Twenty Years of Co-decision Since Maastricht: Inter- and Intrainstitutional Implications

Abstract

One of the most important institutional changes in the history of the EU was the introduction of the co-decision procedure in 1993. This new legislative procedure has transformed the EU system of governance by affecting both the balance of power between the EU institutions and their internal workings. This contribution takes stock of the first 20 years of co-decision by systematically bringing together and reviewing the findings in the existing literature on EU co-decision. Empirical and theoretical work is scrutinized, which examines the interinstitutional balance of power between the institutions, intrainstitutional power shifts within them and the normative implications of the procedure. Based on these findings, an overall assessment of the long-term implications of co-decision for the functioning of the EU is made.

Keywords:

• Co-decision
• legislative politics
• European Parliament
• Council of Ministers
• democratic legitimacy

Notes

1. OJ C 331, 7.12.1993, p. 1.

2. OJ C 148, 28.5.1999, p. 1 and OJ C 145, 30.6.2007, p. 5.

3. Because the preferences of the key actors are in practice not always distributed in such a way that it is possible for the EP to make a proposal that would make a qualified majority of the Council better off with than any unanimous decision the Council could make. Moreover, even if this were possible, it is not a given that the EP would be able to agree to such a proposal and that the Commission would support it.

4. In order to separate early agreements from the rest of the first reading conclusions Toshkov and Rasmussen (2011) employed automated text analysis on the documents provided by the Legislative Observatory database. More details on the procedure are given in ‘Research design and data’ section of their article.

5. Despite the fact that early agreements raise democratic challenges for the EP, a recent article has argued that they may also benefit the EP by strengthening its relative influence vis-à-vis the Council. The argument is that because the Council has limited organizational resources it is more willing to give in to the EP to reach a deal early on compared to later on in the policy process (Häge & Kaeding 2007).

6. European Voice ‘MEPs quick-deal concerns’, vol. 14, no. 2, 17 January 2008.

7. ‘Nouvelle version du guide pratique des procedures internes — codécision’, SPI(2007)73.