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Abstract
The linkage of development cooperation with migration policies has been promoted widely by international organizations from 2000 onwards. This paper analyses the factors that have prompted and impeded a reorientation of the dominant migration policy‐frame within the EU towards the realization of a migration–development nexus. It is argued that external events such as the international debate on the migration–development nexus and the external shocks provoked by the events in Ceuta and Melilla prompted the EU to rethink its traditionally rather narrow approach, focusing on the repression of migration flows. However, the persistence of the established policy‐frame and the existing institutional setting limit the scope for balanced policy coordination, introducing development mainly as an instrument of migration policy rather than the other way round. Challenging the literature that argues that there is a necessary trade‐off between a development and a security‐orientated migration policy, it is shown that this dichotomous juxtaposition hides the many ways in which different orientations can be combined, depending on the institutional context within which they are framed.
Notes
1. Multilateral development aid has decreased dramatically during the last decade. This means that world‐wide remittance flows exceed total development aid and have become the second‐largest — and in some cases even the largest — financial flow to developing countries after foreign direct investment. According to the World Bank (Citation2007), the total flow of recorded migrant remittances to developing countries is estimated to reach $US240 billion in 2007.
2. This DG covers the fields formerly referred to as “Justice and Home Affairs” (JHA). The re‐labelling of the DG's name is illustrative of these actors' struggle to balance the security prerogatives inherent in the field with liberal values and goals.
3. In an earlier publication, Hammar and Brochmann (Citation1997) linked migration and development; however, the term migration–development nexus was coined later. For further literature on the migration–development nexus, see Skeldon (Citation1997), COM (Citation2002), the Special Issue of International Migration (2002) on this topic, De Haas (Citation2005).
4. It is important to note that in Europe and in the USA, for example, previous decades saw a more “liberal” approach to migration, whereby migration was not primarily perceived as a problem. However, what is new with the migration–development nexus is the explicit positive links between migration and development.
5. It has to be noted that even before the 1990s, certain international institutions such as the IOM and the ILO have long linked migration and development issues in their activities. In addition, migrants themselves have a long tradition of linking migration to development by investing their remittances in such a way as to contribute to development (for example, Italian migrants in Switzerland or Turkish migrants in Germany engaging in “Dorfverschönerungsprojekte”). However, only with the migration–development nexus did a conscious effort emerge to link migration and development in theory as well as in policies, as shall be seen below.
6. This definition is strongly related to the concept of “policy paradigms” used in Hall (Citation1989), the notion of “core beliefs” in Sabatier (Citation1993) or the definition of “référentiels” in Jobert and Muller (Citation1987).
7. For recent analyses, see Huysmans (Citation2006), Lavenex (Citation2006a, Citation2006b).
8. Agreement could be reached in limited areas such as common guidelines on the admission of students and trainees (2004) and researchers (2005).
9. For further analysis, see Kunz (Citation2008).
10. See the IOM website: http://www.old.iom.int/en/who/main_mission.shtml.
11. See IOM website: http://www.old.iom.int/en/who/main_history.shtml.
12. See GCIM website: www.gcim.org.
13. See: http://www.gcim.org/en/a_mandate.html.
14. For further information about this conference see: http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/migration/remittances.html.
16. See: http://www.un.org/migration/ [last accessed May 2008].
17. Thus, for example, within the ILO the MIGRANT department focuses on migrant's rights and social justice and tends to adopt a more rights‐based approach, whereas the Social Finance Unit focuses more on remittances and tends to use a narrower approach. Similarly, within the EU, different units adopt different approaches to the migration–development nexus.
19. Interview with DG JLS, 16 May 2006.
20. COM (Citation2007) 247 of 16 May 2007.
21. COM (Citation2007) 248 final of 16 May 2007.
22. See: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_action_plan_2008_2010_en.pdf#zoom=100.
23. Chou (Citation2006, p. 1) came to a similar result concerning the obstacles to the realization of the migration–development nexus within the EU.