Scrutinising the European Semester in national parliaments: what are the drivers of parliamentary involvement?

Abstract

How exactly are national parliaments involved in the European Semester? The stronger coordination of fiscal and economic policies in the European Union (EU) in reaction to the sovereign debt crisis has forced national parliaments to adapt their procedures. This article examines how the European Semester is scrutinised and what factors have driven parliamentary activities in the French National Assembly, the German Bundestag, the Irish Dáil and the Portuguese Assembleia between 2012 and 2017. Particularly noteworthy is that legal provisions for a parliamentary debate on the Stability Programme can be ignored in France, that the German Bundestag is much less active in the European Semester than in EU affairs or in the budget process and that the weakness of Ireland’s parliament in the annual budget procedure affects its role in the European Semester. This article therefore suggests defining minimum standards for parliamentary involvement and strengthening interparliamentary cooperation.

Keywords:

• National Parliaments
• European Semester
• economic and monetary union
• democratic legitimacy
• parliamentary oversight

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the 3rd General Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Parliaments in Munich, the Workshop ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the European Semester’ at the Hertie School of Governance and in its European Governance Colloquium. I would like to thank the participants at these events, the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.

Notes

1. The European Parliament can make a contribution to the throughput legitimacy of the European Semester via its scrutiny of the European Commission at the EU level. The instruments at its disposal include conducting ‘economic dialogues’ with the European Commission and other EU institutions as well as adopting own-initiative reports. The European Parliament was involved in the adoption of the European Semester via the Ordinary Legislative Procedure over the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack, but it lacks direct policy influence over the European Semester. See also Fromage 2018 in this issue.

2. The five ideal types of the Palgrave Handbook on National Parliaments and the European Union (see Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, 27–35) are applied to the European Semester and discussed one after the other.

3. Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.

4. Le Monde, 29 May 2013.

5. ANSA English, 16 October 2015.

6. See Online Appendix, A.1 France.

7. Assemblée nationale (2015, 30; 33).

8. Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016. See also Le Canard enchainé, 15 April 2015, 2.

9. Gilles Carrez, Les Républicains; see Assemblée nationale 2016, 2837.

10. See Online Appendix, A.2 Germany.

11. Interview with a clerk in the EU affairs directorate of the German Bundestag, 2 March 2017.

12. Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (CDU), 22 March 2017.

13. Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), 8 March 2017.

14. See Online Appendix, A.2 Germany.

15. Deutscher Bundestag 2016; 16491C-D. See also van den Brink (2018) in this issue.

16. See Online Appendix, A.3 Ireland.

17. See Online Appendix, A.4 Portugal.

18. See Crum 2018, 275; Fasone 2015, 20–1; Jančić 2016, 242–243. According to Rasmussen (2018, in this issue), however, the Spanish parliament cannot provide substantial scrutiny of the European Semester. It is important to note that Greece and Cyprus, due to financial assistance programmes, were not part of the European Semester for most of the time.

19. President François Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Valls sought to ensure the survival of the government and in the light of a high number of abstentions or possible ‘no’ votes, they refrained from greater parliamentary involvement.

20. When votes take place, opposition MPs are hesitant about whether to approve or reject the motion on the European Semester. This was the case in France.

21. See Online Appendix, A.1 France and A.2 Germany.

22. See Online Appendix, A.1 France and A.2 Germany.

23. Aleksandra Maatsch argues that in the Bundestag ‘parliamentary parties made very effective use of their strong formal powers in order to initiate debates on the European Semester’ (2017, 208). In this respect, however, 2015 (three resolutions proposed and one of them adopted) was an exceptional year. In 2016 and 2017, only one plenary debate took place, no resolutions were tabled. The resolution tabled by the Green Party in 2014 was identical to the Green’s resolution a year later.