Chapter Two: Japan's Military Doctrine, Expenditure and Power Projection

Abstract

Is Japan on a path towards assuming a greater military role internationally, or has the recent military normalisation ground to a halt since the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi? In this book, Christopher W. Hughes assesses developments in defence expenditure, civil–military relations, domestic and international military–industrial complexes, Japan's procurement of regional and global power-projection capabilities, the expansion of US–Japan cooperation, and attitudes towards nuclear weapons, constitutional revision and the use of military force.

In all of these areas, dynamic and long-term changes outweigh Japan's short-term political logjam over security policy. Hughes argues that many post-war constraints on Japan's military role are still eroding, and that Tokyo is moving towards a more assertive military role and strengthened US–Japan cooperation. Japan's remilitarisation will boost its international security role and the dominance of the US–Japan alliance in regional and global security affairs, but will need to be carefully managed if it is not to become a source of destabilising tensions.

Japan's changing defence doctrines and capabilities

In order to respond to the multifarious security challenges it faces, Japan has found it necessary to embark upon successive revisions of its national defence doctrines and capabilities. This process, initiated towards the end of Koizumi's administration, has continued under his successors. Japan released a revised NDPG in December 2004, together with a new MTDP for 2005–09 setting out the country's long-term military procurement plans. The NDPG followed the 1995 NDPO in stressing Japan's regional security concerns and the importance of the US–Japan alliance in responding to them, but moved beyond its predecessor by outlining a range of new threats, including ballistic-missile strikes, guerrilla and special-operations attacks, incursions into its territorial waters and chemical and biological warfare. These concerns are a clear reflection of North Korean and Chinese activities; indeed, the NDPG went further than the 1995 NDPO, not only in identifying North Korea specifically as a destabilising factor in East Asia, but also for the first time highlighting concerns about China's impact on regional security, albeit in oblique terms (Japan, the document said, would ‘remain attentive’ to China's future military modernisation).1 The NDPG also went beyond the 1995 NDPO in its emphasis on global security interests outside East Asia. According to the NDPG, ‘the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan’, thereby mapping Japan's own security interests onto those of the US in the ‘arc of instability’. Japan would engage actively in ‘international peace cooperation’ activities through the dispatch of the JSDF to support US-led and UN multinational operations.2

For Japan to fulfill these regional and global responsibilities, the NDPG and MTDP both argue that the JSDF should seek to establish ‘multi-functional, flexible and effective’ forces characterised by mobility and rapid-reaction capabilities, enhanced joint command and control and the capacity to undertake joint tri-service operations, increased interoperability with UN and US forces, and state-of-the-art intelligence and military technologies. In terms of specific organisation and hardware, the MTDP stresses a quantitative reduction in Japan's Cold War-style forces, and a switch instead to a smaller but qualitatively strengthened JSDF equipped with greater power-projection capabilities.

The 2004 NDPG thus set the agenda for the augmentation of Japanese military power and capabilities over a five-year period that stretched beyond the end of Koizumi's premiership. In early 2009, Japanese security planners were engaged in preparing a revised NDPG for release at the end of the year. The Ministry of Defense started internal discussions on the revised NDPG in 2008 and, as with the revision process of the 1995 NDPO and 2004 NDPG, a new Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense was established in Aso's office in January 2009. The Advisory Group is chaired by Tsunehiko Katsumata, the president of the Tokyo Electric Power Company, and consists of senior academics and former government officials. It is charged with providing an expert and independent report on reformulating the NDPG by mid 2009, to help inform the Ministry of Defense's own efforts. Hence, Japan is engaged in long-term planning for its security policy, and it is within this context that the extent of its remilitarisation should be judged.

Defence expenditure

Assessing Japan's remilitarisation, measured in terms of the size of the defence budget and the number of JSDF personnel, requires a careful methodology and can only partially reveal the extent of military change. Nevertheless, the Japanese defence budget demands examination, first, because any significant change would be a classic symptom of remilitarisation, and second, because Japan itself has long made significant international play of its limited defence budget as a symbol of its restrained military stance.

Measured in US dollar terms (see Appendix: Table 1), the total Japanese defence budget rose strongly between the end of the Cold War and the mid 2000s, reaching between $40bn and $45bn, making Japan the world's third-highest defence spender after the US and France in the late 1990s, and the fourth-highest in 2005 after the US, France and the UK, albeit with the prospect of slipping behind China. These figures are inflated, though, by the relative strength of the yen against the US dollar. If Japan's defence budget is calculated in yen (Table 1), then it has stagnated and actually fallen since the late 1990s, with around $40bn or ¥5 trillion accepted as a de facto ceiling on expenditure. Japan's defence budget in dollar or local-currency terms has not experienced the large-scale growth seen in the US, major NATO states, Russia and even China in the post-11 September period, staying at less than 1% annual growth until 2002, and then contracting to rates of growth between 0.1% and 1.0% until 2008 (Table 1). Defence expenditure is declining in relative importance as a government priority in comparison to the increasing proportion of expenditure devoted to social security and public works in the last decade, declining from around 6.5% of total government spending in the mid 1980s to under 6% by 2008.3 The amounts available within this tightening defence budget for the procurement of new weapons systems are also under severe pressure. The breakdown of the defence budget demonstrates a long-term trend in which an increasing proportion of funds, 44% by 2008, are directed towards personnel and provisions, with a declining proportion going towards equipment acquisition – from approximately 23% of the budget in 1988 to around 17% in 2008.4 Japan's defence allocations are under constant pressure from other sectors. Since 2004, the Ministry of Finance has consistently trimmed requests for 1.2–1.5% increases in the defence budget down to below 1%; for 2009, a 2.2% requested increase was cut to 0.8%.5

Japan's stagnating defence budget suggests continuing constraints on its remilitarisation. This impression is reinforced by the maintenance of the 1% of GNP limit on expenditure. Prime Minister Takeo Miki first introduced the principle in 1976 to limit criticism of the NDPO.6 Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in effect breached the principle by pushing defence spending just above 1% in 1987, although successive administrations have since kept expenditure just below this ceiling (Table 1). Japan's reluctance to increase its defence budget has been a source of frustration not only for the Ministry of Defense and the JSDF but also for the US: US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer called publicly in May 2008 for Japan to increase its defence expenditure to take account of rising defence budgets elsewhere in East Asia.7 However, while it is clear that the size of the defence budget is an important constraint on Japan's remilitarisation, it also should be noted that Japan has used sleight of hand to maintain the 1% limit, that defence expenditure is thus growing in certain ways and that, in consequence, apparent quantitative restrictions have not been an absolute bar on the qualitative expansion of Japan's military power.

Japan's defence budget – in contrast to the practice of NATO states with which it always chooses to compare itself in terms of the limits on its defence expenditure in its annual Defense of Japan White Papers – excludes military pensions and the costs of the paramilitary JCG.8 The government has sought to obfuscate the military status of the JCG, with Article 25 of the JCG Law stating that the entity should not be seen as a military unit.9 Article 80 indicates clearly, though, that the JCG can be regarded as a paramilitary force, due to the fact that, at times of JSDF mobilisation, the JCG can be brought directly under the command of the Minister of Defense.10 Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter 4, the MSDF and JCG have operated as an integrated force in antipiracy missions from March 2009. The JCG possesses increasing lethal force for meeting the external maritime threat from North Korea and China, and its budget has expanded during the current decae even as the rest of the defence budget has stagnated.11 If Japan's defence budget is thus recalculated on a NATO basis, including pensions and the JCG (the figures obtained for the first time here in either Japanese or English), or so-called kakushi yosan (hidden budgets), defence expenditure has actually consistently exceeded the 1% of GNP limit since the 1980s, oscillating between 1.1% and 1.5% (Table 1).12

Japan has also maintained the pretence of keeping defence expenditure within 1% of GNP, while still managing to find the budgetary flexibility to procure expensive and qualitatively improved military equipment, through the practice of deferred payments (saimu futan koi).13 This has been used since the 1970s to spread the costs of weapon systems over a number of years, building up large-scale future payments equivalent to 60%-plus of defence expenditure (see Appendix: Table 2). These payments will have to be serviced at some point from the defence budget, and thus may limit the potential for future budgetary growth, but the practice has allowed for considerable flexibility with regard to surpassing the formal 1% limit, and has enabled Japan to continue expanding its military capabilities.

The size and capabilities of the JSDF

Measuring Japan's remilitarisation in terms of the overall size and recruitment trends of the JSDF produces a similarly mixed picture. In line with the 1995 NDPO and 2004 NDPG, the JSDF's overall personnel strength certainly declined since the end of the Cold War. With the disappearance of the threat of a Soviet land invasion, the GSDF in particular has contracted, losing close to a fifth of its regular personnel since the first NDPO in 1976 (see Appendix: Table 3). Equipment levels have also declined, with the GSDF losing almost a third of its main battle tanks (MBT), and the MSDF and ASDF approximately one-tenth of their destroyers and combat aircraft. At the same time, however, the JCG's total tonnage has climbed from 97,000 in 1988 to 126,000 in 2007 (see Appendix: Table 4), and its personnel have increased to around 12,000.14 A better guide to Japan's military direction in the post-Cold War period, however, is not the quantitative reduction in the size of the JSDF, but rather the qualitative improvement in its military capabilities. As noted at the start of this chapter, the NDPG and MTDP of 2004 sought to convert the JSDF into a ‘multi-functional, flexible’ force. This has meant the progressive erosion of Japan's opposition to the possession of power-projection capabilities, opening the way for an expanded external Japanese military role in support of US-led coalitions and UNPKO.

The GSDF is seeking to convert itself into a mobile force for overseas operations. It has introduced the 50-tonne M-90 MBT, but is also developing the lighter, 44-tonne TK-X MBT, which is easier to transport, is designed for counter-insurgency operations and has armour that is particularly effective against rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices (IED) – both weapons commonly used by guerillas. The GSDF also maintains an interest in acquiring 300 km-range shoreto- shore missiles for the defence of offshore islands, having originally been denied them in the 2004 NDPG.15

The GSDF was dealt a setback in 2009 with the decision to halt procurement of the AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter. Japan had procured its first ten AH-64Ds from Boeing, and had planned for Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI) to produce a further 52 under licence. However, the Ministry of Defense was forced to curtail orders due to the rising unit costs associated with licenced production, and instead may opt for upgrading its existing AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters or developing an attack version of its OH-1.16 However, the GSDF's continuing power-projection ambitions were demonstrated by the provision within the 2009 defence budget of additional ballistic protection for its CH-47JA transport helicopters. Japan appears to be following the example of states such as the UK, which has added armour to its Chinook helicopters to cope with conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, suggesting that it is preparing for possible deployment to such theatres if necessary.

The GSDF established a Central Readiness Group (CRG) in 2007, combining the elite 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, 101st Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Unit and the Special Operations Group (SOG). The CRG represents a new departure for Japan. It is intended as a rapid-reaction force for coordinating nationwide mobile operations, responding to domestic terrorism, guerrilla incursions and NBC warfare, and training personnel for overseas deployment. The earlier establishment of the SOG in 2004 reflected a new interest in special forces. Its balaclava-clad personnel paraded publicly during the ceremony marking the establishment of the CRG in 2007. Concealing the identity of military personnel was virtually unheard of in post-war Japan.

ASDF power-projection capabilities have been strengthened through the procurement of the F-2 fighter-bomber (although in smaller numbers than originally hoped for) and the acquisition of an in-flight refuelling capability with the procurement of four KC-767 tanker aircraft (the first was delivered in February 2008). The ASDF is also upgrading its E-767 AWACS aircraft to improve their capacity to detect incoming cruise missiles. Although Japan's signature of the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008 means that it will dismantle at considerable cost the large stocks of these weapons intended for the defence of its long coastline, the move also offers an opportunity to strengthen the ASDF's capabilities in other ways. For the first time, the ASDF's budget allocation includes fitting its F-2s with joint direct attack munitions (JDAM), providing an arguably more sophisticated defensive, and even offensive, capability than cluster munitions.17 The ASDF's procurement of JDAM as compensation for the loss of cluster bombs, its continuing interest in airborne electronic warfare equipment and its in-flight refuelling assets should now provide it with the potential to strike against enemy missile bases.

In addition, the ASDF is looking to replace its ageing F-4J fighter-bomber with a new F-X air-superiority fighter capable of besting China's Su-27, J-10 and JF-17.18 Japan has shown great interest in the US FA-22A Raptor, as well as in the Eurofighter Typhoon marketed by BAE Systems. The F-22, though, has thus far been denied to Japan by an embargo on overseas sales imposed by the US Congress. During a visit to Washington in April 2007, Abe asked the US to release data on the F-22, and Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma again raised the issue with Defense Secretary Robert Gates in a meeting in Washington at the end of the month. The US Congress, however, maintained the ban on exports in July 2008, partly for fear that Japan might leak sensitive technical information given a scandal over failures to maintain safeguards protecting Aegis system specifications, and possibly also because of concerns about the impact on the regional balance of power of providing the F-22 to Japan. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney said in May 2008 that the US was highly unlikely to transfer information on the F-22 to Japan, and that Tokyo should look instead to the F-35 as a new fighter acquisition. Schieffer, the US ambassador to Japan, reiterated this stance in Tokyo the same month.19

In the absence of any immediate opportunity to acquire the F-22, and because of the related need to assess other possible candidates for its new fighter, Japan has decided to defer a decision on F-X procurement until the new MTDP for 2010–14. In the meantime, as a stopgap measure the ASDF is investing in upgrades to the radar and AAM-5 air-to-air missiles of its F-15s, to improve their capabilities against both aircraft and cruise missiles. The Ministry of Defense has allocated ¥8.5bn for the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to conduct research into an Advanced Technology Demonstration-X (ATD-X) stealth-fighter prototype, with an appearance strikingly similar to the F-22.20

Japan still seems to harbour hopes that the F-22 might yet be released by the US under the Obama administration. The Ministry of Defense and the ASDF consider the F-22 to be an aircraft that would trump China's capabilities and offer strong interoperability with the US, and see it as a matter of prestige that Japan should deploy the most advanced aircraft available. Influential groups in the US might support the export of The manuscript was received 23 April 2003 and accepted for publication after revision 4 August 2003. F-22 to Japan. The US Air Force (USAF) would view Japan's acquisition of the F-22 as an important means of boosting alliance deterrence power in East Asia (with a number of F-22s deployed in Kadena, Okinawa), making up for the claimed deficit in its own F-22 force. Lockheed Martin, Boeing and other US defence contractors might also see benefits in maintaining production lines and technological investment through the transfer of the F-22 to Japan. In February 2007, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a bipartisan report by former US government officials Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye (Nye was thought to be a possible nominee as US ambassador to Japan under the Obama administration), calling specifically for the US to release the F-22 to Japan as an important measure to strengthen the alliance.21

Japan may also need to think seriously about other replacements for the ASDF's F-4Js, especially as the US moves to curtail F-22 orders and possibly to close the F-22 production line. The F-35 would probably meet most of Japan's air-defence needs, and is a true multinational ‘alliance’ aircraft, offering high interoperability with the US and other allies participating in the programme. However, Tokyo is less well-disposed towards this option because the F-35 is not yet available and, as a latecomer to the programme, Japan would have little opportunity to benefit from technology transfers. Japan might favour new versions of the F-15 and F-18 because of the possibility of technology transfer, but these aircraft are not seen as leading-edge technologically, and the ASDF is likely to view the F-18 as essentially a naval aircraft without sufficient air-superiority capabilities.22 Japan might find the Eurofighter Typhoon a better choice because of its lower price tag ($160–200 million per F-22, versus approximately $100 m per Eurofighter), and because it would probably be offered the rights to domestic production.

In deferring its decision on the F-X, Japan may try to hold out for the F-22. Japan's possible future success in procuring the F-22, and the very fact that it seeks such a capable fighter and similar stealth technologies, are important indications of its expanding military ambitions. The F-22 would provide Japan with important air-defence capabilities for its own territory. At the same time, though, the ASDF's deployment of the F-22, combined with new in-flight refuelling capabilities (and consistent with the role the aircraft plays for the USAF), would provide Japan with a potential new capability to penetrate and destroy the air defences of any regional adversary, again indicating new power-projection capabilities.23

The ASDF is also seeking to augment its power-projection capabilities with an indigenously produced C-X replacement for its C-1 transport aircraft, providing an increased 6,000 km range and broadened fuselage for a 26-tonne payload, which will serve as the principal means of air transport for a GSDF rapid-reaction force to regional contingencies and beyond. However, the Ministry of Defense chose not to request the immediate procurement of the C-X in the 2009 defence budget, deciding instead to divert funds to upgrading its F-15s.24

MSDF power-projection capabilities have been enhanced through procurement of three Osumi-class transport ships, with flat decks for the landing of transport helicopters and an integral rear dock for the operation of hovercraft capable of landing tanks. The MSDF justifies these ships as necessary for peacekeeping and other ‘international operations in support of peace’, and two of the three have already been deployed to Timor Leste, Iraq, and Indonesia (as part of the humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004).

Most significantly, the MSDF is constructing two new Hyuga-class DDH (Destroyer-Helicopter) vessels, each displacing 13,500 tonnes deadweight (and approximately 20,000 tonnes when fully loaded with fuels and weapons) and with a standard complement of four helicopters (three SH-60Js and one MCH-101). The first Hyuga was commissioned in March 2009. Despite the Ministry of Defense's designation of these vessels as destroyers, the fact that they are the largest ships launched by the MSDF in the post-war period (equivalent in displacement to Spanish, Italian and British helicopter carriers and light aircraft carriers), combined with their 195-metre end-to-end decks and below-deck hangars, their capacity to carry up to 11 helicopters, and their ability to handle the simultaneous landing and take off of up to three helicopters, indicates that Japan is now reviving its expertise in aircraft-carrier technologies. 25

The MSDF is also indigenously developing the P-X replacement for its P-3C patrol and surveillance aircraft (although Japan has faced pressure to buy the US Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft), with an expanded 8,000 km range suited to patrolling as far as the outer reaches of the South China Sea.26 Japan's security planners, as detailed in Chapter 6, are also showing interest in the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles to strike against enemy missile bases.

Japan's other major procurement project is BMD, the largest budget item for 2004–09. The objective is to roll out the full panoply of BMD systems by 2011. The MSDF has procured an off-the-shelf BMD system with a Standard Missile-3 Block IA (SM-3 BLK IA) from the US, and is seeking to fit BMD capabilities to six Aegis-equipped Kongo- and Atago-class destroyers. The MSDF conducted its first successful interceptor test launch off Hawaii in December 2007. The second test in November 2008 proved less successful – the SM-3 interceptor failed to track the target ballistic missile – but nonetheless the BMD Aegis system was deemed to have passed most of the test objectives set for it.27 Japan and the US in the meantime continue to work on upgrades to the interceptor missile to create the SM-3 Block IIA (SM-3 BLK IIA).

Between 2006 and 2008, the ASDF completed the deployment of four Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) terminal-phase interceptor batteries, consisting of 16 fire units at bases around Tokyo (Takeyama, Kanagawa; Narashino, Chiba; Iruma, Saitama; Kasumigaura, Ibaraki).28 The essential responsibility of these batteries is to defend the capital, and the ASDF conducted drills for deployments in Yoyogi Park and Shinjuku Gyoen National Garden in central Tokyo in September 2007 and January 2008.29 The ASDF also sought to deploy its PAC-3 units to Akita and Iwate Prefectures in the north of Honshu to assist in the possible interception of North Korea's missile test in April 2009. The ASDF successfully tested the PAC-3 system in New Mexico in September 2008.30 The Japanese government has since February 2007 introduced the ‘J-Alert’ system to provide warning of ballistic-missile attacks to the Japanese population.31 The ASDF has also completed the upgrade of its Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) command and control system to create the Japan Air Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) as the principal coordinator of Japanese air defence in the event of a missile attack. The JSDF is further upgrading the FPS-3UG (Enhanced Capability) ground-based radar and developing a new FPS-5 ground-based radar for BMD purposes.

The JSDF is also attempting to embark on its own US-style ‘force transformation’ to enable real-time and enhanced coordination of its military forces. Japan has moved towards the indigenous development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for coastal battlefield surveillance, including this item for the first time in the defence budget in 2009. The JSDF has now begun joint tri-service operations, experimenting with force integration for the first time during the humanitarian operation that followed the Indian Ocean tsunami, with GSDF helicopters and trucks operating from the MSDF's Osumi amphibious ships.

Japan and the militarisation of space

Japanese policymakers began to ease restrictions on the 1969 principle on the peaceful use of space under the administration of Yasuhiro Nakasone (1983–87), with acceptance of the use of satellites for military-communication purposes.32 However, moves explicitly to breach the principle only gained momentum in the wake of North Korea's Taepo-dong-1 test in 1998. The government, driven by the need to improve autonomous intelligence capabilities, and by military-industrial interests keen to exploit procurement opportunities, introduced ‘multi-purpose satellites’ (tamoku-teki eisei) or ‘intelligence-gathering satellites’ (joho shushu eisei) (IGSs).33 Japan uses this terminology to conceal the military nature of these satellites, which are under the control of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) within the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CRIO), again to help disguise the military nature of these procurements. Between 2003 and 2007 Japan launched four indigenously produced IGSs, two optical and two with synthetic-aperture radar (SAR). These satellites have already proved of some use in monitoring North Korea's missile bases, although at resolutions of 1 metre for the optical satellites and 1–3 metres for the SAR they lack the capabilities of satellites deployed by the US.34 Japan remains dependent on the US for crucial infrared satellite surveillance to detect missile launches, and the early warning necessary to operate any BMD system.

Japan's deployment of spy satellites and BMD has progressively pushed it to breach entirely the anti-militaristic principle on the peaceful use of space. Successive governments have incrementally shifted from the original 1969 interpretation of ‘peaceful’ (heiwa no mokuteki) as meaning ‘non-military’ (higunji) to emphasising instead the ‘defensive’ military use of space. In June 2007, the LDP introduced a new Basic Law for Space Activities, Article 2 of which states that Japan will conduct activities in space in accordance with the principles of the constitution, thereby permitting the use of space for ‘defensive’ purposes.35 The DPJ supported the bill, but its progress through the National Diet was held up in late 2007 by general political deadlock. However, the LDP and DPJ eventually pushed the bill through, and the law was enacted in May 2008.

The Basic Law mandated the August 2008 establishment of a Strategic Headquarters for the Development of Outer Space (SHDOS) within the cabinet, under the direction of the prime minister.36 The headquarters consists of a number of working groups tasked with researching the strategic, legal and technical aspects of space activities. These are composed of experts on space law, international politics and technology, some of whom are also members of the prime minister's Advisory Panel on Defense.37 In turn, the Ministry of Defense established its own Committee on the Promotion of Outer Space in September 2008 to advise on space-related activities in the forthcoming revisions of the NDPG and MTDP.38

The SHDOS produced a draft report in November 2008 arguing that Japan might need to introduce infrared early-warning satellites for detecting ballistic missiles in their launch phase.39 The Ministry of Defense Committee on the Promotion of Outer Space produced its first report on 15 January 2009. This argued that Japan should promote the use of communications, global positioning and weather satellites; investigate means to protect its satellites from attack; improve its IGS capabilities; and investigate the acquisition of infrared early-warning satellites to improve the effectiveness of BMD.40 The LDP Policy Research Council (PRC)'s National Defense Division produced its own report in August 2008, which called for Japan to augment its early-warning systems for BMD by 2015.41

Japan's participation in the militarisation of space is clearly driven by its assessment of the regional security environment. Japanese policymakers believe that they must try to catch up with China's burgeoning military space capabilities, and maintain parity with South Korea's and India's military interests in space. Japan further requires enhanced capabilities to keep in step and improve interoperability with the US, and to lessen its dependence on the US for key early-warning satellites for BMD. Japan's ability to develop a full range of satellite capabilities will be constrained by its defence budget, but it seems that the revised NDPG for 2009 and the 2010–14 MTDP will emphasise continuing efforts in this area.

The Japan Coast Guard

The JCG, Japan's maritime paramilitary force, has been quietly augmenting its own capabilities and external power-projection capabilities. The JCG's Shikishima-class patrol large helicopter (PLH) vessel displaces approximately 6,500 tonnes and is larger than the MSDF's Kongo-class Aegis destroyers; it also carries two helicopters, and is armed with two twin 35- millimetre cannons and an M61 20 mm gatling gun. It regularly undertakes missions up to 37,000 km, having been built to escort plutonium supplies from Europe. The JCG has another 55 vessels displacing more than 1,000 tonnes, many of which are similar in displacement to the MSDF's Hatsuyuki-class destroyers. The JCG is reported to have a tonnage close to 60% that of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).42 The JCG also has its own quasi-special forces in the shape of a Special Security Team (SST) for boarding ships, and has longrange early-warning and patrol craft. The JCG has participated in US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) multinational exercises, and joint bilateral anti-piracy exercises with states in Southeast Asia.43

Conclusion

Japanese policymakers argue that the acquisition of the capabilities outlined above does not breach the ban on the possession of power-projection capacity; after all, the MSDF's DDH vessels, even if regarded as light carriers rather than destroyers, are not ‘offensive’ systems, and the ASDF's in-flight refuelling capability, JDAM and fighters might only be put to use for tactically defensive rather than strategic-bombing purposes. Nevertheless, even allowing for the need to challenge these definitional obfuscations, it is clear at the very least that Japan has now acquired power-projection capabilities for deployment outside Japan. In part, Japan's power projection will be used to provide support for UN peacekeeping activities, but in larger part, and as demonstrated by Japanese ‘out of area’ deployments, JSDF capabilities provide a new mobile shield for US offensive power in regional and global contingencies. Japan's naval, amphibious and airlift capacities have already demonstrated in US-led coalitions in the Indian Ocean and Iraq some of their future potential for the support of US global power, and these capabilities will be reinforced by the JSDF's helicopter carriers and its sea-mobile interoperable BMD. Moreover, even while current constitutional interpretations and doctrines limit Japan's procurement and utilisation of military capabilities for essentially defensive power projection, many of these capabilities retain latent offensive power, if constitutional interpretations and doctrines shift in the future.

Japan's strategic environment has dictated that it continues to pursue the long-term modernisation of its military forces. The country has had to make difficult choices about new procurement in the context of a constrained defence budget, in some cases delaying or rolling over purchases, and, like any developed state, its ambitions are not always matched by readily available resources. Nevertheless, Japan has succeeded in significantly pushing forward its defensive and potentially offensive power-projection capabilities since the 2004 NDPG. The country is creating a more mobile ground force, an air force with greater regional and global reach and a maritime force with amphibious and carrier technologies. It is moving steadily forward with the deployment of BMD and new space technologies, and the JCG is expanding its capabilities and the range of its missions. Tokyo is in many cases engaged in something of a quiet arms race with China: matching growing Chinese air power with its own enhanced air-defensive power; countering growing Chinese blue-water naval ambitions with its own more capable anti-submarine and carrier assets; and attempting to nullify Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. Japan's procurement programmes are simultaneously designed to provide the types of capabilities necessary for participation in US-led coalitions.

Japan's ongoing military modernisation has thus not been halted by budgetary constraints or by political tribulations, and is set to continue beyond 2009. The country's evolving regional and global military cooperation with the US, the UN and other international actors continues to push the JSDF towards enhanced power projection. Members of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense have argued consistently in the past for a more assertive Japanese stance on national defence and for greater US–Japan alliance cooperation.44 The Advisory Group is thus likely to counsel a redoubling of efforts in these areas, pressing ahead with the F-X, C-X and BMD programmes, and continuing efforts to counter China's rise.

Notes

JDA, National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005–, http://www.jda.go.jp, pp. 2–3.

Ibid., p. 9.

Boeishohen, Boei Hakusho 2008 (Tokyo: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2008), p. 333.

Asagumo Shimbunsha, Boei Handobukku 1997 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1997), pp. 268–70; Asagumo Shimbunsha, Boei Handobukku 1998 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1998), pp. 268–70; Asagumo Shimbunsha, Boei Handobukku 2007 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2007), p. 336; Boeishohen, Boei Hakusho 2008 (Tokyo: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2008), p. 334

Boeisho, Waga Kuni no Boei to Yosan, Heisei 21nendo Gaisan Yokyu no Gaiyo (Tokyo: Boeisho, 2008), http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/yosan/2009/yosan.pdf, p. 28; Boeisho, Waga Kuni no Boei to Yosan, Heisei 21nendo Yosan no Gaiyo (Tokyo: Boeisho, 2008), http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/yosan/2009/yosan.pdf, p. 28. In response to rising fuel costs, in 2008 MSDF ships ran at reduced speeds to conserve fuel, and the ASDF likewise reduced low-flying exercises. However, problems with fuel costs did not prevent the GSDF from holding its largest exercise since 1994 for territorial defence, involving over 3,000 personnel. The exercise took place in October 2008 in Hokkaido. See ‘Genyu de Kaiji Enshu ga Chushi no Kanosei, Kuji wa Teikuhiko o Sakugen’, Yomiuri Shimbum, 26 August 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jo/national/news/20080826-OYT1T00443.htm; ‘GSDF Stages Huge Defense Drill’, Japan Times Online, 28 October 2008, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/20081028a5.html.

Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 437–8.

‘Beitaishi ga Koen, Nihon no Boeihi “Zogaku Subeki”‘, Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 May 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jo/national/news/20080520-OYT1T00608.htm.

For an example of Japan comparing its defence expenditure with NATO's, see Boeishohen, Boei Hakusho 2008 (Tokyo: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2008), p. 122. For Japan's methodology for calculating defence expenditures without including the JCG, see Chuma Kiyofuku, Gunjihi o Yomu, Iwanami Bukuretto No. 68 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986), pp. 42–49.

Kaijo Hoancho, Kaijo Hoanchoho, 1948, http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO028.html.

Naigai Shuppanhen, Boeicho Kankei Horeishu (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 2005), p. 71; The JCG is defined as a paramilitary force in The Military Balance. See IISS, The Military Balance 2009, p. 394.

David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 157–69; Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 78–9; Richard J. Samuels, ‘“New Fighting Power!” Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security’, International Security, vol. 32, no. 3, Winter 2007–08, pp. 84–112.

Maeda Testuo, Jieitai: Henyo no Yukie (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2007), pp. 144–5.

Harrison M. Holland, Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma (New York: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 34–5; Michael E. Chinworth, Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics and Strategy (Washington DC: Brassey's US, 1992), p. 63; Masako Ikegami- Andersson, ‘Arms Procurement Decision Making: Japan’, in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume I: China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea and Thailand (Oxford: OUP for SIPRI, 1998).

Kaijo Hoancho Somubu Seimuka 2007, figures provided via National Diet Library, 2007; IISS, The Military Balance 2009, p. 394.

‘Kenkyu Chakushu Miokuri: Choshatei Yudodan’, Asahi Shimbun, 8 December 2004, p. 3.

‘Sentoheli Appachi Chotatsu Chushi, Ichiki 200okuen ni Neagari de’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 August 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20080823-OYT1T00413.htm.

‘F15 Kaisu 947okuen, FX Sentei Nanko Boeisho Gaisan Yokyu’, Asahi Shimbun, 27 August 2008, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0827/TKY200808270036.html; Boeisho, Waga Kuni no Boei to Yosan, Heisei 21nendo Yosan no Gaiyo, pp. 21–2.

‘Kimaranu Jiki Sentoki: Boeisho Chugoku wa Gunji Zokyo Bokuryoku ni Kennen’, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 August 2008, p. 2.

‘Beitaishi ga Koen, Nihon no Boeihi “Zogaku Subeki”‘, Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 May 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jo/national/news/20080520-OYT1T00608.htm.

Boeisho, Waga Kuni no Boei to Yosan, Heisei 21nendo Yosan no Gaiyo, p. 23.

Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020 (Washington DC: CSIS, February 2007), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf2020, p. 28.

Alexander Neill, Jonathan Eyal and John Hemmings (eds), Delivering Defence Industrial Change (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2008), http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/JapanEnglish.pdf, p. 61.

Christopher Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-Avery, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2007), p. 5; ‘Visiting F-22s Waging a War with the Bean Counters’, Japan Times Online, 23 February 2009, http://search.japntimes.co.jp/print/nn20090223a9.html.

‘Boei Yosan no Gaisan Yokyu, Nenryo Kosho de Sogaku 4cho 8448okuen’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 August 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20080827-OYT1T00401.htm.

‘Heri Kubo “Hygua” Haibi Yokosuka ni Atarashii Goeikan’, Asahi Shimbun, 19 March 2009, http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0318/TKY200903180279.html.

Ebata Kensuke, Nihon no Gunji Shisutemu: Jieitai Sobi no Mondaiten (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2004), pp. 227–8.

‘MSDF's SM-3 Test Fails To Shoot Down Missile’, Japan Times Online, 21 November 2008, http://searchjapantimes.co.jp/print/nn20081121a3.html; ‘Despite Failure, Missile Defense System OK'd’, ibid., 17 December 2008, http://searchjapantimes.co.jp/print/nn20081217a3.html.

‘Tokyo-area Gets Last PAC-3 Battery’, ibid., 30 March 2008, http://searchjapantimes.co.jp/print/nn20080330a9.html.

‘Yogeki Missairu, Yoyogi Koen Nado de Tenkai Kento Kugatsu ni mo Kunren’, Asahi Shimbun, 31 August 2007, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0830/TKY200708300385.html.

‘MSDF Fails To Intercept Missile in Test’, Daily Yomiuri Online, 21 November 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20081121TDY01303.htm.

‘Missile Attack Alarm Falsely Tripped’, Japan Times Online, 14 August 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20080815a8.html.

Aoki Setsuko, Nihon no Uchu Senryaku (Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppan, 2006), pp. 177–80; Oros, Normalizing Japan, p. 137.

For a detailed account of Japan's introduction of the IGSs, see Sunohara Tsuyoshi, Tanjo Kokusan Supai Eisei: Dokuji Joho to Nichibei Domei (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2005).

Pat Norris, Spies in the Sky: Surveillance Satellites in War and Peace (New York: Springer, 2008), p. 180.

Suzuki Kazuto, ‘Space: Japan's New Security Agenda’, RIPS Policy Perspectives, 5 October 2007, http://www.rips.or.jp/English/publications/rips_pp_5.html.

Kokkai Shugiin, Uchu Kihon Hoan, May 2008, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_gian.htm.

Shusho Kantei, Uchu Kaihatsu Senryaku Semonin Chosakai Koseiin, August 2008, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/pdf/1.pdf.

Japan Ministry of Defense, Space Related Defence Policies and Future Topics for Consideration, November 2008, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/space2008.pdf p. 4.

‘Govt May Propose Missile Defense Satellite’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 November 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20081105TDY020307.htm.

Boeisho Uchu Kaihatsu Riyo Iinkai, Uchu Kaihatsu Riyo ni Kansuru Kihon Hoshin ni Tsuite, 15 January 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/uchuukaihatsu/pdf/kihonhoushin.pdf pp. 4, 6.

‘Uchu no Boei Riyo Kaikin, Gijutsu Kenkyu no Keikakushitsu Shinsetsu e, Boeisho’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 August 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20080828-OYT1T00100.htm.

Samuels, ‘“New Fighting Power!”‘, p. 99.

Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder: CO, Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 222–6.

‘Boei Taiko Kaitei Honkaku Giron e: Chucho Kokusai Koken ni Juten’, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 January 2009, p. 2; Kaneko Masafumi, ‘Boei Taiko o Do Minaosu ka’, PHP Policy Review, vol. 2, no. 11, 10 December 2008, p. 7