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Abstract
In the EU there is a trend towards developing informal networks between the European Commission and national regulatory agencies. Changes in character of the states' public administrations serve as a background for understanding these developments, a distinctive feature being the ‘agencification’ of the administrative apparatus during the last decades. This article focuses on how the role of the European Commission can be understood within these networks. The main finding is that the Commission is playing a proactive role, able to use the networks as a back road to the informal harmonization of regulatory practices. It is argued that it is able to do this mainly because it is perceived as a credible institution with expertise and overview, assets that have become even more important in EU‐27. It is argued further that the influence of the Commission is conditioned by certain factors at the national level, such as ‘noviceness’ and ‘administrative capacity’. It is concluded that it is necessary to take into account institutional features both at the national and European levels in order to understand the multifaceted role of the Commission within this specific institutional setting.
Acknowledgement
The author is grateful to Morten Egeberg, Thomas Christiansen, Christoph Knill, three anonymous referees and the participants at the CONNEX workshop ‘Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe’ (Barcelona, June 7–9 2007) for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. CONNEX is the Network of Excellence on efficient and democratic governance in the European Union (2004–8), funded under the EU 6th Framework Programme of Research.
Notes
1. We should be aware that the name ‘Commission’ can create ambiguity and may be applied in at least three different ways: First, it may be used to refer to the Commission as a collective entity. Secondly, it may be used to refer to the College of Commissioners. Thirdly, it may be used to refer to certain parts of the Commission, like the Directorate Generals (Nugent Citation1997b, 1). In this article, I focus on the decision‐making behaviour of DG officials. Hence, when I refer to ‘the Commission’, I refer primarily to the administrative part of this organization.
2. For a discussion of the ‘partnership‐principle’ within the multi‐level governance literature, see Bauer (Citation2001).
3. For an overview of policy network approaches in EU studies, see Peterson (Citation2003).
4. According to the definition of Pollitt et al. (Citation2004, 10), an agency is
an organization which has its status defined principally or exclusively in public law … is functionally disaggregated from the core of its ministry or department of state, enjoys some degree of autonomy which is not enjoyed by the core ministry, is nevertheless linked to the ministry/department of state in ways which are close enough to permit ministers/secretaries of state to alter the budgets and main operational goals of the organization, is therefore not statutorily fully independent of its ministry/department of state, and is not a commercial corporation.
5. Due to time constraints, I chose to leave out Lithuania and Sweden. A comparative study of the environmental agencies in Norway, Finland and Denmark has been conducted previously (Martens Citation2008). I apply the interview data from this study. I also include a previous smaller case study of the IMPEL network (Martens Citation2006), where my empirical material is based on telephone interviews with national officials from ten different member states and one official from the Commission.
6. For an overview of different Commission expert groups, see Christiansen and Larsson (Citation2007).
7. The members states nominate ‘national coordinators’, the official IMPEL‐members, who are responsible for coordinating the IMPEL activities nationally (see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/impel/members.htm). It should be noted that some member states nominate representatives from their national ministries. However, this does not imply that the agencies in these countries are not participating in IMPEL activities. Different agency officials who are responsible for specific policy fields and/or different EU directives are involved in different projects within the network. These agency officials may also be involved in other networks in the EU related to their specific policy field.
8. The Secretariat has a supportive role towards the plenary meetings and working groups and maintains the contacts with the Commission. It maintains the website and publishes reports, guidelines and conclusions from meetings. The Plenary meeting is IMPEL's main body for final decisions and approval of projects. The meeting is co‐chaired by the Commission and the country holding the Council presidency. For each project, a working group is set up. With regard to development of enforcement‐friendly legislation, at least nine countries are represented in the group unless the Plenary meeting agrees otherwise (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/impel/pdf/struct_keyach.pdf). The members participate in these working groups irrespective of organizational affiliation in their home countries.
9. These groups may have different names, on the CIRCA webpage they are labelled ‘interest groups’. It should be noted that different types of EU committees and groups are using CIRCA, not only informal implementation networks, see https://circa.europa.eu/.
10. Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Feb. 16 1998 concerning the placement of biocidal products on the market.
11. Homeyer (Citation2007) described the development and dynamics of the guiding documents of the Water Framework Directive. See also http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water‐framework/iep/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water‐framework/objectives/implementation_en.htm.