Crisis in EU-US relations under Trump: an emotional contemptuous double game of misrecognition

ABSTRACT

With the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016, the transatlantic relations entered a renewed period of crisis. The former US administration challenged key international norms at the core of the EU’s identity – thereby testing the EU’s ability to rethink its position in the world. Against this background, studies have attempted to analyse the EU’s response vis-à-vis the US mainly from a realist and socio-psychological perspectives. Yet little attention has been given to the crucial emotional component underlying the EU’s response – related to EU’s recognition needs. Therefore, this article proposes to analyse the transatlantic crisis under the Trump administration through the lens of recognition theories and emotions in IR. Based on the emotion discourse analysis of public statements, it shows that dynamics of misrecognition and re-affirmation of identity have been at play in this recent crisis fuelled by the powerful emotion of contempt.

KEYWORDS:

• EU foreign policy
• transatlantic relations
• recognition
• emotions in IR
• contempt
• crisis

Introduction

Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections has marked the beginning of one of the worst crises in the history of the transatlantic relations (Riddervold and Akasemi 2018). Describing the deterioration of the relationship as a breakdown of trust in the transatlantic security community (Böller 2020), a trauma (Cox 2021) or the harbinger of the end of the liberal international order (Ikenberry 2018), analysts agree that the damage done was profound. Simultaneously, however, the transatlantic crisis has led the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) to take a more assertive stance vis-à-vis the United States (US) and has even contributed to galvanize the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence policy as part of the so-called ‘geopolitical turn’ (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019).

So how can one precisely explain the EU foreign policy shift towards a more affirmative stance vis-à-vis the US in this context? Following a realist logic, most explanations so far have suggested that European MS seek greater autonomy as a hedge against sudden American mood swings with the prospect of US abandonment becoming more plausible (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019; Riddervold and Akasemi 2018). Taking a socio-psychological take, others have emphasized changes in the nature and levels of trust between the US and leading European states (Böller 2020; Hellmuth 2017; Nielsen and Dimitrova 2021; Pesu and Sinkkonen 2023). Yet, these accounts fail to explain the striking emotionality accompanying the European response and overlook a parallel dynamic related to identity politics and emotions.¹ By contrast, this article focuses on the affective dynamics related to recognition struggles. It contends that the EU foreign policy shift is not exclusively the result of material considerations and changing trust levels but is also influenced by strong emotions triggered by Trump administration’s contemptuous misrecognition of the EU.

In line with the Special Issue (SI), this article seeks to explain the role of emotions in EU FP when international norms upheld by the EU are violated by external actors. It focuses on Trump’s rhetorical attacks against the EU and his unilateralist policies that transgressed two important norms at the core of the EU’s identity: the norm of multilateralism and norms of diplomatic communication among allies. These blatant norm violations amount to the EU’s misrecognition, as they touch upon the EU’s self-understanding as guardian of multilateralism and an old friend and ally of the US. Drawing on the concept of recognition (Gustafsson 2016a; Honneth 1995; Lindemann and Ringmar 2012) and emotions in IR (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Koschut 2018, 2020), we argue that Trump’s provocative rhetoric and behaviour – violating key international norms upheld by the EU – have catalysed a policy shift at the EU level by triggering an emotional game of misrecognition involving the emotion of contempt. Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy has urged the EU to re-affirm its identity confidently, thereby promising a more active and autonomous international role.

At the core of this article lies therefore an original conceptualization of the emotional recognition game underpinning the transatlantic crisis that has enabled the EU to take a more assertive stance on the international stage. By contrast to realists who equate discourse to cheap talk, proponents of the power of emotions argue that emotions built into the discourse have social effects. Emotional expressions matter as they trigger action with far-reaching implications for social relations. It is therefore crucial to point to what they do in terms of stimulating behaviour and performances (Koschut 2018, 280). The emotional aspect of the transatlantic crisis – underlying the misrecognition process and ensuing response – is worth investigating as hostile emotions, like contempt, have a distinct role in constituting, enhancing, and breaking off social relationships (Fischer and Roseman 2007).¹

We illustrate this argument with the discourse analysis of public statements by the US President and European political leaders (from EU institutions and selected Western, Central Eastern European, and Baltic MS) during the Trump administration (2017–2021). Political leaders are a suitable focus, as they are responsible decision-makers having a political mandate. As carriers of the state’s/institution’s emotions, they also represent the affective embodiment of interstate relationships (Koschut 2014, 545). The analysis shows that President Trump’s violation of key international norms upheld by the EU was interpreted by key European players as contemptuous misrecognition of the EU. In turn, the EU’s response featured the typical cognitive, affective, and behavioural components of returned contempt – resulting in extraordinary assertive foreign policy moves.

This article proceeds as follows. Section one offers a snapshot of existing research on recognition, highlighting the missing link between recognition and emotions. Section two conceptualizes dynamics of misrecognition as an emotional process involving the display of contempt, leading to the re-affirmation of one’s identity through contemptuous countermoves. The last section illustrates this framework with an analysis of the transatlantic relations during the Trump administration.

Recognition and misrecognition dynamics: the missing emotional component

The struggle for recognition is one of the core motivational dynamics characterizing international affairs alongside the search for security and profit (Lindemann and Ringmar 2012). For Ringmar (2002, 116), ‘not only physical, but also social survival is at stake in international politics’. Recognition brings material benefits both for the party being recognized (i.e. prestige, leader’s political survival, and resources) and for the recognizer, as its powers and legitimacy expand in the process (Agné 2013). Yet the quest for recognition is also emotionally loaded and taps into moral and identity matters, as it relates to the ambition to be perceived as an equally ‘moral person’, capable of taking autonomous moral decisions (Honneth 1995; Taylor 1994). From a socio-psychological perspective, recognition is a psychological need related to identity formation and the maintenance of ontological security (Lindemann and Ringmar 2012). While collective actors first develop a self-image arising from domestic discourses and historical experiences, this self-understanding can only become a secure identity once articulated and recognized through social interactions (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017, 4). This stable sense of identity subsequently informs both actors’ interests and how they are to act in pursuit of these interests. As Albert et al. (2000, 13–17) remind us: ‘Whether an organization, group or person, each entity needs a preliminary answer to the question: “who are we?” or “who am I?” to act and interact effectively with other entities over the long run’.

So how does the recognition process work? First, the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ recognition is key (Gustafsson 2016b). While thin recognition refers to the legal status of a sovereign state, thick recognition acknowledges the distinct identity narratives of an individual, group, state, and institution (Strömbom 2014). Institutional identity encapsulates the essential characteristics of an organisation such as its missions, values, and expertise (Missoni 2014, 370). In line with the socio-psychological literature on identity construction (e.g. Brewer 1991), we consider two institutional identity claims for which recognition is sought: relevance and distinctiveness. Relevance relates to the recognition of a ‘social status’ (Ringmar 2012, 7) and privileged relationship (i.e. relationship identity of partners/friends), for which the demonstration of capabilities, coherence, and reliability are important indicators. Distinctiveness refers to the positive appreciation of the institution’s values, interests, and procedures that make it unique (Wolf 2011).

For Lindemann and Saada (2012, 28), thick recognition is granted when the nature of the interaction confirms the actors’ self-ascribed value and importance. At the core of the recognition process therefore lies a match between the self-image of the actor seeking recognition and the treatment it deems appropriate to receive by the recognising party. Recognition can be expressed through practices of recognition, representations, and statements (Blanc 2023; Gustafsson 2016b, 618). While the literature has long conceptualized recognition as a one-off legal speech act, recent scholarship points to the routinization of recognition, whereby self and other routinize the way they recognize each other (Gustafsson 2016b).

Routinized mutual recognition can, however, be disrupted by misrecognition, creating a crisis (Greve 2018; Gustafsson 2016b). Misrecognition corresponds to the denial of thick recognition, meaning that the actor’s unique identity is not properly recognized (Gustafsson 2016b, 617): there is a mismatch between the self-image of an actor and the perceived inadequate treatment it receives from the actor granting recognition. The main explanation for a state’s shift from routinized mutual recognition to misrecognition relates to identity change – resulting either from increased anxiety (Gustafsson 2016b) or internal political changes (Greve 2018). Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy illustrates such an impending change in the US’s self-definition and its established relationship with the world, including the EU (Greve 2018, 869). These processes unfold both in fragile and strong relationships. Even within security communities, states are not ontologically secure and struggle to have their distinctiveness recognized (Greve 2018). Following the breakdown of routinized mutual recognition, the state changing its identity (Actor A) seeks to gain recognition based on its new identity.

But what about Actor B that must suddenly cope with the breakdown of routinized mutual recognition? After all, when a state changes its self-definition (Actor A), it also constitutes a threat to Actor B, given the relational component of their identity. Therefore, Actor B is not only required to either accept or reject Actor A’s new identity, as the literature assumes (Ringmar 2012). It must also deal with its own related-identity change in the relational set-up due to the experienced misrecognition. Rather than focusing on Actor A, we scrutinize the response of other states being challenged in their self-understanding based on the relation with the changing Other. Hence, we suggest that this process might eventually come down to a double misrecognition game, leading to a crisis with long-term consequences, including the need for both sides to re-situate themselves in a new relational configuration.

Another aspect of recognition struggles requiring further theorizing is its emotional dimension. What makes recognition struggles so powerful – to the point that they can bring about extraordinary positive changes or trigger wars – is the presence of identity-related emotions (Lindemann and Ringmar 2012). As its source, the socio-psychological driver for recognition is fundamentally emotional:

our desire to be recognized relates to the concept of ontological identity and to the emotional component of self-esteem. Even if there is a strategic calculation, there are also emotional dynamics at play, with a logic of self-esteem as an end and not only to achieve a wider objective

(Lindemann and Saada 2012, 15). In sum, recognition/misrecognition processes are inevitably emotional. Emotions are worth considering, not only as triggers of action – but also as indicators of perceived recognition. Positive emotions (i.e. trust, joy, and satisfaction) can be expected to emerge when recognition is granted, whereas negative emotions (i.e. anger, humiliation, and shame) are more likely to arise when actors perceive a mismatch between the treatment received and their self-image (Blanc2018). Ringmar only briefly referred to the emotional dimension of recognition struggles, arguing that ‘to be denied recognition is a traumatic experience. We feel slighted, insulted, and brought low; our pride is injured, we have lost our status and face’ (Ringmar 2012, 7). Developing this idea, we propose an innovative conceptualization of the affective dynamics inherent in recognition struggles.

An emotional contemptuous double game of misrecognition

Self-redefinition, misrecognition, and contempt

An actor’s self-redefinition often implies the misrecognition of others as certain components of their identity are intertwined. The degree of misrecognition and the way through which misrecognition is communicated vary, leading to emotional responses of different intensities. First, one should differentiate between an actor changing its self-definition while remaining committed to the values of the community/relationship and one that rejects the most fundamental shared principles. Obviously, in the latter case, one can expect an acute emotional response as the misrecognized actor’s identity is challenged. Similarly, one can expect that the more public and humiliating the communication of misrecognition is, the fiercer the emotional response of the misrecognized party is likely to be.

One of the most extreme ways through which misrecognition can be communicated is through an open display of contempt. Contempt is a rejection emotion, elicited by appraisals of another actor as unworthy, inferior, or beneath some standard of competence (Hutcherson and Gross 2011) or morality (Rozin et al. 1999). Contempt is a powerful emotion as it corresponds to a totalizing response to a target leading to a sense of diminishment: it is the whole being of the target that is being rejected and not just certain dimensions of its character or behavior (Bell 2013, 41). Typically, contemptuous discourse entails an affective dimension reflected in expressions of superiority, belittlement of the target, downward comparisons, and statements of scorn and ridicule (Melwani and Barsade 2011, 507). In behavioral terms, it is associated with action tendencies of looking down or on derogating its targets, and the desire to have nothing to do with them and get other people to reject them, to minimize their impact (Fischer and Roseman 2007). Two different types of contempt reflecting the logic of withdrawal exist. While passive contempt takes the form of indifference and ignorance, communicating that the target is insignificant or unworthy of attention, active contempt involves active non-identification and hostility (Bell 2013). Both forms of contempt signal a change of treatment making explicit the perception of the other’s status as inferior, amounting to misrecognition. Transposed to international politics, these action tendencies, which have repercussions on agency’s inclination (Frijda 2007), translate into the lack of diplomatic consultations, downgrade of diplomatic status, or even refusal to shake leaders’ hands. Importantly, contempt has potentially long-term implications, leading to the deterioration of relationships (Fischer and Roseman 2007).

Fighting back: emotional reform

The way misrecognition is communicated and experienced can lead to various emotions thereby influencing the type of response options available to misrecognized actors: misrecognized actors can accept others’ stories about who they are and rebrand themselves (i.e. adoption); they can stick to their stories and aim to change the verdict based on self-reformation (i.e. reform); or they can decide to stand by their stories without reform and convince others to accept their original stories (i.e. recalcitrance/denial) (Greve 2018; Ringmar 1996, 82; 2012). At a more granular level, humour can also be mobilized to handle misrecognition (Adler-Nissen and Tsinovoi 2019).

In line with the socio-psychology literature on contempt, we expect that when misrecognition is conveyed through scornful public expressions, misrecognized actors will engage in the ‘reform’ response, involving both a reaffirmation of their identity and efforts at self-reformation to make their story about the self, better match reality. While research has examined the response to contempt in the workplace (Melwani and Barsade 2011), we contend that similar emotional dynamics unfold in the diplomatic realm. Contempt with its dual message of social exclusion and loss of status leads to enhanced activation, taking the form of increased performance and determination, as well as feelings of returned contempt toward the contemptuous agent (Melwani and Barsade 2011).

Specifically, actors experiencing contemptuous misrecognition strive to overcome the esteem threat by working harder to prove themselves to their detractors, resulting in improved performance (Melwani and Barsade 2011, 506). Transposed to international politics, this response amounts to the reaffirmation of one’s identity and increased efforts to close the gap between self-image and actual policies. For instance, it can materialize in the advancement of policy initiatives that have long been in the making and whose delay has been criticized by the misrecognizer (e.g. repeated US complaints on NATO burden-sharing). Receiving contempt also triggers returned feelings of contempt towards the contemptuous agent because the recipient of contempt catches the agent’s contempt through emotional contagion – a process by which people synchronize and converge with another person emotionally (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1993). Recipients of contempt consciously attempt to defend themselves, regain status, and avoid exclusion through downward comparisons and derogation of others (Fein and Spencer 1997). Given that the expression of contempt accompanying misrecognition disturbs the social status quo, by responding in a retaliatory manner directed toward damaging the contemptuous agent’s self-esteem, recipients attempt to re-establish the hierarchical and psychological balance in the interaction (Melwani and Barsade 2011). Eventually, the emotional response to contempt helps explain the behaviour of an actor that has been misrecognized but that bounces back, taking a more assertive position in response.

Method and data

To show the presence of the emotion of contempt underpinning the misrecognition process at the heart of the transatlantic crisis and its impact on the EU’s response in CFSP vis-à-vis the US, we have taken the following steps. First, in terms of level of analysis, given the EU’s multi-layered structure, we recognize that emotional differences might exist across and within EU institutions. Yet, we decided to analyse the emotions expressed by the EU institutions’ leaders as well as selected heads of governments to better reflect the emotional input of European MS in the institutional appraisal process, similarly to Smith (2024) and David and L.D. (2024). We therefore collected a corpus of public statements by US President Trump¹ and European leaders (President of the EU Council, of the Commission, of the European Parliament (EP) and the HR/VP for Foreign Affairs and national heads of states, Foreign and Defence Ministers), as these are “the state’s representatives who identify with the state and through which a state ‘feels’’ (Heller 2018, 81) and who have an influential say in CFSP decision-making. The selection of Western European states (France, Germany), CEE (Poland, Hungary), and Baltic states (Estonia and Latvia) captured the diversity of relationships with the Trump administration. The data collection covered the time frame of Trump’s presidency (2017–2021) and had as main selection criteria the topic of transatlantic relations. It lasted until we reached the theoretical saturation point in terms of relevant emotional articulations (Morse 2004).

Secondly, we conducted a discourse analysis, informed by the constructivist view of emotions – which understands discourse as a key means through which scholars can gain access to emotions and their constitutive social function (Koschut 2018). Following Heller’s framework (2018), we broke down the emotion of contempt into three components: (1) the cognitive level corresponding to the evaluation of a situation (i.e. appraisal process); (2) the affective component found in expressions of strong emotional subjectivity (i.e. connotations and stereotypes) (3) the behavioral component detailing how the agent or recipient of contempt must act, reflecting contempt-related action tendencies (broadly and specifically in foreign policy practices) (Table 1). Finally, to analyse the link between Trumps’s contemptuous misrecognition of the EU and the EU’s swift strategic re-orientation, we sought to correlate the discursive representations of contempt on both sides of the Atlantic with the assertive EU’s response and its justification.

Table 1. Operationalization of the emotion of contempt.

Emotion	Cognitive component (i.e. moral judgment in the appraisal process)	Affective component (i.e. emotional expressions)	Behavioural component (i.e. associated action tendency)	Foreign policy practices
Contempt	Contempt as a totalizing response leading to a sense of diminishment (Bell 2013, 41) Appraisals of badbeing and inferiority (Bell 2013, 39–42) Appraisals of incompetence, stupidity, or immorality (Hutcherson and Gross 2011)	Condescending tone, expressions of superiority, downward comparisons Words, such as ‘bad’, ‘outdated’, ‘obsolete’ Statements of ridicule (Melwani and Barsade 2011) Disrespectful remarks	Logic of withdrawal and disengagement in two forms: passive (indifference, lack of attention and ignorance) active (non-identification and hostility) Social-distancing functions: enactment of social exclusion and status reduction (Melwani and Barsade 2011)	Active contempt: Refusal to shake hand Lack of diplomatic consultations Downgrade of diplomatic status Lack of diplomatic appointments
Response to contempt	Unflattering and belittling messages of contempt received as external threats to identity and self-esteem	Similar condescending discourse	Attempt to overcome the esteem threat through: Enhanced activation => improved performance Social exclusion practices and reduction of status	Active contempt Advancement of policies that were the target of criticism, display of autonomy through own initiatives

The transatlantic contemptuous double game of misrecognition under Trump

Transatlantic relations have been characterized by complex patterns of competition and cooperation over time and across policy areas. Hence, it comes as no surprise that scholars have focused on the emergence and resolution of transatlantic crises during the Cold War and beyond, offering diverse perspectives ranging from systemic explanations through FPA (Alcaro, Peterson, and Greco 2016) to constructivist approaches (Risse 2016). For Greve (2018), these fluctuations capture recognition struggles within the transatlantic security community. As a young diplomatic actor, the EU has been successfully striving to gain recognition for its relevance and unique identity vis-à-vis the US – notably through the practice of dialogue (Blanc 2018). Yet, Trump’s arrival to the White House has changed the situation. He set in motion an emotional double game of misrecognition fuelled by the emotion of contempt, constituting an enabling mechanism for a more assertive EU’s foreign policy. Critics may argue that against the backdrop of deeply rooted European anti-Americanism, the blame rests with European politicians for having denigrated Trump, as early as his announcement to run for the elections (Blake 2019). Yet, we consider Trump’s aggressive statements and policies – violating key norms defining EU’s identity – as the main trigger of the misrecognition process underlying the transatlantic crisis.

The US policy vis-à-vis the EU: contemptuous misrecognition

Cognitive and affective dimensions of contempt

Trump’s unilateralist policies and aggressive rhetoric transgressing norms of diplomatic communication among allies did not only challenge the EU’s identity as promoter of multilateralism but also the relationship identity of friendship linking both actors, with the potential to create an ontological security crisis (Blanc 2021; Panke and Petersohn 2017). Never had an American president gone so far in its disparagements, like calling the EU a ‘foe’ on trade – challenging the EU-US mutual recognition as partners. Traditionally, American presidents had supported the European integration project, based on the conviction that a peaceful and prosperous Europe was vital to US interests (Smith 2018). The same was true regarding the idea of a United Kingdom fully committed to the EU (Langlois 2018). Even amidst periods of adversity, the friendship relationship had persisted, demonstrating that crises among close allies could signal strength (Eznack 2011). Yet this time under Trump was different.

Specifically, the discourse analysis of Trump’s statements reveals the use of contemptuous speech vis-à-vis the EU, focusing on its bad-being. Fierce criticism was voiced against the EU’s essence as a unique political entity, based on the idea of post-sovereignty – a key part of its collective identity (Mitzen 2006). Referring to populist tenets, the Trump administration conveyed disdain for the EU, perceived as bureaucratic, unrepresentative, and serving the interests of global cosmopolitan elites rather than citizens (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019). Trump’s praises of Brexit were part of the same populist logic: ‘I think it’s a great thing that happened, an amazing vote, very historic […]. You know I said this would happen. […]. People want to take their country back. You see it with Europe – all over Europe’ (Cillizza 2016). By the same token, his foreign policy team sought to deter the UK from signing a deal with the EU using the prospect of a US free trade deal instead, and provocatively asked EU officials which countries would leave the EU next, denigrating the European integration project (Barker 2017; Taylor 2019). We also found evidence of contemptuous moral appraisals depicting the EU as fundamentally bad in the security and trade realms. Trump insisted that ‘The EU was formed in order to take advantage of the US’ (Colson 2020), emphasizing its malevolent raison d’être. Comparing US’s enemies – among which the EU surprisingly featured, Trump claimed: ‘The EU is possibly as bad as China – just smaller’ (Brunsden 2018). This scornful approach, presenting others as inherently bad and inferior, is a clear marker of contempt. The rejection of multilateralism can also be interpreted as a direct affront to the EU’s core identity, as it has long defined itself as the champion of multilateralism. Since his first days in office, Trump had gone at great length in dissolving multilateral agreements (Böller 2020; Peterson 2018a, 641), notably the agreements symbolizing central achievements of the transatlantic relationship and of the EU specifically (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019, 115; Böller 2020, 309). The rejection and endless criticism of the JCPOA and the Paris Climate Accord illustrate well the US misrecognition of the EU’s achievements as a diplomatic and multilateral actor.

Secondly, the emotion of contempt towards the EU and some of its influential MS was articulated around their alleged incompetence – putting them in an inferior position compared to the US. Throughout his mandate, Trump resorted to condescending terms to describe policy initiatives in which the EU had been involved. Multiplying scornful accusations of inferiority to better assert his power, he derided the club of economic powers G-7 ‘outdated’, just as he branded NATO ‘obsolete’ (Herszenhorn 2020). Positioning himself and the US as superior, he criticized the migration policy of specific European states, particularly Germany: ‘big mistake made all over Europe in allowing millions of people in, who have so strongly and violently changed their culture!’ (Witte 2018). In an indisputable show of contempt, he compared Brussels, the capital of Belgium, hosting the NATO and EU headquarters to a hellhole (Kroet 2016). Interestingly, the expression of contempt also had a gendered dimension. For President Trump, the EU was an essentially effete project, a civilian power that liked to see itself as human rights-based and collegiate, but with no hard power of its own (Cottakis 2018). This description contrasted with Trump’s overt hypermasculinity – a defining feature of his 2016 candidacy and presidency.

Contemptuous behaviour: the logic of exclusion and withdrawal

The Trump administration’s contempt towards the EU materialized in practical actions, aiming at ignoring and excluding the EU from important joint consultations, thereby violating key norms of diplomatic communication among allies (Panke and Petersohn 2017). While the State Department’s capacity to perform its representative role had overall been eroded with many diplomatic positions remaining unfilled for a significant time (Drezner 2019), the disrespectful treatment reserved to the EU was noteworthy. It took more than a year and a half into Trump’s term for the US Ambassador to the EU to take his functions, reflecting the administration’s low priority given to the EU and its preference for bilateral relations with European leaders.² This led to repeated complaints about the lack of interlocutors in the White House: ‘To Obama and Kerry, we talked all the time. Tillerson has never taken the initiative to call’ (Filkins 2017). Eventually, Gordon Sondland, the Trump-appointed US Ambassador to the EU, was rapidly dismissed and replaced by Ronald Gidwitz, the US Ambassador to Belgium, charged with the additional task to be the acting representative to the EU (Herszenhorn 2020). These acts of active contempt indicated that Europe was not deemed to be worthy of any serious engagement as a partner.

Another contempt-related exclusionary practice was the lack of consultations with the EU, notably regarding contentious policies towards the Middle East and North Africa. Examples include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Saudi Arabia and the murder of journalist Khashoggi, and the surprise US withdrawal from Syria without any prior consultations with European allies (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019, 119). Even amid the global pandemic, requiring more than ever cooperation, Trump kept displaying undisguised contempt by announcing a travel ban on Europe with no notice (Herszenhorn 2020). Finally, one of the most scornful acts of the Trump administration towards the EU was the downgrade of the EU’s diplomatic status in the US without informing Brussels. Practically, this implied that the EU mission would have less clout and access to US officials. For Nicholas Burns, former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Bush administration, ‘this is a gratuitous and entirely unreasonable swipe at the EU. It continues the administration’s delegitimization of international organizations and the supranational organization that is the EU’ (Borger 2019). Similarly, at President George H.W Bush’s state funeral, the EU ambassador was not called up in the usual chronological order, from the longest serving to the newest ambassador, but as the last person (BBC 2019).³

Finally, Trump’s refusal to shake the hand of Chancellor Merkel – one of the most respected European leaders – in front of the world’s cameras during a state-level visit in the US constituted yet another symbolic gesture of contempt, aimed at putting distance and reaffirming one’s superiority (Conway 2017). In sum, these exclusionary practices reflected the action tendency of rejection and the fact that the Trump administration severely broke the mutual transatlantic recognition that had been prevailing earlier.

The prevalence of acute contempt against the EU and its oldest members should not obscure the fact that Trump treated European MS differently. His attitude towards the CEE and Baltic was much less aggressive. For instance, in his Warsaw speech, President Trump lauded Poland for raising its military spending to 2% of GDP (CNN 2017). Similarly, he showered praise on Prime Minister Orbán for his anti-migration policies: ‘You’re respected all over Europe. […] You’ve done a good job and you’ve kept your country safe’ (Borger 2019b). During a NATO gathering, as a sign of appreciation to those alliance members that were ‘fully paid’ – among them the Baltic countries-Trump held a special working lunch, entitled ‘2%rs club’: ‘These are the countries that have not been delinquent […] And that’s really a sign of respect for the US’ (White House 2019). Trump’s positive tone towards these states was motivated by substantial commonalities in politics, his perception of a potential for new trade, energy, and military arrangements and willingness to exacerbate intra-European divisions (Tjalve and Holm 2020).

The EU’s assertive response: a series of contemptuous countermeasures

Institutional appraisal of contemptuous misrecognition: the cognitive component

In line with Gürkan and Terzi’s framework (2024), Trump’s violation of key international norms upheld by the EU triggered an institutional appraisal process among the EU institutions’ and of key European MS’ leaders. We found evidence of a widely shared understanding that the violation of the norms of multilateralism and of appropriate diplomatic communication among allies – amounted to contemptuous misrecognition. Most of European leaders interpreted these norm violations – not merely as a critic of EU policies – but rather as a direct attack on its very raison d’être, as this quote by Donald Tusk, the then President of the European Council demonstrates:

‘For the first time in history, we have an American administration that is, to put it mildly, not enthusiastic about a united and strong Europe. Trump wants a world with the US on one side and on the other, a disparate collection of other countries’.

(Euractiv.com 2018)

Similarly, European lawmaker Guy Verhofstadt declared in the EP: ‘we have an American President who is no longer seeing European unity as a pillar for his foreign policy, and he is saying openly he hopes for a disintegration of the EU’ (BBC 2017). The unease with the violation of appropriate norms of diplomatic communication between allies was also initially expressed by CEE leaders. Just days after the US election, the Head of Latvian Foreign Affairs Committee underscored that Latvia was uneasy about the uncertainty brought about by the new President-elect Trump (Milne 2016). Estonia’s Foreign Minister conveyed a similar sentiment: ‘We abhor unpredictability and confusion. We are a small country and like a lot of predictability’ (Higgins 2016).

Yet following the initial shock caused by Trump’s victory, most of the CEE and Baltic states’ leaders engaged in a slightly different appraisal process – reflecting a less contemptuous experience of misrecognition. As EU Members, they were also the target of Trump’s contemptuous misrecognition but by contrast to the EU institutions’ and Western European states’ leaders, their heightened vulnerability and security concerns took precedence overriding the emotion of contempt. Furthermore, they did not share the same historical background of strong transatlantic ties as the rest of Europe: for the Western European powers that had long defined themselves as the cornerstone US allies, Trump had become a symbol of a rupture with the US, heralding the end of the transatlantic era, of America’s role as the key guarantor of the multilateral liberal order and the only reliable pillar of European security. By contrast, CEE and Baltic States had a much more recent history of security alliance with the US. These differences in the components influencing the appraisal process arguably explain why these states refrained from openly antagonizing the US in a show of returned contempt.

In sum, most European leaders interpreted the violation of the key norms of multilateralism and of diplomatic communication among allies as misrecognition of their identity – thereby engaging in the reform response (i.e. reaffirmation of identity and increased performance). While for the EU institutions’ and Western states’ leaders the experience of acute contemptuous misrecognition triggered the action tendency of returned contempt, the CEE and Baltic States experienced less contempt due to security interests overriding this emotion, and as a result engaged in an appeasement strategy through the reinforcement of common European defense policy rather than direct confrontation in the form of returned contempt.

EU’s reaffirmation of its identity and increased performance

The analysis provides compelling evidence that the EU engaged in the self-reformation response encompassing both the re-affirmation of its identity and attempts to reform itself to live up to its self-image with clear markers of returned feelings of contempt. European leaders emphasized the need to defend their sense of pride by reaffirming key components of their identity and by committing to improve their performance. Particularly emblematic in this regard was the letter addressed by Donald Tusk to the EU heads of government after Trump’s inauguration:

‘For the first time in our history, in an increasingly multipolar external world, so many are becoming openly anti-European, or Eurosceptic at best. Particularly the change in Washington puts the EU in a difficult situation; with the new administration seeming to put into question the last 70 years of American foreign policy … today we must stand up very clearly for our dignity, the dignity of a united Europe - regardless of whether we are talking to Russia, China, the US, or Turkey […].The EU should not abandon its role as a trade superpower […]. We should also firmly defend the international order based on the rule of law. […]We should remind our American friends of their own motto: United we stand, divided we fall’.

(Tusk 2017b)

Besides the exceptional rhetoric equating the US with Russia and China – non-democratic rivals of the EU, these lines are replete with calls to defend key norms defining the EU’s identity, such as its role conception of ‘defender of international multilateralism’. Rebuking Trump’s announcement of new tariffs on steel from the EU, President Macron made clear: ‘We, Europeans are the joint custodians of an international multilateralism that I believe to be strong. For the sake of our own sovereignty, it’s up to us to defend its rules, not to give in, and to be neither naïve in the face of unfair competition nor weak in the face of the threat from those who sometimes wrote these rules with us’ (Macron 2018). Shortly after Trump’s election, Estonian Defence Minister, Juri Luik, observed: ‘We have to explain who we are all over again’ (The Economist 2016) – referring to the self-perception of the Baltic states and of the EU as a whole – as reliable US allies.

The realization that the EU should close the gap between its ambitions and actual policies was also palatable in the discourse, reflecting the typical response of a misrecognized actor and target of contempt – that seeks to prove to its detractors that it can live up to its own image. In the words of the President of the EP Tajani directly addressing Trump, ‘Europe is taking on greater responsibility on defence, developing a common European industry, market and research’ (European Parliament 2017). Chancellor Merkel unequivocally stated that European partners needed ‘to take their fate into their own hands (… .) and must fight for their future on their own, for their destiny as Europeans’ (Rheinische Post Online 2017). Similarly, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, argued that the US ‘withdrawal’ as a guarantor of western values ‘forces us to act … Only if the EU defined its own interests and projects its own power can it survive’ (Donahue 2017). Echoing this understanding, President Macron told the Economist: “Europe stands on the edge of a precipice and needs to start thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power; otherwise we will ‘no longer be in control of our destiny’ (Wintour 2020).

Importantly, following the institutional appraisal process in which the EU interpreted Trump’s norm violations as contemptuous misrecognition – it sought to increase its performance de facto and not just rhetorically. First, the EU reacted to Trump’s provocations by redoubling its commitment to multilateralism, as shown by its advocacy of the Iran nuclear deal and the Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019; Peterson 2018b, 647). After Trump pulled the US out of the JCPOA, France, Germany, and the UK issued a joint statement signalling strong support for the deal (Peterson 2018b, 645). Secondly, EU defence initiatives have been re-vitalized, with PESCO suddenly becoming a reality (Nielsen and Dimitrova 2021, 711). Concerning NATO, it is only following Trump’s rhetorical attacks that European countries increased their defence budgets from 1.2% of GDP in 2014 to 1.53% in 2021 in Germany and from 1.8% of its GDP in 2014 to 2.1% in 2021 in France (NATO 2021). While these trends could be seen as hedging strategies based on a cost–benefit calculus, we suggest that the emotional mechanism related to the US contemptuous misrecognition of the EU acted as a catalyst towards this policy change away from the business-as usual stance. After all, the US pivot to Asia and the wider reconfiguration of American interests had already been in the making for years. And yet it is only with Trump’s contemptuous discourse and actions that these European initiatives gained traction. Granted, differences in policy preferences existed among European MS – with the CEE and Baltic States privileging a reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO rather than European autonomy. Yet these differences did not prevent an overall strengthening of the bloc’s security and defence capacities – conceptualized here as the European response to the misrecognition expressed by President Trump.

European returned feelings of contempt: the affective dimension

The analysis finds numerous contemptuous remarks by European leaders – particularly Claude Juncker, former President of the European Commission. EU leaders’ haughty tone focused on the perceived lack of knowledge, diplomatic know-how, and incompetence of their American counterparts, conveying a sense of superiority and breeding the emotional downward spiralling of contempt. Referring to Trump’s scornful comment on Belgium as a hellhole, Juncker retorted:

‘Mr. Trump was saying during the campaign […] that Belgium is a little village in Europe. It is spot on if you look from very far, but it does not reflect reality. So we have to teach the president-elect what Europe is, and how Europe works. He called into question the transatlantic alliance, which is quite pernicious, and he questions the model of the defence of Europe […]. I think we will waste two years before Mr. Trump tours a world, which he does not know’ (Cocoli 2016).

The irony inherent in this belittling statement illustrates the feeling of returned contempt towards the contemptuous agent. The idea that the EU knew better and must teach the US the basics of international affairs was recurrent in the EU discourse of contempt. Following Trump’s cancellation of the US participation in the Paris Climate Agreement, the leaders of France, Germany, and Italy issued a joint statement deploring the US decision, while Commission President Juncker made the strongest statement, questioning Trump’s grasp of the issues at stake:

‘That’s not how it works. The Americans can’t just leave the Agreement. Mr. Trump believes that, because he doesn’t get close enough to the dossiers to fully understand them. It would take three-four years after the agreement came into force in November 2016 to leave the agreement. So, this notion “I am Trump, I am American, America first, and I’m going to get out of it” – that won’t happen. We tried to explain that to Mr. Trump in clear sentences [at the G7] in Taormina’.

(Juncker 2017)

Relating this time to the US decision to leave the Iran nuclear deal, the EU’s High Representative Mogherini delivered a strongly worded rebuke: ‘[i]t is not a bilateral agreement. It does not belong to any single country. And it is not up to any country to terminate it’ (Mogherini 2017). The same sense of exasperation regarding the US president’s lack of understanding of basic international rules was striking. In yet another emotional tit-for-tat response, Juncker bluntly addressed President Trump: ‘if you want to be stupid, I can be stupid as well’ – referring to the potential damage of EU-US trade wars (Toosi 2019).

EU’s contemptuous foreign policy countermoves: the behavioural dimension

The EU’s adversarial response expressed the feeling of returned contempt towards the contemptuous agent and the attempt to regain a sense of pride. In the run-up to the 2018 G-7 summit, President Macron tweeted: ‘The American President may not mind being isolated, but neither do we mind signing a six-country agreement if need be. Because these six countries represent values and an economic market which has the weight of history behind it and which is now a true international force’ (Smith and Sloat 2018). A few years later, Chancellor Merkel rejected Trump’s invitation to Washington, fearing he might want to use a G7 summit for an election-year photo-op (Karnitschnig and Herszenhorn 2020). Another example of rejection related to the planned appointment of Ted Malloch, a hardened EU-sceptic who mulled striking trade deals with EU countries and who predicted the EU’s collapse – as the new US ambassador to the EU. Ahead of this move, the EP issued a letter to oppose this decision in an act of self-respect (Boffey 2017). Noteworthy were also the EU’s countermeasures in retaliation to the Trump’s imposition of tariffs on imports of European steel and aluminium (Bown 2018). All these instances indicate that European leaders were also able to turn their backs on Trump, de facto misrecognizing the US.

Importantly, evidence from the CCE and Baltic States speaks to a slightly different dynamic – namely the absence of returned contempt despite feeling misrecognized. While these states engaged in self-reformation following their misrecognition, they did so without returned contempt. This pragmatism was due to their heightened vulnerability and security dependence on the US compared to the rest of the MS.

Extending a hand and breaking the emotional downward spiralling

Despite Trump’s norm violations, European leaders moderated their discourse by highlighting shared values and areas of potential cooperation. Right after the 2016 Trump’s victory, Donald Tusk and Claude Juncker issued a letter to the president-elect, congratulating him and extending an invitation to visit the EU, noting that:

‘The strategic partnership between the EU and the US is rooted in our shared values of freedom, human rights, democracy, and a belief in the market economy. Over the years, the EU and the US have worked together to ensure peace and prosperity for our citizens and for people around the world. […] the EU–US strategic partnership is broad and deep […] we should spare no effort to ensure that the ties that bind us remain strong and durable. We should consolidate the bridges we have been building across the Atlantic. Europeans trust that America, whose democratic ideals have always been a beacon of hope around the globe, will continue to invest in its partnerships with friends and allies’.

(Tusk and Juncker 2016)

These reconciliatory speech acts mattered as they offered an escape from the emotional downward spiralling leading to a long-term deterioration of the relationship. Further down the line, commenting on a meeting with President Trump, Tusk acknowledged the two sides were far apart on trade, climate change, and Russia, but put a positive spin on the encounter: ‘What gives our cooperation and friendship its deepest meaning are fundamental Western values, like freedom, human rights, and respect for human dignity. The greatest task today is the consolidation of the whole free world around those values, and not just interests’ (Tusk 2017). European politicians even criticized the European arrogant response triggered by Trump’s contemptuous discourse. As the chair of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs committee, Norbert Röttgen, warned;

‘We will not be successful with an approach that entails to say: “We know the world better, we try to teach you to have a better understanding and we hope that you are a good pupil that will learn the lesson” […]. If we are perceived in the White House as the teacher of the US, and particularly of the president, it will be emotionally counter-productive’ (Maurice 2017).

These efforts to avoid deteriorating the transatlantic relationship demonstrate a sense of pragmatism and awareness of the vital importance that the US still holds for the EU.

Conclusion

This article has shown that the EU’s assertive stance vis-à-vis the US is the result of a misrecognition game involving the emotion of contempt, acting as an enabling mechanism for exceptional countermoves to be taken. Specifically, by looking at the turbulent EU-US bilateral relations, this study deepens our understanding of when and how emotions matter in the EUFP when the EU’s norms are transgressed. First, in line with the SI’s framework, we found that emotions matter when they emerge out of a breach of the norms defining the EU’s identity. The US contemptuous misrecognition of the EU has entailed the rejection of key norms at the core of EU’s identity in a humiliating manner (i.e. as a promoter of multilateralism and as a close friend and ally of the US) – thereby shaking the EU’s ontological security (Blanc 2021).

The examination of the institutional appraisal process revealed that Trump’s scornful rhetoric and policy moves – akin to the violation of key norms defining the EU’s identity (norms of multilateralism and norms of diplomatic communication between allies) – were largely interpreted as contemptuous misrecognition of the EU – mainly by the leaders of the EU institutions and of the Western European States. By contrast, CEE and Baltic states leaders appraised differently Trump’s rhetorical and practical moves, experiencing a less contemptuous kind of misrecognition. In line with the SI’s analytical framework, this is due to different historical memories of the transatlantic relationship and to exacerbated security-related concerns overriding emotions.

Moving to the second part of the SI’s analytical framework linking emotion to action, we found that this slight difference in the experience of contempt has not prevented the EU from taking extraordinary actions in terms of defence and foreign policy. The emotion of contempt has led the EU to adopt a series of foreign and defence policy initiatives, displaying the typical action tendencies of an actor target of contempt that seeks to regain its self-esteem by reaffirming its identity, increasing its performance, and returning feelings of contempt. Importantly, CEEs and Baltic States have engaged mainly in the improvement of performance engaging in an appeasement strategy rather than practices of returned contempt – avoiding a direct confrontation with the US.

Paradoxically, the more Donald Trump sought to exclude and diminish the EU, the more it brought attention to the EU and indirectly strengthened it. One can therefore conclude that the emotion of contempt experienced by the EU due to Trump’s norm violations contributed to strengthen the EU’s identity and foreign policy.

Going forward, it would be useful to explore other aspects of this phenomenon. This study, focusing on contempt, is a first step to systematically conceptualize the diverse emotions involved in the recognition/misrecognition process and their consequences: to what extent are the emotions of fear, panic, pride, humiliation, and revenge influential? Moreover, as emotions are particularly salient in crisis moments, future research should explore the emotional management strategies deployed in these extreme political conditions. This is even more relevant as the prospect of Trump’s coming-back in 2024 remains a possibility.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editors and other authors of the SI for their insightful comments on previous versions of the article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Trust – as a socio-psychological concept – relates to emotions differently (i.e. emotion as an integral part of trust, emotions as factors influencing trust, and emotion as an outcome of trust). Most IR studies focus on the cognitive component of trust and its social nature related to norms and values rather than on its affective basis (Jonathan, Dirks, and Campagna 2023). By contrast, this study looks at the cognitive, affective, and behavioural dimensions of the emotion of contempt.

2. Many influential US policymakers sought to undercut the President’s provocative views on US partners (see Blanc 2023). Yet these tempering voices failed in alleviating the contemptuous misrecognition felt by European leaders. This is probably due to Trump’s communication style, which necessitated an emotionally strong public response to save the EU’s sense of pride.

3. In comparison, it took 4 months to appoint a US Ambassador to Israel, 6 months to China and 7 months to Japan. Out of the 27 European MS, 21 were political appointees reflecting the desire to cultivate backchannels with the President and individual MS (American Foreign Service Association, 2024).