Transatlantic security relations since the European security strategy: what role for the EU in its pursuit of strategic autonomy?

ABSTRACT

Transatlantic security cooperation entered a new era after the 9/11 attacks in America, the launch of EU crisis management/security assistance operations, and the release of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003. Since then, years of practical experience have inspired the EU to enhance its ambitions in this realm by developing a Cybersecurity Strategy, a Maritime Security Strategy, and most recently, the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS). As these efforts respect NATO’s primary role in European defence, there is more scope for practical EU-US collaboration regarding crisis management and security assistance operations. However, although there have been some clear successes here, the EU is also increasingly willing to forge its own path in this realm and possibly diverge with US priorities. This article evaluates the recent record of, and prospects for, EU-US security collaboration regarding various problems mentioned as strategic priorities in the ESS, EUGS, and related documents.

KEYWORDS:

• CFSP
• CSDP
• security
• defence
• NATO

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the support of the European Research Council (grant #203613) for funding the research drawn upon in this article. I am also grateful to the editors of this special issue and to the anonymous referees of the Journal of European Integration for their comments on an earlier draft. Finally, I would like to thank the European University Institute for the award of a Robert Schuman Fellowship, which provided a very congenial atmosphere to complete this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Note that I am not dealing with territorial defence/deterrence issues in this article, as these are covered elsewhere in this special issue (see Howorth).

2. See the introduction to this special issue.

3. Such as NATO’s ‘out of area’ initiative to deal with problems in the Persian Gulf; see Kupchan (1988).

4. That is, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement. These were defined in 1992 at the occasion of the WEU Council of Ministers Meeting taking place in Hotel Petersberg (Germany).

5. Briefly, Berlin Plus allows for ‘assured access’ to NATO planning capabilities, a ‘presumption of availability’ to the EU of NATO assets, and NATO European command support for EU-led operations. Berlin Plus discussions began in June 1996 but were not completed (and thus made operational) until 2003.

6. Also see the follow-up Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World (Brussels: Council of the European Union, Solana 2003).

7. For more detailed discussions of this period of US-EU relations, see (Pond 2003; Mahncke, Rees, and Thompson 2004; Quille 2004; Dannreuther and Peterson 2006).

8. See for example the EU’s Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, both adopted in 2005. This EU policy domain is now known as the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.

9. See the European Commission press release on the Defence Union and Permanent Structured Cooperation of 11 December 2017.

10. See Rayroux (2013) for a more extensive discussion.

11. On this point see (Manners 2002; Youngs 2004; Manners 2006; Telò 2006) and the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (Vol. 13, no. 2, 2006) edited by Helene Sjursen on ‘What Kind of Power?’.

12. The EU includes four member states – Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden – that still maintain an officially neutral stance towards multilateral defensive alliances, while Denmark has officially opted-out of the defence/military aspects of the CSDP. All of these states, however, have participated in various CSDP actions.

13. For detailed assessments, see (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane 2009; Dijkstra 2010; Gowan 2011; Haine 2011; Juncos 2013; Engberg 2014; Smith 2017).

14. Although Trump was threatening to withdraw the US from the nuclear agreement with Iran at the time of writing.

15. Without its own OHQ in Brussels, the EU has to either rely on NATO’s OHQ at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (i.e., through Berlin Plus, which requires US approval) or use one of the five EU national OHQs of certain EU member states: the French OHQ in Mont Valérien, Paris; the UK OHQ in Northwood; the German OHQ in Potsdam; the Italian OHQ in Rome; and the Greek OHQ in Larissa. Since the Brexit vote, the EU has taken some small steps to remedy this problem through a new Military Planning and Conduct Capability.

16. ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy.’

17. Eurobarometer surveys consistently show a clear majority of citizens in all EU member states (including the UK) support the CSDP; the average across the EU is around 75% in favour. Surveys since the UK Brexit referendum (June 2016) also show a rising majority of Europeans are optimistic about the future of the EU; see the European Commission press release on ‘A European spring’ of 2 August 2017.

18. EU Military Staff officials who have worked for both NATO and the EU point out the fact that NATO is not accepted everywhere, and may be seen simply as a tool of the US. For the same reason joint EU-NATO military operations are also controversial for many states, so the EU must continue to develop its own capacities where NATO is unable, unwilling, or unwelcome to operate (Smith 2017).

19. There is now considerable evidence that the US is not just unwilling but also unable to engage in effective state-building along the lines of what the EU has achieved in Central and Eastern Europe; see Brownlee (2007).

20. Attributed to US baseball player Vernon Law of the Pittsburgh Pirates.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the FP7 Ideas: European Research Council [203613].