The EU’s Performance with and within NATO: Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and Organisational Practices

Abstract

This article assesses the EU’s performance as a security actor in the context of NATO, both at the institutional level and when acting as a bloc of member states within NATO. Informed by a definition of ‘performance’ as the ability to achieve preset objectives (effectiveness) in an efficient, relevant and viable manner, we observe that the EU’s performance in the context of NATO remains limited. This could be seen as a reflection of underlying political divergences between the two organisations, hampering systematic and formalised intra-institutional cooperation as well as effective cooperation between the EU member states in NATO. More importantly, it has resulted in the emergence of more informal and ad hoc EU practices in the context of NATO as well as parallel EU and NATO practices.

Key Words:

• NATO
• EU
• ESDP
• performance
• practice
• inter-organisational cooperation

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has come a long way in developing a security and defence policy of its own during the last decade, to the extent that most scholars and decision-makers now consider it a relevant – though still atypical – international security actor. A number of scholars have engaged in analyzing what kind of security actor the EU is (e.g. Larsen 2002; Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006), what capabilities it possesses or lacks to act as a security actor (Rieker 2009; Shake, Block-Lainé, and Grand 1999; Toje 2010; Weis 2009; Whitman 2011), and how well it has succeeded in implementing its security tasks and peace-building efforts so far (e.g. Björkdahl 2011; Bono and Ulriksen 2004; Gross 2009). Increasingly, this literature has also come to include studies on how the EU relates to and works with other security organisations in the international arena, both generally and with specific organisations (Howorth 2003; Jørgensen 2009b; Ojanen 2006; Ortega 2005). Recently, a small but growing literature has taken interest in how the EU works within other international institutions in which some or all of its member states are represented (de Vasconcelos 2009a; Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Lindström 2007). Adding to these efforts, this article offers an empirically grounded assessment of the EU’s performance as a security actor working with and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO is a particularly interesting case to study as it is simultaneously a partner and an arena for the EU. The two organisations share historical roots in the post–World War II era, have developed alongside one another, and also share 21 member states. ¹

Our analysis is informed by Charles Lusthaus et al.’s (2002) indicators for assessing institutional performance, presented in the introduction to this collection. Adapted to our case, we operationalise ‘performance’ as, firstly, the degree to which predetermined objectives are being realized when working with and within NATO, in concrete policy output (effectiveness). We also ask whether the accomplishment of these objectives has taken place in an efficient manner, in the context of NATO operationalised as the value of these achievements weighed against the diplomatic, political, military and financial resources invested in pursuing them (efficiency). We also touch briefly on the degree to which the EU is regarded ‘relevant’ by various stakeholders (relevance) and whether it currently has the necessary resources to meet its functional requirements and acquire its stated objectives with and within NATO (viability). From this analytical starting point, we conclude that the EU’s performance as a security actor both with and within NATO is currently very limited. This rings true both if we understand ‘the EU’ to mean the institutions and individuals acting on behalf of the EU, and if we widen it to include formal and informal constellations involving some or all of the 21 EU member states that are also members of NATO.

Our analysis starts by identifying the EU’s stated objectives for its performance with and within NATO as spelled out in official EU documents and statements and in bilateral agreements between the EU and NATO. In the second section, we make some overall empirical observations concerning the EU’s present achievement of these, relatively vague, objectives. In the third section, we identify some factors that may shed light on the EU’s limited performance with and within NATO. We end with a recommendation for a future research agenda, suggesting an alternative assessment model for the EU’s performance with and within NATO. Focusing instead on performance as everyday formal and informal practices, we argue, might provide a somewhat different picture of EU achievements and shortcomings in its relationship with NATO.

Identifying the EU’s Objectives with and within NATO

Since 1992, EU treaties have routinely established guidelines for the EU’s and EU member states’ relationship with and strategic objectives in relation to other international organisations as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Specific objectives for the EU’s relations with NATO, however, are surprisingly few and far between. Even after the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty, NATO is mentioned by name only twice in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), and in both cases with reference to the precautionary Article 42, Section 2, stating that the EU is to ‘respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in [NATO]’ (European Council. 2010).

An early milestone in the institutional relationship between the EU and NATO was the establishment of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the framework of NATO in 1996. Two years later, the French-British Saint-Malo declaration also opened the possibility for EU military action outside NATO’s structures (France and the United Kingdom 2008), eventually leading to the adoption of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (European Council. 1999a, 1999b). In response to then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s warnings against EU structures that would compete with NATO (Albright 1998), then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson made it clear that the ‘ESDI does not mean “less US” – it means more Europe, and hence a stronger NATO’ (Robertson 1999). This view marked the discourse on EU-NATO relations in the subsequent years. A formal letter exchange between the EU Presidency and NATO’s Secretary General of January 2001 – the details of which remain classified – became the starting point for the two organisations’ formalised security cooperation. In 2002, the ‘EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP’ outlined the political principles for the relationship, identified objectives for their effective joint performance in the international arena, and established a strategic partnership (EU and NATO 2002). A set of formal arrangements between the two organisations, collectively and better known as the Berlin Plus framework, has been in effect since March 2003 (for a full overview of the agreement, see NATO 2003). This remains the main formal framework for EU-NATO cooperation, outlining the conditions under which the EU can draw on NATO assets in operations where NATO as a whole does not wish to act (EU and NATO 2002). The Berlin Plus arrangements also provide the EU access to NATO planning, European command options and assets and capabilities in these situations (Consilium. 2003).

When it comes to the EU’s objectives for its performance within NATO, they are even harder to unearth. Accordingly, an assessment of the EU’s effectiveness within NATO will have to depend on the general objectives set out for the EU’s performance in international institutions, listed in Articles 32, 34 and 35 of the Treaty on European Union (European Council 2010). Adapted to the case of NATO, they can be summarised as follows: first, the EU member states are to coordinate their action and uphold common EU positions in NATO. This work should be organised by the EU High Representative. Second, the EU member states in NATO should keep non-NATO EU member states as well as the High Representative informed of matters of common interests. Third, EU member states should ensure that their diplomatic and consular delegations to NATO cooperate and contribute to the formulation and implementation of common EU approaches. Member states must further ensure that decisions defining EU positions and actions are complied with and implemented and that cooperation is enhanced through the exchange of information and by carrying out joint assessments (European Council 2010).

With these objectives in view, the next section looks at cooperation between the two organisations, before we move on to studying how the 21 EU member states in NATO are performing within the alliance. This distinction between ‘with’ and ‘within’, it should be noted, is primarily an analytical one. In practice, the EU’s work with NATO and within the NATO context must be seen in relation to one another.

The EU’s Performance with NATO

Practical and institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU is mainly regulated by the Berlin Plus framework arrangements of March 2003. This package of agreements has unleashed both formal and informal cooperation practices between the EU and NATO, of which the most important ones will be analysed here.

NATO and EU officials meet on a regular basis at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors to discuss issues of common interest. There are monthly meetings between the EU’s Security and Political Committee and the North Atlantic Council, alternating between NATO Headquarters (HQ) and the EU’s Justus Lipsius Building in Brussels. Meetings at the military level take place between the EU Military Committee and the NATO Military Committee, and between NATO’s International Staff and the EU International Military on lower levels. Permanent military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate EU-NATO cooperation at the operational level as well. Since 2005, a NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff, and an EU Cell was set up at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 2006. There are also regular staff contacts between the European Union’s Council Secretariat and Military Staff, as well as with the European Defence Agency (EDA).

The Berlin Plus framework has, however, not worked as intended, largely because of the political disagreement between two participating states, Turkey and Cyprus, also involving Greece. In short, because EU officials have dismissed Turkey’s demands to be more involved in EU decision-making on security issues, Turkey rejects Cyprus’ wish to take part in NATO meetings (Pop 2010). Greece has called for a security agreement between the EU and Turkey as a prerequisite for the latter’s signing of an administrative arrangement with the EDA, which is being blocked by Cyprus (Sturm 2010). ² This situation has hampered political dialogue, coordination of strategy, institutional cooperation and, consequently, joint EU-NATO action. During 2010, national representatives to both organisations engaged in formal, high-level strategic discourse only once, with the Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the only topic on the agenda (Daalder 2010). For the time being, informal practices seem to have taken over that function. For instance, transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinners have taken place since September 2005. ³ In contrast, the NATO Secretary General’s wish to hold a NATO-EU summit as part of NATO’s 60th-anniversary meeting in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009 never materialized (Lachmann 2010).

Unlike many other multilateral institutions with which the EU interacts, NATO is not only a partner, but in some respects also a competitor. Although cooperation and division of labour were underlined from the start to avoid competition and duplication between the two, this has proved difficult to achieve in practice. Instead, parallel and sometimes competing practices have emerged. One illustrative example is the fact that the permanent NATO and EU headquarters remain separate – four miles from each other – despite both being located in Brussels. The headquarters for military and defence planning are also located separately: NATO has its strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium (although military representatives are located at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels), whereas the EU has separate military planning headquarters placed in five member states. ⁴ NATO also has a number of military commands in its member states, although this is continuously shrinking. ⁵ In general, member states have been eager to have military headquarters and commands on their soil, both as a symbol of their importance in NATO or EU strategy and defence planning, and for national security concerns. ⁶ For leading NATO members like the United States, NATO basing policy not only provides material arrangements for military operations, but arguably also political influence in these regions (Cooley and Nexon 2007).

NATO and the EU also have separate, partly overlapping military capabilities. The EU’s European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) (European Council 2001) and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment (2002) remain poorly synchronised, despite the setting up of a joint NATO-EU Capability Group. Meetings in the Group take place every four to six weeks, alternating between the Council’s Justus Lipsius Building and NATO HQ. Because briefing content is rarely exchanged before meetings, however, they often lack substance and instead take the form of largely formulaic information exchange. The EU and NATO’s more or less simultaneous decisions to establish rapid reaction forces – the EU Battlegroups in 2002 and the NATO Response Force in 2003 – is one striking example of the development of parallel practices. Both forces are designed for rapid, temporary deployment and flexible use for the international community or, alternatively, the EU or NATO acting on its behalf. Single-issue meetings initiated by the EU Presidency and meetings at the level of MOD policy directors in the member states seem to have functioned somewhat better (Sturm 2010).

While both the NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative have stressed the need to further integrate EU and NATO capabilities, the building up of parallel structures, capabilities and practices seems to continue. For example, NATO’s new Strategic Concept establishes a NATO civilian capacity. The idea is to train NATO personnel in civilian competence to enhance cooperation with other actors, including the EU, in complex emergencies and operations, and improve the implementation of NATO’s ‘comprehensive approach’ (NATO 2010a). How the new civilian capacity will be integrated or coordinated with EU civilian capabilities, however, remains unspecified. While a NATO civilian capacity may enhance EU-NATO cooperation in the field, the risk of duplication of non-military capabilities is also present. By establishing a civilian capacity, NATO is moving into the EU’s traditional area of competence.

Cooperation is also hampered by the fact that the EU and NATO must take different priorities into account – defined by their respective organisations – and they also follow different methodologies. Hence, it could be argued that politics and military organisational cultures encourage the development of separate practices. Regarding methodology, (higher) military education practices provide a clue. While the NATO Defence College was established in 1951, the European Security and Defence College was set up only in 2005. Unlike the former, which provides senior military education for military and civilian staff, the latter is a network of European Defence academic institutions set up to promote and train EU member states in the implementation of the ESDP/CSDP and CFSP. ⁷ The members of the EU Military Committee have followed similar careers, however, and many have attended the NATO Defence College or American military schools like the National Defence University (Washington, D.C.) and even the US Army War College (Carlisle, Pennsylvania). Accordingly, they largely share professional norms and values (Cross 2010). Education is a strong socialising mechanism and NATO has been an influential norm entrepreneur within military professionalism and doctrine (Forster 2006). A more coherent education of military staff could lead to more coherent conduct of joint operations, increasing military interoperability as well as political interoperability (‘a common world view’).

The EU’s cooperation and performance with NATO also suffers from the fact that NATO and EU defence planning processes – defined as the collective setting of targets and performance reviews – have not been brought together (see e.g. Biscop 2010). Vital practices like defence planning, defence reviews and coherence in capability development remain a member-state concern (Cameron 2009; Sturm 2010). Also within defence procurement, national – usually industrial – concerns are hampering cooperation, although examples of routinised cooperation among EU-countries exist. Standardising military hardware is a huge challenge for the EU (de Vasconcelos 2009b).

Despite the mutual employment of expertise and capabilities by both organisations in missions, EU and NATO often seem to pursue parallel instead of synchronized policies in the field. Examples include the transition of security responsibilities to an independent Kosovo, the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the training of police officers in Afghanistan (Daalder 2010). This tells of weak synchronisation between EU and NATO at the strategic level. The processes of adopting the Lisbon Treaty and of revising NATO’s Strategic Concept took place more or less in parallel during 2009 and 2010, and could have provided a point of departure for more coordinated policies and coherent practices, potentially also improving the preconditions for the EU’s performance in the NATO context. However, this did not happen to any extent. Before the Summit, no common EU perspective was formulated on the Concept (de Vasconcelos 2010).

While the Berlin Plus framework was hoped to provide ‘the framework for reconciling NATO and the EU … in a genuinely strategic partnership’ (Robertson 2003), this has not (yet) materialised. Both the Albright report and the new Strategic Concept emphasise that NATO’s strategic partnerships, and especially with the EU, need to be strengthened (NATO 2010a; 2010b). As Sven Biscop observes, however, ‘no real choice has yet been made on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and on the level of ambition and the degree of autonomy of the EU as strategic actor vis-à-vis NATO and the United States’ (Biscop 2006: 6). This still seems to be the case: the EU remains internally divided, both with regard to capabilities, politics and the future of European security, revealing an underlying divergence within the union (Sturm 2010). Others have warned against the CSDP becoming a ‘mini-NATO’ disconnected from the CFSP to boast a specifically European, comprehensive approach to security (Lachmann 2010). Consequently, the Cyprus issue can only partly account for the limited inter-organisational cooperation. The conflict seems to transcend the parties involved, serving at times as a cover for other interests in the matter. ⁸ Arguably, even if the stalemate were resolved, EU-NATO relations would still suffer from tension because of different views concerning what the main threats are and how security is best achieved. In the absence of substantive agreement regarding political and military priorities and how things are to be done, practical solutions have instead emerged in the field, as well as informally. Over time, these ad hoc, informal solutions may develop into standard practices, either improving cooperation or further cementing the build-up of parallel and separate NATO-EU practices.

The EU’s Performance within NATO

EU-NATO divergences also complicate the EU and its member states’ performance within NATO. Significant achievements on the EU’s part are difficult to spot, at least on account of our analytical point of departure where performance essentially equals the achievement of preset objectives. Starting with the general objective of establishing common EU positions and actions within international organisations, little has been accomplished in NATO at the time of writing. While the general trend in the UN General Assembly has been greater coordination within ‘the EU bloc’ (see Laatikainen and Smith 2006), the 21 EU member states that are also NATO members have rarely been seen to coordinate their positions or attempt to speak with a single voice in NATO. One observer notes that while the overlapping or parallel goals of the EU and NATO in theory might be expected to trigger ‘some form of commitment to inter-EU consultation and “alignment”’ to strengthen the EU’s position inside NATO, this has so far not been the case. Instead, he claims,

NATO is one of the EU’s taboos. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, EU Member States take decisions that vitally affect the security of all Europeans, and yet such decisions are not concerted among the EU’s members (unlike the established practice at the United Nations). Arguably EU Member States’ decisions in their capacity as NATO members are more likely to affect EU security options than what member countries decide at the UN (de Vasconcelos 2009a: 1).

Indeed, few formal or informal practices inside NATO appear to have been generated by the EU as an institution or by constellations of EU member states. There is, for example, no formal or informal coordination mechanism for EU positions and actions in NATO. One analyst observes that ‘several attempts throughout the first half of [the 2000s] to establish a coordination mechanism among EU NATO members have failed’, in turn raising ‘serious questions about the prospects for the emergence of a greater unity among EU member states within NATO’ (Garbers 2008: 2). In contrast, before each new session of the UN General Assembly, the EU member states have preparatory meetings to discuss and approve a paper outlining the EU’s priorities for the forthcoming session.

The second objective identified above was operationalised as the EU member states’ commitment to keeping non-NATO EU members (currently Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) and the EU High Representative informed of ‘matters of common interest’ within NATO. For a long time, however, this communication has been highly problematic, because of the dispute between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. NATO’s Fogh Rasmussen has emphasised that the EU needs to accommodate Turkey’s demand for a security agreement with the EU as well as with the EDA, and to include non-EU NATO members in ESDP decision making, while Lady Ashton has stressed the importance of a realist, pragmatic approach (see Rasmussen 2010). ⁹ This includes ‘“practical,” confidence-building measures between NATO and the EU, such as in-theatre co-operation on medical assistance, joint exercises and seminars’ (Pop 2010). The fact that seven of today’s NATO members – including the United States – are not in the EU, ¹⁰ also complicates the dialogue between the two organisations. Under the Berlin Plus agreement, these states are entitled to meet with the EU Troika four times a year to be informed and consulted about ESDP-related issues, but in practice these meetings have taken the form of one-way information sharing rather than of political substance discussions (Græger 2007). These meeting formats were dissolved upon the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and have not yet been replaced by new formal formats. ¹¹

A final EU objective for its performance in international organisations concerns the obligations of the EU member states’ diplomatic delegations to NATO. It is a stated EU objective to formulate and implement common approaches, to ensure information exchange and compliance with and implementation of EU positions and actions in the relevant field. At this point too, EU performance within NATO comes across as limited. There is, for example, presently no EU delegation to NATO, nor is there an official website informing the public about the EU’s work with and within NATO. In contrast, the EU has been present at the UN since 1964, with a diplomatic delegation there since 1974. Relevant information concerning cooperation and dialogue between the two organisations is found at the EU’s official website European Union @ United Nations: Partnership in Action (EU External Action. n.d.). This website also collects joint UN-EU publications and reports, and presents a list of EU priorities, policies, statements and declarations at the UN.

Explaining the EU’s Limited Performance with and within NATO

The EU’s limited performance in the context of NATO might be reflective of several factors, and in the following we will briefly highlight some of the most important.

Firstly, what may be described as ‘great power politics’ appears to affect both the institutional relationship between the EU and NATO and the EU’s prospects for playing a greater role as an actor or bloc inside NATO. In NATO, the impact of US officials’ warning against the development of a stable EU caucus should not be underrated. Furthermore, it could be argued that France’s long-term absence from NATO’s military structures has disallowed the French-German and French-British cooperation and initiatives that often have pushed European integration forward. France’s return as a full-fledged member in NATO’s military cooperation and the recent signing of a historic French-British agreement on strategic security and defence cooperation (see Taylor 2010) may therefore ease future discussions about greater EU coordination and dialogue within NATO (Garbers 2008). Ultimately, however, enhanced dialogue and cooperation between the EU and NATO and greater coordination of the EU bloc inside NATO largely rely on shared political priorities and agreement on how to reach them.

Secondly, a complicating factor regarding the prospects for an EU bloc in NATO concerns the existence of other sub-groups and constellations among member states in NATO, which often seem to take priority over EU unity. Such informal constellations have existed in NATO since the beginning. Some are fairly persistent, based on factors like geographic location and shared history; others are formed on a case-by-case basis. Examples include ‘the Atlanticists’ (and various sub-groups thereof), ‘Core Europe’ and ‘Club Med’ (see Græger and Haugevik 2009). Notably, however, the EU is rarely listed among these constellations. On the contrary, those (few) observers who have taken an interest in the matter of EU performance in NATO either point out that there are few indications of an ‘EU caucus’ emerging inside NATO (Burwell et al. 2006; Whitney 2008), or they warn against such a development. Instead, the current case seems to be that the EU member states operate flexibly and pragmatically in NATO, spreading themselves on other sub-constellations.

Closely related to this, it remains a trend in both NATO and the EU that much informal decision-making depends on bilateral relationships between member states. For a key NATO and EU member state like Britain, for example, the value of ‘working bilaterally’ is now recognised in official documents (Ministry of Defence 2010). Most importantly, the United States maintains close bilateral relationships with a number of NATO and EU countries. In most cases, these bonds were established during and immediately after the Second World War, forming an important backdrop for the establishment of NATO and the United States’ commitment to the territorial defence of European states. Bilateral relationships have also been upheld outside NATO’s structures. During the Cold War, the United States’ overseas basing strategies were characterised by ‘largely bilateral, variegated and asymmetric contracts between the U.S. government and host government’ (Cooley and Nexon 2007: 3). Similarly, scholars have argued that, during the second Bush administration and around the invasion of Iraq, bilateral relationships appeared to be replacing multilateral alliances (Dumbrell and Schäfer 2009: 2).

Today, the United States maintains close bilateral relationships with many NATO-and-EU members. Some of these relationships are short-term and practically motivated. Others are more long-term ‘special relationships’, characterised by extensive cooperation and shared political practices. Here, Britain has historically been in a category of its own, followed by other ‘Atlanticist’ NATO members such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. In recent years, however, new NATO and EU member states like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary seem to be playing ‘the bilateral card’ too. ¹² In light of this, one could hypothesize that the emergence of a stable EU caucus inside NATO, formally or informally and accompanied by a distinct set of shared EU practices, could complicate bilateral relationships with the United States. A divided and fragmented NATO was a central concern in the internal NATO debates in the 1990s leading up to the establishment of the ESDI in NATO. From this perspective, a potential EU caucus in NATO has been described as the ‘elephant in the room’, one that could complicate relations between the EU and NATO and weaken decision-making in NATO (deCamp 2005).

At the same time, it could be argued that the 21 EU member states in NATO currently lack the military and financial capabilities to play a greater role as a collective bloc within NATO. Although representing 75% of NATO’s member states, the EU 21 possessed in 2008 only about 47.2% of NATO’s armed forces. In comparison, the United States alone had about 37% and Turkey 13.8% (NATO 2011b). Similarly, in late 2010 the 26 EU countries participating in the NATO-led ISAF operation collectively provided only 24% of the troops. In the midst of severe budgetary cuts across Europe, including in leading EU members in NATO like Britain and France, the EU’s financial capability to act with a stronger collective voice can be questioned. Consequently, one might ask what the incentives would be for the EU to play a stronger role within NATO, politically and practically. As Jolyon Howorth has noted, even if the EU 21 were to act as one bloc in the North Atlantic Council, they would still only possess one out of eight voices, since decision-making here remains intergovernmental. Besides, he notes, the fact that one of these ‘others’ is the United States really ‘makes all the difference’ (Howorth 2009: 5). For the EU, it could therefore make more sense to concentrate on further strengthening its own security and defence dimension, rather than using NATO as an arena. This, in turn, could materialize into the establishment of further parallel institutional practices where organisational labels and footprints are given priority over EU-NATO cooperation and joint ventures.

A third important factor for the lack of EU performance in the NATO context is the build-up of separate structures for the daily, routinised (‘nitty-gritty’) military planning and other activities (e.g. headquarters), as well as the organisational culture growing out of or being confirmed by these practices. Arguably, organisation, working procedures, as well as capabilities are more than ways of organising activity; they also symbolise an organisation’s identity, power and prestige. From this viewpoint, the EU and NATO remain competitors rather than partners and collaborators. Indeed, both institutions have a stated objective to obtain a position as security actors beyond their own territories, seeking a role in regional, and increasingly also global security.

Clearly, NATO has impacted profoundly on the development of ESDP institutions and particularly on the set-up of the EU military committee and staff (Jørgensen 2009a: 192). With its stronger influence on the EU than vice versa, long-term experience with operations, defence planning and integrated command structure, NATO could potentially infringe upon the autonomy of the EU in this field. However, inter-organisational learning has also taken place in missions like Concordia and Althea, deepening EU-NATO relations in the field (Warvick and Koops 2009: 116). Yet, there are also examples of NATO policies being modelled after the EU, such as the ‘comprehensive approach’ to conflict management and post-conflict operations. In the EU Military Committee, where posts are double-hatted (both EU and NATO), a post-modern culture and doctrine has emerged where the civilian dimension of military thinking is deemed important (Cross 2010: 19).

An alternative explanation could be that EU objectives have been reframed – de facto if not de jure – not to compete with NATO but as a result of the poor functioning of the Berlin Plus framework. Years of political stalemate and lack of progress in EU-NATO cooperation may have pushed for the development of separate EU capacities and practices. Such an explanation would emphasise the pragmatic rather than ideological or competitive aspects of EU institution building and policy in the field of security.

On a final note, several practices within the field of security continue to be seen as sensitive. At the end of the day, they therefore remain national matters. This presumably affects EU performance more than NATO performance, inasmuch as the consensus principle in NATO has been seen as a buffer against at least formal loss of sovereignty to the alliance.

Measuring Performance: Towards a New Research Agenda?

This article has suggested that the EU is currently neither a relevant nor visible performer in the context of NATO, whether in its institutional cooperation with NATO or as a bloc of EU member states within NATO. Firstly, at the institutional level of EU-NATO interaction, both the updating of shared objectives as well as effective practical cooperation (i.e. capability development and in the field) and information sharing continue to be hampered by the Cyprus stalemate. In addition, diverging agendas and priorities among member states on both sides make it difficult for the two organisations to find a shared way ahead.

Secondly, inside NATO there is a noteworthy lack of formal as well as informal practices involving the 21 EU members in NATO acting collectively or as a bloc. At the time of writing, other bi-, tri- and multilateral constellations, whether long-term or ad hoc, and especially those involving the United States, seem to take precedence over the formation of an EU caucus.

As noted above, the EU has set out few objectives for its performance in NATO, making it challenging to measure the degree to which objectives have been achieved (and in an efficient, relevant and viable manner). But there is also an apparent lack of EU-generated practices inside the framework of NATO. This is true even if we broaden the definition of performance to encompass how the EU, intentionally or not, de facto works inside NATO on a daily basis.

At the end of our discussion, we identified some possible explanations as to why future assessments of EU performance with and within NATO in the near future are likely to produce the same conclusion, if they are based on Lusthaus et al.’s (2002) understanding of performance as achievement of preset, stated objectives. This does not mean that the EU cannot improve its performance in NATO in the future; however, it suggests that the EU’s performance in NATO is complicated by a number of contextual and structural factors.

Taking this into consideration, let us end with a suggestion for how future research on the EU’s performance with and within NATO could be conducted. After all, it seems clear that any assessment of performance will depend on how we define performance in the first place. Although a ‘comprehensive approach’ has trumped a purely military approach in crisis management also in NATO, this is often overlooked in the literature. Numerous articles have been published about the EU’s lack of ability to underpin its political ambitions in security and defence with military posture since the Bosnia operation in 1995. These contributions often measure the Union’s performance according to how it fulfils its stated goals as a security actor, focusing on access to EU (autonomous) military means. When ‘hard numbers’ are what counts, NATO remains the big brother of the two, because of its interoperable military capabilities and integrated command structure. As argued by Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2009), the military focus in scholarly (and especially Nordic) studies of ESDP has led to a neglect of the civilian dimension of ESDP, where EU performance has proved to be effective, efficient and relevant, to use the Lusthaus et al, (2002) terminology. The EU is now a major actor within civilian crisis management and peace building (Björkdahl 2011).

An alternative definition of performance, which looks more systematically at performance as practice (see Adler and Pouliot 2011; Pouliot 2010) might therefore produce other findings, leaving more room for an analysis of what the EU is de facto doing with and within NATO, despite the lack of a coherent EU-NATO policy or poor institutional cooperation. A practice-based approach would focus less on the correspondence between institutional objectives and outcomes, and rather pay attention to the establishment of the everyday formal and informal activities, procedures and habits that can be seen as indicative of the EU’s performance with and within NATO.

Notes

1. The 21 EU member states in NATO are Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain.

2. In contrast, Norway signed such an agreement with the EDA in 2006 (see Utenriksdepartementet 2006-2006).

3. For a list of NATO-EU informal and formal meetings, see NATO (2011a).

4. In France (outside of Paris), Britain (outside of London), Germany (Potsdam), Italy (outside of Rome) and Greece (Larissa).

5. In the Netherlands (Brunssum), Italy (Naples), Portugal (Lisbon), Poland and Britain.

6. It should also be mentioned that NATO commands tend to be seen as a positive contribution to the local community where the headquarter is located. This also goes for NATO’s military bases.

7. http://esdc.mil-edu.be/

8. According to a Norwegian government official. Seminar in Oslo, 19 October 2010.

9. Rasmussen said this after the EU’s Political and Security Committee and NAC met on 25 May 2010 (NATO 2010c). According to a Danish source, Rasmussen’s engagement reflects his aspirations to become EU High Representative for CSDP at a later stage (personal interview, 10 June 2010).

10. The non-EU member states in NATO are the United States, Norway, Canada, Iceland, Turkey, Albania, and Croatia.

11. Some non-EU NATO members also have bilateral agreements about participation in EU crisis management operations and with the European Defence Agency in 2004 and 2006 respectively (see Utenriksdepartementet 2006-2006).

12. The former two signed a bilateral agreement in 2009 with the United States as part of the American plans for a missile defence system in Europe.