Abstract
After clarifying the concept of intergovernmental union, the article analyses the performance of the latter during the euro crisis. The economic policy side of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) epitomises the intergovernmental union because based on the principle of voluntary coordination between member state governments as a condition for advancing the process of integration. Tested during the euro crisis, because of the distrust emerged between member states, EMU has ended up in creating a highly centralised policy regime, where the creditor member states have come to play a domineering role with regard to debtor member states. Hierarchical relations between national governments have finally substituted consensus with domination. The absence of a European legislative check on the decisions taken by the intergovernmental Euro Summit and Eurogroup has made domination an unjustifiable feature in the eyes of the public opinion of the debtor member states.
Notes
1. One of the most radical proposals has been advanced by Chalmers (Citation2013, 9), according to which ‘unless two thirds of parliaments indicate their support for a measure, a Commission proposal should not go forward to the Council’, or ‘if one third of national parliaments propose either that legislation be reviewed or that new legislation should be proposed, the Commission is obliged to make a proposal to that effect’. See also Cooper (Citation2015).
2. After the negotiation for setting the multiannual financial budget (2014–2020), the latter has become less than 1% of the total GDP of the EU. The size of the budget is defined according to the following procedure, as stated by the TFEU, Art. 312.2: ‘The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall adopt a regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework. The Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of its component members’.