Abstract
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is a new mode of European Union (EU) governance which, according to political rhetoric, aims to install (elements of) deliberative governance at the level. The article provides an empirical assessment of whether and how deliberative processes are actually induced in the practical implementation of the method. It presents results of a series of interviews conducted with members of the Employment Committee of the EU. The collected empirical material suggests that, in spite of initial expectations, the OMC (so far) falls short in establishing a novel deliberative basis of legitimacy for EU governance.
Acknowledgement
This study was conducted in the framework of the European Research Colloquium (a training programme for PhD candidates) and was initially a joint effort between Elissaveta Radulova and Anna Horvath (Central European University). The author would like to gratefully acknowledge Anna Horvath’s contribution in the process of setting up the research topic and for the fruitful discussions had during the work together. Furthermore, Section 3 of the current paper is based directly on Anna’s suggestion to study the political rhetoric that surrounded the launch of the Open Method of Coordination. Respectively, the documentary analysis presented in this section was collectively elaborated and is therefore to be regarded as a joint product. The author would also like to acknowledge the valuable comments of Prof. Tannelie Blom.
Notes
1. The lack of control over the EU institutions, first, at the national and, secondly, at the European level — the so‐called “double democratic deficit” (Lodge Citation1996, 190–191), the low (and declining) voter turnout for European Parliament elections and the alienation of the average European citizen from the decision‐making processes at the EU level have been featured as the major problems which the EU system of governance is facing (for a systematic review of the alleged “symptoms, diagnosis and prescriptions”, see Follesdal (Citation2006) and Follesdal & Hix (Citation2006).
2. For the omni‐presence of negotiations and networks in the EU see Kohler‐Koch (Citation1999).
3. For the central position of the principle of autonomy for the democratic project, see Kohler‐Koch & Rittberger (2007, 12–14).
4. According to Joensson (2002, 218): “bargaining can be understood as the exchange of offers and counter‐offers, concessions and retractions; as bazaar‐like haggling in contrast to joint problem‐solving”.
5. European Employment Strategy (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/index_en.htm#value).
6. The interviews conducted were as follows: with an official from the Commission of the European Communities, Directorate‐General ‘Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities’, Direction A, Unit 2 ‘Employment Strategy’, Brussels (30 March 2005); with a member of the Employment Committee from Denmark, Brussels (9 March 2006); with a member of the Employment Committee from Austria, Maastricht (via telephone, 15 March 2006); with a member of the Employment Committee from the Netherlands, the Hague (17 March 2006); with two members of the Employment Committee from Finland, Brussels (28 March 2006); with a member of the Employment Committee from Spain, Brussels (30 March 2006); with the Secretary of the Employment Committee Mr Stefaan Hermans, Brussels (31 March 2006); with a member of the Employment Committee from Sweden, Brussels (31 March 2006); with a member of the Employment Committee from Portugal, Brussels (7 April 2006); with a member of the Employment Committee from Belgium, Brussels (11 April 2006);with a member of the Employment Committee from Germany, Bonn (18 April 2006).