Turnabout or continuity? The German Zeitenwende and the reaction of the V4 countries to it

ABSTRACT

During Angela Merkel’s term as Chancellor, Germany did not play a leading role in the realm of security and defense; moreover, estrangement with the German government’s allies based on its attitude towards Putin’s Russia slowly grew. Since Russia’s war against Ukraine began, the situation has changed dramatically. This article will show the different reactions of the Visegrád 4 (V4) countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) to the Zeitenwende [turning point] in Germany, focusing on Germany´s relationship with Russia, its energy security policy, defense, and support for Ukraine. The question is whether Germany is shaping the Zeitenwende into a 180° turnaround in policy or a 360° pirouette resulting in continuity of its former policies and further mutual loss of trust. Germany is unlikely to become a pre-eminent military leader but can make positive contributions if it implements the Zeitenwende and regains the trust of its eastern partners.

KEYWORDS:

• Zeitenwende
• Germany
• Visegrad
• Olaf Scholz

1. Introduction: long term trends in German-V4 relations: differentiated pragmatisms, increasing polarisation

Relations between Germany and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have deep historical roots, given their shared geographic location at the very heart of Europe.

Given the experience of the Nazi era and World War 2, mainly for Poles and Czechs relations with Germany and German minorities have always been of existential importance. It has been thus a part of the ‘genetic code’ of their national politics to watch closely German attitude towards the past (Handl 2012, 107).

The goal of normalization and stabilization of their relationships in the post-Cold War era was thus high on the agenda in the 1990s. Relations have primarily been conducted bilaterally and Germany’s relations with the four countries as a group (further V4) were limited because the profile of the group was vague and because Germany took a cautious approach in general to any group-building in the EU. Germany’s cooperation with the V4 has thus develop

ed on an issue-by-issue basis and within the ‘Visegrád+’ framework, in which the V4 countries invite their neighbors to participate in specific meetings and projects.

The Visegrád Group has never been a geopolitical unit, but rather a platform for consultation and co-operation among countries with divergent geopolitical interests (Kořan 2015, 125). Relations with Germany and Russia (the main ‘flanking’ powers of Europe’s center) have never been topics for coordination within the group, given the divergent interests and preferences of the individual V4 countries. Moreover, a high level of political volatility in the four countries has hampered development of intensive, self-sustaining group relations with Germany. The V4 states have been able to forge only limited domestic consensus and continuity in their foreign policies. A frequently quoted characterization of long-term foreign policy thinking in the V4 states is that it fluctuates between streams of Atlanticist, Europeanist, internationalist, and sovereigntist thought (Růžička, Drulák, and Kořan 2008, 34–52). In contrast, German foreign policy in the period between 2005 and 2022 has generally maintained continuity with minor adjustments to the changing environment. It was driven by Chancellor Merkel and was based on a broad political consensus within the governing coalitions.

In economic terms, Germany has traditionally been the most important trading partner of all the V4 countries and one of the top sources of their foreign direct investment. The share of the V4 countries in Germany’s foreign trade has steadily increased since their accession to the European Union. Taken together, they represent Germany’s most important trading partner (Poplawski 2016). As for energy, the V4 countries (except for Poland) have been even more dependent on Russian energy resources than Germany. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline was a contentious issue mainly for German-Polish relations. The Czech Republic benefited from Nord Stream 1, because of a new gas pipeline, Gazela, that connects Saxony and Bavaria through Czech territory (Lidovky.cz 2013). The project was conceived as an improvement in the Czech Republic’s energy security and an opportunity to connect the Czech gas infrastructure with Western Europe’s (gas.cz 2022). The main feature of the transition in German energy – the phase-out of nuclear power – has been a challenge for the neighboring Czech Republic and Poland in particular.

Since the accession of the V4 countries to the EU, Germany has to a greater or lesser extent perceived them as a group of ‘awkward partners’ who must, however, be involved in the formulation of European policy (Lang 2012, 14). Germany’s cooperation with the V4 has been far from intensive. One of the reasons has been that the V4 countries have never defined a shared vision of the future of the EU for themselves. Internal V4 cooperation has remained focused on ‘low politics.’ It was mostly a feeling that they were regarded as second-class members of the EU that helped to hold them together.

Moreover, during the refugee crisis in Fix (2015), the V4 found itself in direct confrontation with Germany. In its wake, the Czech Republic’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lubomír Zaorálek, stressed the need ‘to rebuild trust and bring Germany and Visegrád closer together,’ as well as to ‘reject any tendencies to position Visegrád as a counter-balance to Germany or the core of EU integration’ (Zaorálek 2016).

In the last ten to fifteen years, it has primarily been Hungary and Poland who have departed from the European mainstream led by Germany. The cultural conservatism of Putin, but also of Orbán, Kaczynski, and indeed Trump, is attractive to some national conservative political circles (both right and left) in Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In short, the distance between the V4 countries and Germany has been gradually growing since their EU accession in 2004 (Heyttey 2019). Also, long before the presidency of Donald Trump, the long-term disinterest of Germany in defense issues diminished its leadership role in Europe and was a serious problem in German-U.S. relations (Szabo 2015).

Russia was an important differentiating issue long before the Russia-Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the 2022 war. German policy was based on the conviction that European security could not be guaranteed without Russia’s cooperation. Germany effectively pursued a Russia-first policy (Malinowski 2015). Ukraine used to be a terra incognita, which even the German left ignored (Schoch 2015, 237). Even after the Georgian war in 2008, Russia was still perceived as a state eager to modernize and participate in the existing post-Cold War international system. Germany therefore offered Russia a ‘modernization partnership’ in 2010.

In contrast, the attitude of the V4 countries to Russia was a patchwork of positions and policies, which reflected the historical diversity of the Eastern Bloc countries. After their NATO and EU accession, a certain level of normalization in their relations with Russia took place (Zagorski 2015). The Visegrád Group never produced a common Russian strategy, although it has always been a priority to preserve at least some level of unity and co-operation within the group itself (Kořan 2012).

Most of the Atlanticists within the V4 viewed the German strategy for inclusion of Russia into European cooperative security arrangements with suspicion and skepticism. They argued that while Russia played a role as a supporter of the status quo on the global stage, it was acting like a revisionist power at the regional level (Adamkus et al. 2009). At the same time, however, a substantial part of the Czech and Slovak political class focused on pragmatic cooperation and economic advantage.

Traditionally, relations with Russia sharply divided Czech politicians and society. The country’s historically reserved attitude to Russia slowly warmed over time. The improvement in political relations was led by former presidents Václav Klaus and Miloš Zeman. However, the revelation in 2021 that an explosion at the Vrbětice ammunition depot in 2014 was organized by Russian secret service operators represented a turning point in mutual relations. The Czech Republic expelled around 100 diplomats and staff from the swollen Russian diplomatic mission in Prague (Kratochvíl and Sychra 2022, 24–25). Subsequently, Russia declared the Czech Republic (along with the United States) to be an ‘unfriendly state’ (Moscow lists 2022).

Hungary took a unique position toward Russia within the whole EU: it developed a partnership ‘on the basis of energy and ideological ties’ and essentially behaved as a ‘Trojan horse’ for Russia in Central Europe (Orenstein 2019, 44). Viktor Orbán announced a ‘twenty-first century partnership’ with Russia after 2009 and declared a foreign policy goal of an ‘eastern opening’ (Rácz 2015, 1). In Moscow, he signed the first contract for expansion of Paks II, the only Hungarian nuclear power plant, a few weeks before Moscow seized Crimea. He continued the project with Russia during the next few years. Putin himself visited Budapest three times, in 2015, 2017 and 2019. In August 2022, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó announced the start of the Paks II construction process ‘in the coming weeks,’ six months after the start of the latest Russian aggression in Ukraine (BBC 2022).

Nevertheless, the 2014 Russia-Ukraine crisis brought Germany and the V4 countries closer together. For its part, the German government gave up its Russia-first policy. The German approach towards Russia had been described as containment, on the one hand, and engagement on the other (Dembinski, Schmidt, and Spanger 2014). Germany backed both multilateral negotiations and a European sanctions regime for Russia. It also implemented multilateral and national defensive measures within NATO and the EU (Fix 2015). In 2016, the new German white book on defense acknowledged that “without a fundamental change in policy, Russia will constitute a challenge to the security of our continent’ (Federal Ministry of Defence 2016, 32). As for the V4, the 2014 Budapest Declaration by the V4 ministers of defense clearly condemned the ‘aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of Crimea [which] have changed the security environment in Europe and made us re-think our defense posture’ (Budapest Declaration 2014). The recognition of the threat increased the chances for more co-operation between Germany and the V4 countries in the defense area. So, during the V4’s meeting in Warsaw with Chancellor Merkel in August 2016, the V4 states (except Slovakia) announced their support in principle for the European defense integration (Presilla 2016).

Below the surface, however, the individual search for an adequate response to Russian aggression, and domestic factors as well, caused problems for the V4 countries. Czech President Zeman suggested that the correct solution to the Ukrainian question was the ‘Finlandization’ of Ukraine (Zeman 2014). Slovak Prime Minister Fico criticized western sanctions on Russia as ineffective but confirmed that he would ‘not undermine the unity of the Union’ (Fico 2016). Viktor Orbán represented the most pro-Russian position and supported Germany’s cautious approach. He assured Angela Merkel of Hungary’s loyalty to the foreign policy line of Germany (Rácz 2015, 3).

The German policy of containment and engagement, which included the building of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, alienated Poland, however. Common Polish and German interests led the Polish liberal government of Donald Tusk to follow the German bandwagon on Russia, but the enthusiasm has died down under the PiS governments, which have openly opposed Germany and tried to offset its influence (Ulatowski 2020, 92).

2. Differentiation of approaches towards the Russian aggression

The Russia aggression has changed the basic premises of Russia policy of all the countries under scrutiny. In order to assess the change, we build on the typology defined by Kratochvíl and Řiháčková in order to assess the attitudes to Russia after the annexation of Crimea and instigation of the war in Donbas and Luhansk. When analysing Czech approaches to the crisis, he identified multilateralist, hawkish, pragmatist and pro-Russian types as attitude (Kratochvíl and Řiháčková 2015, 14–24).

In our article adjusted we adjust the typology in order to analyse the attitude towards the Russian war against Ukraine. While all the ideal typical approaches reject direct military involvement in the conflict, but they still differ in the way how they position themselves as regards the support of Ukraine and the sanction of Russia.

The multilateralist approach spills over into a de-escalating, risk-aversive restrained multilateralist attitude. It builds on concerted/co-ordinated action with the NATO/EU allies but also hides behind them. It rejects Russian aggression without reservation, Russia is viewed as an enemy. It regards gradually increasing military support for Ukraine necessary as it may not loose, and Russia may not win the war. However, this approach seeks to minimise the risk of further escalation and thus has been cautious as regards supplying Ukraine with even more weapons which in the end could push Putin in the corner.

The hawkish approach actually turned out to be the closest to the post-Crimea reality in Russian attitude and translates currently as an activist approach. This focuses on swift and full-scale military support for Ukraine in co-ordination with the allies or individually. It supports the above principles but emphasises not the risks of further escalation but the need to back Ukraine nearly at all costs. The aim is a fast and complete victory of Ukraine and defeat of Russia on the territory of Ukraine.

A pragmatist approach rejects the Russian aggression but views Ukraine and the West as partly co-responsible for the crisis and is cautious to negative as regards the military support for Ukraine. The aim should be an immediate cease fire and peace negotiations, which should include some territorial compromises as well as security guarantees for both sides. Further weapon delivery de facto hampers a political solution. Also, current sanctions against Russia are viewed as ineffective and should be gradually abolished; Russia is still seen as an important economic partner.

A pro-Russian approach views the Russian invasion as a logical result of the policy of Ukraine/the West. Sanctions and military response of NATO and its member states are rejected, and the West is called to seek a new great bargain with Russia over the heads of Ukrainians (essentially a new Munich Treaty 1938 arrangement).

In the following we present the approach of the individual countries based on official documents and presence of official representatives in the media. Later we discuss the response of the Visegrád countries to the German Zeitenwende, their expectations and general assessment of German attitude to the war. In the end, we give our own assessment of German policy and the approaches of the Visegrád countries using our typology.

3. Compatibility and differences in Germany’s and the V4’s reactions to Russian aggression in 2022

The first reactions of Germany and the V4 countries to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022 presented a diverse picture. In Germany, the Russian attack against Ukraine came as a terrible shock for the entire German classe politique, society, and business. The German leadership was made aware of what was coming several days in advance and Chancellor Scholz was able to issue a well-drafted statement about it. In expectation of the Russian attack and in response to the Putin’s recognition of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Republics, Scholz suspended certification of Nord Stream 2 on February 22.

On February 24, Scholz roundly condemned the Russian aggression in a clear and strong televised speech (Scholz 2022a). On February 27, he declared that the war represented a watershed in the history of the European continent. ‘With the attack on Ukraine, the Russian President Putin has started a war of aggression in cold blood,’ he said. In Scholz’s eyes, there was no possible justification for the war, so he underlined that it represented a violation of international law. ‘There is nothing and nobody that can justify it.’ (Scholz 2022b). This emphatic rejection of the war reflected the consensus of Germany’s mainstream political parties: the governing coalition of the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP, as well as the leading opposition parties, the CDU and CSU (Bundestag 2022). Well aware of the negative impact of Germany’s flawed former policy towards Russia and that Germany had ignored warnings by its eastern neighbors, German MPs recognized the need to take the interests of its partners in Central and Eastern Europe more seriously and acknowledge their ‘different threat perceptions’ (Entschliessungsantrag 2022).

Scholz characterized the war as an ‘attempt to wipe an independent country off the map’ (Scholz 2022b) and to ‘overthrow Ukraine and destroy its culture and its identity’ (Scholz 2022c). Moreover, he said, it is clear that Putin is ‘demolishing the European security order that had prevailed for almost half a century since the Helsinki Final Act’ (Scholz 2022b). With one blow, Russia destroyed the whole conceptual basis for Germany’s Russia policy, which had started with the new Ostpolitik, and rendered its last two decades not only obsolete but also deeply wrong. The work of generations of German politicians has been destroyed. Hopes for Wandel durch Annäherung [change through rapprochement] and Wandel durch Handel [change through trade] have collapsed. The implosion of the optimistic vision of cooperative relations with Russia – the German version of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ — has been spectacular. Russia attacked not only Ukraine but also pillars of German foreign policy that were grounded in a rule-based world order, inclusivity, and a co-operative attitude to security, as well as in a German culture of restraint when it comes to the use of military power. The effectivity of what has been labelled as German Zivilmacht (civilian power) by Maull (2018) has been put to a severe test. Germany’s national security and its resilience have become existential issues. The Chief Commander of the German Army, Lieutenant-General Alfons Mais, has described the Bundeswehr as ‘more or less blank’ (Rieke 2022). The CDU/CSU as well as the political star of Die Linke, Bodo Ramellow, have even raised the possibility of reintroducing compulsory military service in Germany (Heinrich 2022).

The collective reaction of the V4 countries was similarly emphatic. They called the Russian action ‘a brutal, unprovoked and premeditated attack against a sovereign, peaceful democratic state,’ which represented ‘an egregious violation of international law and the UN Charter, which undermines European security and stability’ (Visegrádgroup 2022). However, the positions of the individual countries and their leaders differed in their details.

As in the German case, the Polish condemnation of the war was unequivocal. Polish President Andrzej Duda stated that ‘Ukrainians are taking today the most trying test, where their lives are hanging in the balance … . They not only defend their freedom but the freedom of us all. In this respect, they can count on full support from Poland’ (Duda 2022a).

In contrast to Germany however, Poland did not feel a need to critically reassess its relations with Russia. Duda included a thinly vailed criticism of Germany’s Russia policy in one address, in which he underlined that ‘until now, many world leaders have lived in the illusion that Vladimir Putin and Russia could be engaged in normal negotiations, and that agreements can be reached that will be respected. As Poland, we have repeatedly warned against such an attitude.’ The dominant message of Duda’s speech was a call for full support of Ukraine and unity of the western countries in the face of Russian aggression (Duda 2022a).

In Prague, the first hours of the Russian war evoked an unusual political unity of all the major political parties and their leaders. Given the increasingly hostile relations between the Czech Republic and Russia, the country provided political support and supplied Ukraine with military material from the first moment of the Russian invasion. The first donation of artillery ammunition was announced in January 2022, but unfortunately delivery was not realized before the war began. This failure was broadly criticized by the general public, and the Czech government immediately reacted: the first train with military supplies, including the artillery ammunition announced in January, left the Czech Republic on 27 February 2022 (Natoaktual 2022). Even a once-ambivalent actor, Czech President Zeman, who is known for his connections to Russian and Chinese politicians, completely changed his position towards Russia. In a speech on February 24, he called for support of Ukraine and said that he shared the position of the government and the majority of Czech society (Kottová 2022).

In Slovakia, the reaction to the war has been affected by the country’s highly volatile internal political situation. On the one hand, President Zuzana Čaputová is one of the leading European figures supporting Ukraine. She was the initiator of a joint letter from nine Central and East European heads of state condemning the annexation of territories partially occupied by Russia. She strongly condemned Russian military aggression against Ukraine the very same day the attack began (Prezidentka 2022b). The Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Obyčajni ludia movement, Igor Matovič, fully supported the imposition of sanctions on Russia and accused Putin of causing intentionally an energy crisis. On the other hand, there were some politicians who viewed any offer of help to Ukraine negatively. The former prime minister and leading opposition figure Robert Fico, of the SMER political party, called for an ‘immediate end of the conflict’ and criticized arms deliveries to Ukraine (Čas 2022). There are also politicians in Slovakia who are openly pro-Russian and who voice Russian propaganda. For example, a former prime minister and anti-communist dissident, Ján Čarnogurský, called for dealing with Russia and abandoning Ukraine. Moreover, a significant part of Slovak society belongs among the most pro-Russian people in the European Union. According to a poll conducted in July 2022, 52% of Slovaks want Russia to win the war. Thirty percent want Ukraine to win, and 18% don’t know (Denník 2022). A significant reason for those Slovaks’ stance is their country’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, which before the war was 100%.

The Hungarian position towards the Russian aggression has been determined by the long-term ambivalent position of Viktor Orbán and his government towards Russia. On February 1, Orbán visited Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where he described Russia’s security demands as ‘reasonable’ and denounced Western sanctions as counterproductive (Watson 2022). Immediately after the invasion, he was forced to condemn Russia’s military action. At the same time, however, he declared that Hungary would send no military aid to Ukraine and ‘would not be dragged into the war’ (Reuters 2022). Orbán’s careful treading around the issue showed following the first NATO summit after the war started, when his spokesman announced that ‘Hungary will support all sanctions against Russia’ (Novak 2022).

The peak of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the Hungarian government came after the landslide victory of Orbán’s Fidesz party in the country´s general election in April 2022. In his victory speech, Orbán described Ukrainian President Zelensky as his ‘opponent’ and reiterated his intention to stay out of the conflict. As the war began to drag on, the Hungarian prime minister started to criticize sanctions against Russia more and more: ‘Initially, I thought we had only shot ourselves in the foot, but now it is clear that the European economy has shot itself in the lungs, and it is gasping for air.” Orbán called on Brussels to lighten sanctions (RFE 2022). Hungary thus remained the sole voice in the EU calling for negotiation with Putin’s regime, criticizing sanctions, and even sending its foreign minister to Moscow in July.

4. Scholz’s Zeitenwende and its perception in the V4 countries

Three days after Russia’s attack against Ukraine, Chancellor Scholz addressed the German Bundestag with a historic policy statement, declaring a fundamental change in German policy (Scholz 2022b).

German national security policy has always developed in reaction to its external environment. The proactive elements in the German approach were limited to strengthening the rule-based international order, arms control and arms reduction, enhancing multilateral institutions relevant to international security, and participation in multilateral international peace missions.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has changed most of that. In the words of Chancellor Scholz, this historic Zeitenwende [turning point] means that the world will never be the same as it was before the Russian aggression. He said that the ‘new reality requires an unequivocal response’ and announced a change in several of the key elements of German national security policy as it has been known so far (Scholz 2022b).

Scholz has effectively started a revolutionary turn in the financing of Germany’s defense by creating a 100 billion euro ‘special fund for the Bundeswehr’ and increasing the defense budget to more than 2% of GDP. Germany will invest in cooperative defense projects, including some with France. It will purchase armed drones, acquire the American F-35 as the country’s future fighter aircraft, and buy the NATO CH47-F transport helicopter and the ‘Iron Dome’ missile defense system. Due to the huge deficit in the armament of the Bundeswehr and the time pressure, Germany is going to buy a lot of its needed arms and equipment ‘off the shelf.’ The major focus will be on the needs of the heretofore dramatically weakened Bundeswehr, not on international cooperation (Theis 2022).

Germany’s more recent contributions to the enhancement of NATO and EU defense capabilities have been very substantial. Germany was the first country that was ready to assign 15,000 of its troops (including an armored division) to the new NATO Force Model (Gotkowska and Tarociński 2022, 3). Berlin also supported new efforts such as the introduction of a European Union Rapid Deployment Capacity by 2025. The Bundeswehr has deployed in the context of enhanced NATO Vigilance Activities in cooperation with the Czech Republic (the lead nation), Slovakia, and Slovenia. These include sending a binational German-Dutch Air and Missile Defence Task Force to Slovakia and standing up a multinational battlegroup, also in Slovakia (Bundeswehr 2022). Similarly, Germany responded positively to Lithuania’s wish to upgrade the multinational NATO battlegroup there to the level of a brigade. During 2023, Germany will be the lead nation in NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

In another dramatic turn, Germany decided to abandon its practice of refusing to deliver weapons into zones of conflict and supply Ukraine with weapons for the country’s defense. A new series of economic sanctions has been announced involving the exclusion of major Russian banks from the SWIFT banking communication system, a measure Germany had previously opposed.

German energy policy has also shifted radically. The country has taken a fast path to de facto decoupling itself from Russian supplies of coal, oil, and gradually, natural gas. It is also building new liquified natural gas terminals. The government was not able to stop importing Russian gas immediately, however. Thus it was indirectly funding the Russian war until Russia stopped deliveries itself. In order to compensate for the loss of Russian energy resources, previous political decisions had to be adjusted or even reversed. The usage of coal is being increased and the lifespan of nuclear power plants either prolonged or renewed. Some German experts argue that Germany should show more European solidarity and boost its domestic energy production using all means available, including fracking to produce natural gas, and should support reform of the European energy market (Ansari and Pepe 2022).

For years, most of the above-mentioned measures were objects of hot ideological and political disputes. ‘Berlin’s head-spinning reversal’ (Inside 2022) was clearly the result of shock and an understanding that with the Russian attack, not only Ukraine’s security, but also more broadly that of Europe is at stake – and that for the first time in a long while, Germany’s security is in play as well.

The political sea change was the decision of a small circle around the Chancellor. It caught the SPD and Green parliamentary groups unprepared, which only emphasized the sense of urgency. The change of course is clearly an answer to a ‘wrong direction in three critical policy areas: energy policy, security policy, and policy towards Russia and Ukraine’ (Fix 2022, 84). The long-term policy line cost Germany a great deal of its authority, influence and trust, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. As expected, the turn was enthusiastically backed by the conservative CDU/CSU opposition, but it was rejected as war mongering by the radical left Die Linke and the radical right AfD. Skyrocketing energy prices notwithstanding, the general public has increased its backing for Ukraine, which reached 74% of those polled in September 2022 (ZDF 2022).

Many details of the German policy turn still remain unclear. Unsurprisingly, the months that followed the Russian invasion were filled with internal coalition negotiations, disputes, and struggle (Koenig 2022). As a result, the early positive response has transformed into disappointment and a lack of trust in the ability of German policymakers to produce a coherent and active policy line at a time of deepening international crisis.

The image of the German government at home and abroad has been tarnished. Such an attitude toward Germany is to an extent unjust; Germany is one of the most active supporters of Ukraine in several areas. It backs an extensive sanction regime against Russia and is seeking to overhaul German industry, which heretofore has been highly dependent on the import of relatively cheap energy resources from Russia. In some crucial and also symbolic ways, however, Germany is moving forward at very low speed and only under constant pressure. Germany’s cautious approach to the delivery of Leopard 1 and 2 main battle tanks and Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine has caused dissatisfaction. The German reluctance to do so was heavily disputed in the ruling coalition, in which the Greens and the FDP pushed the government to supply the tanks and armored fighting vehicles. The decision to deliver Marder infantry fighting vehicles was then taken in January 2023 but only in response to the French readiness to supply Ukraine with its AMX RC-10 ‘light tanks’ and in co-ordination with the US delivery of their Bradley fighting vehicles. German public opinion supported these deliveries, but by only a narrow margin (47% favorable versus 44% opposed) (ZDF 2022). It has become obvious that Chancellor Scholz is concerned with the prospect of a possible escalation of hostilities and nuclear war. Berlin has been content to just fall in line behind the United States and follow its lead when it comes to supplying tanks.

The V4 countries have reacted to the new German defense policy in accordance with their attitudes to Russia and the current state of their relations with Germany. By the time of the Russian attack against Ukraine, Polish relations with Germany were at their lowest ebb since 1990. Germany’s enhanced defense activities have been welcomed: Polish officials acknowledge that if they are really implemented, German defense reforms will have a ‘beneficial effect on increasing NATO’s defense potential and on the security of Poland and the entire Eastern Flank of the Alliance’ (Jasiński 2022, 2). At the same time, Germany‘s piecemeal approach to supplying arms to Ukraine has caused a very negative reaction in Warsaw.

Prime Minister Morawiecki clearly sees a role for Poland in pushing Germany. He came to Berlin for swift consultations one day before Scholz’s February 27 speech. Afterwards, he declared that he had ‘met with the Chancellor to stir the conscience of Germany so that they finally decide to introduce “crushing” sanctions’ against Russia, meaning cutting Russia off from SWIFT. He underlined that ‘there is no time for the unyielding egoism seen in some Western countries – unfortunately also here, in Germany’ (Morawiecki 2022b). Poland itself has been one of the most active supporters of Ukraine, supplying it with heavy weapons, including 260 T-72 tanks and other material valued at more than two billion USD (Morawiecki 2022a). Morawiecki concluded that Ukraine would no longer exist at all if it had been dependent on Germany for its defense; in his eyes, the lack of action put a question mark also to the alliance with Germany (Morawiecki 2022a, 88). In Poland, Germany was seen as simply lacking the political will to support Ukraine (Piotrowski 2022, 1).

In the energy security area, Polish officials have been very critical of German policy. President Duda underlined that he viewed the (late) Nord Stream 2 pipeline as an unfriendly act on the part of Germany against Poland (Duda 2022b). German policy was blamed for having severely damaged Europe by increasing its dependence on Russian gas (Morawiecki 2022a, 88). Prime Minister Morawiecki accused Germany of arrogance at a time of pandemic-caused financial crisis and vowed not to bow to ‘German dictat’ in the EU during the current energy crisis. He also criticized Germany’s 200 billion euro scheme for cushioning the domestic impact of high gas bills on its citizens as an unfair subsidy to German industry (Zeit 2022).

In Czech politics, the Zeitenwende announced on 27 February 2022, brought relief to those who were concerned about Russian aggression. However, like other capitals, Prague was confused by Berlin´s slow implementation of the U-turn in its policy, mainly in its delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine (‘Česká Kritika’ 2022). The Czech Republic very quickly delivered ex-Soviet arms and ammunition to Ukraine, ready for immediate use. Such supplies kept the Ukrainian army fighting early on and thus bought time for training Ukrainian specialists in the use of the western-type weapons which were delivered to the Ukraine in late spring.

Germany’s backing for Czech military supplies to Ukraine, and its decision to participate in the NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activity mission led by the Czech army in Slovakia in March 2022, represented one practical impact of the Zeitenwende on Czech-German relations. A similar arrangement has been concluded between Germany and Slovakia, although one has not yet materialized with Poland. In fact, Germany has adopted a role as a ‘supporter of supporters.’ The Czech Republic sent several of its Soviet-style T-72 tanks to Ukraine, and in return has been promised one-half of their number by Germany in the form of Leopard 2A4s. The supply of the Leopard 2a4s to the Czech Republic and their modernization will be financed by the German government on behalf of Ukraine (Vojáček 2022). Supplies of Czech Army armored vehicles and helicopters will also be funded by other European partners of the Czech Republic and the United States (English.radio.cz 2022; Expats.cz 2022).

As for Slovakia and its society, Germany as non-neighboring country does not play a significant role in Slovakia’s stance on Ukraine (a difference with Poland and the Czech Republic). On the other hand, Slovakia has welcomed German help in providing it with Patriot missile systems together with Bundeswehr specialists who have been stationed at Sliač airbase since April 2022. The Patriot system replaces the S-300 anti-air systems that Slovakia provided to Ukraine at the beginning of April (Markíza 2022). To strengthen the bond with Slovakia, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited eastern Slovakia in April 2022. According to his Slovak counterpart Zuzana Čaputová, his visit ‘opened a new chapter in Slovak-German relations’ (Prezidentka 2022a). Slovak politicians have pressed their German counterparts to step up their deliveries to Ukraine and to start the accession process for Ukraine to join the EU.

5. Conclusions

The Zeitenwende is a watershed moment in the development of German defense policy and its relations with Russia. There is no return to the antebellum status quo – the changes in German defense and energy policy and in its relations with Russia are profound.

The article searched for evidence of four ideal typical approaches to the Russian aggression in official the policy of Germany and the Visegrád countries: a restrained multilateralist, activist, pragmatic and pro-Russian one. While all four of the above positions have been present in the policy discourse in Germany as well as in the Visegrád states, the fully pro-Russian attitude is missing in the official policy of the countries under scrutiny.

The German policy has been convincing in its rejection of the Russian aggression and massive support of Ukraine.Nevertheless, there are areas where the new German policy has so far not provided a clear strategy. The most prominent and controversial of them is the question of supplying Leopard 2 battle tanks and armored fighting vehicles to Ukraine. Also, the more general question of the future role Germany should play in Europe remains open – regarding both defense and energy security policy. A military expert on the European Council on Foreign Relations, Gustav Gressel, criticized the German attitude and argued that unlike the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom, Germany does not understand the nature of the war, a failing it shares with France (Volmer 2022).

But does Germany want a leading role for itself? So far, it has preferred not to push forward in the security and defense area. As a ‘civilian power,’ Germany has traditionally avoided a prominent (and thus costly and risky) role on these issues. Will the Zeitenwende, driven by Russian aggression, cause Germany to permanently change its attitude in this regard? On the one hand, Lars Klingbeil and Christine Lambrecht have argued repeatedly that Germany should assume a leading role in the defense of Europe. In reality, as concerns both weapons deliveries and oil and gas sanctions, Berlin has in fact ‘refused a leadership role and left the heavy lifting to the United States, United Kingdom and Northern, Central and Eastern member states’ (Fix 2022, 86). Change in German policy has been an introverted process so far, not a leap forward in international security arrangements and defense cooperation. This is true as well for coordination and cooperation in arms production and procurement. The Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, Eberhard Zorn, has suggested that new resources will be used only within the German national framework (Theis 2022).

The Zeitenwende has primarily been an abrupt, face-saving correction of the German course. Germany has reacted from a position of military weakness and critical dependence on energy resources coming from Russia. Even among German experts, there is visible skepticism concerning Germany’s ability to use the 100 billion euro increase in its defense budget effectively enough to prepare the Bundeswehr for coming crises and conflicts. Most in doubt, however, is the question of whether Germany can lastingly change its way of thinking about foreign, security, and defense policy, geopolitics, and the military instruments of policy. The Zeitenwende just occurred in February 2022. A change in strategic culture is usually the result of a mid- to long-term process of adaptation.

The overall assessment of the German policy is also complicated by the fact that the coalition has been internally differentiated and has struggled to act coherently. The official line has been defined by the Chancellor Scholz himself and has underlined need of fundamental change in German and international politics, the notion of the Zeitenwende. At the same time Scholz´s attitude has been restrained by the view of possible risks of escalation and a spill-over of the conflict into a much broader war. The Chancellor thus gradually arrived at a restrained multilateralist line of policy response to the Russian actions in Ukraine.

The V4 countries by and large have also tended to the support of the multilateralist line of action in reaction to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. After all, the role of the transatlantic alliance has radically increased due to the Russian aggression. Neither European allies in NATO, nor the EU can deliver strategic guarantees comparable with the capabilities and guarantees of the USA.

This has potentially increased chances for co-operation within the Visegrad group as well as with Germany as long as the the countries involved are able to co-ordinate their approaches and keep domestic politics out of their mutual relations.

This is, of course, not an easy task. Firstly, the Visegrád group countries have differed from Germany in their attitude to the Russian aggression. On the one hand Hungary has a predominantly pragmatic attitude to the war: its support of the NATO and EU policy towards in this regard is primarily instrumental, Budapest is keen to maintain its position of balancer between the West and Russia/China. All the other Visegrad states have taken an opposite, activist attitude, supporting Ukraine actively and without ‘red lines’ (except getting directly involved into warfighting). Poland has taken a very strong and demanding attitude, assuming in fact a leading position in the whole region. The Czech Republic and Slovakia, who also adopted the activist position, have followed rather Poland than Germany but have been cautious not to fall into the anti-German pre-election policy line of the PiS.

The German Zeitenwende has thus introduced a new dynamic and caused a differentiation in the relations between Germany and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. It has resulted in the intensification of cooperation on enhanced defense efforts within NATO and the EU. It remains unclear, however, how much German leadership its eastern neighbors are seeking. The degree of closeness between Germany and the V4 countries has traditionally depended on long term trends in the relations of these countries with both Germany and Russia. Hungary’s openly pro-Russian course offers only a few chances for new cooperation with Germany. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are making the best of the Zeitenwende by focusing on increased practical military cooperation with the Bundeswehr. It is, however, the United States and the United Kingdom whose roles in the security and defense of Central and Eastern Europe have most considerably increased.

Most importantly, the anti-German course of Polish politics under the PiS government has focused on containing German influence rather than boosting it. While Polish criticism of German policy is often on point, Polish policy has failed to acknowledge the radical shift in the German attitude to Russia and its officials continue to criticize Berlin for domestic reasons (Buras and Zerka 2022, 5). Warsaw is even seeking more disagreement with Germany: the Polish government recently demanded 1.3 trillion USD from Germany in compensation for damage caused by the German occupation of 1939 to 1945 — a demand the German government swiftly rejected (‘Poland to Seek’ 2022).

As a result, Poland and its politicians ‘seem to spend more time criticizing Germany’s and France’s attempts at solidarity with Ukraine than cooperating with Berlin and Paris to shape the EU’s eastern policy’ (Buras and Zerka 2022, 5). By taking the path it has, Poland is only deepening divisions within the EU and NATO.

Driven by Russian aggression, the German Zeitenwende has only just begun. It has the potential – if translated into a coherent strategy and effectively implemented – to change both Germany and the heart of Europe. It inevitably opens up new opportunities for practical cooperation with Germany´s closest eastern neighbors in the areas of defense, energy security, support for Ukraine, and for dealing with an aggressive and unpredictable Russia. Whether the V4 and its member countries become closer politically with Germany will in the future depend on political will in all five countries.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.