Russia’s war in Ukraine and transformation of EU public diplomacy: challenges and opportunities

ABSTRACT

Employing a perceptual approach to EU foreign policy studies, we argue that extensive changes following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have created important opportunities for diminishing many of the perceptual gaps that existed between the EU and Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea. We distinguish between changes in Ukraine’s and the EU’s attitudes towards each other, contextual changes as a result of the war and changes in EU policy on the candidacy of Ukraine – shifts that open up new avenues for closing existing perceptual gaps but also create challenges for EU diplomacy. We apply this theorisation to understand one aspect of Europe’s transformation in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine – the transformation of the EU’s public diplomacy. We venture that the opportunities for perceptual changes that have occurred may only be realized if the EU commits to a ‘new’ public diplomacy.

KEYWORDS:

• Ukraine
• Russia’s war against Ukraine
• EU public diplomacy
• perceptual approach to EU foreign policy
• gaps in perceptions

Introduction

Ukraine will remain a key issue in the EU’s foreign policy for decades to come. Ukraine during and after the war will remain in the core of the EU’s search for support of its external actions, directions and policies towards other neighbours to the East and South, towards the Russian Federation, as well as global partners, likeminded and otherwise. Relations between the EU and Ukraine will also undergo qualitative and quantitative changes, not lastly due to the EU’s decision to engage with Ukraine as an EU candidate state.

This article ventures that extensive changes in attitudes, context and policy that have occurred in connection with the dramatic events following the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 have created important opportunities for diminishing, or even closing, many of the perceptual gaps that existed between the EU and Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea and the start of war in Donbas. However, considered in a longer time-perspective, we also discern disconcerting challenges that may instead widen many of these gaps.

This article applies this theorisation to understand one aspect of Europe’s transformation in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine – the transformation of the EU’s public diplomacy. The geo-strategic implications and impact of this conflict on Europe suggest that the EU will have to critically revisit and update its public diplomacy. We argue that the seismic shake caused by the 2022 war against Ukraine offers a number of opportunities for perceptual changes, but that these may only be realized if the EU commits to a ‘new’ public diplomacy – defined as ‘political instrument with analytical boundaries and distinguishing characteristics … used by states, associations of states and nonstate actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance interests and values’ (Gregory 2008, 276). However, a number of challenges is also predicted. We link the discussion about opportunities and challenges to the duality in understanding public diplomacy in modern day diplomatic practice (cf. Zaharna 2008; Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013) as a strategic communication endeavour which prioritises advocacy and perceptions management or a relational tool which foregrounds true empathetic dialogue and mutually-beneficial collaboration.

Assessing mutual perceptions of the EU and Ukraine, we distinguish between changes in Ukraine’s and the EU’s attitudes towards each other, contextual changes as a result of the war and changes in EU policy on the candidacy of Ukraine – shifts that open up new avenues for closing existing perceptual gaps between the EU and Ukraine and, as a consequence, for EU public diplomacy. After 24 February 2022, Russia has lost in the competition for hearts and minds in Ukraine. The year of 2022 marks the EU’s historical decision to grant Ukraine the status of an EU candidate. In parallel, the latest surveys demonstrate overwhelmingly positive pro-EU/pro-NATO attitudes among Ukrainians, increasing over time. At the same time, Ukrainian refugees in Europe offer new unexpected opportunities for Europeans to learn about and understand Ukraine through direct people-to-people contacts. Finally, Ukraine is emerging as an assertive actor who is not shy to ask the EU difficult questions, an actor with agency, stepping away from the self-narrative of a victim.

The article also considers challenges for the EU. Here we ask: Do the EU institutions, Member States, elites and citizens share the narrative of Ukraine as a proactive actor, or is it only in the eyes of Ukraine? Does Europe truly know and understand Ukraine? How to address the probably long process from candidacy to actual membership negotiations? How to explain this to probably impatient Ukraine’s public opinion and elites?

We thus explain opportunities and challenges for the EU’s public diplomacy towards Ukraine in the context of war by engaging with perceptual approach to understanding EU foreign policy. This analysis argues that opportunities for EU public diplomacy will be realised when/if gaps in perceptions are diminished as a result of relational practices guided by a collaborative perspective. Secondly, we predict that a dominant reliance on the strategic communication approach risks deepening the gaps which in turn may jeopardise the revision and fine-turning of EU public diplomacy. Representative public opinion surveys conducted in Ukraine and the EU by professional social research groups provide us with the perceptions data.

The article ends with discussion on how a perceptual approach to EU foreign policy, by prioritizing listening to the receiver of the EU’s public diplomacy, may help to transform EU public diplomacy in a context where there is an opportunity to reduce or even erase existing perceptual gaps.

Public diplomacy: strategic communication or relational tool?

Expanding his definition of the ‘new’ public diplomacy listed above, Gregory (2008, 76) describes it as a tool to ‘understand, engage, and influence publics on a wide range of … issues relating to governance, economic growth, democracy, the distribution of goods and services, and a host of cross-border threats and opportunities’. For some, public diplomacy is a strategic communication/informational tool (Nye 2008; Tsvetkova et al. 2020), for others it is a relational instrument (Zaharna 2008; Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013). The former aims to influence target audiences with directed information flows from diplomacy producers to receivers (Lee & Ayhan 2015; Golan, Yang, and Kinsey 2015). The latter fosters reciprocal relationships between various actors, both state and non-state, outside and within the producer of public diplomacy (Zaharna 2008). In the EU’s case, its public diplomacy policy-area is led by EEAS and implemented by Delegations of the EU to third countries/international organisations. Yet, following the ‘new’ public diplomacy definition above, all EU divisions that engage with the world as well as EU Member States also act as public diplomacy producers. In its ‘new’ public diplomacy approach, the EU’s public diplomacy targets the general public, as well as key audiences among state and non-state stakeholders, the ‘milieu factors that constitute the psychological and political environment in which attitudes and polices towards other countries are debated’ (Melissen 2005, 13).

Public diplomacy as strategic communication tool is used to influence/manage perceptions among receivers, to benefit foreign policy outcomes of the influencer (Cowan and Cull 2008; Gregory 2008; Nye 2008). In this view, public diplomacy consists of strategically pre-designed messages/initiatives intended to influence target public in a specific way (Nye 2008).

The relational approach prioritizes the notions of reciprocity, mutuality (Zaharna 2008, 92) and interconnectedness (Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013). In this conceptualization, public diplomacy facilitates international collaborative projects (Zaharna 2008), ideally mutually-beneficial. According to Gregory (2008, 278), this approach promotes dialogue, ‘discourse and mutual understanding’.

The collaborative approach to public diplomacy is stemming from the relational outlook. For Riordan (2005), the key features of ‘collaborative’ public diplomacy paradigm include the following priorities: 1) ideas and values which should never be imposed or asserted; 2) a genuine dialogue aiming to convince, gain credibility, understand deeper, treat others with respect, and recognise difference, not to win; 3) the importance of listening to the Other; and 4) a public diplomacy strategy ‘aimed beyond government to broader civil society’.

The EU Global Strategy – main EU foreign policy document that outlined the European neighbourhoods as its foreign policy priority and critically revisited the role of and narrative on the Russian Federation – frames public diplomacy mainly from a strategic communication perspective (see also Nitoi and Pasatoiu 2022):

The EU will enhance its strategic communications, investing in and joining up public diplomacy across different fields, in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners. We will improve the consistency and speed of messaging on our principles and actions. We will also offer rapid, factual rebuttals of disinformation. (European Commission 2016a, online).

The EU recognizes the importance of relational approach when the EU conceives its international cultural relations. The Commission states that these relations should be underpinned by ‘reciprocity, mutual learning and co-creation’ while ‘generating a new spirit of dialogue, mutual listening and learning, joint capacity-building and global solidarity’ (European Commission 2016b, 4) (for more examples of relational public diplomacy by the EU see a 13-country Update Study 2021: Perceptions of the EU and EU policies (B&G/PPMI/PD-PCF UC 2021)).

Theory

This article further advances the theorisation of the perceptual approach to understanding EU foreign policy (Chaban and Elgström 2020, 2021a, 2021b), and the EU’s public diplomacy within it. In this approach, both the sender and the receiver of foreign policy/diplomatic messages are active agents informed by a range of cognitive, emotive and normative images of the EU. Assuming a perceived distance between an external actor and the EU, this approach predicts clashes between perceptions by the senders and the receivers. Distance directly indicated by contradictory perceptions of EU characteristics defines the first type of the clash – a perception gap between Others’ perceptions of the EU and the EU’s self-perception. In the second type of clash, distance is indirectly indicated by the fact that third countries do not perceive the EU to act as expected, possibly leading to disappointment and frustration – the expectation-performance gap, between Others’ expectations and their perception of EU performance. The perceptual approach also identifies a hope-performance gap, an intensified and deepened expectation gap of a particular nature. While an expectations-performance gap refers to the perceived likelihood that something will occur, often based on previous experiences, a hope-performance gap is argued to take place when confidence in attaining desired goals that would benefit the perceivers is perceived as impacted negatively. Significantly, hope is linked to a perceived positive outcome for yourself, while expectations may also be negative.

Existing literature engages with the gaps of different types from a static perspective, often informed by a snapshot into perceptions at a given historical period. Yet, the theorisation of the dynamics behind the mending (or deepening) the gaps remains overlooked. This article addresses this deficit by re-focusing on the evolving nature of perceptions as a result of a major impact/crisis. While literature notes that images and perceptions are notoriously rigid (Jervis 1976; Elgström 2000), research also argues that images may change due to revolutionary/cataclysmic events (Jervis 1976). We argue that three types of phenomena that may cause changes in perceptions – changes in attitudes (change in emotive image element), contexts (change in cognitive image element) and policies (change in normative image element) – may create an opportunity to diminish, or even close, the perception gaps. In addition, a window-of-opportunity is created by the changes to bridge the gaps between expectations/hopes and perceived performance.

Emerging literature that considers the EU’s public diplomacy in intersection with EU foreign policy studies within the perceptual approach (Chaban and Elgström 2020, 2021a, 2021b) has already demonstrated a perception gap existing between the views from the EU and Ukraine on the EU-Ukraine relations. Comparing perceptions among EU actors involved in relations with Ukraine vis-à-vis views on these relations among Ukrainian elites in the years following the Euro Maidan, annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, Chaban and Elgström (2020, 510) established a number of cognitive, normative and emotive dissonances in the respective images of the EU leading to ‘incongruences in the perceived characteristics of the EU as a partner and in evaluations of the degree of understanding of the Ukraine exhibited by the EU’. They found that in the past Ukraine elites often saw the EU as a self-centered partner that did not listen to its interlocutor and did not understand its situation: ‘Ukraine perceptions do not reflect neither a “genuine dialogue” (where the partner should be respectful and demonstrate empathy), nor a “listening” attitude (with the partner “talking with” rather than “talking at” its Ukraine counterparts)’ (Chaban and Elgström 2020, 511). In the EU’s self-perceptions, the Union was seen as a ‘benevolent partner who strives to co-operate with Ukraine authorities on an equal footing’ (Chaban and Elgström 2021a, 177). In contrast, the earlier, pre-2022 research showed that Ukraine elites were ‘more prone to depict the EU as a strict, and sometimes arrogant and self-centred, authority. The EU is seen to be committed to help, but from an egotistical perspective’ (Chaban and Elgström 2021a, 177).

In the theorisation of the expectation – performance gap, Chaban and Elgström (2021a) emphasised gaps driven by EU-specific factors when focusing on EU-Ukraine relations. Ukrainian evaluations of the EU’s role performance in the post-Maidan pre-war years were found to be quite negative. Ukrainian actors expected much more from a partner than the EU has, in their view, actually provided. In the case of mediation, Ukraine interviewees’ evaluation of the EU’s role performance as ineffective mirrors their probably unrealistically high expectations of what the EU would be able to do (‘solving the conflict’, not only producing a frozen conflict). In the field of public diplomacy, the EU’s under-performance was perceived to lead to ‘missed opportunities’ – less exposure to Western values and ways of doing things for Ukraine on the one hand, and Russia filling aggressively gaps in public diplomacy where the EU has missed on the other.

In their conceptualisation of a hope-performance gap, Chaban and Elgström (2021a) discussed how their pre-2022 material revealed that for Ukraine, ‘there is a clear clash between expectations in cognitive vs. emotive terms, or “brains vs. heart”’ (178). The EU was often seen by the Ukrainian decision-makers interviewed in 2016–17 as ‘“too rational” and lacking in empathy in its relations with Ukraine, while Ukraine expects emotive connection, support and responsiveness from the EU’ (Ibid.). The hope-performance gap was most clearly demonstrated by Ukrainians’ hopes for signs of a positive EU attitude towards a future EU membership, while they instead experienced reluctance and disinterest from an EU, seen to be preoccupied by its own crises.

The escalation of war by Russia against Ukraine on 22 February 2022 marked a critical historical event with a major impact on Ukraine, the EU and wider Europe, and on the world. Events of this magnitude can change perceptions, presenting a unique chance to test the three types of changes in terms of attitudes, contexts and policies. We therefore use this three-fold distinction as a structuring device in our analysis.

We argue that our theorisation of opportunities and challenges being related to the perceptual approach, also relates to the opportunities in the practice of public diplomacy. We propose that such opportunities could only be realized if the EU’s public diplomacy is changed into a more co-operative manner. However, in a longer time perspective, new or even widened gaps could occur. Our argument – and we will come back to it back in our concluding discussion – is then that a more co-operative public diplomacy is needed to realize the opportunities and prevent the challenges turning into major gaps.

Opportunities

Attitudes: changes in public opinion

Three evolutions in the general public opinion on the EU in Ukraine post February 2022 mark an opportunity for changed perceptions and, as a consequence, the EU’s public diplomacy dialogue with Ukraine: the overcoming of Ukraine’s geographical divide in its vision of the EU, the solidifying of strongly positive attitudes towards the EU and a dramatic deterioration of attitudes towards Russia.

The Razumkov’s Centre’s representative survey of Ukraine’s public opinion twenty years ago, in 2002, was clear in a perceptual split between regions on which direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy should be a priority: while the western regions assigned this priority to the EU (56%), followed by central regions (31.3%), southern and eastern regions saw the priority with Russia (34.3% and 45.1% respectively) (Pashkov 2002). The Razumkov’s Centre survey in 2021 found that when asked about perceived threats from Russia, nearly 93% of respondents in the west and around 81% in the centre shared a perception of the threat emanating from Russia. And while more respondents in the east and south shared the feeling of threat from Russia than those who did not, the share was lower than in the other two regions (almost 60% in the south and almost 55% in the east) (Razumkov Centre 2021).

However, the KIIS representative survey undertaken in 2022 after Russia escalated its aggression against Ukraine, showed a different, and a more unified picture. When respondents were asked to formulate their attitude towards Russia in the regional context, respondents from all regional shared strongly negative attitudes toward the country-aggressor: 93% in the west, 95% in the centre, 90% in the south and 85% in the east. Assessing a longer-term dynamic of positive and negative attitudes towards Russia in Ukraine, KIIS (2022c) reported a massive drop in positive attitudes – from 89% in April 2008 to 2% in May 2022. In comparison, perceptions of the EU immediately after the Maidan registered a sharp spike in positive visions of the EU, with a majority of respondents choosing the EU as the preferred economic union for Ukraine (The Baltics Survey/Gallup Organization 2014) and the main priority of Ukraine’s international affairs (Razumkov’s Centre 2016b). The surveys also registered heightened support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU (Baltics Survey/Gallup Organization 2014; Razumkov’s Centre 2016a; 2016b).

However, in the year following the Maidan, Ukrainians saw that international community, including the EU, did not exert enough pressure on Russia to stop the annexation of Crimea. The proxy war supported by Russia in the east of Ukraine turned into a frozen long-playing conflict, with Ukraine pushed by Western counterparts towards agreeing to a short-term solution. Moreover, Ukraine’s European choice did not lead to any immediate breakthroughs towards Ukraine’s membership in the EU. The Razumkov’s Centre survey (2016b) found deterioration of attitudes at that time. It reported that in the answers to the question ‘Should Ukraine enter the EU’?, a negative ‘no’ was observed among almost 30% in 2015 and more than 35% in 2016.

In sharp contrast, in 2022, following the escalation of the Russian aggression, the surveys found that there is a strong consensus in Ukrainian society about joining the EU − 81% support Ukraine joining the EU according to KIIS (2022b) and 91% according to Rating Group (cited by Valero and Rosskopf 2022). KIIS (2022b, online) concludes ‘The occupation of Crimea by Russia, the outbreak of the war in Donbas, and finally the full-scale invasion of 2022 significantly accelerated the dynamics of views and led the vast majority of Ukrainians in all regions (and all linguistic and ethnic categories) to the understanding that Ukraine should be a member of both the EU and NATO.’

Public opinion in the EU also demonstrates a positive dynamic when it comes to attitudes towards Ukraine among citizens of the EU. A Flash Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2022) in all EU Member States ‘shows large consensus among EU citizens in favour of the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’. The majority of Europeans think that since the war started, the EU has shown solidarity (79%) and has been united (63%) and fast (58%) in its reaction. Respondents are widely in favour of the unwavering support to Ukraine and its people. In particular, more than nine out of ten respondents (93%) approve providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war. 88% of Europeans approve the idea of welcoming in the EU people fleeing the war. 80% approve the financial support provided to Ukraine. 66% agree that ‘Ukraine should join the EU when it is ready’, 71% believe that Ukraine is part of the European family … The vast majority of Europeans (80%) approve the economic sanctions against Russia (European Commission 2022).

Positive attitudes towards each other are instrumental for overcoming perception gaps – positive views of the Self by the Other typically resonate with positive Self-perceptions. And the absence of perception gaps – indicating corresponding images of the EU and its actions in both parties – facilitates co-operation and decreases the risk of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. The changes in EU as well as Ukraine attitudes after February 2022 clearly indicate a chance that previously existing perception gaps – notably turning perceptions of the EU as a strict and arrogant partner to that of a benevolent friend – are ready to be mended. At the same time, mutually positive images is a solid background to boost public diplomacy.

Contexts: changes in people-to-people contacts

The act of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine triggered a wave of refugees from Ukraine seeking safety in the EU. According to the Ukrainian Centre for Economic Strategy (CES) (cited by Nadtoka 2022), as of December 2022, 7.8 mln Ukrainian refugees – predominantly women, children and elderly – were recorded across Europe (with Poland and Germany hosting most of people seeking refuge). And while this migration was caused by tragic and abnormal events, we argue several opportunities for the EU’s public diplomacy, and specifically in building motivated collaborations based on genuine empathy. Millions of Ukrainians, including many young people, are now getting first-hand experience of everyday life in EU Member States in direct contact with European citizens. According to CES (cited by Nadtoka 2022), 43% of all Ukrainian children are studying in the EU as a result of the war.

On the other side, millions of the EU citizens also engage in a direct daily contact with Ukrainians, learning more about Ukraine in addition to the heightened exposure to Ukraine through the mass media. Ukrainian students, tourists, professionals, labour migrants and diaspora have been always present throughout Europe, and this presence was further facilitated by the EU’s 2017 decision of no-visa entry for Ukrainian citizens into the Schengen area. The events of 2022 exposed EU citizens to a different, much higher scope of direct contacts with Ukrainians and in different, war-related contexts. In Germany, 670,000 Ukrainians have registered for the national protection schemes (UNHCR 2022), and according to the German Federal Employment Agency, 353,424 of them are registered in various employment agencies and centres, while more than 146,000 Ukrainian children are now attending German schools (Yuskiv 2022b).

Perhaps even more important than high numbers are the attitudes of compassion and solidarity shown by the general public in the EU states towards Ukrainian refugees, and the generous, humanitarian assistance extended to them. To list just few examples, 77% of Polish citizens took part in various initiatives to support Ukraine including financial and material donations, volunteering activities and hosting refugees (Yuskiv 2022a). In March 2022, the German alliance of humanitarian and charity organisations received around 180 mln Euro in donations from ordinary citizens specifically dedicated to help Ukraine (Yuskiv 2022b).

Importantly, these efforts by EU citizens have been noted and appreciated by Ukrainians. In a survey of the returning to Ukraine refugees, the Razumkov’s Centre (2022, online) asked respondents to assess provided assistance. Respondents reported that ‘64% received assistance from the host country’s government agencies; 64% received help from the host country’s ordinary citizens who they did not know before while 56% received help from volunteer organisations’. In addition, respondents were asked to assess support and assistance provided to them. In their responses, ‘62% said they were very happy with it, 29% were rather happy … . Not a single respondent said he or she was totally dissatisfied with the provided assistance’ (Ibid.).

Change in the contexts and patterns of direct contacts/collaborations between Ukrainians and EU citizens, as well as evolving sentiments and motivations around this involvement suggest a potential for perception change. Such a change feeds into the reduction of the expectation-performance and hope-performance gaps – intense direct contacts help to recalibrate expectations and hopes on both sides of the people-to-people dialogue. Arguably, in mending the gaps through collaboration/direct contacts on the ground a new basis for a meaningful collaborative approach in EU public diplomacy activities emerges.

Policy: changes in the status of Ukraine vis-à-vis the EU

On 23 June 2022, the European Council decided to grant Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidate countries for EU membership (European Council Conclusions 2022). The President of the Council, Charles Michel, announced that ‘Today makes a crucial step on your path towards the EU’ and described the Council decision as a ‘historic moment’ (BBC 2022).

In doing so, the Council followed the recommendation of the European Commission, issued on 17 June. On that occasion, President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen declared that ‘Ukrainians are ready to die for the European perspective … We want them to live with us in the European Union’ (EU neighbours east 2022). Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy immediately hailed the EU decision, declaring that it constituted ‘a unique and historical moment in UA[Ukraine]-EU relations … Ukraine’s future is within the EU’ (BBC 2022).

The decision to grant Ukraine the status of a membership candidate country changed the context of future EU-Ukraine relations. The EU now unambiguously declared that Ukraine has a ‘European perspective’ – that it will become an EU member when all conditions are fulfilled. Such a decision obviously creates expectations and hopes among Ukraine’s citizens and elites. The EU now has to prepare for future accession negotiations, but also for initiatives to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to Ukraine. In a long-term perspective, these talks give the EU a major opportunity to help the Ukrainian people to build a truly democratic and economically vibrant nation. The decision thus created an opportunity to diminish the gap between Ukraine hopes for membership and actual future EU performance.

A different change – this time a change in Ukrainian policies – adds to the arsenal of opportunities for the EU’s public diplomacy, yet from a different perspective. This is a change in policies towards Russian cultural productions, to protect Ukrainian cultural and information sphere from Russian influence. Since February 2022, a number of legislation acts have been adopted by Ukrainian policy-makers, including acts supporting Ukrainian culture, getting rid of Russian narratives and their promoters, strengthening Ukrainian information space; tightening control over providers of telecom services, etc. (Sologub 2022). Importantly for our argument, this is not a top-down imposed change. Reuters (2022, online) quotes Ukraine’s minister of culture who notes how legal acts reflect on the opinions among broad Ukrainian audiences ‘which after the Russian invasion do not accept any Russian creative product on a physical level.’ The KIIS opinion survey in Ukraine (2022c, online) demonstrated that Russia’s aggression both on the level of the leadership and ‘ordinary’ citizens, ‘buried the idea of “friendly” and “comfortable” relations’ – ‘Regardless of region or language, Ukrainians seek to isolate themselves from Russia’. These perceptions demonstrate that the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine has effectively cancelled the decades of the Russkij Mir projections onto Ukraine – a flagship project by the Kremlin opinion-makers to ensure global and regional influence for Russia through the ‘networked structure of large and small communities that think in and speak the Russian language’ (Tishkov 2008). In a macro trend, various brand indexes register a steep collapse in Russia’s prestige in the world (including the EU) crippling Russia’s engagement with the international community long-term: The Soft Power Index 2022 finds that Russia’s reputation has plummeted by 19% globally compared to 2021 (Brand Finance 2022); The Anholt-Ipsos Nations Brands index 2002 registers Russia’s fall from 27th out of the 60 nations polled to 58 (Wintour 2022).

Challenges

Attitudes: thinning interest and support

The contexts are in flux. According to Shaun Walker (2022), the ‘initial outpouring of goodwill across Europe wears off’. The media interest in Ukraine is getting less as the war is turning out to be a lengthy one. Donations by European citizens are getting smaller, while public debates are re-focusing on negative effects for Europe (Yuskiv 2022b). Some negative patterns appear in the treatment of Ukrainian refugees (Wintour 2022) as euphoria in support of Ukraine is waning in the EU. The World Vision report warns of disinformation about Ukraine and its refugees, and such information manipulation could cause breakdown in relations with local communities (Ambrose 2022). On the other side of this dialogue, Ukrainian refugees report psychological distress from putting ‘lives on hold’ (UNHCR 2022) while agonizing over when (and if) to return (S. Walker 2022).

A poll of EU citizens demonstrated an emerging split in opinions when it comes to the support for Ukraine’s accession and the proposed scenarios how to end the war. According to this survey, ‘citizens of Poland, Portugal, Finland, and Sweden are the most likely to support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. French, German, and Italian citizens are the least likely – although most of them are still in favour’ (Kelmendi and Piaskowska 2022, online). France, Germany and Italy are also the countries in which ‘most people would prefer a swift end to the war even if this required Ukraine to make concessions’. The study found that citizens in these countries still broadly favour the EU’s responses to the war. Yet, they are ‘less likely to do so than respondents in other countries’ (Kelmendi and Piaskowska 2022, online).

The re-emerging distance between the peoples of Ukraine and the EU – and specifically in the refugee case – may lead to the deepening of the perception gaps on both sides, as well as widening of expectation- and hope-performance gaps among Ukrainians and within the EU.

Contexts: knowledge and understanding of Ukraine

Exposure to Ukraine through the voluminous dramatic media coverage of Russia’s aggression has been listed among the key factors behind the strong motivation to help Ukraine and its people (Yuskiv 2022a). And while more media information about Ukrain has risen the profile and visibility of Ukraine, the question remains open if European societies truly understand and possess in-depth knowledge about changing Ukraine. One of the main changes is the transformation of Ukraine’s self-narrative – from a storyline of a victim to a narrative of a proactive agent able to defend itself (V. Walker 2022). Global media commentators went further and proposed to frame the conflict in terms of the battle by David vs. Goliath where Ukraine is compared to the former, being smaller but agile, clever and innovative, and Russia to the latter, with Ukraine as the hero and Russia as the villain (Al Jazeera 2022; CBS News 2022; CNN 2022, to name few). Yet, the latest research into external narratives around Ukraine in the ongoing conflict present very different storylines in the knowledge-forming discourses of Western academia and think-tank community. Koval et al. (2022), after analysing a large corpus of academic and thinktank texts from seven countries including Germany, France, Italy, Greece and Poland, identified ‘major pitfalls of (mis)perceptions and (mis)representations of the “Ukraine crisis”’ (176). The authors found that the key narratives of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict produced by influential knowledge-shapers convey a ‘realist pressure for seeking a quick, even if unjust, solution, … encouraging scholars and analysts to advocate compromises and concessions’ (Ibid., 175). Another major problem with these narratives is the ‘symmetrization of responsibility and a tendency to blur the difference between the victim and the perpetrator’. In their final conclusion, Koval et al. (2022, 175) argue that the ‘war of narratives, propaganda, and disinformation via social and ordinary media has become one of the most important weapons in this conflict’.

Since the ‘gap between academic and analytical approaches has narrowed in many countries, and political strategies have penetrated analysis’ (Ibid., 175), their strategic communication outputs may increase expectation- and hope-performance gaps among educated policy-makers in Europe towards Ukraine. Importantly, propaganda, mis/disinformation and psychological operations continue to impact not only academia and the think tank community, but ordinary citizens in the EU and Ukraine deepening the perception gaps for people on both sides of the dialogue.

Policy: long accession processes

In the context of changes in policies, a crucial challenge to EU public diplomacy will be how to address and explain to Ukraine’s public opinion and elites the probably very long process from candidacy to actual membership negotiations and then to a final EU enlargement decision. Accession policy lays the ground for, and is a key input into, public diplomacy campaigns. The road to accession is long and bumpy. Candidates for membership need to adopt and implement the entirety of the acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of EU law and obligations. Furthermore, candidate countries encounter political conditionality: candidates have to demonstrate the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights, but also the administrative capacity to effectively implement all obligations required by the EU. Progress on the ground in these respects is closely monitored by the European Commission – and by Member States, in a context where ‘enlargement fatigue’ has increased with each new round of accessions.

Recent accession processes demonstrate that smooth and quick enlargement negotiations are not to be expected. Montenegro and Serbia were formally granted candidate status in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Negotiations are on-going, but yet without concrete results. North Macedonia and Albania received candidate status in 2005 and 2014 – in these cases, the opening of talks has not yet taken place. Admittedly, this can partly be explained by bilateral disputes with neighboring Member States, but these examples still give evidence that negotiations for membership are drawn-out and cumbersome.

Ukraine’s membership aspirations will probably not prove to be an exception. Further complicated by the formidable reconstruction task that awaits Ukraine after the war – and the accompanying costs for EU members in helping out Ukraine – negotiations will have to tackle the corruption and lack of administrative capacity that troubled Ukraine even before the war. EU public diplomacy will need to handle the impatience of Ukraine citizens and elites by explaining the reasons behind the time-consuming process and by providing reassuring messages to keep up the commitment to the EU in the country. As expectations are high and performance, in terms of rapid negotiations, will probably not correspond, the risk for a growing hope-performance gap is acute, creating a formidable challenge to EU public diplomacy.

This challenge may be compounded by an already emerging perception captured by the KIIS public opinion poll (KIIS 2022d, online): ‘if Ukrainians are ready for a certain “postponement” of membership, they are unlikely to be ready to wait very long’. Moreover, the same survey found that while 31% of respondents believe that Ukraine should approve all necessary laws and fulfil all EU requirements in order to become a member as soon as possible, 62% of respondents generally hold the opinion that Ukraine should defend its interests and not agree to certain demands, even if it delays the acquisition of full membership. These results indicate that aspiration of Ukraine to become a member of the EU ‘is not completely unconditional and, in general, Ukrainians feel that there are certain issues that require a fair and careful discussion with the EU’ (Ibid.).

Discussion

The introduction of the dynamic perspective into the perceptual approach to the EU’s foreign policy has illuminated how different type of gaps (e.g. perception gap or expectation-/hope-performance gaps) may widen, or heal, at times of a major upheaval. While images in international relations are known to be resistant to change, revolutionary shakeouts (in our case, the escalation of war by Russia against Ukraine) may disrupt the image architecture consisting of emotive, cognitive and normative image elements. We tracked three types of phenomena that impact the perceptual gaps via their influence on the image elements: changes in attitudes, in contexts and in policies, and considered them in terms of opportunities and challenges for the gap mending.

Changes in attitudes towards more positive mutual perceptions in Ukraine and in the EU mend a perception gap (between how an actor sees itself and how the other sees it). At the same time, changes towards more negative attitudes observed in some European countries in reaction to the significant number of the refugees from Ukraine, as well as in response to the growing prices on electricity/energy carriers in the EU as a result of war, and, in some cases, stirred up by the Russian propaganda risk widening the perception gaps on both sides, but also deepening expectation- and hope-performance gaps among Ukrainians and within the EU.

Changes in contexts, linked to the increased motivation in the EU to help Ukrainian people and to growing direct contacts between the EU citizens and millions of Ukrainians refugees hosted in EU Member States post-February 2022, build a potential for perception changes. Such changes may contribute to the healing of the expectation- and hope-performance gaps on both sides. Yet, changes in contexts may also increase these gaps. Our article points that the latter scenario is closely linked to peculiar narratives communicated by knowledge-formation discourses in the EU Member States (targeting educated elites) as well as Russian mis/disinformation campaigns (targeting the general public).

Changes in policy, and specifically the EU’s decision to offer Ukraine the status of an EU candidate country, is another historical benchmark that has a potential for perception changes. Such changes may mend the hope-performance gap existing in Ukraine that had hoped for membership for decades yet had been denied a candidacy status until 2022. Changes in Ukraine’s policy to defend its information and cultural space from the influence by an aggressor country may also trigger perceptions changes and diminish Ukraine-EU perception gaps instigated in the past by cultural productions from Russia. This is on the background of Russia’s fall in reputation and loss to the EU in the competition for hearts and minds in the shared neighbourhood. However, with accession process potentially long and bumpy, Ukraine’s high expectations may be dampened by the EU’s performance in negotiations. As such, in a long-term perspective, the risk for a deepening hope-performance gap remains high.

We argue that our theorisation of a dynamic perspective in the consideration of and challenges to the perceptual approach bears significance to the practice of public diplomacy of the EU in short- and long-terms. Changes of Ukrainian attitudes towards the EU and Russia present an opportunity for the EU to build and manage relationships; and further influence opinions and actions to advance interests and values. The main questions here are how to realize the opportunities and prevent the challenges turning into major gaps. The answer comes with a focus on co-operative public diplomacy. ‘Too much’ strategic communication onto Ukraine risks alienating Ukraine. A relational and collaborative approach, speaking to both minds and hearts, is needed to create a real and lasting change in perception (diminishing the gaps). A harmonious relationship requires that the EU sees Ukraine as an equal partner and ‘really understands’ Ukraine, and this is done by listening and genuine dialogue, as illustrated by an unprecedented reaction to help Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees by the citizens of the EU. With positive mutual perceptions peaking as a result of war, the EU’s public diplomacy may put even more emphasis on initiatives that engage with joint problem solving in win-win scenarios. The collaborative direction is even more a possibility due to the EU’s decision to offer Ukraine a status of a candidate.

However, this relational mode also requires that Ukraine understands the EU’s demands for reforms. It means that the EU needs to make its position clear for Ukraine while factoring new attitudes, contexts and policies emerging on both sides. Innovative strategic communication approaches should be sensitive to the impacts of the war on Ukraine and avoid a mentoring tone and impositions. As discussed above, Ukrainian self-perceptions have become more assertive. At the same time, Ukrainian society is affected by strong emotions in its response to war: anger, rage, hate and disgust are reported by 53% of respondents, pride for Ukraine and its army by 52% and anxiety, fear and horror by 38% (KIIS 2022a). Strategic messaging by the EU towards Ukraine should be also aware of Member State-specific narratives. The EU’s narrative formulates that in response to Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine, the EU’s Member States acted with unprecedented speed, determination and unity in support of Ukraine. Yet, research by Koval et al. (2022, 176) demonstrated that on the level on the nation-states in the EU, the narratives formulated by academia and think tankers differ. The dissonance in narratives around Ukraine and the conflict may deepen and fraction the perception gap, ‘splintering’ the image of Ukraine in the eyes of EU citizens across Member States. Finally, skilful and timely strategic communication by the EU in public diplomacy domain is needed not lastly to keep counterbalancing Russian mis/disinformation and propaganda efforts.

To ensure a genuine collaborative approach to its public diplomacy, the EU should engage in strategic communication with its own citizens to reduce the gap in perceptions and expectations. The ECFR suggests three lines for the EU’s strategic communication to guide its approach to Ukraine’s as a candidate: 1) ‘clearly communicate the security advantages of enlargement to the east’; 2) ‘reassure its citizens that support for Ukraine and enlargement to the east will not escalate the conflict’, and 3) ‘capitalise on public solidarity with the Ukrainian people to convince EU citizens that Ukraine belongs in the union’ and ‘promote the idea that, ultimately, Ukraine’s accession will help the EU defend itself’ (Kilmendi and Piaskowska 2022).

Finally, strategic communication by Ukraine to the EU and its citizens is another key part of the effective public diplomacy dialogue between the two actors. Ukraine needs to communicate in a powerful manner messages about its distinct role in the post-Soviet space, its new identity (no longer a victim, but a pro-active protagonist belonging to the western system of values), its key role in finding geo-political solutions to the crisis on the continent and in the global economy flows (as demonstrated by the grain export crisis). This is a key momentum for the EU-Ukraine public diplomacy – Global Soft Power Index 2022 (Brand Finance, online) found that global perceptions of Ukraine (including in EU Member States) ‘have seen a shift as a result of Russia’s invasion, with familiarity increasing by an extraordinary 44%, influence by 24%, and reputation by 12%’. A new brand of Ukraine quickly emerges globally – Ukrainians are fighters: for freedom, dignity, democracy, their culture and identity (Nekraschuk and Iliin 2022).

Conclusions

Perceptual gaps create risks of misunderstanding and conflicting interpretations. EU public diplomacy must be aware of existing gaps and their dynamic in the context of the war by Russia against Ukraine, and use the new opportunities to diminish them. This requires a frank dialogue and continuous collaboration. But a successful public diplomacy also requires that attention is paid to the challenges we have outlined above. The EU has to explain and motivate its policies (be it in accession negotiations or in refugee policies), while listening to critique that emerges. The article provides a normative, prescriptive warning about Eurocentrism in public diplomacy and assumptions that Ukraine will be subservient to wait for accession while subsuming itself to EU rules. The takeaway message is that the EU can learn from and collaborate with Ukraine in a cooperative and equal manner. Ukraine can help the EU with many things, including building strategic autonomy and managing democratization processes.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.