Chapter Five: Security-Sector Reform

Abstract

By the middle of 2007, Afghans had become increasingly disillusioned with a state-building process that had failed to deliver the peace dividend that they were promised. For many Afghans, the most noticeable change in their lives since the fall of the Taliban has been an acute deterioration in security conditions. Whether it is predatory warlords, the Taliban-led insurgency, the burgeoning narcotics trade or general criminality, the threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan are manifold. The response to those threats, both in terms of the international military intervention and the donor-supported process to rebuild the security architecture of the Afghan state, known as security-sector reform (SSR), has been largely insufficient to address the task at hand. NATO has struggled to find the troops and equipment it requires to complete its Afghan mission and the SSR process, from its outset, has been severely under-resourced and poorly directed. Compounding these problems, rampant corruption and factionalism in the Afghan government, particularly in the security institutions, have served as major impediments to reform and a driver of insecurity. This paper charts the evolution of the security environment in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, assessing both the causes of insecurity and the responses to them. Through this analysis, it offers some suggestions on how to tackle Afghanistan's growing security crisis.

Notes

1. Opening Address by President Hamid Karzai to the National Symposium on Security Sector Reform, 30 July 2003.

2. Mark Sedra, ‘Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Toward Expediency’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 1, March 2006.

3. See Emma Sky, ‘The Lead Nation Approach: The Case of Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal, December 2006.

4. The framework had been introduced at the January 2002 Tokyo donor conference, but took form at Geneva.

5. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Afghanistan Security: Efforts To Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, But Future Plans Need To Be Better Defined (Washington DC: GAO, June 2005), p. 9.

6. Petersberg Declaration, Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability, 2 December 2002.

7. United Nations Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, A/56/875-S/2002/878 (New York: United Nations, March 2002), p. 10.

8. Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan, National Military Strategy (Kabul: Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan, 2004), p. 10.

9. In July 2005, the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan (OMC-A) was renamed the Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan (OSC-A), after it assumed responsibility for supporting the police as well as the Afghan military. Its name was changed again in May 2006, to the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

10. Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSCT-A), Fact Sheet: Afghan National Army (ANA) Organization, Training and Operations, April 2006, http://oneteam.centcom.mil/default.aspx. The plan was to move to a six-kandak model in December 2006.

11. GAO, Afghanistan Security, pp. 17–18

12. Interview with CSCT-A officials, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

13. Interview with Lieutenant-General Karl W. Eikenberry, Kabul, 19 June 2006.

14. Interview with CSCT-A officials, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

15. Ibid.

16. Jim Garamone, ‘Pace Pleased with Progress at Afghan Training Center’, American Forces Press Service, 23 April 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32901.

17. The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, February 2006, Annex 1.

18. US Department of Defense, News Briefing with Lieutenant-General Karl W. Eikenberry and Minister of Defence Abdul Rahim Wardak in the Pentagon, transcript, 21 November 2006.

19. Helene Cooper and David S. Cloud, ‘Bush To Seek More Aid for Afghanistan as Taliban Regroups’, New York Times, 26 January 2007.

20. Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), pp. 21–2.

21. World Bank, Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development – Improving Public Finance Management in the Security Sector (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), pp. 42–3.

22. Interview with CSTC-A officials, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

23. ‘Defence Minister Says Afghan Army Must Be 5 Times Larger’, Associated Press, 12 July 2006.

24. Ibid.

25. Interview with senior Ministry of Counter-Narcotics official, Kabul, 18 June 2006; interview with senior Interior Ministry official, 23 June 2006.

26. CSTC-A, Factsheet.

27. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Sector Summary Report (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006).

28. David Zucchino, ‘It's Starting To Look a Lot Like an Army’, Los Angeles Times, 22 August 2006.

29. Interview with CSTC-A officials, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

30. Telephone interview, NATO official, 23 October 2006.

31. As of June 2007, the following nations had contributed full OMLTs/ETTs: Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the UK and the US.

32. Anthony H. Cordesman, Winning in Afghanistan: Afghan Force Development (Washington DC: CSIS, 2006).

33. Major Rick Peat and Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Rice, ‘Afghan Military Academy Opens Gates to Future Leaders’, American Forces Press Service, 28 March 2005.

34. Interview with CSTC-A officials, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

35. ‘Afghanistan Celebrates Opening of Command and General Staff College’, American Forces Press Service, 30 October 2006.

36. Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan, Afghan National Army: The Future of a Nation (Kabul: Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan, 2006).

37. Ibid.

38. Interview with Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) official, Kabul, 21 June 2006. There are 2–3 MTTs in the field at any one time; they spend between two weeks and a month providing training down to the battalion level.

39. Jim Garamone, ‘Pace Pleased with Progress at Afghan Training Center’.

40. Antonio Giustozzi and Mark Sedra, Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Pathway Forward – Afghan National Army Technical Annex (Kabul: Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan, 2004).

41. Elaine Shannon, ‘Can More Aid Save Afghanistan?’, Time, 26 January 2007.

42. Giustozzi and Sedra, Securing Afghanistan's Future.

43. MPRI has been contracted to develop the personnel management, payroll and leave system. Interview with MPRI official, Kabul, 21 June 2006.

44. Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Military Reform in Afghanistan’, in Mark Sedra (ed.), Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma: Reforming the Security Sector, Brief 28 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2003).

45. Anja Manuel and P.W. Singer, ‘A New Model Afghan Army’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 8, no. 4, July–August 2002, p. 57.

46. See Chapter 2, note 78.

47. Such allegations are difficult to verify because the US and the Afghan government have refused to reveal a precise ethnic breakdown of the ANA.

48. Interview with Ustad Mohammed Mohaqqeq, Kabul, 16 June 2006; interview with Vice-President Abdul Karim Khalili, Kabul, 18 June 2006.

49. Interview with MPRI official, Kabul, 21 June 2006.

50. Ibid.

51. Seema Patel, Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (Washington DC: Center for Security and International Studies, 2007), p. 38.

52. Personal communication with Western donor official, 31 August 2007.

53. David Zucchino, ‘Afghan Army Could Help Unify a Nation’, Los Angeles Times, 13 November 2006.

54. Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan, Afghan National Army.

55. Ibid.

56. Zucchino, ‘Afghan Army Could Help Unify a Nation’.

57. US Department of Defense, News Briefing with Major-General Robert Durbin and Deputy Minister Abdul Hadir Khalid from in the Pentagon, transcript, 9 January 2007.

58. Ibid.

59. Interview with Deputy Minister of Defence Yusuf Nuristani, Kabul, 20 June 2006.

60. GAO, Afghanistan Security, p. 16.

61. Trini Tran, ‘US Giving Afghans $2B Worth of Weaponry’, Associated Press, 3 July 2006. This is in addition to the roughly $2bn already expended on ANA equipment and infrastructure up to 2006.

62. Zucchino, ‘Afghan Army Could Help Unify a Nation’.

63. United Nations Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, A/59/744-S/2005/183 (New York: United Nations, March 2005), p. 5.

64. Interview with MPRI official, Kabul, 21 June 2006.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid; interview with Western adviser to the Ministry of Defence, Kabul, 14 November 2005.

67. Interview with CSTC-A official, Kabul, 21 June 2006.

68. Ibid.

69. Interview with Western adviser to the Ministry of Defence, Kabul, 14 November 2005.

70. Carlotta Gall, ‘Anti-US Rioting Erupts in Kabul; At Least 14 Dead’, New York Times, 30 May 2006.

71. Carlotta Gall, ‘Afghans Raise Toll of Dead from May Riots in Kabul to 17’, New York Times, 8 June 2006.

72. Interview with CARE Afghanistan Country Director Paul Barker, Kabul, 24 June 2006. The police reportedly donned salwar kameez in an attempt to conceal their uniforms. Others took off their uniforms altogether in favour of civilian clothing.

73. Interview with NGO representative, Kabul, 25 June 2006.

74. Tonita Murray, ‘Police-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Civil Security Building’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 1, January 2007, pp. 122–3.

75. Interview with senior Interior Ministry official, Kabul, 23 June 2006; Scott Baldauf, ‘Inside the Afghan Drug Trade’, Christian Science Monitor, 13 June 2006.

76. Interview with senior Interior Ministry official, Kabul, 23 June 2006; interview with international police adviser, Kabul, 20 June 2006.

77. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, p. 67.

78. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Afghan Press Monitor, no. 51, 25 November 2004.

79. German Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Interior, Assistance for Rebuilding the Police Force in Afghanistan (Berlin: Federal Foreign Ministry and Federal Ministry of Interior, 2005), p. 8.

80. Inspectors General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington DC: Department of State and Department of Defense, November 2006), p. 5. This force figure could be broken down as follows: 44,300 regular police, 12,000 border police, 3,400 highway police and 2,300 counter-narcotics police. However, this blueprint was superseded by amendments to the size and structure of the ANP in 2006, which saw the force target expanded to 82,000, the creation of a standby police unit and the disbanding of the highway police.

81. Interview with UNAMA official, Kabul, 13 June 2006.

82. ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police (Brussels: ICG, 2007), p. 10.

83. German Embassy in Washington, Secure and Democratic Future for Afghanistan: Germany's Commitment, 2006, http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/archives/background/Afghanistan_factsheet.pdf; German Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Interior, Assistance for Rebuilding the Police Force in Afghanistan, p. 9; personal communication with Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) researcher, 10 February 2007.

84. Interview with Norwegian police project official, Kabul, 3 May 2005.

85. German Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Interior, Assistance For Rebuilding the Police Force in Afghanistan, p. 11. Of these, 57 graduates were women.

86. Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, Paper 25 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002).

87. The topics covered by the curriculum included crime investigation, operational police skills and human rights. Due to a lack of weapons and ammunition, trainees did not receive firearms training until 2006. Thirty DynCorp advisers were originally dispatched across the country to conduct the training. GAO, Afghanistan Security, p. 23.

88. Ibid., p. 20; Pam O'Toole, ‘Afghan Police “Under-equipped”’, BBC News Online, 13 July 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/6897051.stm.

89. GAO, Afghanistan Security, p. 20.

90. Inspectors General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 15.

91. Ibid., p. 16.

92. Ibid., p. 22.

93. The police have borne the brunt of casualties in the ongoing insurgency with the Taliban. Between May 2006 and May 2007, 406 ANP were killed, more than twice the number of fatalities in the ANA over the same period (ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police, p. 14).

94. Inspectors General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 22.

95. O'Toole, ‘Afghan Police “Under-equipped”’.

96. Equipment donations from the international community totalled $92.5m from FY2002 to 2006; Inspectors-General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 44.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., p. 20.

99. Interview with CSTC-A officials, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

100. Inspectors-General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, pp. 20–21.

101. Interview with senior Interior Ministry official, Kabul, 23 June 2006; Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, p. 69.

102. Interview with senior ANBP official, Kabul, 30 April 2005; ICG, Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track (Brussels: ICG, 2005), p. 7.

103. ICG, Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, p. 7.

104. Interview with senior ANP official, Kabul, 19 June 2006.

105. Ibid.

106. ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police, p. 7. Some mentors will also come from the military and MPRI.

107. Inspectors-General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 25.

108. Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Afghanistan: EU Aid Targets Justice System’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 February 2007.

109. Telephone interview with Professor Ali A. Jalali, 16 November 2006.

110. Interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 6 November 2005.

111. Interview with senior Interior Ministry official, Kabul, 23 June 2006; Baldauf, ‘Inside the Afghan Drug Trade’.

112. Interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 6 November 2005.

113. The tashkil is an organisational document which dictates force structure, personnel end-strength, command relationships and unit/staff functions.

114. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’; telephone interview with Ali A. Jalali, 16 November 2006.

115. Interview with EC official, Kabul, 22 June 2006.

116. Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police (Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007), p. 38. To facilitate the efficient delivery of salaries to the ANP, the US has established a programme to build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior Finance Department, notably in developing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting and Pay Master system (Inspectors General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 28).

117. Interview with EC official, Kabul, 22 June 2006.

118. Wilder, Cops or Robbers, p. 24.

119. World Bank, Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development, p. 46; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact: Bi-Annual JCMB Report (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, November 2006), p. 6.

120. GAO, Afghanistan Security, p. 26.

121. Interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 6 November 2005.

122. Ibid.

123. ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police, pp. 8–9; Wilder, Cops or Robbers, pp. 19–20.

124. ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police, p. 8.

125. Interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 14 June 2006.

126. Inspectors General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 18.

127. Interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 14 June 2006.

128. Wilder, Cops or Robbers, pp. 27–8.

129. Ibid; ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police, p. 9.

130. Captain Dave Huxsoll, ‘Afghan Interior Ministry Reforms Rank, Pay Structures’, DefendAmerica, 4 November 2005, http://www.defendamerica.mil.

131. Inspectors-General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 27.

132. Huxsoll, ‘Afghan Interior Ministry Reforms Rank, Pay Structures’.

133. Interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 14 June 2006. One of the 14 candidates did not sit the written test, while the remaining 13 were not subjected to the file review process.

134. Declan Walsh, ‘UN Report Sheds Light on Afghans’ Darkest Deeds', San Francisco Chronicle, 17 June 2006.

135. Interview with CSTC-A officials, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

136. UNAMA, Press Briefing Transcript, 17 January 2007, www.unama-afg.org.

137. Wilder, Cops or Robbers, pp. 41–2.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Afghanistan Ministry of Interior, Afghan National Police: In Service for the People (Kabul: Afghanistan Ministry of Interior and CSTC-A, 2006); interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 14 June 2006.

141. Interview with international police adviser, Kabul, 20 June 2006. The system is intended to be funded by LOTFA.

142. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.

143. Inspectors-General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, p. 29. It is envisioned that the temporary police will be integrated into the regular ANP after one year of service.

144. Mark Sedra, Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and Strategic Pathway Forward – National Police and Law Enforcement Technical Annex (Kabul: Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan, 2004).

145. Interview with MPRI official, Kabul, 21 June 2006.

146. Inspectors-General of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, pp. 31–2. It is important to note that the GPPO objected to the adoption of this structure in the tashkil. The GPPO proposed an eight-region system, designed to ensure balanced regional and ethnic representation in the commands. It perceived the transplantation of the ANA command structure as an attempt to militarise the police, with deleterious implications for the reform process. Interview with GPPO official, Kabul, 6 November 2005.

147. ‘Suspects Detained in Afghanistan; Police Center Opens’, American Forces Press Service, 20 December 2006.

148. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Sector Summary Report (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006); ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police, p. 13.

149. As of January 2007, camps had been established in Farah, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Ghazni and Kandahar; Captain Greg Hignite, ‘On Patrol: Newest ANAP Graduates Provide Security in Kandahar’, CSTC-A Defense and Security Highlights Afghanistan (CSTC-A: Kabul, 7 January 2007).

150. ICG, Reforming Afghanistan's Police, p. 13.

151. Benjamin Sand, ‘Afghan Government Recruiting Thousands of Auxiliary Police To Battle Insurgents’, Voice of America, 10 January 2007.

152. US Department of Defense, News Briefing with Major-General Robert Durbin and Deputy Minister Abdul Hadir Khalid at the Pentagon, transcript, 9 January 2007.

153. Personal communication with Western donor official, Waterloo, Canada, 19 December 2006.

154. Interview with Ustad Mohammed Mohaqqeq, Kabul, 16 June 2006; interview with Vice-President Abdul Karim Khalili, Kabul, 18 June 2006.

155. Interview with senior UNAMA official, Kabul, 17 June 2006.

156. Personal communication with Western military official, 8 July 2007.

157. Paddy Ashdown, ‘International Humanitarian Law, Justice and Reconciliation in a Changing World’, The Eighth Hauser Lecture on Humanitarian Law, New York, 3 March 2004, http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/lordpaddyashdown.pdf.

158. David Tolbert with Andrew Soloman, ‘United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Developing Countries’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 19, Spring 2006, pp. 44–5.

159. Ibid., p. 45.

160. Bonn Agreement, Article II, No. 2.

161. World Bank, Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development, p. 50.

162. Thier, Re-establishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, CDDRL Working Paper No. 19 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for International Studies, September 2004), p. 2.

163. Lobjakas, ‘Afghanistan: EU Aid Targets Justice System’.

164. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Justice for All: A Ten-Year Strategy for Justice Reform in Afghanistan (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, October 2005), p. 13.

165. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, unpublished, June 2006, p. 7; interview with USAID official, Kabul, 14 November 2005.

166. Interview with senior Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 22 June 2006.

167. Lobjakas, ‘Afghanistan: EU Aid Targets Justice System’.

168. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, p. 10.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid., p. 11.

171. Interview with senior Afghan Ministry of Justice official, Kabul, 9 May 2005.

172. Interview with Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 15 May 2005; interview with senior Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 22 June 2006.

173. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, p. 11.

174. Ibid.

175. Ibid., p. 12.

176. Interview with senior Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 22 June 2006. It is also envisioned that a Master's of Law degree course will be offered there.

177. Barfield, Nojumi and Thier, The Clash of Two Goods, pp. 19–20. During a 40-year period from 1964 to 2004, seven new constitutions or basic laws were enacted, in 1964, 1977, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1992 (a proposed mujahadeen constitution) and the most recent constitution in 2004.

178. Ibid.

179. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, p. 5.

180. It is based largely on the 1965/74 Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Interim CPC and the Egyptian CPC; UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, pp. 5–6.

181. Interview with Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 15 May 2005. For instance, in the Interim CPC, a suspect can be kept in custody without trial for a month, at which time they would have to be released. The new CPC permits detentions without trial of up to six months.

182. Thier, Re-establishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, p. 12.

183. Interview with USAID official, Kabul, 14 November 2005.

184. Interview with senior Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 22 June 2006.

185. Interview with UNAMA official, Kabul, 22 June 2006.

186. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, p. 1. The Justice Sector CG comprises several working groups, including Law Reform, Institutional Capacity and Physical Infrastructure, Legal Education and Professional Training, Legal Aid and Access to Justice, Land Reform, Prisons and Detention Centres and the Advisory Group on Women and Children in Justice.

187. Interview with senior Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 22 June 2006.

188. Interview with senior Afghan Ministry of Justice official, Kabul, 9 May 2005.

189. Thier, Re-establishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, p. 1.

190. Carlotta Gall, ‘Afghan Parliament Rejects Chief Justice Nominee’, New York Times, 28 May 2006.

191. Thier, ‘Order in the Courts’, New York Times, 28 August 2006.

192. Amin Tarzi, ‘Afghanistan: New Supreme Court Could Mark Genuine Departure’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 August 2006.

193. Kim Barker, ‘Afghanistan's Judge of Last Resort’, Chicago Tribune, 28 January 2007.

194. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Justice for All, Preface.

195. Ibid., p. 3.

196. Ibid., p. 14.

197. The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the People (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2006), p. 59.

198. Ali Wardak, ‘Building a Post-war Justice System in Afghanistan’, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 41, no. 4, May 2004.

199. Ibid., p. 320.

200. Barfield, Nojumi and Thier, The Clash of Two Goods, p. 3.

201. Ibid., p. 4.

202. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Justice for All, p. 7.

203. The studies include USAID, Field Study of Informal and Customary Justice in Afghanistan and Recommendations on Improving Access to Justice and Relations Between Formal Courts and Informal Bodies (Washington DC: USAID, June 2005); International Legal Foundation (ILF), The Customary Laws of Afghanistan (New York: ILF, September 2004); and Barfield, Nojumi and Thier, The Clash of Two Goods.

204. Barfield, Nojumi and Thier, The Clash of Two Goods, p. 22.

205. Office of the President, President Karzai Assigns the Attorney General To Take Decisive Actions Against Corruption, Press Release, 28 August 2006.

206. Interview with Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 15 May 2005.

207. Sarah Lister, Moving Forward? Assessing Public Administration Reform in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, September 2006), p. 4.

208. Ibid., p. 8.

209. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Justice for All, p. 8.

210. Interview with senior Afghan Ministry of Justice Official, Kabul, 9 May 2005.

211. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, p. 16.

212. A significant number of these facilities were in fact rented and were not designed to serve as detention facilities.

213. ‘General Director of Prisons Chosen’, Pajhwok News Agency, 24 January 2007.

214. This figure does not include those held in the approximately 300 smaller district-level detention facilities across the country.

215. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, p. 17.

216. Ibid.

217. Ibid.; interview with Italian Justice Project official, Kabul, 15 May 2005.

218. Ibid.

219. Marco-Toscano Rivalta and Drury Allen, Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Pathway Forward – Considerations on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System (Kabul: Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan, 2004).

220. UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice Sector Overview, p. 19.

221. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Justice for All, p. 5.

222. Hamid Karzai, Statement at the Tokyo Conference on the ‘Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan – Change of Order “From Guns to Plows”’, 22 February 2003.

223. Quoted in Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture, p. 3.

224. Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, Brochure for the Second Tokyo Conference on Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan (Kabul: ANBP, 15 June 2006).

225. ICG, Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, p. 3.

226. Weapons constructed locally or in the Pakistani weapons workshops that dot the border with Afghanistan were viewed as equivalent to unserviceable and rejected. Rossi and Giustozzi quote a UNAMA official as saying that 36% of all weapons collected were constructed in workshops in Pakistan (Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Afghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities, Working Paper No. 2, Series No. 2 (London: LSE Crisis States Research Centre, 2006), p. 4.

227. Sedra, Securing Afghanistan's Future, pp. 3–7.

228. ICG, Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, p. 6.

229. Political Parties Law, Art. 6, No. 5.

230. ICG, Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, p. 6.

231. Christian Dennys, Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament? The Effects of Disarmament in Afghanistan (Kabul: Japan Afghan NGO Network, June 2005), p. 4; Rossi and Giustozzi, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan, p. 4; interview with International Organisation for Migration (IOM) consultant, Kabul, 5 May 2005.

232. Interview with ANBP Special Adviser, Kabul, 29 April 2005.

233. Interview with senior ANBP official, Kabul, 13 June 2006.

234. Ibid.

235. ANBP, Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, p. 2.

236. The majority of ex-combatants chose the agricultural option (41.9%), with small-business support (24.6%) and vocational training (15.5%) the next most popular options. The reintegration programme cost approximately $1,200 per ex-combatant, with $700 being directly expended on reintegration packages and the remaining $500 absorbed by overhead costs (ANBP, Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, p. 5). Interview with USAID DDR Program Manager, Kabul, 24 May 2005.

237. UNDP, Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004 (Kabul: UNDP, 2004), p. 57.

238. It is important to note that this was a self-evaluation conducted by the ANBP rather than an external actor, making its results more vulnerable to criticism.

239. Interview with senior ANBP official, Kabul, 13 June 2006.

240. ANBP, Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, p. 2.

241. Interview with senior Japanese Embassy official, Kabul, 12 May 2005.

242. ICG, Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, pp. 11–12.

243. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Strategy for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, January 2006), http://www.diag.gov.af, p. 1.

244. Ibid., p. 11.

245. The Afghan government defines an illegal armed group as ‘a group of five or more armed individuals operating outside the law, drawing its cohesion from (a) loyalty to the commander, (b) receipt of material benefits, (c) impunity enjoyed by members, [and] (d) shared ethnic or social background’. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Strategy for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan, p. 2.

246. Interview with ANBP official, Kabul, 23 May 2005.

247. The members of the committee include the National Security Adviser, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, National Directorate of Security, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, the EU, UNAMA, the ANBP, the Coalition and ISAF.

248. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Strategy for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan, pp. 4–5.

249. Ibid., p. 7.

250. Japan's contribution to the $35m DIAG development fund has largely been channelled through Afghan development initiatives such as the National Area Based Development Program and the National Solidarity Program, which are engaged in the provision of DIAG community-development projects. Other donors to the DIAG process include the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UNDP and Denmark.

251. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 11 Province Main Phase DIAG Proposal, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, unpublished, 5 November 2005.

252. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Guidelines for DIAG Development Activities, unpublished, 2005.

253. During the national assembly and provincial council election stage of the DIAG process, over 124 candidates submitted 4,857 weapons and 34 candidates were disqualified for non-compliance.

254. Interview with official from the DIAG Joint Secretariat, Kabul, 24 June 2006.

255. Ibid.

256. Ibid.

257. Office of the Afghan National Security Council (ONSC), Security Sector Paper (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004), p. 15.

258. Mark Sedra, ‘European Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Examining Trends Through the Lens of Afghanistan’, European Security, vol. 15, no. 3, September 2006.