Report for Congress, 11 February 2005.

80. ‘Iran Arming Taliban, US Claims’, CNN.com, 13 June 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/06/13/iran.taliban/index.html.

81. ‘Gates: US Has Evidence of Iran Helping Insurgents’, CNN.com, 9 February 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/02/09/gates.iraq.iran.ap/index.html; and Michael R. Gordon, ‘US Says Iranian Arms Seized in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 18 April 2007.

82. ‘Iraq-Style Bomb Found In Afghanistan’, CBS News, 2 June 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/02/world/main2878128.shtml?source=RSS&attr=_2878128.