Chapter Three: Indonesia

Abstract

There is no recipe for democratisation that can be readily applied to all countries. Every country presents unique factors that influence the fate of its democratic reforms, which must therefore be evaluated within their specific socio-political, cultural and historical context.

Building on this premise, this paper examines military reform and democratisation through the experiences of Turkey and Indonesia, two democratising countries with predominantly Muslim populations, secular regimes, and militaries that are deeply involved in politics.

The paper strives to explain why both the Turkish and Indonesian militaries, which have developed a sense of ownership over the state, may be wary of democratic change; how the people perceive the military's traditional role in society; and in which direction societal and military attitudes towards democratic reform have been moving over the years.

In relating these domestic observations to various external factors, it seeks to identify the regional and global trends, events and actors that promote and obstruct the development of substantive democracy in each country, and to draw broader lessons for the study of democratisation and military reform.

Notes

1. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.

2. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, East–West Center Occasional Papers, Politics and Security Series, no. 4, February 2001, p. 9.

3. Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 192.

4. Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 275.

5. This last clause has become one of the main ideological tools employed by the military to justify its socio-political role and excessive political influence.

6. Pratikno, ‘Exercising Freedom: Local Autonomy and Democracy in Indonesia, 1999–2001’, in Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole Faucher (eds), Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p. 23.

7. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 8.

8. BICC Country Briefing, ‘Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2005, p. 2.

9. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 192.

10. Pratikno, ‘Exercising Freedom: Local Autonomy and Democracy in Indonesia, 1999–2001’, p. 23.

11. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 178.

12. Ibid., p. 148.

13. Ibid., p. 196.

14. In the late 1980s, Suharto helped to form and supported the Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals; he also cultivated a ‘green’, or Islamist, faction within the military against the ‘red and white’ – nationalist secular – hardline officers. For the Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals, see Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power (Washington DC: RAND Monograph Report, 2002), p. 37. For the ‘green faction’, see Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, p. 277.

15. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 201. Emphasis added.

16. The ‘New Paradigm’ was subsequently published as a book entitled ‘The TNI in the Twenty-First Century’. DEPHANKAM, TNI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisisi Peran TNI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa (Jakarta: Jasa Buma, 1999).

17. Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2006), p. 165.

18. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 1.

19. Lex Reiffel, ‘Indonesia's Quiet Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 5, 2004, p. 104.

20. Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, p. 290.

21. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 26.

22. Aceh is rich in oil and gas. Irian Jaya is the site of the world's largest gold and copper mining operations; it also has extensive oil and gas reserves. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 106.

23. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 178.

24. For more on oknum-oknum, see ibid., p. 179.

25. The military established a ‘military operation zone’ in Aceh province in 1990 in response to the increasing number of uprisings there in the late 1980s. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 22.

26. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 69. The military's economic interests will be elaborated in the ‘state’ section.

27. BICC Country Briefing, ‘Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 3.

28. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 145.

29. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 285.

30. Reiffel, ‘Indonesia's Quiet Revolution’, p. 105.

31. Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order (Singapore: NIAS Press, 2005), p. 61.

32. Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), p. 399.

33. For more on keterbukaan, see Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, pp. 8–14.

34. Ibid., pp. 109–10. Harold Crouch characterises the main divide as being between ‘financial’ and ‘professional’ generals; the former wishing to preserve the status quo, the latter opting for reform. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 308–9.

35. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 35.

36. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability, p. 42.

37. As translated in Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, p. 54.

38. Pratikno, ‘Exercising Freedom: Local Autonomy and Democracy in Indonesia, 1999–2001’, p. 23.

39. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 30.

40. Terence Lee, ‘Indonesian Military Taking the Slow Road to Reform’, Straits Times, 18 December 2004.

41. ‘When Generals go on Manoeuvres’, Jakarta Post, 26 January 2007.

42. Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, p. 240.

43. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, ‘The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems’, in Jim Rolfe (ed.), The Asia Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 195.

44. Major post-1998 conflicts and movements: conflict between the Dayaks and the Madurese in Kalimantan, and between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas; the resurgence of the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh; and the insurgencies in East Timor and Irian Jaya.

45. Bhakti, ‘The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems’, p. 195. While Indonesia's GDP per capita grew significantly between 1998 ($1,066) and 2006 ($3,900) (see CIA World Factbook), extreme poverty continues to plague a very significant portion of the population, and the income discrepancy between rich and poor has widened. In 2006, more than 39m people (18% of the population) lived beneath the official poverty line of $16.80 per month, notwithstanding the overall increase in national wealth. ‘Poverty in Indonesia: Always with Them’, The Economist, 14 September 2006.

46. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 1.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., pp. 32–3.

49. Vedi Hadiz, ‘Reorganizing Political Power in Indonesia’, in Erb, Sulistiyanto and Faucher, Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, p. 45.

50. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 273.

51. Anwar, ‘Indonesian Domestic Priorities Define National Security’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice, Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998) p. 475.

52. Anwar, ‘Indonesia's Role in ASEAN’, paper presented to seminar on ‘The ASEAN Experience and its Relevance for SAARC’, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1995, p. 3.

53. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability, pp. 19–23. These purges also saw the expulsion of leftist officers from the military. Ibid., p. 29.

54. Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, p. 103.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p. 104.

57. Ibid.

58. Anwar, ‘The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Democratisation and Political Transition in Asia’, paper presented to the conference on ‘Asia Pacific Security in a Time of Economic Recovery’, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 1999, p. 3.

59. Indonesia's economy shrank by 13.5% in 1997. The rupiah plunged from an exchange rate of 2,000 rupiah to $1 to 18,000 to $1 in a few months. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.pdf.

60. Anwar, ‘The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Democratisation and Political Transition in Asia’, pp. 5–7.

61. Joakim Ojendal, ‘Back to the Future? Regionalism in South-East Asia Under Unilateral Pressure’, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3, 2004, p. 522.

62. Anwar, ‘Indonesia's Role in ASEAN’, p. 4.

63. Ojendal, ‘Back to the Future? Regionalism in South-East Asia Under Unilateral Pressure’, p. 524.

64. Anwar, ‘The Future of Asia in the 21^st Century and the Role of ASEAN’, paper presented to the international symposium on ‘Interaction for Progress: Myanmar in ASEAN’, Yangon, Myanmar, October 1998, p. 4.

65. ‘Malaysian Foreign Minister Says ASEAN is No “Talk Shop”’, Asian Political News, 12 May 2005.

66. ‘Lessons from Indonesia: Predatory Power Possible Under Democracy’, Jakarta Post, 20 December 2006.

67. The EU did initially refuse to conduct free-trade negotiations with ASEAN because of concerns about undemocratic regimes in certain member states. But talks were launched in February 2007, sparking protest among pro-democracy groups; see http://www.eubusiness.com/Trade/1178276401.21/.

68. Gareth Evans, ‘Indonesia's Military Culture has to be Reformed’, International Herald Tribune, 24 July 2001.

69. Ibid.

70. ‘Indonesia Protests Australia's Papua Visa Decision’, ABC News Online, 24 March 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200603/s1600102.htm.

71. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 113.

72. BICC Country Briefing, ‘Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 6.

73. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 114.

74. Ojendal, ‘Back to the Future? Regionalism in South-East Asia Under Unilateral Pressure’, p. 533.

75. BICC Country Briefing, ‘Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 6.

76. ‘Wolfowitz Dukung Kerja Sama Militer dengan Indonesia’, Kompas (Indonesian daily), 11 October 2002.

77. Tim Johnston, ‘US Eases Indonesia Arms Ban’, BBC News, 26 May 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4581733.stm.

78. ‘IMET Resumption Seen as Recognition of TNI Reform’, Jakarta Post, 1 March 2005.

79. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, ‘Terrorism, Democratization and Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, working paper presented to Indonesia Research Unit, Institute of Political Science, Justus-Liebig University, Giessen, Germany, 20 December 2005, p. 12.

80. Bhakti, ‘The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems’, p. 205.

81. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 13.

82. For the most recent official record of the composition of the MPR, as well as an explanation of its functions, see People's Consultative Assembly – Republic of Indonesia (MPR-RI), Annual Report 2003, http://www.mpr.go.id/pdf/ketetapan/putusan%20MPRRI%202003.pdf.

83. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 13.

84. Ibid. In 1997, under mounting popular pressure for liberal reform, the Suharto government reduced the military contingent in the DPR to 75.

85. BICC Country Briefing, ‘Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 2.

86. Dwight Y. King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 225.

87. BICC Country Briefing, ‘Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 3.

88. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 19.

89. In 2001, for instance, it amounted to 0.8% of GDP, and less than 4% of the government's budget. Husain Pontoh Coen, ‘Guns, Ammunition and the Stench of Blood: Unravelling Military Involvement in the Ambon Conflict’, Pantau, year 3, no. 33, January 2003, p. 141.

90. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 70.

91. An audit of the main army foundation found that in 2000 its companies returned a net loss of 8.21bn rupiah ($985,000). Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High A Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities’, vol. 18, no.5 (C), June 2006, p. 15.

92. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 144.

93. ‘Daerah Konflik, Peluang Bisnis Militer-Pengusaha’, Kompas, 13 September 2003.

94. Ichsan Malik, ‘Military Business in the Maluku Conflict Area’, in Roem Topatimasang and Don K. Marut (eds), The Land of Soldiers: Exploring the Political Economy of Indonesian Military (Yogyakarta: INSIST Press, 2007), p. 131.

95. Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High A Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities’, p. 72.

96. Danang Widoyoko, Irfan Muktiono, Adnan Topan Husodo, Barly Harliem Noe and Agung Wijaya, ‘Bisnis Militer Mencari Legitimasi’, Indonesia Corruption Watch, Jakarta, 2002, pp. 39–40, http://www.antikorupsi.org/docs/bukubismil.pdf.

97. Kompas, 7 October 2001, quotation translated in George Junus Aditjondro, ‘Ebony, Security Post Business, Arms Trade, and Protecting Big Capital: The Political Economy of Military Business in Eastern Sulawesi’, in Topatimasang and Marut, The Land of Soldiers: Exploring the Political Economy of Indonesian Military, p. 153.

98. ‘Presidential Push Needed on TNI's Internal Reform’, Jakarta Post, 27 February 2007.

99. Ridwan Max Sijabat, ‘Government Urged to Put Military Out of Business’, Jakarta Post, 17 February 2007.

100. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 16.

101. Ibid., p. 17.

102. Ibid., p. 20.

103. Perwita, ‘Terrorism, Democratization and Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 10.

104. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 16.

105. Perwita, ‘Terrorism, Democratization and Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 10.

106. Anwar, ‘Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military’, p. 26.

107. M. Taufiqurrahman, ‘Defence Minister Says TNI Not Out to Regain New Order Power’, Jakarta Post, 2 March 2007.

108. Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesiapp. 240–41.

109. Robert Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 295.

110. Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, p. 114.

111. Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, p. 39.

112. King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia, p. 224.

113. Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, p. 181.

114. Ibid., p. 178.

115. Ibid., p. 179.

116. ‘Indonesia Not to Try Wiranto’, Tempo Interaktive, 21 June 2007.

117. ‘Army Accused Over Moluccas Conflict’, BBC News, 17 July 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/836852.stm.

118. Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, p. 183.

119. Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, p. 297.

120. BICC Country Briefing, ‘Security Sector Reform in Indonesia’, p. 11.

121. Ibid., p. 2.

122. Harry Bhaskara, ‘Is Our Democracy on the Right Track?’, Jakarta Post, 16 October 2006.

123. Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, p. 234.

124. Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High A Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities’, p. 19.

125. Alvin Darlanika Soedarjo, ‘TNI Unveils New Doctrine: No Politics’, Jakarta Post, 25 January 2007.

126. Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, p. 51.

127. Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, p. 200.

128. ‘Eighteen Regencies Sharia Bound’, Indonesia Matters, 4 May 2006, http://www.indonesiamatters.com/320/eighteen-regencies-sharia-bound/.

129. John Aglionby, ‘Jakarta Struggles with Politics of Pornography as Playboy Comes to Town’, Guardian, 30 January 2006; ‘A Softer Islamic Hard Line Sweeps Indonesia’, International Herald Tribune, 29 June 2007.