How Policy‐Shaping Might (Not) Affect Policy‐Taking: The Case Of National Parliaments in the European Union

Abstract

There is an increasing literature which traces non‐compliance with European Union (EU) law back to the decision‐making stage. Yet, little attempts have been made to theorize on how and why the phase of shaping EU policies has an effect on their implementation, and to empirically demonstrate if there is a causal link between the two stages. This article seeks to fill this gap by first developing a theoretical framework which identifies three causal mechanisms linking policy‐shaping and policy‐taking: assertiveness, fairness and information. Second, it empirically tests their explanatory power by drawing on the case of national parliaments. The case studies of the Assemblée Nationale’s and the Bundestag’s involvement in the negotiation and transposition of the Water Framework Directive show that a causal link between policy‐shaping and policy‐taking is most likely if (1) actors remain identical, (2) little time elapses and (3) the involvement of implementing actors in policy‐shaping focuses on providing information.

Key Words:

• Compliance
• national parliaments
• transposition
• enforcement
• management
• legitimacy

Notes

1. The legitimacy approach does not necessarily require that implementing actors are actually consulted. The primary causal mechanism at work refers to the chance of implementing actors to participate and to have a voice in the process.

2. See the summaries of DUE meetings in the 11th electoral term on http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/europe/comptes-rendus-11leg.asp, and of the committee on production and trade meetings in the 11th electoral term on http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11//cr-cpro/01-02/liste.asp (accessed 27 August 2010).

3. See the questions relating to ‘water’ and ‘directives’ between May 1998 and October 2000 in the search engine on questions http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/questions.asp (accessed 27 August 2010).