Safeguarding, shifting, splitting or sharing? Conflicting conceptions of popular sovereignty in the EU-polity

ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the Euro-crisis, refugee crisis and Brexit, Europe’s finalité politique once again became a topic of heated debate. Both Eurosceptic nationalists and defenders of the EU appeal to the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, but they offer conflicting interpretations. This study seeks to offer a fine-grained framework to analyze this normative conflict of sovereignty. I distinguish four conceptions of popular sovereignty in Europe’s transnational polity; each is linked to a parliamentary arrangement. First, national popular sovereignty proposes a safeguarding of sovereign nation-states. Second, European popular sovereignty suggests that decision-making power should shift from the member-states to a European superstate. Third, simultaneous popular sovereignty suggests that national peoples and EU citizens should be represented in the EU. Fourth, shared popular sovereignty points toward national parliamentarians being the central locus of democratic authority in the EU. These conceptions thus result in conflicting institutional prescriptions.

KEYWORDS:

• Democracy
• European Union
• parliaments
• political theory
• popular sovereignty

I. Introduction: conflicting conceptions about popular sovereignty in Europe

The appropriate conceptualization of popular sovereignty is a central object of contestation in debates about the future of EU democracy. Appeals to national popular sovereignty have become a cornerstone in Eurosceptic populist rhetoric in the United Kingdom, Poland, Hungary and Italy among others (see Hobolt 2016; Borriello and Brack; Coman and Lecont in this issue). Yet their opponents also invoke popular sovereignty to ground their case for further European integration. German social democrat Martin Schulz, for instance, made the case for referenda across Europe on the creation of European superstate.¹ The referenda give power to Europe’s true sovereign: EU citizens.

In the aftermath of the recent crises, the democratic deficit of Europe’s institutional architecture has emerged as a central theme in EU studies (see for example, Chalmers, Jachtenfuchs, and Joerges 2016; Nicolaïdis 2016). An influential analysis is that an increasing number of core-state powers were transferred to supranational institutions without organized opposition (Van Middelaar 2017). Some scholars even argue that the EU is transforming into ‘a technocratic order’ (Sánchez-Cuenca 2017). The institutional response to the EU crises has raised serious concerns about Europe’s democratic credentials. EU federalism has become a particularly influential theme (Fossum 2017; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016; Fossum and Jachtenfuchs 2017). Yet, the appropriate federal construction for the EU relies in part on a conception of European peoplehood. Should a European federation empower EU-citizens, national peoples or perhaps both?

The principle of popular sovereignty can provide guidance to democratize EU decision-making procedures, however the sui generis nature of Europe’s political landscape challenges a straightforward transposition from the national state to the EU’s multi-level system of governance. Broadly, the principle of popular sovereignty entails that political power should remain with the citizenry in democratic polities. Crucially, a citizenry democratically authorises politicians through elections to represent them in decision-making procedures. But how should this democratic principle be understood in Europe’s multi-layered polity? And, by extension, which politicians should represent citizens in EU decision-making procedures?

Although a rich debate in political and legal theory has emerged on the appropriate norm for institutionalizing democracy in the EU polity (e.g. Beetz, Corrias, and Crum 2017), distinct norms seem to overlap in their institutional upshot. For instance, demoicrats seem to disagree on institutional prescriptions (compare Beetz 2018; Bellamy 2016; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Nicolaïdis 2013). Moreover, Miriam Ronzoni suggests that the demoicratic proposals collapse in either intergovernmental regime or federal union (Ronzoni 2017). Furthermore, proponents of a pouvoir constituant mixte often present themselves as an alternative to demoicrats (Patberg 2017a), yet they often advocate very similar institutional solutions (compare Habermas 2012; Nicolaïdis 2013). Jeremy Waldron (2016) argues that normative commitments should provide guidance on the design of political institutions. From this perspective, the current ambiguity can be taken as a serious shortcoming. One important issue is that it obfuscates the distinctiveness of the positions featured in this debate.

This article aims to map this normative conflict on the institutional alternatives for EU democracy based on the principle of popular sovereignty. To this end, I first unpack this democratic principle into two dimensions that are directly relevant for institutionalizing democracy in Europe. The first dimension concerns peoplehood in a transnational polity. The core question is whether a European people (should) exist, and be represented in EU governance, or exclusively national peoples. The second dimension concerns the proper institutionalisation of sovereignty, which parliament should represent the sovereign people in EU decision-making procedures? By extension, does popular sovereignty necessarily entail de facto state sovereignty or can, and maybe, should we disentangle executive prerogative from legislative powers?

The two dimensions result in a framework with four democratic conceptions of popular sovereignty. I refer to these conceptions as: national popular sovereignty, European popular sovereignty, simultaneously popular sovereignty and shared popular sovereignty. Each conception, I will argue, suggests a distinct parliamentary arrangement to democratise EU decision-making procedures. The normative debate has arguably become more complex in practice and theory, yet underlying this complexity lies a fundamental choice when considering the democratisation of the EU.

My argument unfolds as follows: In the next section, I argue that the democratic principle of popular sovereignty is a fruitful lens to theorise alternative models of EU democracy. I then distinguish four distinct conceptions in Europe’s transnational setting. Each of the subsequent four sections elaborates on one of these, first by discussing the normative principle in relation to (implicit) proponents in the literature then by discussing the ideal institutionalisation of parliamentary representation as well as indicate practical opportunities and concerns. The seventh section concludes.

II. Conceptions of popular sovereignty in Europe’s transnational polity

Popular sovereignty already features in normative studies on the EU, but these studies tend to focus on the appropriate conception rather the possible conceptions (e.g. Balibar 2004; Beetz 2017; Beetz and Rossi 2017; Bellamy 2016; Dawson and de Witte 2015; Habermas 2012; Majone 1999). Scholars usually distinguish between three conceptions: national, supranational and an in-between ‘post-sovereign’ conception (e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 1997; Morgan 2005; Nicolaïdis 2013). These studies usually take a statist conception of sovereignty as their point of departure. Alternatively, some claim that sovereignty should be jettisoned altogether in favour of post-sovereign ideals (Balibar 2004; MacCormick 1996). Still, these scholars often recognise that the principle of popular sovereignty has been influential in shaping democratic institutions in the state, hence this democratic principle is a promising point of departure for theorising EU democracy.

However, two features distinguish the EU-polity from national states: The EU-polity is a transnational one, because it consists of multiple national polities; further the EU is a multi-layered regime, because its political decision-making structures were built on top of national orders. These features have been important sources for conflict on how popular sovereignty should be conceptualized in contemporary Europe. Therefore, by taking Europe’s specificity into account, I seek to ensure that I cover the full range of conceptual possibilities.

In the EU-polity, two dimensions are particularly relevant in a realistic conception of popular sovereignty able to guide institutional design. The first of these concerns the existence of peoples in Europe’s transnational polity. Many competing definitions of the people exist (Scherz 2013). The real-world exercise of popular sovereignty requires political decision-making and policy implementation systems: a democratic people can only exercise its right within a bounded system of governance (Cheneval 2006).² By extension, a people is bounded by its system of governance. This study follows Cheneval in defining the people as ‘a finite political decision-making community’ (Cheneval 2006, 206). Despite its theoretical and practical challenges as well as normative alternatives, this conception of the people provides a suitable definition for my purposes.

We can distinguish two positions in the EU context: the first holds that the EU polity consists exclusively of multiple national peoples. Finite political communities exist solely within the established governance systems of the member states.³ The logical alternative is that a supranational ‘European’ people exists. The existence of a supranational system entails the existence of a (nascent) European people. This position does not necessarily deny the existence of national peoples; Europe’s transnational polity can be theorised as a polity of national peoples and a European people. The logical distinction is between those positions that deny a supranational people and those who accept its (necessary) existence or advocate its creation.

The second dimension concerns sovereignty understood as the institutional representation of the sovereign(s) in decision-making procedures. Two conceptions of sovereignty are relevant to theorise institutional representation of the people in EU decision-making. The first conception is a statist one, of which the central feature is that de jure and de facto sovereignty are necessarily bound up with another. Glyn Morgan, for instance, argues that internal sovereignty within a political order and external sovereignty in international relations are two sides of the same coin. Following this Hobbesian logic, he submits that a unitary chain of representation from people via parliament to executive is paramount for a democratic order (Morgan 2005). A sovereign parliament should represent the people in its decision-making procedures.

Contrasting this statist conception, international political theorists have developed a novel conception in which sovereignty is the prerogative of the demos or demoi (e.g. Beetz and Rossi 2017; Habermas 2012). These scholars sharply distinguish de jure popular sovereignty from de facto state sovereignty. Their central argument is that the legislature represents the sovereign people in decision-making procedures. The disconnection from de facto state power, however, enables the conceptualization of multi-layered democratic orders, because multiple demos – demoi – can be represented by separate parliamentary bodies in decision-making procedures. In other words, a unitary chain of representation is not a requirement for a democratic order. Moreover, the legislature(s) can choose to empower multiple executives with decision-making power on behalf of the people. This logic does entail that executives should remain effectively accountable to the appropriate legislature(s). I will refer to this second conception as demos sovereignty.

Based on these two distinctions, I distinguish between four conceptions of popular sovereignty. First, national popular sovereignty combines a denial of European peoplehood with a statist conception of sovereignty. Second, European popular sovereignty results from an acceptance of European peoplehood with a statist conception of sovereignty. Third, simultaneous popular sovereignty combines an acceptance of European peoplehood with a demos conception of sovereignty. Fourth and finally, shared popular sovereignty is a conception that denies European peoplehood and relies on a demos conception.

I will focus on parliamentary arrangements in this study. The following reasons motivate this choice. Firstly, parliamentary arrangements enable a clear distinction between different modes of representation. Leaving aside in-depth discussions on logics and practice of representation (Pitkin 1967), a central distinction can be drawn between one-dimensional and two-dimensional logics of representation. One-dimensional logic refers to a political order – executive and legislature – representing a single people. Two-dimensional logic means that multiple chambers represent distinct peoples (Morgan 2005, 11–6). Parliamentary arrangements can consist of multiple chambers to secure appropriate representation in decision-making procedures. This institutional focus can draw out the differences between the statist and demos conception of sovereignty.

Second, representative democracy is the established institution of democratic governance in mass societies. Although deliberative and participatory democratic initiatives might enrich EU democracy (e.g. Crespy 2014; Steffek 2014), representative democracy remains uniquely suited to ensure appropriate representation of the people in decision-making processes (Crum 2005, 455). Parliaments have been a central institution in modern democracies as a realistic route to ensure citizens voice in their self-government. In short, this institutional perspective offers a realistic lens to reflect on the democratisation EU decision-making. In the rest of the article, I will flesh out the four conceptions of popular sovereignty.

III. Safeguarding national sovereignty of Europe’s peoples

National popular sovereignty is a traditional and familiar conception. A European people does not exist. The only democratic decision-making communities in the EU-polity are the national peoples. This denial of European peoplehood is combined with a statist conception of sovereignty. The state provides the organizational structure for democratic representation. National popular sovereignty thus entails that the sovereign nation-states remain the only legitimate democratic orders in Europe’s transnational polity.

In EU studies, this conception has become associated with communitarian scholar. Their analysis leans on a mixture of sociological analysis and normative arguments about the functioning of modern mass democracies (Bellamy and Castiglione 1997). These scholars (e.g. Grimm 2009; Miller 1999) often rely on classic arguments that sociological characteristics generate pre-conditions for the peaceful, democratic exercise of collective power, such as trust and shared sentiments (e.g. Mill 1865; Tamir 1993; Taylor 2011). In a similar vein, some argue that the existence of a shared identity underpins the authority of the state; the lack of a European nation undermines the possibility of a legitimate EU democracy for the foreseeable future (Malcolm 1991). Moreover, the necessity of community for democracy means that popular sovereignty cannot be shifted, shared let alone split even if national peoples would desire such a solution. Incidentally, one might well consider that this argument also applies to certain communities within states, such as Catalonia, Bavaria, and Scotland. In practice however, these arguments tend to focus on the member states (Grimm 2009; Malcolm 1991; Miller 1999). In sum, the exclusive loci of popular sovereignty in the EU-polity are the member states.

Turning to the institutional upshot, national parliaments remain the legitimate representative bodies in Europe’s transnational polity while EU politics remains a domain of international politics. National parliaments remain the representatives of Europe’s sovereign peoples. In (semi-)presidential systems there is a second representative of the people. Still, on this conception, the national peoples of Europe democratically authorize the state to act upon their behalf. As a democratic consequence, state executives should maintain their veto in EU politics. Without a veto, national executives can shirk responsibility toward their national publics. Crucially, parliaments lose their ability to effectively control the executive in the name of the sovereign people. Furthermore, EU-institutions should remain agents of the member states. If they gain autonomous powers without effective accountability mechanisms to their executive principals, they will undermine democracy in Europe.

A strict conception seems unrealistic, however an intergovernmental ideal might be possible. Adherence to an uncompromising conception would result in a return to sovereign states, which clearly resonates in calls for a return of power to European states by nationalist Eurosceptics during the crises. Intergovernmentalists arguably provide a possible alternative conception. Stanley Hoffman’s distinction between high and low politics provides a conceptual space for various degrees of legitimate delegation of discretionary powers to EU bodies (Hoffman 1966). Most intergovernmentalists seem sanguine about a transfer of some powers in the domain of ‘low politics’ to attain Pareto-optimal outcomes (Moravcsik 2002). Arguably, Majone’s argument for a confederacy controlling EU regulatory governance might fit this democratic conception of popular sovereignty (Majone 2005). Nevertheless, this conception would continue to warrant the right and effective ability for state-executives to withdraw their consent in any policy area. Such institutions were largely in place, hence they are a feasible set-up. The question is how credible commitments and effective decision-making remain ensured within the shadow of national vetoes in a Union of 28 member states.

In sum, national popular sovereignty entails a safeguarding of popular sovereignty within the member states. It is closely associated with communitarian nationalists, who argue that peoplehood only exists at the national level. Further, a statist conception of sovereignty results in member states remaining the sole legitimate loci of democratic authority. The institutional upshot is that national parliaments should be able hold their democratic executives accountable for their role in international politics. EU politics should remain an international setting; therefore, executives should continue to hold veto powers to effectuate democratic control by national parliaments.

IV. Shifting sovereignty to a European state

By contrast, European popular sovereignty entails that a European people should be(come) the only sovereign in the Union. This conception also relies on a statist conception of sovereignty; a state order should structure democratic representation. The crucial difference is that sovereignty is attributed to a European people. This supranational people should hold the exclusive right to self-government in a democratic EU-polity. European popular sovereignty results in a case for European statehood, which in turn ultimately results in transcending the polity’s transnational character.

Proponents of a European superstate rely upon this conception of popular sovereignty. Despite disagreements on its ontological and conceptual status, the central conceit is the existence of a European people. Some scholars argue that a European community exists and that shared philosophical, cultural or historical roots are the foundation of this European community. A problem is that EU-citizens do not (yet) recognise this shared identity (Delanty 1995; Siedentop 2000). In a different vein, other scholars posit a more modest, institutional conception of peoplehood. To them, peoplehood is a product of shared participation in democratic procedures arguably with some foundation in shared democratic values. The existence of EU governance systems provides the institutional foundation of a European people (Føllesdal and Hix 2006). In this vein, some Eurosceptics argue that EU peoplehood could emerge over time despite being ‘a tall order’ (Bickerton 2011, 670; Malcolm 1991). Leaving aside the exact conception, the existence of a European people in combination with a statist conception of sovereignty cumulates in a case for a European state order. If the EU becomes Europe’s sovereign authority, member states must give up their claim to sovereignty. In short, a European people requires a sovereign political order: a European superstate (Morgan 2005).

Turning to the question of an appropriate parliamentary arrangement, European popular sovereignty suggests that the EU requires a directly elected and fully empowered European Parliament. This Parliament represent the sovereign people in EU decision-making. EU politics effectively becomes domestic politics in which Europe’s citizenry decides the direction of policies through supranational democratic processes. A one-dimensional logic of representation should govern the institutional design of the Union, but the exact institutional design is not predetermined; a parliamentarian, a presidential or a semi-presidential system are all possibilities. One particularly important consequence is the disempowerment of the member states; the national parliaments become regional assemblies. They would represent citizens of their constituencies on ‘local’ matters. Further, they might partake in EU decision-making. The United States of America as well as Germany offer blueprints of such a federal superstate. However, national parliaments and executives are ultimately subject to the sovereignty of the EP, and, by extension, Europe’s executive. European popular sovereignty is undermined if ‘member states as regions’ cannot be forced to accept supranational decisions. Europe’s sovereign political order, therefore, should have credible threat on its side The EU should therefore gain control over crucial enforcement mechanisms, such as taxation, a police force, and a military.

This democratic conception seems utopian to many; its final demand to ensure enforcement seems an unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future. That being said, the EU wields – whether successfully and effectively or not – increasingly extensive powers in the domain of core-state powers, such as macro-economic policy and border control. Moreover, many proposals to democratise the Union seek to strengthen the direct relationship between EU citizenry and the EU politicians. For instance, despite recent developments, the Spitzenkandidat procedure was a move toward the parliamentarisation of EU politics. A European superstate might be an effective decision-maker in the face of global superpowers and market (Morgan 2005), yet political and public support remain limited.

In sum, European popular sovereignty demands the shifting of sovereign democratic authority from the national to the European level. Proponents of a European superstate rely upon this conception of popular sovereignty. Although some theorists posit a historical European community, another line of argument appeals to the transformative power of democratic institutions. Democratic institutions can create their own normative precondition: a European people. Combined with a statist conception of sovereignty, European popular sovereignty justifies a unification project in which member states become regions in a sovereign European order. Institutionally, the EP should become the democratic heart of Europe’s political order and gain all the necessary powers to hold Europe’s executive bodies accountable. The highest executive should be a European politician with a democratic mandate, such as a president or prime minister.

The clash between these traditional conceptions is well established, but some of the institutional consequences might have become obscured. If one is committed to national popular sovereignty, the increasing shift toward more qualified majority voting is a cause for normative concern. Democratic concerns have become amplified by the executive handling of Euro-crisis, and the related transfer of power to technocratic bodies (Sánchez-Cuenca 2017). From this perspective, Brexit might be deemed a desirable safeguard of popular sovereignty. Proponents of European popular sovereignty might actually underwrite some of the sceptics’ democratic concerns, but they are proponents of giving up national veto powers. They condemn the dominance of national executives in the Council of Ministers and especially the European Council. Further, this conception requires demoting national parliaments to a subservient position to the European Parliament.

Many scholars tend to be more hesitant in their prescriptions, in part, due to the revolutionary implications of the previous conceptions. For instance, some support a European Parliament without a demotion of the national parliaments. Other scholars accept the absence of a European people without necessarily supporting a reinstatement of national vetoes as a democratic requirement. These statements, so I submit, imply a commitment to different conceptions of popular sovereignty. In contrast to others (Morgan 2005; Bellamy and Castiglione 1997), I submit that there is not a single in-between position. Rather this conceptual space is occupied by two distinct conceptions, which are a further source of conflict in Europe’s transnational polity as they result in conflicting institutional prescriptions for EU democracy.

V. Splitting sovereignty between national peoples and EU citizens

Simultaneous popular sovereignty splits the democratic right to self-rule at the root between a European people and national peoples (Habermas 2012). This conception relies on the acceptance of European peoplehood setting itself apart from European popular sovereignty, the demos does not require a sovereign political order. The conceptual innovation lies in the acceptance of the demos conception of sovereignty. In this conception, Europe’s demos can be placed on a par with the national peoples by securing equal democratic representation. The establishment of a sovereign executive is no longer a requirement. Let us examine this conception of popular sovereignty more closely by scrutinizing key arguments in the literature that (implicitly) rely on it.

This conception has arguably become closely associated with proponents of the ideal of a pouvoir constituant mixte (Patberg 2017a). Despite originally a constitutional logic, theorists have also applied this logic to theorize appropriate institutions for everyday political decision-making in the Union (e.g. Habermas 2017; Niesen 2017). Democratic decision-making communities – peoples – exist on the national and European level and are normatively on equal footing. However, they are not necessarily conceptually identical in these arguments. In the literature, appeals to EU citizenship with pan-European individual rights capture the democratic nature of Europe’s ‘thin’ demos. This conception is thus without any communitarian connotations that national peoplehood often retains (Scherz 2013). In one variation, democratic citizenship underpins the national peoples and European people. Instead of a dual ontology, a dual subjectivity is prescribed to Europe’s democratic citizens. The EU citizen should simultaneously imagine herself in the role of lawmaker on the national and European level (Patberg 2017b; Habermas 2017). Whether asserting a dual ontology or subjectivity, the normative upshot remains that national peoples and European people retain their right to self-rule: Europe’s transnational polity has two relevant finite political communities.

Both of Europe’s peoples should be represented in EU decision-making. Instead of accepting the ‘Hobbesian article of faith’, an important conceptual move is to distinguish de jure popular sovereignty from de facto state sovereignty. As a result, democratic representation can and should take place following a two-dimensional logic. Proponents ascribe normative equality between the European and national sovereigns. In this regard, the situation is comparable to the United States of the antebellum in which sovereignty claims could legitimately posited by politicians from both the state and federal level of government (Glencross 2012). In line with this conception, proponents of a pouvoir constituant mixte often argue for a federation (of states): a Staatenbund (e.g. Habermas 2012; Niesen 2017). This democratic model should not be confused with a federal superstate (Bundesstaat); a federation maintains the sovereignty of its member states. National peoples thus retain their democratic authority in domestic politics. EU citizens are empowered with democratic authority as citizens of their individual member states as well as the Bund. Some demoicrats have similarly defended a federal vision for the Union (e.g. Nicolaïdis 2003, 147).

In terms of the parliamentary arrangement, both finite political communities require parliamentary representation in EU decision-making procedures. Unlike the previous models, the institutional upshot is less well established. The splitting of sovereignty suggests the need for two-dimensional representation of Europe’s national peoples and European people. At the EU level, each democratic decision-making community thus requires its own parliamentary body; hence an arrangement with two parliaments suggests itself. The normative equality of the people suggests that neither chamber should be able to dominate the other one; consent from both chambers is necessary to pass legislation. Degressive proportionality in the parliament of national representatives might well prevent cross-national domination (Habermas 2017; Scherz 2017).

This model seems quite feasible compared to the other proposals. The ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) broadly aligns with this arrangement, which functions well as a legislative procedure. From the perspective of simultaneous popular sovereignty, three critical observations are in place regarding the contemporary arrangement. First, the EP is currently elected in national elections, therefore it might actually represent the national demoi (Bellamy 2013; Lord 2017) rather than a supranational people. A pan-European list could create a mix of supranational and national representation, which fits well with the conception of simultaneous popular sovereignty in a single parliament. Second, the greatest discrepancy between the OLP and this conception is that the Council of the EU represents the national executive rather than the national peoples. An assembly model, which refers to a parliament in which national MPs take a seat (Beetz 2017; Nicolaïdis 2016), aligns more closely with this concept’s commitment to democratic sovereignty. This would be possible; although the double mandate might require some accommodation to remain feasible in practice. Finally, the parliaments should also have the official right to initiate legislation. As democratic authority lies with parliaments, Europe’s executives should, if not lose its right of initiative, at least share it with the supranational parliamentary bodies.

In sum, simultaneous popular sovereignty posits that the right to self-rule should be split between Europe’s national peoples and supranational people. According to this conception, a European and national peoples exist in contemporary Europe. In an innovative conceptual move, simultaneous popular sovereignty relies on a demos conception of sovereignty. Following from this commitment, a democratic EU-polity requires the systematic incorporation of European and national peoples in EU decision-making procedures. The institutional upshot is that the EU requires parliaments representing individual citizens as a part of a European demos and national peoples, respectively.

VI. Sharing sovereignty between national peoples in the Union

Shared popular sovereignty entails national peoples pooling their sovereignty at the EU level. Unlike the previous conception, it denies the existence of a European people. Popular sovereignty is neither shifted nor simultaneous, because a supranational demos does not exist. Yet, the lack of a European people does not mean that decision-making power associated with de facto sovereignty – so-called core state powers – should remain restricted to the national level to ensure democratic rule in the EU-polity. Unlike national popular sovereignty, a demos conception of sovereignty is relied upon. It thus inhabits the conceptual space between national and simultaneous popular sovereignty, however it does not collapse into either of them. The crux is that, without a European people, democratic authority remains with the national peoples, but they can transfer important powers to an EU executive. The latter should remain accountable to them, therefore national parliamentarians rather than executives should represent Europe’s peoples in EU decision-making. As I will argue, this position points towards the empowerment of national parliaments through a European assembly.

The conception posits that national peoples remain the only peoples in the EU’s transnational polity. National processes of legitimate aggregation of preferences legitimate European peoples or demoi (Nicolaïdis 2018, 1627). Moreover, Europe’s peoples have distinct historical trajectories shaping their contemporary democratic practices and values (Nicolaïdis and Pélabay 2009). Citizens remain deeply embedded in their (sub)national public spheres (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013). Further, many deny that a European people exists. This does not necessarily mean Europeans have no shared values or transnational connections. Existing commitments and procedures, however, do not provide a meaningful social substrate for a European people. Finally, the violent means used in the past are incompatible with Europe’ shared democratic norms (e.g. Beetz 2017; Fossum 2017). National peoples remain the only finite communities in the EU-polity.

On a demos conception of sovereignty, national peoples can share sovereignty on the European level, because popular sovereignty is not equated with state sovereignty. The national peoples should be directly represented in EU decision-making procedures. A crucial point is that shared popular sovereignty is applicable to the EU-polity, because EU politics is no longer a domain of international politics. Intergovernmental logic might govern international regimes, however a crucial feature of the EU’s sui generis nature is the existence of political decision-making structures built on top of national orders. Intergovernmental mandates no longer suffice to democratically legitimate the extensive decision-making at the EU level. Lacking a supranational people, national peoples should directly authorize and keep accountable EU executives to ensure their democratic legitimacy. Shared popular sovereignty, as conceived here, underpins arguments for ‘governing together rather than as one’ (Nicolaïdis 2013). Because popular sovereignty is not equated with state sovereignty. The national peoples should be directly empowered at the European level. This conception of popular sovereignty might be recognized as the regulatory ideal of proposals for a multilateral democracy (Cheneval 2011) or demoicratic confederation (Beetz 2018).

A parliamentary arrangement based on a conception of shared popular sovereignty should result in a levelling up of the national parliamentary representation. Multiple avenues seem possible to achieve this levelling up. Some argue that the Early Warning Procedure should gain a positive counterpart: a green card procedure (Kröger and Bellamy 2016). National parliaments should become empowered to propose EU legislation as well as veto it. Further, the creation of a European assembly in which national members of parliament have a seat, has gained increased support. A senate of national parliamentarians with a double mandate should become the democratic heart of EU decision-making (e.g. Beetz 2018; Dawson and de Witte 2016; Piketty and Vauchez 2018). This assembly should replace European representation, because national peoples are the sole democratic authority of the Europe’s transnational polity. Intergovernmental representation might complement parliamentary arrangements, but they are not the most appropriate institutional body in a transnational polity.

How feasible are these solutions? The Early Warning Mechanism is an example, which demonstrates that coordination problems might create a challenge to effective oversight. The Assembly seems a more promising route to overcome this challenge. Before the direct election of its members, the European Parliament was an Assembly. The historical record shows that this proposal is therefore feasible. Yet another coordination problem seems to arise from the dual role of the national parliamentarians. They would have a double mandate, which might hamper their effective concurrent participation in national and EU decision-making. Some accommodation might be necessary to overcome this feasibility challenge. Yet, it was possible in the past.

In sum, shared popular sovereignty requires national peoples to share power at the EU level of governance. Theorists often appeal to similar value commitments between the national peoples, but these shared commitments do not equate to a European people. EU citizens remain primarily part of national peoples. Sovereignty, however, is not placed with the state orders, but national peoples remain the sovereign in the EU-polity. Therefore, they should be able to democratically decide to pool authority at the EU level. This conception of popular sovereignty requires the empowerment of national peoples at the EU level. In terms of parliamentary arrangements, a levelling up of national representation should be achieved. An Assembly, so I submit, follows the logic most closely, because national representatives of the Europe’s peoples collectively decide upon matters. This institutional arrangement, as well as the others discussed, seek to secure democratization of EU decision-making through the inclusion of the representatives of national peoples rather than their political orders.

The four conceptions of popular sovereignty result in conflicting institutional proposals. Simultaneous popular sovereignty and shared popular sovereignty point toward incompatible institutional proposals or at least interpretations of parliamentary praxis: the former requires the representation of a European people, whereas the latter denies its existence, hence its institutional representation makes no sense. Moreover, these positions are incongruent with European and national popular sovereignty. Simultaneous popular sovereignty requires that sovereignty remains, in part, with national peoples, while European popular sovereignty requires its shift to the European people. National popular sovereignty submits that executives with the national veto ensure proper representation in EU decision-making. Yet, shared popular sovereignty points toward national parliaments to ensure the democratic legitimacy of EU decisions. In sum, these four conceptions result in conflicting institutional prescriptions for the democratisation of the Union. Figure 1 captures the conceptions and associated parliamentary arrangements in a four-fold framework.

Figure 1. Conceptions of popular sovereignty in the EU-polity & associated parliamentary arrangements.

This framework seeks to elucidate the distinctiveness of competing theories of EU democracy. National popular sovereignty underpins most national communitarian positions, which thus result in argument for intergovernmental representation in EU decision-making. European popular sovereignty should unite proponents of a European superstate. Simultaneous popular sovereignty is an ideal that chimes with proponents of a constituant pouvoir mixte; yet maybe some institutional proposals put forward by demoicrats also reflect this conception. Finally, other demoicrats rely on shared popular sovereignty in arguing in favour of a powerful role of national parliamentarians in EU governance. A consistent, democratic position is expected to rely on one of the four conceptions of popular sovereignty. If followed through consistently, the (implicit) normative commitment results in very distinctive institutional prescriptions for EU democracy. These institutional proposals are, however, in conflict with each other.

VII. Conclusion: conflicting conceptions of popular sovereignty

A conflict has (re)emerged on democratic finalité politique for the EU in the aftermath of the Euro-crisis, refugee crisis and Brexit, yet proponents of conflicting visions have appealed to the principle of popular sovereignty. This article has endeavoured to clarify that different conceptualisations of the same principle result in incompatible institutional designs for democratising EU decision-making. The findings suggest that normative disagreement underpins contemporary debates on democracy in the EU.

In this article, I unpacked popular sovereignty into two dimensions to map possible conceptions in the EU-polity. Based on these dimensions, I distinguished four coherent conceptions of popular sovereignty: national popular sovereignty, European popular sovereignty, simultaneous popular sovereignty, and shared popular sovereignty. I then showed how these conceptions map onto current debates. Furthermore, I theorized the parliamentary arrangement to ensure proper representation of Europe’s popular sovereign(s) in EU decision-making. Leaving aside their desirability, these arrangements illustrate that these conceptions result in distinct, conflicting institutional proposals.

In addition to mapping the fault lines in the current normative literature, the framework might contribute to other debates in the literature. First of all, the study results in a more fine-grained framework for theorizing popular sovereignty beyond the state. Building on a recent distinction in international political theory (Beetz and Rossi 2017; Habermas 2012), I draw out the innovative potential for international political theory by distinguishing between de facto state sovereignty and de jure popular sovereignty. The framework departs from the dominant distinction between national sovereignty, supranational sovereignty and an in-between ‘post-sovereign’, which is premised on a statist conception of sovereignty. Simultaneous and shared popular sovereignty illustrate new avenues to theorize democratic self-rule in an age of interdependence (Innerarity 2015).

Second, the framework might provide a sharper lens for empirical analyses of contemporary developments in EU studies. Mark Dawson argues that this intergovernmental-supranational dichotomy paradigm hinders empirical analyses of contemporary developments in EU governance structures (Dawson 2015). The proposed framework might provide a foundation for empirical analyses of post-crisis governance arrangements. Further, conflicts of sovereignty in the EU are not merely topics of academic debate, but have once again become topic of public debate. The responses to the recent crises politicized the democratic quality of EU governance (Wilde and Lord 2016). Scholars might benefit from this framework in analysing and reflecting on these debates.

Third, other studies might well analyse different modes of democratic participation, such as referenda. Conceptions of popular sovereignty can be taken to inform alternative procedures. For instance, they will determine the appropriate electorate and rules for a referendum: is the eligible electorate national, transnational or supranational? And should a negative outcome in one country veto the entire process?

Finally, some limitations are worth mentioning to stimulate future research. First, I took popular sovereignty as the normative ideal for the Union; for my purposes, this realistic ideal was particularly attractive. However, as mentioned, its desirability is contested. I did not reflect on the attractiveness of the four conceptions, however normative reflection on concepts and conceptions remains warranted. Second, although the feasibility of each conception was touched upon in this article, some questions remain, such as how to avoid decision-making paralysis with two equal chambers or double mandates of national parliamentarians. Future research could inquire into these matters.

This study obviously does not provide a solution for the EU’s democratic deficit. Rather it suggests that a normative choice must be made to determine which democratic institutions are to legitimate Europe’s governance system. The current deficit results, at least in part, from a conflict about the appropriate conception of popular sovereignty in transnational, multi-layered polity. Increasing the powers of the European Parliament will, for instance, upset those committed to national popular sovereignty. Meanwhile, the inclusion of national parliaments will disgruntle those with a strong commitment to European popular sovereignty. A solution will involve a choice for a democratic conception of popular sovereignty to guide institutional design in Europe’s novel political landscape. In addition, a vast majority of citizens will have to accept or at least acquiesce to the chosen conception. Institutions and ideas will have to become congruent on the appropriate democratic norm for the Union. Until that time, conflicts about the appropriate conception of popular sovereignty are likely to continue to challenge the stability of the European Union.

Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of the article were presented in Paris, Hamburg, Utrecht and Madrid. I am thankful for the comments of the discussants and audiences at these occasions. I am especially grateful to Martin Deleixhe and Markus Patberg for their thought-provoking comments. I would also like to thank the editors of the special issue for their detailed suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. See https://euobserver.com/political/140200 (last accessed 12 September 2018).

2. I am grateful to Martin Deleixhe for his insightful comments on this point.

3. For argument’s sake, I will largely leave aside the important discussion about subnational polities. The question does not impact the core of my argument on EU democracy.