Implementation performance in the field of the EU Customs Union: consequences of differentiated policy implementation on customs control efficiency

ABSTRACT

Research in differentiated policy implementation in the European Union is in vogue because of its strengths for deploying public policies and assessing policy outcomes. This article sets out a path dependency argument about the dynamics of differentiated customs policy implementation in the EU. We analyse two highly representative cases of customs fraud to develop a quantitative and qualitative approach to the impact of customisation on customs control performance: the first, linked to an exercise of unfair competition; the second, a case of customs common standards ‘misinterpretation’ related to path dependency. We conclude that differentiated policy implementation has proved inefficient for ensuring an equivalent level playing field of customs controls in the EU, resulting in three substantial negative outcomes: economic and budgetary; problem-solving capacity; and output legitimacy. Differentiated policy implementation can lead to a competitive disadvantage, especially when dealing with policies that do not permit any graduation in their fulfilment.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• customs policy
• policy implementation
• economic integration
• path dependency
• historical institutionalism

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Francesco Bucceri, administrator in Unit B3: Control of Traditional Own Resources (DG Budget), for his support and advise.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Art. 3, TFEU.

2. The Union Customs Code is the basic body of legislation governing Customs Union, Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013.

3. Council Decision 2014/335 of 26 May 2014 on the system of own resources of the European Union; Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 609/2014 of 26 May 2014 on the methods and procedure for making the TOR available.

4. Art. 5 (3), Union Customs Code.

5. Communication COM (2012) 791 final of 12 December 2012 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the State of Customs Union: 9–10.

6. Ninth Report COM (2019) 601 final of 26 November 2019 from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, on the operation of the inspection arrangements for traditional own resources (2016–2018): 2.

7. Art. 50, Union Customs Code.

8. Commission Implementing Decision (2018) 3293 final of 31 May 2018 laying down measures for the uniform application of customs controls by establishing common financial risk criteria and standards pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 laying down the Union Custom Code for goods declared for free release.

9. Report COM (2018) 549 final of 20 July 2018 from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, on the implementation of the EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs risk management: 7.

10. European Court of Auditors. Differing approaches to customs controls affect EU revenue. Press release, 30 March 2021.

11. Ninth Report COM (2019) 601 final of 26 November 2019 from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, on the operation of the inspection arrangements for traditional own resources (2016–2018): 6.

12. Court of Justice of the European Union. Case C-213/19, Commission v. United Kingdom (Lutte contre la fraude à la sous-évaluation).

13. Report SWD (2016) 235 final of 14 July 2016 from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, on the protection of the European Union´s financial interests – fight against fraud 2015 Annual Report, Annex 1: 15.

14. Ninth Report COM (2019) 601 final of 26 November 2019 from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, on the operation of the inspection arrangements for traditional own resources (2016–2018): 6.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by Cliobasque [IT 1523-22]; Biography and Parliament [IT 1263-19]; Parte Hartuz [IT 1556-22].

Notes on contributors

Mikel Erkoreka

Mikel Erkoreka is Lecturer in the Department of Public Policy and Economic History and researcher at Ituna Center for Basque Economic Agreement and Fiscal Federalism Studies (University of the Basque Country). He mainly develops his research activity in the areas of public finances, fiscal federalism and European Union integration process.

Asier Blas

Asier Blas is an Associate professor and was Head of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU). He teaches Comparative Politics and Citizen Participation. His research is focused on federalism, the democratic innovation, comparative nationalism and power-sharing arrangements.