Agonistic reflections on the legitimacy of EU referenda

ABSTRACT

This article suggests that we need to rethink the legitimacy of EU referenda by considering them as democratic games with different groups of players, levels and rounds. Unlike most research on EU referenda informed by direct democracy or demoicracy, the article employs the approach of agonistic democracy. It argues that we need to shift analytical focus from the member-state to the EU citizen and develop EU-level criteria for a comprehensive assessment of EU referenda’s legitimacy. The criteria are whether all EU citizens – and not just the citizens from the country conducting the referendum – had opportunities to participate in the political dialogue surrounding the EU referendum, and whether citizens across the EU have been able to develop EU-level democratic subjectivities through such participation. Applying these criteria in the cases of the Greek and British EU referenda, the article finds legitimacy shortcomings for both, yet with variations.

KEYWORDS:

• EU referenda
• legitimacy
• democratic game
• agonistic democracy

Introduction

The project of European integration stands at a critical crossroads. The European Union (EU) has faced a number of crises (Caporaso 2018; Zielonka 2014): a financial crisis testing the Eurozone members; a refugee crisis pushing to the limit the governmental capacity of the member-states at the EU’s external borders; an existential crisis as EU institutions and member-states have still not made up their minds about what kind of socio-political animal the EU is; and an institutional crisis, often associated with democratic/legitimacy deficits, which has contributed among other factors to the first ever application of a member-state to exit the EU. Since the tumultuous ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the end of the permissive consensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009), the legitimacy of the EU has interested politicians, practitioners and scholars. Discussions in particular about the conduct, results and implications of EU referenda have propagated after the Greek and British referenda in 2015 and 2016, respectively.

In liberal constitutional democracies, the referendum is a democratic practice which directly reveals the people’s will over a matter of great gravity, for example, on regime change. Depending on a country’s Constitution, the results of a referendum can be advisory or binding (Setälä 2006, 705). Apart from raising normative concerns, non-compliance with the results of a referendum can signify dire political and electoral costs for the government of a country (see also Schimmelfennig 2019). The legitimacy of a referendum can become a particularly complicated issue if it is conducted nationally but has international or supranational implications, with a direct impact on the lives of citizens other than the ones of the country conducting the referendum. This captures the case of EU referenda, hereby defined as referenda nationally organised and conducted by an EU member-state on a topic related to EU politics and European integration. What makes EU referenda unique and worthy of scholarly investigation is exactly that their conduct is limited within the domestic order of the organising member-state; however, they substantially impact transnational and supranational policy decisions and actions that in their turn affect all the EU citizenry. In such a complicated governance landscape, how can we address their legitimacy? I argue that we need to shift our attention from the level of the member-state to the level of the EU citizen and render them our analytical focus. Following, we need to take into consideration two criteria: whether all EU citizens – not just the citizens from the country conducting the referendum – have opportunities to participate in the political dialogue surrounding the EU referendum; and whether citizens across the EU have been able to develop EU-level democratic subjectivities (see theoretical section for an explanation of the term) through such participation. Based on a long-standing scholarly conviction that one cannot assess EU democracy and legitimacy using criteria that got developed for the nation-state (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013), the suggested legitimacy criteria qualify as ‘EU-level’ rather than referring solely to the member-state conducting the referendum. What is more, the suggested criteria are not exclusive; they may well complement other legitimising factors, particularly institutional and legal obligations, adding and improving legitimacy without being the only legitimising source.

Unlike most research on EU referenda that engages with direct democracy (Abromeit 1998; Cheneval and Ferrín 2018; Garry 2013; Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 2016) or demoicracy (Bellamy, 2013; Nicolaïdis 2013; Welge 2015; Beetz 2015, 2019; Crespy and Ladi 2019 to name but a few), I am employing instead the readings of agonistic democrats. Chantal Mouffe (1999, 2005) and James Tully (2005, 2008), among others (see, for example, Tambakaki 2011; Wenman 2013; Wingenbach 2011), have developed the approach of agonistic democracy, which focuses on public contestation, agonistic pluralism, and the balance of practices of governance and freedom for the sake of effective citizen participation in politics. As a key mode for articulating citizens’ voice in politics, referenda are often cited in the theorisation of agonistic democracy. Besides, agonistic democracy focuses on the open-endedness of democratic processes (Griggs, Norval, and Wagenaar 2016; Vink 2007), bestowing upon political contestation much democratic potential, an element that features promptly in what follows.

The article starts with a comparative reading of the more established approach of demoicracy and the proposed alternative of agonistic democracy. The same section provides a revisit of the legitimacy of EU referenda from an agonistic democracy perspective. The section that follows explores the legitimacy of the EU referenda in Greece and the UK. In both cases, my theory-driven/normative propositions indicate legitimacy deficits yet with variations. The EU referendum in Greece did not allow enough time for a democratically robust and inclusive dialogue both within the country and within EUrope, hence limiting the chances for citizens’ developing EU-level democratic subjectivities. In comparison, the UK’s referendum may have given more time to British citizens to deliberate on the UK’s membership in the EU, yet citizens of other member-states did not involve in the respective political dialogue, once more restricting their chances for developing EU-level democratic subjectivities. The concluding remarks summarise the discussion, pinpoint its limitations and put forward thoughts for follow-up research.

Before proceeding, I need to clarify the research objectives of my analysis. My intention is neither to epistemologically enrich the approach of agonistic democracy by means of ‘theory building’ nor to provide an exhaustive account of the Greek and British EU referenda and of their democratic quality. Standing on the intersection of the two issues, the purpose of the article is to use the Greek and British experiences as case studies, exploring the contribution of agonistic democracy for an alternative understanding of EU referenda’s legitimacy. Unlike other approaches, the present puts emphasis on both dispute and dialogue as experienced by the citizens themselves. The primary value-added of the study is that it links citizens’ engagement with the EU referenda with the possibility of them exercising EU-level democratic subjectivities and developing transnational political bonds.

Demoicracy, agonistic democracy and EU legitimacy

Demoicracy: main features

The demoicratic approach is a relatively recent yet popular development in the literature of European integration. Influenced by republican ideas, it has often been seen as a third way between a federal and an intergovernmental EU (Nicolaïdis and Viehoff 2017, 593). The approach has been theoretically delineated in the works of Francis Cheneval, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Richard Bellamy and their collaborators. Demoicrats consider the need to approach both democracy and integration in the EU from a realistic starting point and not according to statehood criteria historically developed for the nation-state (Hüller 2016). They deem that the EU’s empirical reality in present times is neither supranational nor federal, with the co-existence of nationally defined ‘statespeoples’ being fundamental for the future of the EU (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013).

The definitions of demoicracy vary but generally agree on certain elements. Bellamy’s (2017) demoicratic suggestion for the EU is a Republic of sovereign states. His approach is closer to intergovernmentalism compared to the insights of other demoicratic thinkers. Cheneval and Schimmelfennig (2013, 334, original italics) state that the EU is a ‘polity of multiple demoi … the demoi are the primary subjects to whom accountability is owed’. Cheneval and Nicolaïdis (2017, 237, original italics) stress that in EU demoicracy ‘popular sovereignty [is] exercised concurrently by several rather than just one dêmos’. Stevenson (2017: 16) views ‘demoicracy to mean a multi-demos form of governance that promotes horizontal intersubjectivity’. Whereas Wolkenstein (2018, 287) cites Nicolaïdis and terms demoicracy as ‘A larger polity of multiple demoi, in which each demos is more or less sovereign but has agreed to “regulatory principles of interaction … ”’. Even though they present nuances, all these definitions share an emphasis on the horizontal sharing of sovereignty among nationally determined demoi and their (states)peoples. Nicolaïdis (2012) highlights demoicracy is about people governing together without dominating each other.

The main features of demoicracy are often summarized in the works of the above scholars, yet again with nuances. For example, Cheneval and Schimmelfennig (2013, 342–343) emphasize the constituent power of statespeoples and the recognition of each other’s sovereignty, the principle of non-discrimination, the need for equal legislative rights between national parliaments and the European parliament, and the primacy of multilateral law. Nicolaïdis and Viehoff (2017, 592) name as key values of demoicracy the individual and collective autonomy of peoples, their equal recognition, and the individual and collective non-domination. They deem democratic solidarity as an important prerequisite for the EU’s demoi to equally recognise and non-dominate each other (Nicolaïdis and Viehoff 2017, 597).

What is then the profile of the EU citizen? The demoicratic citizens do not have to choose between a national and a European identity, thinking as and enacting both identifications at the same time (Nicolaïdis and Viehoff 2017, 594). In principle, demoicrats prefer to refer to the ‘peoples’ of EU rather than to its ‘member-states’, with the peoples being the ultimate source of sovereignty in the EU polity (Cheneval and Nicolaïdis 2017, 237, 240). Within the context of EU governance, the EUropeans bond with each other horizontally rather than vertically because they co-govern without any statespeople being able to dominate over the others (Cheneval and Nicolaïdis 2017, 243). Co-governance is conducted primarily through deliberative mechanisms (Nicolaïdis 2012), which should respect the individuality of each statespeople within the EU. As reiterated by Cheneval and Nicolaïdis (2017, 244, original italics), ‘for demoicracy to work, we need a collective intention of togetherness and co-sovereignty among all its peoples’.

Agonistic democracy: main features

Turning to agonistic democracy, its main features are public contestation; agonistic pluralism; the balance of practices of governance and freedom for the sake of effective citizen participation in politics; and the social construction of democratic subjectivities resulting from participation in the democratic game.

Drawing on post-structuralist political philosophy (Foucault, Schmitt) and discourse theory (Wittgenstein, Laclau and Mouffe), agonistic democrats understand politics as an arena, where political actors with different power leverage articulate diverse, often contrasting and conflictual, public demands. Unlike deliberative democrats that focus on a pre-established moral drive to reach a consensus through deliberation (Crespy, 2013), agonistic democracy does not suppress the plurality of voices. Public demands get contested, decontested, and modified due to the interaction with dissident voices, which are also entitled to be heard. According to Mouffe (2005), democracy acquires its full meaning through agonistic pluralism. Democratic politics get the form of an ‘agonism’ – which stands for battle but also game in ancient Greek – between disagreeing political subjects. There is a shift from radical democracy’s emphasis on antagonistic relations between political enemies (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) towards agonistic relations between friendly adversaries who do not try to annihilate each other (Mouffe 2005, 102).

Whereas Mouffe (2005) accentuates agonism as struggle, Tully (2008) counters it as game, with participants holding varying identities, perceptions and subject positions in the power nexus, a diversity that manifests when individuals raise public demands. As Tully (2008, 30, original italics) highlights, there is need to ‘listen to the other side (audi alteram partem)’ within the democratic game. Tully (2008) recognises two principal types of players, the governing actors, and the governed ones. Rulers, politicians, policymakers, technocrats, bureaucrats, political and economic elites exercise governmental power over the governed citizens through practices of governance. The citizenry reacts to this power subjection by exercising respective practices of freedom (Tully 2008, 21), the primary of which is citizens’ involvement in the political dialogue. The power status of the two sides is unequal but not sedimented since the governed ones can become the governing actors as the game progresses.

Tully has been more explicit than Mouffe about the political and normative potential of participating in the democratic game. On the political potential, citizens participate indirectly through relations of informed and ‘critical trust’ in their representatives; and directly through ‘public spheres, local initiatives, referendums, consultative meetings, political parties, elections, public service, interest groups, dissent, protest, civil disobedience and the occasional rebellion’ (Tully 2008, 147). On the normative potential, Tully reflects on the transformative capacity of the democratic game. Constant civic interpellation draws on ‘practices of critical reflection’ that are ‘nonfoundational’ (Tully 2003). This means that there are no actual standards that we a priori adopt in order to evaluate the process, results, our roles, and political identities; all these get negotiated and revisited throughout the democratic game. An individual is hence not born or recognised as a citizen but becomes a citizen through their participation in the game. This type of exercised citizenship associates with Tully’s (2014) ‘practices of citizenization’. The latter is a dynamic process in which the individual comprehends their civic qualities due to the socio-political interactions – often conflict-laden – with the governing actors and fellow governed citizens. Eventually, practices of critical reflection and citizenization enable citizens to develop and exercise democratic subjectivities. The notion of subjectivity is many times cited in political theory and political philosophy without a concrete definition (see, for example, Howarth 2006; Kröger and Friedrich 2013). The term originates in Michel Foucault’s philosophy, referring to how agents hold specific subject positions in the power nexus, allowing them to exercise power over others. The working definition of democratic subjectivity in my analysis is that of empowered, conscious, and intentional political agency that allows citizens to hold active and central positionalities within democratic politics. The sequential process from participation in the democratic game and respective political dialogues to critical reflection to citizenization to democratic subjectivities, as shown in Graph 1, will be cardinal in my discussion of EU referenda’s legitimacy.

Graph 1. Sequential chain of legitimising impact from an agonistic democratic perspective.

Source: Author

The differences with the demoicratic approach

Agonistic democracy’s epistemological plane shares certain convictions with the demoicratic approach since it does not prioritise the state as the nodal point of legitimacy and it does not envisage the EU as a unified entity but as multinational, multilevel, and multi-layered (see also Nicolaïdis 2012). Both accounts urge for considering the voices and opinions in all member-states, with an emphasis on democratic results at the transnational level. Nevertheless, there are fundamental differences. First, demoicracy refers to transnational negotiations and bargains between, on the one hand, governments of member-states governing together (Nicolaïdis cited in Ronzoni 2017, 211) and on the other the EU institutions, often ending up with a ‘top-down’ analysis of legitimacy where analytical primacy is given to the governing actors rather than the governed citizens. On the contrary, applying agonistic democracy allows for a ‘bottom-up’ investigation, ruled ones being at the bottom and rulers at the top. Second, demoicrats talk about ‘non-domination’ of EU peoples on behalf of each other (Ronzoni 2017, 218), while agonistic democrats would centre on the role of citizen participation in the EU democratic game and respective political dialogue, with positions initiated by the individual citizen, nationally articulated and then transferred to the EU level. So, if demoicracy’s main unit of analysis is the statespeople of EUrope, for agonistic democracy it would still be the citizen as both an individual, a national and a potential EUropean. I thus concur with Wolkenstein’s (2018, 290) criticism of demoicracy that ‘The possibility that citizens themselves could seek to project their political activities across borders in order to cultivate the transnational solidarities that are required in order for a European demos to emerge is not considered’. Third, demoicrats envisage decisions within EU governance to be taken through deliberations, risking the depoliticisation of EU politics, while agonistic democrats would much value dispute and dissonance within EU governance, seeing uneven power relations between governing and governed ones within the EU to be politicising EU policymaking. Fourth, whereas demoicracy seems skewed towards democratic end results, agonistic democracy always remains processual, with a particular emphasis on the political and normative potential of dispute caused by political differences within the body politic. Following, agonistic democracy pays much attention to the constitutive capacity of actually ‘fighting’ the democratic game. It is through their agonistic behaviour within the game that the various players can develop democratic subjectivities and understandings of EUropean civicness. And fifth, the different strands of demoicracy have put forward a no-demos thesis for the EU (Schütze 2020, 36), yet a reading based on agonistic democracy leaves open-ended the possibility that a collectivity of EUropean cives may emerge in the long run through the development of EU-level democratic subjectivities. Table 1 summarises these key differences between demoicracy and agonistic democracy.

Table 1. Main differences between demoicracy and agonistic democracy.

Type of difference	Demoicracy	Agonistic democracy
Main unit of analysis	Statespeople/people	Citizen
‘Direction’ of democracy/legitimacy	Top-down	Bottom-up
Democratic focus	End results	Process
Mode of decision-making	Deliberation	Dispute & dissonance not suppressed
Future of EU	EU polity as a union of sovereign peoples	Citizens develop EU-level democratic subjectivities, becoming aware of their EUropean civicness

Source: Author.

A reading of EU referenda’s legitimacy through agonistic democracy

In principle, agonistic democrats do not proceed with rigid efforts to formalise legitimacy. This contrasts the common practice of EU studies scholars to explicitly or implicitly discern input, output and throughput forms of legitimacy (Novak and Hillebrandt 2020; Scharpf 2009; Schmidt 2013; Strebel, Kübler, and Marcinkowski 2019). Mouffe (2005, 100–101) insists on legitimacy’s affiliation to power-related conflict, and how their interdependence relates to a ‘hegemonic ordering’ in democratic politics. For Tully (2005, 194) constitutional democracy is legitimate if it equally respects the principles of constitutionalism – defined as rule of law – and of democracy – defined as democratic freedom. Tully (2005, 197, 200) regards trends of political globalisation, including the European integration project, to challenge these two principles. In more recent writings, he fleshes out processes for global citizens to question the governmental power exercised upon them by regulatory regimes such as international and regional organisations (Tully 2014).

A critical comment here is that the EU is not just one more regulatory regime in the pile. EU institutions in association with member-states’ governments exercise supranational governmental power over the citizens, but this occurs – and becomes meaningful – in the framework of a polity that is both multi-national and multi-level.¹ In the EU democratic game, the manifestation of EU governmental power and citizens’ agonistic reactions to it can have transforming results, compatible with a liberal form of governmental power (Foucault 2010, 2011; Walters 2012), and resulting in respective democratic subjectivities for the EU citizens. Taking all these into account, my suggestion for assessing EU legitimacy primarily draws upon Tully’s positions, emphasizing the role of agonistic participation in EU political dialogues in socially constructing democratic subjectivities for the EU citizens.

Within the EU context, what is legitimate and what is not is institutionally and legally framed by the EU’s thin constitutionalism (Weiler 2002) as set by the EU Treaties and the acquis communautaire. This juridico-political framing of EU legitimacy has in its core, on the one hand, the checks-and-balances system between the different levels of the EU polity, citizens – member-states – EU institutions. And on the other, an equilibrium between citizens’ participation and representation, an equilibrium which also contributes to balancing the EU’s different levels and which I consider in the empirical analysis below. Further, a comprehensive assessment of EU legitimacy should ponder upon opportunities of citizens to participate in the democratic game and accompanying political dialogues at both national and EU levels. A final insight is that disputes due to different positions held within the democratic game foster democratic subjectivities that refer beyond the national borders of member-states. As in Graph 1, contrasting views on EU matters, clashing with each other, can pave the way for practices of critical reflection and citizenization on behalf of the players, who can start thinking about their positionality not simply as citizens of member-states but of the EU. To put it simply, players in the EU democratic game may start nationally, but they may well become EU democratic subjects, a contingency which ipso facto improves EU legitimacy. Suffice it to say that this does not necessarily imply the emergence of a EUropean identity. It instead open-endedly signals awareness of EU citizens that they are governed together, having no predetermined assumptions about whether their common governance will entail further political integration at EU level.

Applying the above discussion in the specific case of EU referenda’s legitimacy, the democratic game within the member-state conducting the EU referendum entails diverging and conflictual public demands of at least three different groups of players: the governed ones voting ‘No’ to the referendum, the governed ones voting ‘Yes’, and the governing actors that ought to translate the electoral result into political decision and action at both national and EU levels. Following the conduct of the referendum, the nationally dominant public demand is transferred to the EU level according to the EU’s institutional and legal framework. Since major decisions in the EU need the formal (unanimity) or informal (consensus) agreement of all member-states, the results of the referendum may lock a member-state’s government to a non-negotiable direction and hence hinder an EU decision to be taken. In this way, national decisions influencing the EU level are of interest to the rest of the member-states and their citizens who have not been allowed to express opinions on the matter. Ideally, formal or informal mechanisms should be developed so as to allow citizens of other member-states to express themselves about EU decisions/actions impacted by a nationally held EU referendum.²

Allowing all EU citizens to voice opinions related to the specific EU referendum and fight for them opens the field of EU politics towards democratic contingency. The decision to participate in the process and play the democratic game is an individual one. Yet, the democratic conflict emanating from citizens’ different standpoints can reify democratic subjectivities that transcend national borders, whose point of reference is arguably not national but EUropean. The point is that such a development is not just an end result of the agonistic democratic process. It should be considered as an indication that the preceding democratic process was sufficiently legitimate. In short, when an EU referendum allows for the development and exercise of EU-level democratic subjectivities, this becomes a legitimising factor.

It should be noted that a reading of EU referenda’s legitimacy through agonistic democracy differs from other citizen-centric, bottom-up readings of referenda. For example, Cheneval and el-Wakil (2018) argue in favour of bottom-up and binding referenda, meaning referenda initiated by the citizens themselves and which are legally binding for the governing authorities. However, their understanding of ‘bottom-up’ centralises on citizens being the political actors entitled to request the conduct of a referendum and becoming the actual decision-makers due to the referendum’s binding nature. The present analysis renders the EUropean citizens and their respective voices the paramount source of legitimacy of an EU referendum, regardless of whether the latter was put in motion by governed citizens or governing authorities. Similar to demoicratic acounts, Cheneval and el-Wakil’s (2018) discussion does not take the normative step on linking citizen participation in the political dialogues surrounding a referendum with the social construction of democratic subjectivities. This becomes a crucial legitimising parameter when approaching the EU referenda in Greece and the UK.

Problematising the legitimacy of EU referenda

This section discusses the legitimacy of EU referenda in Greece and the UK through the theoretical lens of agonistic democracy, putting the two cases to its normative test. These two referenda have been chosen due to their importance for EU politics, their contemporaneity – both were conducted in the post-Lisbon era – and because together they cover questions of both EU membership and governance.

The Greek referendum on a new bailout programme

Held in July 2015, the so-called bailout referendum in Greece addressed a matter of EU governance. In times of lingering financial recession, austerity measures aiming at fiscal consolidation, and intense disagreements with other Eurozone countries and EU institutions on how to remedy Greece’s macroeconomic imbalances, the coalition government of SYRIZA (left-wing) and ANEL (right-wing) sought citizens’ direct approval for a new economic adjustment programme (Matthijs, Parsons, and Toenshoff 2019). With a turnout of 62.5%, 61.31% of the Greek citizenry voted ‘No’ and 38.69% ‘Yes’ to the suggested programme, meaning that the majority of Greek voters – a majority that reifies the country’s popular sovereignty (Crespy and Ladi 2019) – refused the new bailout programme.

In general, the legitimacy of the referendum was criticised by practitioners and experts from a juridico-political perspective and with reference to the process, i.e. the initiation, organisation and conduct of the referendum. The referendum was considered anti-constitutional since the Greek Constitution does not foresee referenda on matters of governance and administration; the 17-line question was confusing and long-winded; the precedent campaign, public rallies and parliamentary dialogue lasted roughly 10 days during which the polarisation of the Greek society reached a peak; and Greek citizens that happened to be abroad were not given the opportunity to vote at embassies and consulates (see also Tsebelis 2016).

If seen as a democratic game, we can recognise four main players in the Greek referendum that had a say in the respective political dialogue:

• citizens voting ‘Yes’, largely equating their consent to a new bailout programme with the country’s staying in the Eurozone;

• citizens voting ‘No’, whose main demand was against further austerity measures, a demand raised in opposition to ‘Yes’ voters but also to the government that would be asked to respect the ‘No’ voters’ voice;

• the Greek government, which coalesced with ‘No’ voters but at the same time had to stand against them in the adversarial relationship between governing actors and governed citizens;

• the parliament opposition parties, which held diverse political demands, and of which the primary opposition party (New Democracy) had challenged the rationale and overall legitimacy of the referendum.

It can be said that in principle the referendum enabled all the above players to ‘fight’ the game if they wish to do so, adding points of legitimising agonistic pluralism. Post referendum, ‘Yes’ supporters felt their voice not having made a tangible political impact as they were on the losing side of the democratic game. ‘No’ supporters expected from the Greek government to respect the popular will, renegotiate with EU partners, and cease further austerity measures accompanying the new bailout programme. Whereas opposition parties expected a robust parliamentary dialogue and scrutiny of the referendum results before any final governmental decisions. The political dialogue within the Greek parliament was instead rather brief due to the deadlines set by the EU’s juridico-political frame.

Whether on the winning or losing side, the democratic game did not reach its full normative potential. The absence of vote by mail or electronic voting complicated participation of citizens vacationing or being abroad. If the democratic game favours pluralistic public contestation by means of maximising the number of participating voices, indirect exclusion of certain groups of citizens negatively affected the legitimacy of the procedure, limiting potential configurations of open public contestation among citizens. Further, citizens did not have the opportunity to discuss the political realities surrounding the conduct of the referendum. Ten days is arguably not sufficient for a citizen to gather the necessary amount of information to grasp even a minimum level of political and legal complexities, process these, and articulate and juxtapose opinions in public (Fanoulis 2018). The time Greek voters had at their disposal did not allow them to develop practices of critical reflection concerning the political intentionality and consequences of the referendum. Thus, they did not have enough time to ‘fight’ the democratic battle that would lead them from critical reflection to citizenization and to the development and exercise of EU-level democratic subjectivities.

An additional legitimacy challenge lies in the way that the government accepted, processed and transferred the main public demand – the one of ‘No’ voters – to the EU level. Whereas the dominant voice in Greece refused stricter financial austerity, the Greek government proceeded with the programme, bypassing the popular will (Crespy and Ladi 2019). The reasoning behind this unpopular decision was founded on that the bailout programme was the only viable solution to counter Greece’s soaring sovereign debt.

Turning to the EU as the second level of the democratic game, which are the key players here? On the governing side, there is the Greek government, the governing authorities of the other 27 member-states and the EU institutions. On the side of the governed citizens, there are the citizens of the other EU countries, who did not have the chance to express an opinion with regard to the bailout programme and whose lives nonetheless get affected by the Greek financial crisis due to the EU’s multi-level structure and increased interdependence between its members (see also Shaw 2017, 4). As Cheneval and Ferrín (2018, 1185) underscore, a nationally held referendum appears to introduce a discrimination between the citizens of the member-state holding the referendum and the rest of the EU citizens, which negatively affects its legitimacy.

Two kinds of political interaction between these groups of players are distinguishable after the referendum. The first was between the executives of the member-states and within the EU institutions. The intergovernmental negotiations in the frame of the European Council, the Council of EU, Euro summits and Eurogroups resulted in the adoption of a third economic adjustment programme that set Greece under continuous fiscal supervision and financial austerity. The dominant voice of the Greek people and its democratic effect got dampened when transferred to the EU level. The second refers to the citizens of the other EU countries, who had scarce chances to articulate opinions on the Greek question towards their governing elites, debate, contest or decontest governmental actions within their respective domestic orders. Few protests and demonstrations against austerity took place during the financial crisis, often calling for solidarity with the Greek people (Karyotis and Rüdig 2018; Pianta and Gerbaudo 2015). The legitimising impact of Graph 1 appears not to be functioning, with citizens of other member-states having been unable to participate in the Greek referendum’s broader political dialogue. For EU-level democratic subjectivities to develop, citizens that start their agonistic arguments domestically should in the process of the democratic game become aware that their democratic fights surpass the national horizons and incur transnational democratic results. We cannot anticipate such awareness to emerge in a pre-referendum period of 10 days.

Overall, EU negotiations after the Greek referendum indicated a suppression of agonistic pluralism at EU level as well as limited time available for democratic contestation nationally and transnationally. The point is not that decisions at EU level should comply with a clumsy bricolage of the dominant public voices in the 28 – now 27 – EU countries. It is rather that legitimacy deficits endure since the vast majority of EU citizens, even though their lives were indirectly influenced by the Greek referendum, were never granted the chance to express their views on the matter, juxtapose their opinions and start reflecting on their civic role within the context of the EU polity. The rushed process certainly did not corroborate the emergence of EU-level democratic subjectivities.

The British referendum on EU membership

The British Prime Minister David Cameron announced a referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU as part of the electoral campaign of the Conservative party for the 2015 general elections (Baines, Brewer, and Kay 2020; Hobolt 2016; Vasilopoulou 2016). The Brexit referendum took place on 23 June 2016, with a turnout of 72.21%. About 51.89% of the citizenry voted to leave the EU, whereas 48.11% to remain. Following the referendum, the British government invoked Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and commenced negotiations with the rest of the 27 member-states and EU institutions for the UK to exit the Union. Whereas the Greek referendum was on a question of EU governance, the UK’s referendum was on EU membership and hence closely associated with the issue of national identity, sovereignty and self-determination.

Scholarly voices have expressed concerns about the legitimacy of motivations, organisation and political implications of the Brexit referendum. For example, Hayton (2018) considers the decision for the referendum to be due to PM Cameron’s underestimation of the dynamics of British Conservative politics, dragging inadvertently the whole constituency – and not just the governing Conservative party and its supporters – into what Baines et al. (2020) consider a ‘policy fiasco’. Smith (2021, 2) highlights that ‘An optional, non-binding vote had created a critical juncture in British politics and apparently constrained the choices of elected representatives’, signalling that there is a discrepancy between the democratic significance of the process and the ensuing political outcomes. A significant number of experts have challenged the conduct and results of the referendum because voters did not have a clear picture of what Brexit actually means when casting their votes, an issue that got even more complicated as the country’s different national groups voted very differently (Eleftheriadis 2017; Hunt, Minto, and Woolford 2016; Shaw 2017; Wallace 2016). With all different interpretations of what the UK’s exit from the EU would look like, in Brexit referendum’s democratic game, certain groups were playing backgammon whereas others chess, to use a very simple example. What is more, Weale (2017, 171) stresses that the EU citizens who have been residing in the UK should have been at least given ‘the right to oppose Brexit’ by being allowed to vote since their lives would be greatly affected by the results of the referendum.

Following Tully’s terminology, the key national players in the democratic game of the British referendum are the British government, the opposition parties in the parliament, the ‘Brexiters’ and the ‘Remainers’. Having prevailed in the referendum, Brexiters represented the sovereign will of the British people, in short, that the UK had to leave the EU. Their voice was contested by the Remain voters. Even though on the losing side, Remainers endeavoured to commence follow-up rounds of the game, either asking for a soft Brexit that would allow the UK’s participation in the Customs Union and the Single European Market or, more radically, asking for the conduct of a second referendum on EU membership. The British government had to negotiate how to satisfy the dominant public demand and exit the EU, and it had to enter into dialogue with the losing side of Remainers, ensuring that their voices on the type of Brexit or regarding a second referendum were at least heard.

The British government showed a certain responsiveness to the prevailing popular will at the time (leaving the EU) by initiating negotiations for exiting the Union. That said, its executive decisions have not always been according to the country’s democratic principles and emphasis on parliamentary dialogue. For instance, the government tried to bypass parliamentary scrutiny of Brexit negotiations by proroguing the Parliament, a decision that was revoked by the UK’s Supreme Court (Bowcott, Quinn, and Carrell 2019). Differences in Greek and British governmental reactions, among other factors, should be credited to the content and question of the referendum. The British government was not dealing with a question of governance but with a significant polity matter, and about how the British people envisage its own sovereignty. Tully (2001, 9) writes about multinational forms of political association

… .the members are free to either accept the conditions of association or enter into democratic negotiations to change the conditions that can be shown to be unjust; or, if the second of these options is blocked, to initiate the option to negotiate exit …

Along these lines, any people/nation within the EU has the right to initiate a process of dissociation from the EU so long that this right is expressed according to the letter of the national law and according to EU legislation.

With the exception of how EU citizens residing in the UK got excluded from the voting process, if we follow agonistic democrats’ argumentation, the British government’s decision to leave the EU was the result of a direct democratic practice that allowed pluralism and contestation during the months before the referendum. The interval period between declaring and conducting the Brexit referendum was sufficiently long to allow British citizens to engage, formulate opinions on their country’s membership in the EU, and ‘fight’ in their support, entailing practices of critical reflection. An important weakness in the theorisation of agonistic democrats emerges at this point, i.e. their inability to concretely qualify agonistic pluralism and citizens’ engagement with the democratic game. Due to the need to keep the democratic game as open-ended and as pluralistic as possible, agonistic democrats do not provide any requirements for citizens to participate in it. However, players need to share some common understandings of the democratic game and issues at stake for effectively playing it. This in its turn assumes adequate knowledge of the game’s content, with citizens being able to knowingly express their opinions and fight for them (Fanoulis 2018). It is arguable whether the campaigns, mediatisation, and political debates were sufficient to educate British citizens on the significance and complexities of EU membership before casting their vote. Especially since just after the voting process got finalised, the second most popular Google search in the UK was ‘What is the EU’ (Selyukh 2016). British citizens seemed to have engaged with the democratic game and developed some sort of critical reflection. Yet, and echoing the scholarly views above, there is no real evidence that this reflection was corresponding to factual truths about the role of the UK and its citizens in the EU polity. This important issue cannot be easily interpreted via the readings of agonistic democrats.

Legitimacy problems are additionally found at the transnational level, where the voices of citizens of the other EU member-states were not sought, even though Brexit could influence their well-being. Impact studies expected a reduction in GDP growth due to Brexit in all EU countries (European Parliament, undated). Regarding the actors playing the democratic game at the EU level, we can distinguish the British government, the executives of the other member-states, the EU institutions, and also the citizenries of the other EU countries. The EU democratic game was not an agonistic multilogue, but a game played only among the governing actors, more specifically between the British government, other member-states’ governments and the EU institutions. The opportunities of EU citizens to formulate opinions, debate about them within the EU body politic and then support them against the governing elites across Europe were rather limited. Even if citizens across EUrope reflected about the pertinence of Brexit, little could they do to express an opinion about its governance. Their exclusion signified a missed opportunity for them to shape democratic attitudes empowering them within the broader context of EU governance and realise transnational civic bonds due to all being governed within EUrope.

Concluding remarks

Following the path of agonistic democracy, I have mapped out the Greek and British EU referenda as democratic games with multiple groups of players, rounds and levels. The visual depiction of Table 2 summarizes the main insights of the empirical discussion:

Table 2. Assessment of the legitimacy of Greek and British EU referenda.

Practices of governance or Practices of freedom	Greek bailout referendum	Brexit referendum
Conduct of the referendum at the domestic level	Exclusion of citizens from the democratic game led to limitations of public contestation	Political contestation occurred but with inconclusive democratic results due to knowledge deficits
Transfer of the dominant public demand on behalf of national government to EU level	Greek government did not serve the public demand that won the referendum	British government served the public demand that won the referendum; its executive decisions did not always comply with democratic principles and norms
Negotiations with other member-states and EU institutions	As defined by the institutional and legal framework	As defined by the institutional and legal framework
Opportunities of citizens from other member-states to have a say	Limited	Limited
Development and exercise of EU-level democratic subjectivities	Did not materialise	Did not materialise

Source: Author.

The narrative has looked at opportunities for agonistic engagement granted to different groups of players at different rounds and levels of the democratic game, illustrating legitimacy shortcomings for both referenda. The Greek referendum showcased an exclusion of groups of players at both national and EU levels, with the Greek government not respecting the popular will as expressed by the referendum results, and with very limited ability of Greek and EU citizens to develop democratic subjectivities resultant from defending their insights within the arena of respective political dialogues. In the case of the UK, the British governing political subjects allowed contestation within the society to flourish, but they endeavoured to limit contestation of executive decisions within the Parliament. The British government eventually complied with the dominant public demand (exiting the EU), yet the exclusion of citizens from other EU member-states has been evident. Any development of EU-level democratic subjectivities ended up being ambivalent because the factual truths of EU polity and of Brexit remained unknown to the British citizens.

Even if the current analysis has been narrowed down to the legitimacy of EU referenda, the suggested criteria may apply to legitimacy issues within the broader field of EU governance, in particular regarding decisions which necessitate unanimity, when the government of one member-state can stand against the collective will of the rest of the member-states.³ The article’s scope has not allowed such a comprehensive exercise. We can also not dismiss limitations of the precedent discussions that associate with either the applicability of agonistic democracy in EU democratic politics or with its theoretical shortcomings. Arguably, agonistic democracy is normatively ambitious, raising challenges on the applicability of its criteria.⁴ In the context of multi-level EUropean governance, agonistic democracy’s normative imperative for pluralistic participation in political dialogues may necessitate profound institutional, Treaty-related changes to the EU polity, for example by allowing pan-EUropean referenda with multiple-choice instead of Yes/No questions or by introducing pan-EUropean virtual fora or public consultations that would allow citizens of other EU countries to timely express opinions about another member-state’s EU referendum (Fanoulis 2017). Another concern that could be raised is how pluralistic contestation can translate into EU policy- and decision-making following an EU referendum. Concrete solutions to such practical issues appear to be necessary for any further application of agonistic democracy to the case of EU referenda.

Adding to the above reservations, agonistic democrats do not provide clear theoretical answers about potential non-willingness of citizens to play the democratic game. They appear to take for granted that citizens will be politically willing to participate in the game and voice themselves in the related political dialogues. Therefore, they cannot really factor abstention from the democratic game. In the concrete case of EU referenda, they cannot answer how their legitimacy gets impacted by citizens abstaining from the voting process. Engagement with literature on citizen participation and disenfranchisement may be beneficial. And when citizens choose to play the democratic game, agonistic democrats should explore how citizens’ truthful knowledge of political facts and events may affect the quality of resultant practices of critical reflection and citizenization. Such weaknesses pave the way for more explorations, both theoretical and empirical.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Han Dorussen, the editor, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful, detailed comments and constructive criticism.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Drawing upon normative political theory, Bellamy and Weale (2015) and Weale (2017, 360) have referred to two-level games in their explorations of EU legitimacy and to the ‘irreducibility’ of the EU’s ‘two-level character’. Arguably, that the EU consists of two levels is a somewhat arbitrary inference. Depending on the analytical perspective, it may be said that the polity levels are three: sub-national (citizens), national (member-states), EUropean (EU institutions). Further, irreducibility cannot mean lack of organic and dynamic interactions between the levels, nor negligence of the constitutive capacity of these interactions and of the democratic game itself. In this respect, the present analysis differs from such readings of EU legitimacy.

2. This question is briefly but concretely entertained in the concluding remarks.

3. I owe gratitude to the Reviewers for this valuable insight, which cannot be fully elaborated here due to the scope and focus of the article.

4. Some of these thoughts have been inspired by the author’s engagement with the Reviewers’ criticism of agonistic democracy.