Multi‐level Democracy: Deliberative or Agonistic? The Search for Appropriate Normative Standards

Abstract

This article compares two contrasting conceptions of deliberative supranationalism, which together suggest a third alternative. All three draw on both the practical and idealizing aspects of communication theory, but each proposes a different view of the European constitutional model, the normative principles on which the European Union (EU) is to be based, and the Constitution for Europe. The first, by Joerges & Neyer, defends a ‘non‐majoritarian’ view in which democratic legitimacy is based primarily upon mutual recognition and Europe’s ‘multiple demoi’. The second, by Eriksen & Fossum, proposes a ‘majoritarian’ scheme based upon a European hierarchy of law, direct accountability to a ‘general public’ and ‘one constitutional demos’ as the ultimate source of European democratic legitimacy. The article concludes with a non‐consensual ‘complex majoritarian’ approach to multi‐level democracy aimed at combining the advantages of the first, polycentric and non‐hierarchical model with agonistic freedoms of citizens in a polity which finds its sources of democratic legitimacy in various modes of democratic representation as well as multiple access points and communication channels that open up EU decision making to European publics.

Key Words:

• Deliberative supranationalism
• norm construction
• EU constitutionalism
• European democracy
• agonistic democracy

Acknowledgement

Special thanks to Veit Bader, Ben Crum, Ron Holzhacker and the journal’s external referee.