Assessing capacity in watershed organizations in British Columbia: A study of reliability and resilience in organizational processes

Abstract

Given the uncertainty that watershed organizations will face in the future, having the capacity to respond to the unexpected will be critical. This study assessed the reliability and capacity of watershed organizations in British Columbia (BC) to manage the unexpected, based on five interrelated behavioural processes: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise. Empirical research for this article was conducted by sampling a small proportion of the more than 230 non-governmental and non-profit organizations that work towards the protection and conservation of freshwater resources in BC. Findings show that elements of four of the five behavioural processes were considered by respondents to be occurring already in watershed organizations in BC. Yet results also suggest more progress is needed in regards to overall resilience, adaptability and reliability of organizations in the face of change.

Étant donné l’incertitude face à laquelle les organismes de gestions de l’eaux vont être confrontés dans quelques années, être réactif face à l’imprévu va très vite devenir une qualité incontournable. Cette étude évalue la fiabilité des organismes de gestion de l’eau en Colombie-Britannique (CB) ainsi que leur capacité à gérer l’inattendue. Cette évaluation se base sur cinq procédés comportementaux liés les uns aux autres : l’importance donné à l’échec, la réticence face aux besoins de simplification, la sensibilité des opérations, la ténacité et le respect de l’expertise. La recherche entreprise pour cet article s’est faite par le biais d’un échantillonnage de plus de 230 organismes non-gouvernementaux et à but non lucratif travaillant à la protection et la conservation des ressources d’eaux claire en CB. Selon nos participants, les résultats indiquent que quatre des cinq procédés sont considérés comme étant des pratiques courantes au sein des organismes de gestion de l’eau en CB. Ils indiquent aussi que face à des demandes grandissantes en termes d’adaptabilité, ces mêmes organismes vont être confrontés à la nécessité d’accroitre et d’améliorer leur ténacité, leur fiabilité et leur adaptabilité.

Introduction

Our freshwater systems are changing, often in unexpected, and always in complex, ways (see e.g. Vörösmarty et al. 2000; Carpenter et al. 2011; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015), whether this involves climate change or the mounting tension surrounding allocating water to grow food, produce energy and satisfy urban demands, all while maintaining aquatic health (Cook et al. 2009; Granit et al. 2012). Not surprisingly, then, governing freshwater systems is also complex. Both scholars and practitioners are considering how to alter current governance approaches and decision-making processes to respond to this complexity (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Plummer et al. 2014). Numerous assertions have been made that flexible and resilient organizations will be key to being able to cope with unexpected and turbulent natural and social circumstances (Bierly and Spender 1995; Berkes et al. 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Walker and Salt 2012). At its most basic, resilience refers to “the ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic function and structure” (Walker and Salt 2006, 1).

One widely promoted solution to respond to this complexity has been to focus on the creation of watershed organizations, with the premise being that these organizations will work across traditional political boundaries and scales, and, ideally, have the ability to “see” the inter-connections between issues that all affect a single watershed. In jurisdictions across Canada and farther afield, some watershed organizations have already been formally established in water governance processes, such as the Conservation Authorities (CAs) in Ontario, River Basin Districts under the European Water Framework Directive, or Catchment Management Authorities in Australia (Baltutis, Brandes et al. 2012). In British Columbia (BC), Canada, a new Water Sustainability Act (2014) has created enabling mechanisms for watershed organizations to similarly gain this type of a formal governance role. But, as of this writing, the province has yet to begin the transition to such a governance model. Thus, BC offers a case where water governance is currently in flux, and where significant attention needs to be focused on understanding how to ensure newly established watershed organizations meet the identified needs with respect to being resilient and ensuring the watersheds “persist, learn, change, and/or transform in response to disturbances” (Plummer et al. 2014, 1).

Despite the growth and adoption of watershed-based governance models in jurisdictions throughout the world, questions do still remain about whether these organizations have the capacity to change, respond, learn and potentially transform in the face of unexpected events (Huitema et al. 2009; Cosens and Williams 2012; Green et al. 2013; Plummer et al. 2014). While an organization will never truly know if it is prepared for the unexpected, given that those events are in fact, uncertain and impossible to predict, previous organizational studies research has demonstrated that being able to manage complexity and uncertainty requires organizations to adopt suitable cultures, practices or management principles (Weick and Putnam 2006; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Collectively, these practices, cultural norms and principles create a capacity to be what is referred to within this scholarship as a “high-reliability organization” (HRO) (Roberts 1990; LaPorte and Consolini 1991; Bierly and Spender 1995; Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) – in essence, to be resilient. Although scholarship has demonstrated a growing and detailed understanding of the what, how and why of HRO operations, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) have synthesized the key characteristics into five broad themes. Accordingly, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) consider HROs to be characterized by the following. They:

(1)	Are preoccupied with failure;
(2)	Hold a reluctance to simplify complex problems;
(3)	Are highly sensitive to operations;
(4)	Demonstrate a commitment to resilience; and
(5)	Show deference to expertise.

Using these five behavioural processes as a framework, this study aims to explore whether watershed organizations in BC share the characteristics of high-reliability organizations and demonstrate a capacity to deal with complex or highly uncertain, unexpected circumstances.

The article is structured as follows: first, a review of water management and governance in the Canadian, and specifically BC, context will establish the governance environment in which watershed organizations currently exist. Second, a brief review of HROs will be described, along with the characteristics, strategies and processes that appear to establish reliability and resilience within organizations. Next, the article will outline the methods used for this study and for the application of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) framework, before presenting the results of the empirical research. Finally, the paper will discuss the results by considering whether current watershed organizations are likely to be responsive, and flexible, and to learn in the face of unexpected and complex circumstances, and whether further efforts are needed to build additional capacity for resilience.

Literature review

The context for water governance in British Columbia

Water is a naturally variable resource, but for those responsible for governing water, this variability is compounded by human drivers of change. Routinely, reports and studies on water cite the shifting demands from increasing populations, the volumes and rates of extracting water during times of peak consumption, the growing presence of infrastructure deficits (e.g. aging and worn water-distribution systems), and uncertainties related to a changing climate as creating complexity (Canadian Water Network [CWN] 2014; Moore 2013). Recent droughts in areas such as Australia, Washington, California and elsewhere (Aghakouchak et al. 2014) epitomize the variability and uncertainty associated with hydrological systems impacted by a changing climate. Pressures on freshwater systems have created a significant degree of uncertainty for those responsible for confronting such challenges, leading to interest in understanding and building resilience for water management and governance (Moberg and Galaz 2005; Booher and Innes 2010; Akamani and Wilson 2011; Cosens and Williams 2012; Green et al. 2013). Watershed organizations have an important role to play in navigating these changes and the uncertainty on behalf of the communities that they aim to represent. However, it must be recognized that in watershed organizations across Canada, the level of decision-making authority and responsibility to navigate uncertainty is diverse, ranging from formal authority (e.g. Ontario CAs) to a more voluntary role in the community (e.g. Streamkeepers).

As aforementioned, important recent changes to freshwater legislation, such as BC’s Water Sustainability Act (2014), hold the potential for collaborative watershed governance, providing the legal foundation to meet the water-related challenges currently seen across the province, which parallel challenges experienced across the country (Baltutis, Shah et al. 2012). But, to date, little is known about the capacity of watershed organizations to take on additional responsibilities, and to be responsive to the uncertainty and changes that they are bound to face. Morris and Brandes (2013) highlight that watershed organizations want support to build their capacity for additional authority and responsibility. Yet there has been little scholarly assessment conducted about whether these organizations will be any better prepared than our existing governance arrangements.

Expected hydrological changes

There are a number of conditions that can lead to changes or disturbances (expected and unexpected) to natural systems that can challenge the capacity of watershed organizations to govern and manage freshwater systems in a reliable manner. In Canada, and BC in particular, scientists have projected that climate change is expected to increase the occurrence of wetter and warmer climates (Merritt et al. 2006). Such conditions are expected to result in a higher frequency of floods in rainfall-dominated watersheds, and a decrease in the number and magnitude of flood events in snowfall-dominated watersheds (Merritt et al. 2006). Reductions of snow pack in snow-dominated regions, both in BC and globally, will have implications for the ability of mountains to act as a reservoir for water storage (Barnett et al. 2005), which is an important water source in dry summer periods.

Trends over recent decades in BC have shown a pattern of altered hydrological cycles, with “decreased snowpack, earlier onset of spring melt, decreasing summer flow and delayed onset of autumn flows, resulting in an extension of the dry hydrological season” (Schnorbus et al. 2014, 1170). Harma et al. (2012) find in their study on hydrologic responses to climate change in the Okanagan region of BC that “there was a projected reduction in flow volumes…at the time of highest water demand, leading to similar results during critical periods” (683). The authors further admit that the results “may be underestimates of the potential change due to climate change” (Harma et al. 2012, 683). This suggests that the Okanagan region, and many other parts of BC (Merritt et al. 2006), may face significant, and to a certain extent, unknown, impacts and stressors on freshwater resources in the face of climate change, population growth and land-use changes (S. Cohen et al. 2006), leading to a high degree of uncertainty about future water resource availability and quality. In addition to the above concerns, more frequent extreme precipitation events are projected to occur at rates two to three times the current averages in, for example, the Columbia Basin (Murdock and Sobie 2013, v). Under climate change, water governance and management require a greater appreciation for the uncertainty and variability of snow and ice coverage and river flows and the implications for the reliability of surface waters (Field and Barros 2014, 251). This change in the hydrological regime in the Pacific Northwest region presents a significant challenge to the governance and management of fresh water resources across BC.

Variability of fresh water resources presents challenges to water governance and management processes seeking to meet multiple objectives, such as municipal supplies, environmental flows, navigation, energy development or flood control, to name a few (S. Cohen et al. 2006). In BC and other jurisdictions with prior appropriation principles (e.g. “first in time, first in right”), rising water demands and variability in water supply from changes in hydrological regimes may result in increased conflict between users, as those with senior licenses invoke “first in time, first in right” over those with more junior licenses (S. Cohen et al. 2006). Recent changes to BC’s water legislation, with the introduction of Bill 18-2014, the Water Sustainability Act, further enshrines prior appropriation principles, though all water licenses are subject to amendment, such as through discretionary oversight by the comptroller of water rights (Curran 2014).

High-reliability organizations

Beyond the water governance scholarship, other disciplines such as organizational studies have long been grappling with questions about how to build capacities for resilience (e.g. Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007). One sub-field of organizational studies scholarship has examined organizations that are tasked with the management of potentially dangerous but essentially technical systems (e.g. nuclear power generation plants), that have successfully avoided failures of the system despite a range of challenging circumstances. These organizations are referred to as HROs (Boin and Schulman 2008, 1052). Previous research indicates that HROs exhibit characteristics of adaptability, reliability and resilience, which contribute to successful management and continued operations through uncertainty and adverse circumstances (Weick et al. 2008). Under such conditions, HROs remain effective and suppress tendencies towards inertia, while encouraging ongoing adaptive learning and learning-based performance within their organization (Weick et al. 2008). For water governance scholars interested in these same capacities for watershed organizations having to confront changing social (governance) and ecological (especially, hydrological) conditions, questions remain about how and why HROs are able to acquire and maintain these characteristics.

The literature suggests five behavioural processes (see Table 1 for more detail) can assist an organization to reduce the negative impacts from change and uncertainty, so as to enable a more rapid recovery from unexpected events (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). These behavioural processes in turn provide the foundations for an organization to become adaptable, reliable and resilient. The 10 statements presented in the questionnaire used to gather the empirical data for this research (see Table 2 in Results for more detail) act as “audits” to assess the reliability of organizations when faced with an unexpected event. These audits aim to illustrate the extent to which an organization can be characterized as meeting some or all of the five behavioural processes. One key feature of HROs is that they are mindful of having a clear comprehension of emerging threats and small discrepancies or change within a system and “the factors that interfere with such comprehension” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2006, 516). Relying on past successes to uncritically guide current actions (understood as being “mindless” in action, or acting on “automatic pilot”; Weick and Putnam 2006), is a factor that can interfere with the comprehension of emerging threats that can be symptomatic of larger problems within the system.

Table 1. Five behavioural processes of high-reliability organizations, based on Weick and Sutcliffe (2007).

Principles of high reliability	Description of principle
Preoccupation with failure	An organizational culture that is preoccupied with failure is one that accepts and embraces failures or problems within their organization (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). The preoccupation is an indicator of an organization’s culture and willingness to learn (Weick et al. 2008). Organizations that operate in this manner have been found to exhibit strength in early detection of the symptoms, or roots, of complex problems (Vogus and Stucliffe 2007)
Reluctance to simplify	A reluctance to simplify describes organizations comfortable operating in complexity. These organizations encourage a diversity of opinions and perspectives within the organization, exemplified by staff that will challenge the organization’s assumptions and routine practices (Mintzberg and Westley 2001). This is a technique to resist the temptation to simplify problems, approaches or issues, and situate them within pre-defined plans or problem-solving approaches (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007)
Sensitivity to operations	Monitoring expected interactions, and the ability to respond promptly to unexpected events, involves being sensitive to operations. Previous research has demonstrated that the intended plans and strategies and those actually implemented by organizations tend to be quite different (Mintzberg 1994). Importantly, those in the front lines feed their experiences into the operations of the organization (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007), but someone in that organization must be responsible for being mindful of all of the feedback and the small deviations, disturbances or mistakes
Commitment to resilience	Resilient high-reliability organizations accept errors as inevitable, and work towards increasing the ability to learn from those errors, while being able to cope with surprises (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) that challenge the ability of an organization to continue its typical operations. This requires equally committing to the development of staff skills and knowledge, and building the capacity to draw on supporting resources through informal networks (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007; Moore and Westley 2011)
Deference to expertise	Deference to expertise refers to the importance of decisions being made by those who may have the most relevant knowledge regardless of their position within an organizational hierarchy. This principle is concerned with the “accountability, responsibility, and broad awareness of where to go for help” within an organization (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 101)

Table 2. Summary of questionnaire results.

Principle	Statement	Qualitative scale (percentage distribution)
Principle 1: Preoccupation with failure	We actively look for failures of all sizes and try to understand them	Not at all – 9%
		To some extent – 67%
		A great deal – 24%
		Non-responses – 0%
		N = 33
	People feel free to talk to superiors about problems	Not at all – 3%
		To some extent – 30%
		A great deal – 67%
		Non-responses – 0%
		N = 33
Principle 2: Reluctance to simplify	People listen carefully, and it is rare that someone’s views go unheard	Not at all – 9%
		To some extent – 33%
		A great deal – 58%
		Non-responses – 0%
		N = 33
	When something unexpected happens, people spend more time analyzing than advocating for their view	Not at all – 21%
		To some extent – 48%
		A great deal – 27%
		Non-responses – 3%
		N = 32
Principle 3: Sensitivity to operations	During an average day, people interact often enough to build a clear picture of the current situation	Not at all – 21%
		To some extent – 52%
		A great deal – 24%
		Non-responses – 3%
		N = 32
	Managers constantly monitor workloads and reduce them when they become excessive	Not at all – 33%
		To some extent – 33%
		A great deal – 15%
		Non-responses – 18%
		N = 27
Principle 4: Commitment to resilience	This organization is actively concerned with developing people’s skills and knowledge	Not at all –6%
		To some extent – 36%
		A great deal – 55%
		Non-responses – 3%
		N = 32
	People have a number of informal contacts that they sometimes use to solve problems	Not at all –3%
		To some extent – 12%
		A great deal – 85%
		Non-responses – 0%
		N = 33
Principle 5: Deference to expertise	People in this organization value expertise and experience over hierarchical rank	Not at all – 6%
		To some extent – 18%
		A great deal – 76%
		Non-responses – 0%
		N = 33
	It is generally easy to obtain expert assistance when something comes up that we don’t know how to handle	Not at all – 9%
		To some extent – 30%
		A great deal – 61%
		Non-responses – 0%
		N = 33

What makes HROs unique is their emphasis on reliability over efficiency, so as to avoid – at all costs – system failures (Boin and Schulman 2008). A focus on failure prevention does not imply HROs are immune to failure, but it is their ability to contain the effects of failure while continuing to operate that sets them apart (Bellamy et al. 2005). To draw on Walker and Salt’s (2006) definition of resilience again, these organizations are able to respond to unexpected events or disturbances, while maintaining their basic identity, structure and function.

Existing applications of the principles of high reliability have focused on sectors such as health care, firefighting and emergency response (e.g. Tamuz and Harrison 2006; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007; Bagnara et al. 2010). Watershed organizations are unique compared to what are typically understood as HROs given they may not always deal with high-risk activities where failure could mean catastrophic consequences (notable exceptions include watershed organizations that operate or maintain dikes or dams, or ensure provision of safe drinking water and source-water protection). However, the activities of watershed organizations and their ability to operate and remain reliable and resilient are affected by uncertain social and ecological environments, such as the variability of climate change, uncertain funding environments, a large number of (conflicting) interests and uncertain legal footing (as water-related legislation changes). Moreover, the events that are often associated with climatic or ecological shocks, such as massive floods, extreme drought, the failing of infrastructure or the sudden loss of significant numbers of fish or other species within a watershed, do carry with them real risks, to which these organizations may be expected to respond.

Though resilience is often conceptualized as a return to equilibrium of a system (engineered resilience), resilience theory from a social-ecological systems perspective supports the notion that resilience is a system property – one that ensures adaptiveness and a capacity to learn and transform, which ultimately enables the sustainability of a system (Folke 2006). In this way, HROs provide a model for what constitutes a resilient system (Reason 2000; Bagnara et al. 2010) with a focus on learning (continuous training), adaptability (reorganizing to meet local conditions) and redundancy (back-up systems/people) in their operations, recognizing that systems are continually confronted with unexpected events, and uncertainty is pervasive. Redundancy in a system is key to ensuring that problems, regardless of their size, can be caught several different ways before they become catastrophic (Roberts and Bea 2001). Failure can result when standardized – and rigid – procedures are faced with unexpected events, rendering them ineffective (Bellamy et al. 2005).

Methods

Empirical research for this article was conducted by sampling a small proportion of the more than 230 non-governmental and non-profit organizations that work towards protection and conservation of fresh water resources in BC (see Morris and Brandes 2013). Organizations surveyed for this paper represent a diverse geographical spread across the province, from the northern regions of BC along the border with Alaska, Yukon and Alberta, the headwaters and Canadian portion of the Columbia River basin, the Fraser River basin and the northern and southern interior of BC, to the lower mainland and southern Gulf Islands, and a vast portion of the southern half of Vancouver Island.

The sampling strategy targeted individuals who self-identified as working or volunteering with watershed organizations. Statements presented in the questionnaire (see Table 2 below) were adopted and modified based on previous research by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), who developed audits for organizations, based on their five behavioural processes about maintaining high reliability in the face of unexpected disturbances. For each of the five main processes in their framework, two statements are used to “test” the presence or absence of that behavioural norm, practice or principle within the organization. Therefore, the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) framework and audit methods serve as a foundation to meet the objective of this study to gather information about the capacity of watershed organizations to remain reliable when faced with unexpected events.

The questionnaire method relied on a self-administered questionnaire consisting of 10 statements with a closed set of responses, consistent with Weick and Sutcliffe (2007). Closed responses to each of the statements present within the questionnaire were structured as follows:

(1)	Not at all;
(2)	To some extent;
(3)	A great deal.

The questionnaire was conducted both in person and electronically. In-person participants for the questionnaire were recruited during a national watershed governance forum hosted by the researchers, with over 200 water professionals from across Canada attending. At the forum, the researchers made a general announcement to delegates, inviting those who work or volunteer for a watershed organization to take part in the study. Individuals who offered to fill out the questionnaire were asked again if they work or volunteer for a watershed organization. For those who self-identified as working or volunteering for a watershed organization, the researchers presented them with the questionnaire. Of the 35 questionnaires handed out at the forum, 17 (48%) were completed and returned to the researchers.

Additionally, following the forum, the researchers circulated the questionnaire via an online survey program (FluidSurveys) broadly to watershed organizations that were identified through existing research projects by the POLIS Project on Ecological Governance a partner who hosted the forum event and who had contact information that was publicly available. Approximately 46 electronic questionnaires were sent out, with a 34% completion rate (16 more respondents). The total number of questionnaires circulated (in person and online) was 81, with a total of 33 (40%) completed. This compares favorably to previous studies from similar assessments of watershed organizations in BC, which had a response rate of 26% (Morris and Brandes 2013). Of the 33 total responses, there was overlap in regions of BC and watershed organizations represented, as some individuals who work or volunteer for the same organization took part in the research.

The size of organizations represented in the questionnaire ranged from less than five individuals (two organizations), between six and 25 individuals (19 organizations), 26 to 100 individuals (five organizations), and more than 100 individuals working or volunteering for the organization (seven organizations). Groups represented are those engaged in trying to change activities and decision-making processes with the goal of protection and conservation out of concern about the direction of change in the watersheds in which they operate. Activities of these organizations range from influencing decision-making (e.g. direct participation, lobbying, public campaigns) to stream improvement and monitoring, capacity building, and public education and building awareness (as described previously by Wilkes et al. 2013). However, as identified by Wilkes et al. (2013, 3), few groups in BC actually engage in more formal governance in a traditional sense, where they “participate in some form of decision-making processes or with decision-making agencies.”

Limitations to the methods include a limited number of respondents from each watershed organization, which may provide a biased understanding of the true capacity of the entire organization to remain reliable in the face of unexpected events. Undertaking an in-depth study of a limited number of watershed organizations and surveying a greater number of individuals within each organization could address such limitations. Additionally, self-reporting bias has also been identified as a limitation in the methods used for the paper, as respondents in self-administered questionnaires often tend to respond in a way that makes them look as good as possible on the remote chance that funders or future employers will gain access to their responses (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone 2002, 247). Self-reporting bias allows for the possibility that some respondents may have rated their organizations as more reliable and resilient to unexpected events than is actually the case. Therefore, the authors acknowledge that a limited sample size, as well as self-reporting bias, may limit the generalizability of our findings.

Results

The following section presents the results from the questionnaire that assessed the capacity of watershed organizations in BC to confront unexpected situations in a reliable and adaptive manner. There is variation in response rates (N) across the statements, accounting for non-responses, as not all respondents provided an answer for each statement. Some of the closed responses were left blank, indicating that respondents either did not understand the statement, or the statement did not apply to their particular context. The non-responses suggest further research is needed to understand more fully why some respondents did not, or were unable to, provide an answer.

Below, each principle is introduced, including the ideas and concepts that generated the statement asked of the participants, as well as the research findings for each statement. Interpretation of the results will follow in the discussion section of the article. Full summaries of the questionnaire results are provided in Table 2.

Principle 1: Preoccupation with failure

In asking respondents about the preoccupation with failure, the researchers were attempting to gauge the extent to which watershed organizations in BC accept – and embrace – failure or problems within their organization. Such acceptance is a useful indicator of an organization’s culture and their willingness to learn. Moreover, paying attention to signals of failures or problems allows early detection of the symptoms of what may be larger problems (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) within a watershed. A “reporting culture” must be developed where people within the organization feel comfortable to report problems, “near misses” and mistakes (Bellamy et al. 2005, 392). Establishing trust within the organization, and a “just” culture, where one understands the boundaries drawn between “blameless and blameworthy actions,” is key to establishing an organizational culture that supports learning and can increase the capacity to develop strategies for adaptation (Reason 2000, 767).

Research finding

Statement 1: We actively look for failures of all sizes and try to understand them.

Among the watershed organizations surveyed, 9% of respondents disagreed with the statement that their organizations actively look for failures of all sizes and try to understand them, 67% agreed with the statement “to some extent” and 24% felt their organizations did this “a great deal.”

Statement 2: People feel free to talk to superiors about problems.

It is clear that the majority of respondents believe there is a culture of openness and freedom to talk to supervisors about problems, with 67% answering this exists “a great deal,” and 30% suggesting it exists “to some extent.” Only 3% of respondents felt their organization did not allow for open communication between supervisors and employees.

Principle 2: Reluctance to simplify

Statements 3 and 4 assess an organization’s reluctance to simplify – the purpose of which is to acknowledge the tendency to want to keep operations simple and not be overwhelmed by complex challenges. HROs recognize that surprises and the emergence of unexpected events, such as an extreme drought that continues longer than previous droughts in the watershed, an earthquake that disrupts water and wastewater supply services, or a sudden low return of salmon runs, are accepted as an ongoing reality. Such organizations can move quickly away from simply laying blame to responding to the unexpected, or supporting the organizations responsible for a direct response (e.g. water utilities; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Typically, HROs also encourage a diversity of opinions and perspectives within the organization and staff that will challenge the organization’s assumptions and routine practices as another technique to resist the temptation to simplify problems, approaches or issues, and situate them within pre-defined plans or problem-solving approaches (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).

Research finding

Statement 3: People listen carefully, and it is rare that someone’s view goes unheard.

Just over half of respondents felt that their organization embraced a culture of listening to diverse views and a variety of inputs, with 58% agreeing that this happens “a great deal.” One third, or 33%, felt this happens “to some extent,” and only 9% of respondents felt this does not happen at all within their organization.

Statement 4: When something unexpected happens, people spend more time analyzing than advocating for their view.

Almost half of all respondents (48%) answered that on the occasion of an unexpected event, people in their organization spend more time analyzing than advocating for their view “to some extent,” 21% felt this happened “not at all,” suggesting that advocating for personal views occurred, and 27% answered that the tendency of people in their organization to analyze rather than advocate for personal views happened “a great deal.” On the questionnaire, 3% of respondents did not answer.

Principle 3: Sensitivity to operations

To be sensitive to operations means “to monitor ‘expected interactions’…and to respond promptly to those unexpected”; it is about “the work itself, about seeing what [one is] actually doing regardless of what [one is] supposed to do based on intentions, designs, and plans” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 59). Previous organizational study research has demonstrated that the intended plans and strategies and those actually implemented by organizations tend to be quite different (Mintzberg 1994). In HROs, those in the front lines feed their experiences into the operations of the organization, which allows for small deviations, disturbances or mistakes to be given attention. This extreme attention to details of front-line operations allows anomalies to be identified at a stage where they can still be isolated and addressed fairly easily (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 13). Relationships amongst all levels in an organization are important, which also helps achieve Principle 2 (reluctance to simplify) by bringing a diversity of expertise together to address issues. Interaction amongst workers creates opportunities for information sharing, builds trust and credibility, and builds an understanding of the complexity of the watershed’s social-ecological system.

Research finding

Statement 5: During an average day, people interact often enough to build a clear picture of the current situation.

Almost equal weighting was given to “not at all” (21%) and “a great deal” (24%) by respondents to the above statement. Half of all respondents (52%) felt that interaction among co-workers, to help build sensitivity to operations of the watershed organization, happened “to some extent.” Three percent of respondents did not answer.

Statement 6: Managers constantly monitor workloads and reduce them when they become excessive.

A more even distribution of responses was witnessed for statement 6. Thirty-three percent of respondents answered that managers did not constantly monitor workloads and reduce them as necessary or this happened “to some extent” within their organizations. Only 15% of respondents felt this happened “a great deal” within their organizations, and 18% did not answer.

Principle 4: Commitment to resilience

Recognizing that human-designed systems are fallible, continuous learning and skill development that builds resilience to error and surprise is a central tenet of HROs. Resilient HROs accept errors as inevitable, and work towards increasing the ability to respond to those errors that challenge the ability of an organization to maintain its core functions, while learning and implementing changes for the future (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).

Learning and skill development is critical to maintain this type of resilience within an organization (Armitage et al. 2008; Baird et al. 2014). Therefore, it would be expected that watershed organization staff would need to expand their general knowledge and their technical skills, in order to improve “their abilities to both see problems in the making and to deal with them” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 99). Dealing with unexpected problems entails using knowledge in unexpected ways, evident in the informal expert networks people self-organize to solve problems by sharing expertise, best practices and innovative solutions, and often applied in an improvisational manner (Moore and Westley 2011). These informal networks and the information sharing they enable can enhance technical capabilities of individuals, while fostering support for organizations where burn-out is common and capacities are limited. The extent to which an organization involves diverse knowledge, skill development and informal networks may play a key role in how resilient it is in the face of complexity and unexpected events. The role of networks is explored further in the discussion section below.

Research finding

Statement 7: This organization is actively concerned with developing people’s skills and knowledge.

The majority of respondents (55%) felt that their organizations were actively concerned with developing people’s skills and knowledge “a great deal,” and 36% felt that this happened “to some extent” within their organizations. Six percent felt that their organization did not develop individual skills and knowledge, with implications for long-term resilience of the organization. Three percent did not answer.

Statement 8: People have a number of informal contacts that they sometimes use to solve problems.

Signaling the importance of informal network building amongst individuals working with watershed organizations and the role this plays in addressing problems, 85% of respondents agreed “a great deal” that people in their organizations have a number of informal contacts they can use to solve problems. Only 12% felt this happened “to some extent,” and 3% said it happens “not at all.”

Principle 5: Deference to expertise

Statements 9 and 10 in the questionnaire were designed to assess the extent to which the organization defers to expertise, even if that expertise lies with an individual who is not at the top of a hierarchical organizational structure. But deference to expertise is more than delegation to those lower down in the hierarchy of the organization. It is more specifically about the importance of decisions being made by those at the front line of operations, and who may have specialized knowledge that others along the organizational hierarchy may not (Hopkins 2007). Thus, this group of statements is designed to assess “accountability, responsibility, and broad awareness of where to go for help” within an organization (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 101).

Research finding

Statement 9: People in this organization value expertise and experience over hierarchical rank.

It is clear from the results that expertise and experience are highly valued over hierarchical rank in watershed organizations across BC. Seventy-six present of respondents felt this was the case in their organizations “a great deal,” and 18% responded such deference to expertise and experience happened “to some extent.” Only 6% felt deference to expertise happened “not at all.” Such results suggest that in the event of problems, watershed organizations in BC adopt a non-hierarchical decision-making structure, deferring to those with the appropriate expertise, rather than a specific position in the organization.

Statement 10: It is generally easy to obtain expert assistance when something comes up that we don’t know how to handle.

In the event of problems faced by a watershed organization, 61% of respondents agreed “a great deal” that it was generally easy to obtain expert assistance when something comes up beyond the expertise of the individual, and 30% felt this was possible “to some extent.” Only 9% felt that they were unable to easily obtain the expert assistance needed in the face of a problem.

Discussion

In British Columbia, a transition is underway, with recent legislative changes indicating a move towards adopting and enabling new forms of watershed governance. Although important critiques have been levied at watershed governance approaches (A. Cohen and Davidson 2011; Vogel 2012), it is clear that governance practices are increasingly moving towards a rescaling of governance to the watershed level, both in BC and in numerous other jurisdictions (Parkes et al. 2010; Plummer et al. 2011; Brandes et al. 2014). This shift emphasizes “civic responsibility and ecological stewardship…[and] patterns of governance that befit natural units defined on ecological and community grounds” (Molle 2009, 491).

Several watershed organizations already exist in British Columbia (see Morris and Brandes 2013), and these organizations may be required and interested to undertake more formal governance roles under the new Water Sustainability Act. However, these organizations will then be responsible for governing and confronting the complexity and changing dynamics of both the governance system and the hydrological and climate changes in the watershed. Given the uncertainty in this context, having the capacity to respond to the unexpected will be critical. Therefore, this study examined a sample of watershed organizations to assess the presence of the characteristics that previous scholarship has identified for HROs. Findings suggest that those working within the sampled organizations perceive that their organizations exhibit some of the characteristics of HROs, but additional capacity building is needed.

Respondents to the questionnaire indicated that the development of skills and knowledge amongst employees or volunteers, and the role that informal contacts and networks play in solving problems, is an active process already, and one which contributes to the resilience, adaptability and reliability of organizations. However, further research is needed to understand the outcomes of these networks and the different ways in which the networks are already helping to specifically grapple with unexpected and complex problems. In a sector where burn-out is rife, and where the capacity of individuals is often overstretched, having informal networks to rely on to solve problems can greatly support the sustainability of an organization to continue to engage in activities related to watershed governance. Knowing who to go to for important information can decrease the time spent digging for information or the risk of “reinventing the wheel.”

The results show that experience is valued more highly than hierarchical rank within watershed organizations (deference to expertise). This creates the flexibility within an organization that is needed to address unexpected events. Expert assistance in the face of a problem is critical, though a small percentage (9%) of respondents felt they were unable to easily obtain this assistance. It is unclear from the results why this assistance was not forthcoming, though limited capacities in other organizations that may be seen to hold the requested “expertise” (e.g. local or provincial governments) may be one explanatory factor. This indicates an area for further research. For watershed organizations faced with unexpected challenges, such as floods or droughts, changes in funding streams or unforeseen fish mortality rates, having the skills and knowledge available as well as the authority to act can be essential to remaining reliable and resilient when navigating unexpected challenges.

The data revealed limitations to achieving reliability in certain areas, most notably “sensitivity to operations.” Results showed that excessive workloads are not often monitored and reduced when needed, leading to the potential for burn-out amongst employees and volunteers. Questionnaire data suggest that managers within watershed organizations need to monitor individual workloads, and respond accordingly if workloads appear too excessive, leading to burn-out and reduced capacity of the organization to manage unexpected events. Sensitivity to operations and extreme attention to detail allow for small deviations, disturbances or mistakes – whether those are climatic, political, financial, cultural or otherwise – to be addressed. However, in chronically under-resourced organizations in the non-profit sector, many organizations may not have the luxury to reduce workloads or monitor operations to the extent needed. Given that 18% of respondents did not provide an answer to statement 6, this might suggest that the statement was not understood, or that many respondents do not have formal managers who can monitor workloads and reduce if necessary. Further research is needed to understand this high rate of non-responses.

Results from the empirical data showed mixed responses for the themes of “preoccupation with failure” and “reluctance to simplify.” Data revealed that individuals in watershed organizations were generally able to talk to superiors about problems that were arising, yet actively looking for failures of all sizes within the organization in order to understand problems better is an area indicated as needing improvement (preoccupation with failure). This is an important indicator of the extent to which an organization mindfully embraces opportunities for learning, and to detect symptoms of larger problems before they become catastrophic. Yet this limitation could also be explained by a lack of resources that can be devoted to investigating potential problems within the organization. Further, responses revealed that watershed organizations generally have a culture of openness to views from individuals within the organization, while the majority of respondents felt that in the face of an unexpected event, more time is spent analyzing than advocating for their view. Diversity of viewpoints and responses is encouraged, which can challenge the assumptions and routine practices of the organization and lead to avoidance or resistance to simplify problems, approaches or issues. Embracing complexity, and avoiding routine practices and responses, though often requiring more time and resources, will ultimately result in building the reliability of organizational responses to problems.

Overall, the results of the study indicate that, in general, watershed organizations in BC are progressing towards reliability in organizational processes or are already considered reliable and have the capacity to manage the unexpected, based on four of the five behavioural processes presented. For only one behavioural process – sensitivity to operations – were respondents unanimous that their organizations were doing an average (“to some extent”) or poor (“not at all”) job. Specifically, statement 6 (managers constantly monitor workloads and reduce them when they become excessive) indicated that only 15% of organizations represented were constantly monitoring workloads and reducing them when excessive “a great deal,” compared to 33% indicating that organizations were achieving this “to some extent” or “not at all.” This suggests that a major area of improvement for watershed organizations is to be conscious of the workload individuals are tasked with, and adjust as necessary.

The results of this study create a baseline of information on five critical principles of high-reliability organizations from which to conduct more in-depth research on the capacity of watershed organizations to manage through unexpected events. The framework on HROs developed by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) provides a useful tool to generally assess the reliability of watershed organizations in BC. However, future research on this issue would benefit from a more in-depth investigation of a smaller number of organizations, to more fully explore where the limitations to reliability exist within specific organizations. Such an analysis would demand a more extensive application of the audits developed by the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) framework. Further, other studies indicate substantial challenges exist before BC becomes a global leader in fresh water protection, and where new approaches to governance embrace local leadership, community capacity, and empowered local watershed borders co-managed with First Nations (Morris and Brandes 2013). The data presented here suggest the capacity exists, in various forms, for reliable and resilient watershed organizations to move BC towards a more sustainable fresh water future.

Conclusion

This study establishes a baseline of understanding of whether the culture and capacity of watershed organizations across BC are well suited to be reliable and resilient when facing unexpected events. This will be increasingly important as watershed organizations are given larger decision-making powers over watershed land and water uses, as well as being faced with decreasing budgets and unexpected climatic changes.

Taking the framework created by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), this study assessed the reliability and capacity of watershed organizations in BC to manage the unexpected, based on five interrelated behavioural processes: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise. Findings suggest that much of the ground has already been laid for watershed organizations to be resilient, adaptable and reliable in the face of change. Elements of four of the five principles of high reliability (deference to expertise, commitment to resilience, and aspects of reluctance to simplify and preoccupation with failure) were considered by respondents to be occurring already, suggesting that the principles of high reliability are imbedded within the organizational cultures of watershed organizations in BC.

Despite the obvious differences between high-risk/low-failure organizations, such as nuclear power plants or aircraft carriers, and watershed organizations, many of the defining characteristics of HROs are nonetheless relevant to organizations working towards clean, healthy and resilient social and ecological systems. But principles of HROs should not be treated as prescriptive or as an exhaustive list of techniques for achieving high reliability and resilient operations in the face of uncertainty (Bellamy et al. 2005). As described in their analysis of the US school system, Bellamy et al. (2005) used HROs as a metaphor as opposed to a model in their application of principles of high reliability.

Research has shown organizations that move beyond a mentality of “expect the unexpected,” and actively plan for the unexpected, and maintain a focus on failure prevention, have greater capacity to adapt to unexpected situations, as discussed in the opening sections of this article. Using a series of statements aimed at a general population of watershed organization employees and volunteers, the authors were able to get a general assessment of the reliability and resilience of watershed organizations in BC. Yet, as HROs are obviously very different than watershed organizations, it is not expected that the strategies used in HROs will transfer easily to the unique nature of water governance and management in BC. As each watershed organization is unique, not all aspects of reliability and resilience from the HRO literature will be applicable to all watershed organizations.

Acknowledgements

This research was made possible by the support of the Canadian Water Network.