A ‘Europe of defence’? The establishment of binding commitments and supranational governance in European security and defence

ABSTRACT

Cooperation between EU member-states in the field of security and defence is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the notion of intergovernmentalism. The decisions to establish the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and most recently the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) have resulted in integrative commitments between EU member-states. In order to account for these commitments, we must analyse the positions and perspectives of key (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) EU member-states. The article adds to the literature on European integration in two respects. First, by developing indicators to identify and establish the extent to which a move beyond intergovernmentalism has taken place. Second, through the application of a comprehensive approach, which is required in order to understand why EU security and defence integration has come about.

KEYWORDS:

• European integration
• European security and defence
• beyond intergovernmentalism
• identity and norms
• ‘European togetherness’

Introduction

The field of foreign and security policy in the European Union has been contrasted with other EU policy fields based on the absence of integration. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are generally described as intergovernmental, stripped of supranational traits (Menon 2003, 2013). However, scholars have argued that cooperation within the EU in the field of security and defence goes beyond what can be captured by the notion of intergovernmentalism (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013; Haroche 2020; Sabatino 2022; Sjursen 2011).

The past 5 years have seen significant changes in the field of security and defence cooperation in the EU. The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy stipulated an ambition for the EU to increase its strategic autonomy (EEAS, 2016). Shortly afterwards, in 2017, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) were established. The Russian war against Ukraine has led to additional commitments between member-states at the EU level in security and defence affairs. For the first time, as a result of The European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), EU member-states will receive financial support from the EU to restock their armies and upgrade their military hardware (Foy, 2022). The establishment of these initiatives may have restricted the ability of member-states to make independent decisions regarding the development of their military capabilities. This form of cooperation is different from one in which decisions are made through unanimous votes in an intergovernmental format. What enabled the establishment of such integrative commitments?

Other scholars (Fabbrini 2023; Fiott 2023) have asserted that the new EU defence initiatives do not go beyond intergovernmentalism. However, missing from these analyses are criteria for examining changes to EU security and defence from 2017 onwards based on the kind of interaction they imply. Fiott (2023, 459) argues that the lack of establishment of new supranational institutions in EU defence and the Commission acting like a ‘policy entrepreneur’ as opposed to seizing the opportunity to create a ‘substantial shift towards supranationalism’ on common defence procurement constitutes a form of interaction best depicted by intergovernmentalism. This suggests a binary distinction between intergovernmental cooperation and supranationalism. It further suggests that the Commission working as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ equates to the Commission having no independent role in EU security and defence affairs, which is not the case. In order to understand the changes created by recent EU defence initiatives and the corresponding implications this has on member-states’ sovereignty, there needs to be a clear definition of intergovernmentalism alongside other relevant forms of interaction-like integration. Without such criteria it is difficult to make sense of the institutional changes in the EU that have come about because of the establishment of the EDF, PESCO and more recently EDIRPA and the European Peace Facility (EPF).

I address this gap in the literature by constructing criteria for identifying integration as opposed to intergovernmental cooperation and providing a comprehensive account of why member-states may have established PESCO, CARD and the EDF, with a focus on the role of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Thus, the present study aims to shed light on the broader trajectory of the kind of commitments and sovereignty concessions member-states are willing to make in EU security and defence.

The article is structured in the following manner. The first section, in which I unpack and clarify what constitutes intergovernmental cooperation and integration, outlines the analytical approach adopted in the article. In the second section, I present the analytical expectations derived from realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism, each of which provides a theoretical proposition for why member-states decided to establish PESCO, CARD and the EDF. In the third section, I draw on the analytical expectations and discuss the extent to which these perspectives can account for the establishment of these initiatives relative to the kind of commitments, integrative or cooperative, EU member-states have made and the theoretical generalisations that can be made based on the findings.

Intergovernmental cooperation vs. integration

The development of the field of EU security and defence has historically differed from that of the EU’s economic integration. There has been less involvement and power devolved to European institutions, and decisions have been made through unanimous votes. The traditional view is that security and defence is an area in which member-states retain control over core state powers. The absence of mutually binding commitments and supranational governance has been attributed to a variety of factors. Scholars have pointed out that there are strong differences between member-states in terms of their strategic cultures (Meyer 2005; Meyer and Strickmann 2001), and these act as a barrier to integration in member-states’ core state powers in this policy field. It has also been suggested that states are unwilling to constrain sovereignty in security and defence because it is critical to the integrity and survival of the state (Hoffman 1966; Øhrgaard, 1997). Menon (2013, 66) contends that the EU’s involvement in member-states’ core state powers is close to zero, referencing Stanley Hoffman’s arguments regarding security and defence as ‘high politics’ as the rationale for the absence of integration.

However, there is a growing volume of literature that calls into question the notion that EU foreign and security policy is strictly intergovernmental and subject to decision-making solely at the hands of member-states (Cross 2013; Riddervold 2016; Sjursen 2011; Weiss 2013). Scholars have pointed to EU experts (Cross 2013, 2015) and institutions (Howorth 2010; Juncos and Reynolds 2007) as playing important roles in the development of the CFSP and CSDP. Neofunctionalist literature argues that the European Commission and the ECJ have ‘mission crept’ into the field of defence because of policy spillover resulting from their role in regulating the internal market (Håkansson 2021; Haroche 2020; Weiss 2013). Constructivist literature has argued that the CFSP and the CSDP have moved beyond intergovernmentalism, highlighting norms (Mauer, Whitman, and Wright 2023; Riddervold 2016; Sjursen 2011), national roles and identity (Aggestam 2006; Tonra 2003, 2019) and rules (Strikwerda 2017) as significant for this development. Pannier and Béraud-Sudreau (2021) apply a sociological framing approach to account for developments in EU security and defence cooperation and argue that strategic use of framing by member-states and EU officials led to the establishment of new defence initiatives, such as PESCO and the EDF. However, there is a gap in the literature in accounting for the kind of commitments, cooperative or integrative, the EDF, PESCO and CARD represents and why member-states were willing to allow sovereignty concessions in security and defence. Unlike neofunctionalist literature on cooperation and integration in EU security and defence (Haroche 2020), in which integration is explained from a top-down understanding of causality where non-state actors are drivers for integration, the present article provides a mechanistic account of the positions and perspectives of EU member-states that triggered the establishment of these initiatives. The focus of mechanistic accounts is to identify salient features within a process of interaction (Elster 1986). The analytical expectations are therefore premised on cooperation or integration as a consequence of a process of decision-making.

Furthermore, missing from literature on European integration is analyses of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF together.¹ There are studies that have focused on the creeping competence of the European Commission and the ECJ in defence by looking at the EDF (Haroche 2020; Hoeffler 2023; Sabatino 2022) while paying little attention to how or why PESCO and CARD work in conjunction with it. A recent study on European security and defence described PESCO as an attempt by the EU to enhance European strategic autonomy (Sweeney & Winn, 2020) without noting the role of CARD and the EDF alongside it. It has also been argued that PESCO is different from other initiatives in the CSDP because the commitments states make to each other within the PESCO framework are legally binding (Biscop, 2018, 162), and that PESCO may represent a change in EU defence because it has the potential to improve member-states’ military capabilities (Nováky 2018). Furthermore, while PESCO projects are mainly financed by the member-states involved in each project, it has been noted that the EDF can provide an additional 10% monetary bonus for PESCO projects if they reach and fulfil their targets (Biscop, 2018, 163), which makes it clear that the EDF works in concert with PESCO.

The significance of this absence is twofold. The economic mechanisms upon which PESCO, CARD and the EDF are based – creating a more competitive and efficient industrial defence industry, increasing economies of scale in military capability acquisition and development, creating a basis for more compatible and interoperable European military forces and technology – are mutually reinforcing. Thus, to understand the scope and significance of defence at the European level, an analysis of EU defence integration will benefit from the inclusion of the totality of military capability initiatives. Second, and more importantly, in accounting for why member states have relinquished governance and authority to EU in their core state powers it is necessary to account for the entirety of constraints that have been introduced by PESCO, CARD and the EDF together. Thus, studying these initiatives together avoids a fragmented approach to our understanding of military capability development in the EU and the subsequent effect this has on the authority and governance of member-states.

PESCO, CARD, and the EDF: beyond intergovernmental?

PESCO was launched alongside the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) in 2017 as mechanisms to increase EU cooperation for the purpose of developing and strengthening common member-states’ military capabilities. While 26 of the 27 EU member-states have now signed up to PESCO, participation in its various projects varies across projects. The EDF represents a milestone for the EU. For the first time, capital from the Community budget will be used to support financial defence cooperation through an EU framework. This gives the Commission a role in the decision-making, allocating and funding the development of member-states’ military capabilities. The EDF also provides financial contributions to certain PESCO collaborative projects (EU document on PESCO). CARD is a tool to aid member-states in identifying novel projects that may allow for increased cooperation (EU document on PESCO). The European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are involved in drafting the recommendations in CARD that are later presented to member-states.

The establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF may place constraints on EU member-states sovereignty. Sjursen (2011) argues that in order for a system of interaction to be deemed intergovernmental, we must examine the following four dimensions: ‘1) the actors involved in decision-making 2) how decisions are made 3) the ability of the actor to delegate and revoke power 4) raison d’être of the cooperative endeavour’ (pp. 1081–1082). I further develop these as criteria and indicators of integration. I thus consider that integration will have taken place if commitments between states result in one or more of the following outcomes: 1) actors aside from those specific to a given state (i.e. EU supranational institutions) are involved in making decisions that affect this state, 2) states are unable to veto decisions, 3) a transfer of power over a specific issue to an EU institution which cannot be reversed and, 4) the purpose of commitments made by EU member-states is not reducible to the interests or values of a single state. Integration will have taken place if one or more of the indicators are proven to be true.

PESCO, CARD and the EDF are mechanisms through which the state’s role in at least two of these dimensions – and arguably a third – has been constrained. The EDF has given the Commission a leadership role as both the initiator and evaluator for the kinds of military capabilities member-states should acquire, renew, invest in and develop. Member-states who follow through on PESCO projects may potentially receive additional funding from the Commission through the EDF. EDIRPA takes this even further by providing funds from the EU to member-states so that they can acquire new material and upgrade their individual military capabilities. The common denominator is that a situation has been created in which the development of EU member-states’ military capabilities has become a ‘European’ endeavour, through the establishment of initiatives of which the purpose is for EU member-states to establish and develop common military capabilities. The result is that the purpose of commitments cannot be reduced to the interests and values of a single EU member-state. It can also be argued that since the EDF has given the Commission a role in member-states’ defence budgets, this constrains member-states’ authority in decision-making and potentially their ability to veto decisions relating to financial investments the Commissions makes. While it is true that member-states can make independent decisions on national capability development, they are not able to veto how their contribution to the EU budget is allocated to defence capability development through the EDF. Accordingly, the combined effect of PESCO and the EDF is to satisfy the first and fourth criteria for integration developed above.

This is a different form of interaction than what is implied by the concept of intergovernmentalism. In a debate in the Spanish Senate in 2017, it was argued that in the past year, European states had taken more decisive steps towards European security and defence integration than in the previous 10 years (Spanish Senate debate, 22 December 2017), while in the same year a member of the Bundestag argued that in 10 years time the introduction of PESCO would come to be considered a milestone on the same level as Schengen, the Internal market and the euro (German Bundestag debate, 12 December 2017). Such depth of commitments – based on the role of the Commission in the planning, funding, decision-making and development of such capabilities – places constraints on member-states’ authority, thereby challenging their national sovereignty. How can one account for the establishment of such integrative commitments?

The approach

Strengthening the defence capability of the EU

In the realist tradition, states are considered to act in line with their first-order interests, the most important being safeguarding their own national security and survival (Hyde-Price 2008). In such context, states cultivate military power and capability in order to exert influence in international affairs (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). If states perceive an increase in threats to their survival, this will, according to realist thinking, lead to increased incentives for states to cultivate military capability. In seeking to account for the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF, a realist expectation is certainly warranted. Neoclassical realism asserts that small states can act independently of big states and it has a moderate view of the effect of anarchy on state behaviour (Foulon and Meitbauer 2020, 1207). In the neoclassical view, domestic factors impact state behaviour (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1993). Geopolitical location, new military technology and the presence and absence of regional alliances all influence the way in which the international environment affects state behaviour (Foulon and Meithbauer 2020, 1207; Snyder 1996; Ripsman et al. 2016). In such a view it is therefore believed that states are willing to make minor sovereignty concessions in the pursuit of their strategic interests.

Following this realist understanding we expect that (Expectation 1) EU member-states established PESCO, CARD and the EDF due to a perceived need to defend the territories of the EU. Indicators that would support the realist expectation would be justifications given by EU member-states for the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF that are focused on the need to protect member-states from external threats. Justifications that are given with reference to changes in the strategic environment – such as shifting focus among important alliance partners like the United States – or due to perceived weaknesses in current defence capabilities – such as gaps or weaknesses in NATO’s collective defence mechanism – would be examples of such justifications.

However, it is not clear from a neoclassical realist perspective why leading EU member states believed that their security interests could be best addressed through the involvement of supranational institutions in the EU. It is also not clear that the establishment of PESCO and the EDF only involve minor concessions for the authority of member states. To provide a comprehensive understanding of the development of integrative commitments in the EU’s security and defence sector, it is necessary to make use of an additional analytical perspective that recognizes states’ interests go beyond concerns about their own security.

The economic benefits of EU military capability development

An argument that is well established within the literature on European integration is that states engage in cooperation based on material cost – benefit calculations (Moravcsik 1993, 1998 Schimmelfenning & Moravcsik, 2009). The argument presented in the liberal institutionalist perspective is that states pursue cooperation owing to interdependence (Keohane 1984, 8) Thus, cooperation is the result of states seeking to maximise their material interests in the context of global economic interdependence. Following the liberal institutional perspective, (Expectation 2) EU member-states decided to establish PESCO, CARD and the EDF due to a need to realise economic gains or savings.

Indicators substantiating the liberal institutionalist expectation would be justifications given by member-states for the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF that are focused on the need for or opportunity to realise economic gains, such as cost- and risk sharing, economies of scale in production, procurement and capability development as well as retaining or stimulating local employment. This expectation is different from the realist expectation, which is grounded in a perceived need to enhance security. Cost–benefit justifications could be directly related to the scale of defence spending – such as references to general budget constraints and defence technology inflation – or broader economic considerations such as creating a competitive and efficient defence industrial base.

However, at the time PESCO, CARD and the EDF were established in 2017, European defence spending as a share of GDP had been declining since the fall of the Soviet Union and there was nothing new about the fragmented and inefficient nature of the European defence industry. This lack of obvious discontinuity suggests that there may have been additional factors that contributed to the breakthrough in defence cooperation in the EU. Scholars have suggested that identity and norms are important factors to consider in the policymaking of states (Aggestam 2006; Elgström and Smith 2006; Tonra, 2003). In the next subsection, I develop an analytical expectation that may allow to fill the gaps left by other accounts of the commitments EU member-states have made to each other in the field of security and defence.

‘Shared understanding’

Research on European integration and cooperation in the field of security and defence has argued that foreign and security policy is also driven by factors outside rationalist interest (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt, 1992). One argument is that identity and norms influence foreign policymakers and the decisions they make (Aggestam 2006; Holsti 1970; March and Olsen 1998). Thus, ‘ideas about who “we” are may serve as a guide to political action’ (Aggestam 2006, 14). A role may be defined as ‘patterns of expected behaviour or appropriate behaviour’ (Elgström and Smith 2006, 5; March and Olsen 1998). In the policymaking process, states may be relying on a certain role following the logic of appropriateness in which ‘actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collective, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation’ (March and Olsen 2006, p. 689).

The extent to which the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF was the result of acting in line with shared role conceptions between member-states in the EU will therefore be considered. According to this constructivist perspective, Expectation 3 suggests that EU member-states established PESCO, CARD and the EDF because of a shared understanding of the role they seek to play in international relations.

Indicators supporting this expectation would be justifications for integrative commitments in EU security and defence that are not primarily rooted in achieving specific policy objectives such as enhanced security or material benefits, but rather in the idea that there is a shared European self-understanding within security and defence and that this role carries certain corresponding duties. Examples of such roles and duties include that the EU project must also extend to military power and a shared role perception among leading EU member states, specifically France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, grounded in a need to be significant and influential on the international stage.

Method and data

The research presented here is qualitative in nature and based on the case-study method (Bennett & George, 2005). I construct three analytical expectations, one derived from each of the three theoretical perspectives employed – realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism – and analyse whether these expectations can be substantiated, and, if so, to what extent. While the combination of these theoretical perspectives does not live up to a standard of ontological purity, it has been established that research premised on understanding the empirical complexity of a phenomenon through the application of different conceptual frameworks has validity and academic value (Allision 1971; Carlsnaes 1994). The objects of analysis for the present study are the justifications given by EU member-states for the establishment of the EDF, PESCO and CARD. I rely on process tracing, which is a method that uses theoretical variables for the purpose of further extrapolating research findings into theoretical generalisations (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 211). Thus, the research findings may allow for theoretical generalisations to other developments in EU security and defence cooperation in which states make cooperative and/or integrative commitments. I have endeavoured to define the scope and ambition of my research clearly and transparently. I have included a selection of European perspectives (certainly not all) while being clear about the limits of the potential for generalisability of my findings. The analysis draws on three different data sources: semi-structured interviews, primary official documents and secondary literature. I have also conducted data triangulation, which is a method of ensuring data reliability by cross-checking data and collection techniques in order to provide validity and consistency in research findings (Bennet and Checkel 2015).

I have analysed over 200 official documents related to the establishment of the EDF, CARD and PESCO, such as EU documents related to the Strategic Compass, EU documents on PESCO, CARD, the EDF and EDIRPA and the EU Global Strategy. I have also systematically searched governmental databases in EU member-states for documents related to the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF and analysed parliamentary transcripts in the period 2016–2022. I also collected and analysed speeches made by European heads of state. Finally, I conducted nine semi-structured interviews with senior government and military officials in Germany, France, Britain, Belgium and the EEAS. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their knowledge of the negotiation processes surrounding the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF, and of the inner workings of EU security and defence. The interviews have been anonymised and numbered from 1 to 9.

Collective security and defence interests among EU member-states?

In the time leading up to the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF in 2017, there was a recognition among EU member-states that the geopolitical focus of the USA was shifting away from Europe. Literature on EU security and defence cooperation has emphasised that European defence cooperation would not get off the ground if the USA could be relied upon for security (Mérand and Angers 2013, 48). Senior British government officials interviewed as part of the research for this article pointed to the US pivot to Asia as an important trigger for European defence cooperation, citing the rise of China as main driver for this change (Interviews 5 and 6). A senior German military official noted that while NATO was Germany’s main priority in defence, the development of PESCO should be seen in connection with concerns regarding the USA’s continued level of commitment to Europe; ‘When Americans want to do less in Europe, we should be able to solve the problems in the European neighbourhood by ourselves’ (Interview 7).

I have also identified justifications from member-state government officials for the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF grounded in assertions relating to external pressures and a growing perception of threat to member-state national security, independent of a perceived retrenchment of US support for Europe. There were justifications for increasing defence cooperation at the EU level in interviews with senior government officials in Germany and France who argued that the geopolitical situation in Europe has changed, referencing the rise of China and growing Russian imperialism (Interview 7 and 9). A member of the German parliament commented during a Bundestag debate in December 2016 on European defence that ‘since the fall of the wall, the threat of a military confrontation with Russia has not been as great as it is today.’ (German Bundestag debate, 15 December 2016). A French government official summarised the significance of growing Russian imperialism in 2014 in the following manner:

The challenge is to build new military capacities in Europe. I mean true capacities: battalions, tanks, so on…. In 1989, you could say that there was no more danger, that defence was just a budgetary loss, but could you say that today? Thanks to Mr Putin, you cannot. (Interview 9)

Further confirmation of support for the realist expectation is found in justifications related to the growing number of security threats for European states that are not adequately addressed by NATO. There was a sense among EU member-states that there were external threats related to homeland security, cyber security, energy security, and border security that could be better addressed through an integrated EU approach to military capability development (Biscop 2018, 172, Interview 3, Spanish Senate debate, 22 December 2017). The argument was that defence exist along a continuum and that there are tasks that fall below NATO’s Article V threshold which the EU is better placed than NATO to address (Biscop 2018, p. 172).

Research on the EU’s defence initiatives has also pointed out the significance of external pressures (Håkansson 2021; Haroche 2020; Sabatino 2022). Håkansson (2021, 595), citing interviews with EU member states, EU Commission officials and EP officials, highlighted the significance of ‘ … the terrorist attacks in Europe of 2015–2017, the migration crisis, the UK leaving the EU, the election of Donald Trump and the changed geopolitical situation following the revival of great power competition’ as significant external events that led to increased defence cooperation in the EU. This is not to say that the weighting of the aforementioned security concerns was consistent across the member-states. For example, there were natural variations in the relative importance of issues based on factors such as member-states’ relative size, NATO affiliation, history with terror attacks, and geographic proximity to northern or southern security threats. Nor does this paper argue that there was uniformity among member-states on the ideal scope and design of the initiatives to address security concerns. For example, France and Germany are widely viewed as the architects of PESCO, with one interviewee calling them ‘the motor of Europe on defence’ (Interview 2). However, several interviewees highlight their tug-of-war over the inclusiveness of PESCO, with France pushing for a smaller club of committed member-states and Germany taking the opposite view that PESCO should be more of an open platform (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8). Similarly, interviewees describe a tension between the larger and the smaller member-states regarding the design of PESCO over a ‘painful two-year negotiation process’ (Interview 1), where the larger states generally ‘sought to retain control over governance and the smaller states tended to seek more supranational influence’ (Interview 3). Rather, what this paper finds is clear evidentiary support for Expectation 1 in the justifications provided by member-states for the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF pointing to the changing security landscape, growing external threats and weaknesses in the current territorial defence.

What is still missing is understanding why leading member-states believed these challenges could be most adequately be addressed in the EU, including through the involvement of EU supranational institutions, rather than through alternative formats such as the European Intervention Initiative or NATO’s Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Literature on EU security and defence cooperation has also highlighted how economics and globalisation have been significant factors for developments in the establishment of cooperative and integrative commitments in EU security and defence (Calcara 2020). Interviews with government officials similarly pointed to the existence of economic rationales, in particular with respect to the possibility that EU military capability development could be materially beneficial for the member-states (Interviews 6, 7).

The economic benefits of EU military capability development

When the EDF, PESCO and CARD were established there was a pervasive perception among leading EU member-states that Europe was facing a severe capability gap in defence, and that European states and their defence industrial base would have neither the necessary level of investment nor the scale and sophistication to address this shortcoming without greater coordination and pooling of resources. The political climate in Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War led EU member-states to cut their military procurement budgets in order to invest in other areas of their domestic policies (Weiss 2013, 34). In contrast to the United States, Europe’s total defence spending declined between 2001 and 2009 (Ibid). World Bank (n.d.) data show that while both EU and US defence spending as a share of GDP declined from 1985 to 2001, the US figure jumped nearly 60% in the following decade while the EU’s fell by another 11% to a level that was broadly maintained throughout the subsequent decade. This left Europe with a defence investment ‘debt’ which would be less daunting for member-states to address collectively than individually. Additionally, lower defence spending was exacerbated by the increasing cost and complexity of modern defence technology: ‘driven by technology, the real costs of developing and producing sophisticated military platforms – aircrafts, warships, and tanks – have increased at rates far faster than the modest economic growth experienced by European states’ (Weiss 2013, 33). As well as raising the cost of compensating for years of lower defence spending, increasing complexity requires greater and more specialised capability development, which again improves the case for sharing scarce capabilities and avoiding overlapping R&D investments.

The third major factor underlying the economic case for integration was the fragmented nature of the European defence industry. In 2019, the European Commission highlighted the cost of fragmentation by contrasting the 178 main weapons systems in the EU with the corresponding 30 such systems in the USA, estimating that ‘around 80% of defence procurement is run on a purely national basis, leading to a costly duplication of military activities’ (Factsheet European Defence Fund, 2019). Interviews with EU-member states illustrate the significance of reducing fragmentation and increasing cooperation on military capability development at the EU level (Interview 7,8). One interviewee argued that while there were multiple drivers for the launch of PESCO, the economic arguments weighed most heavily: ‘PESCO is technical, political and economic…. There is a political sense; everyone understands that we need to do better in the sense of coordination and wasting a lot of money. But the main driver is not the political reason: it is the economics of it all’ (Interview 7). As another government official put it: ‘PESCO is really a tool to strengthen the industrial base. A tool to provide industrial autonomy in European defence’ (Interview 8). Not only is the European defence industry nationally driven, but its corporate structure also compounds fragmentation. Europe’s defence industry consists of a combination of large international contractors coupled with medium- and small-sized nationally focused companies. The scale of the challenge was forcefully laid out by the 2019 French Senate report on European defence (2019), which asserted:

[T]he majority of European defence companies are strongly convinced that if the different defence industries of the European countries do not join forces, or, worse, if they continue to compete directly for the same contracts as they most often tend to do, they will all be eliminated relatively soon. One foreign manufacturer estimated this time frame to be between 5 and 10 years at most for most segments of the defence industry. (French Senate report 2019)

Thus, it is clear that there was a compelling case to be made for integration in the field of EU security and defence on the basis of cost–benefit calculations for member-states. However, EU member-states have arguably underinvested in defence for decades, and this has been coupled with rising costs of defence technology and a fragmented European defence industrial base. For the liberal institutionalist account to have merit, it must be able to account for the breakthrough in European defence integration. Yet when PESCO, CARD and the EDF were launched, these trends had been playing out for over two decades. One factor that lends evidentiary support to the liberal institutional explanation is that negotiations between member-states resulted in these initiatives being structured in a manner that was more in line with the material interests of both the larger and smaller EU member-states. The EDF, along with its forerunner programmes, Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), found a way to incentivise the involvement of smaller and medium-size companies in the European defence industry. This had been a concern for the smaller EU member-states. As Håkansson (2021) points out, citing interviews with a member-state official, while European defence integration had been championed by larger countries like France and Germany, the Commission used the EDF bonus system on PESCO projects and other incentive schemes to create ‘incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises, mid-cap companies, and so on’ (p. 600). In other words, negotiations between member-states resulted in the Commission creating a tangible solution for the ‘small states’ in the EU, making European military-capability development a more beneficial option not only for the larger EU member-states such as France and Germany, but also for the smaller states, which are linked to smaller to medium-level defence companies. The importance of the link between the EDF and PESCO also underlines how the structure and incentive models of PESCO, CARD and the EDF, and more recently also EDIRPA, are intended to be mutually reinforcing and must be considered as a whole rather than separately assessed as individual initiatives. The initiatives are incentive-based systems that have been engineered to increase the competitiveness of the European defence industry by creating opportunities for economies of scale, improving military systems compatibility among EU member-states (PESCO), incentivising member-states to join PESCO projects by providing capital from the community budget (EDF), pooling, and sharing costs related to defence research and technology (PESCO) and identifying areas of defence capability development for greater cooperation and coordination among member-states (CARD).

While the analysis finds support for Expectation two in member-states’ justifications for the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF, that is not to claim that the evidence proves EU integration was the only way to achieve these economic objectives. For example, closer regional and bilateral defence integration such as the 2009 Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the 2010 Franco-British Lancaster House Treaties (LHTs) were partly predicated on achieving similar objectives and could have been models to follow. Regional or smaller-scale cooperative formats could arguably be easier to tailor to the specific interests of member-states, with less need to find compromise. Similarly, Germany’s acquisition of 35 US-made F-35 fighter jets in 2022 highlighted more off-the shelf purchases as an alternative path to cut costs and fill capability gaps, although Germany, France, and Spain announced later in 2022 that an agreement had been reached to move forward with the joint Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project (Abboud et al. 2022). Another perspective must therefore also be considered if we are to provide a comprehensive account for the recent shift towards integration in the field of EU security and defence. Analysis of the data collected for this study suggests that an emerging and shared understanding among leading EU member-states regarding their identity and role in international affairs was crucial for the emergence of integrative commitments in EU security and defence affairs.

Shared understanding of ‘Europe of defence’ among EU member-states?

In order to provide a comprehensive account of the cooperative and integrative commitments that have emerged between EU member-states, I argue that a significant contributing factor for the establishment of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF was the emergence of an increasingly shared understanding among leading EU member-states regarding the inclusion of security and defence as an integral part of the ‘idea of Europe’.

First, a general point can be made regarding EU member-states’ understanding of the role of the EU in the world. There is evidence suggesting that the development of European military capability is connected to an emerging common understanding in and between EU member-states of an ‘idea of Europe’ as a hard power, also involving the development of ‘European’ military capability. This view is evident in public statements, opinion papers and founding documents for the EU defence initiatives. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy outlined an integrated approach to European security, involving both soft and hard power; ‘The idea that Europe is an exclusively ‘civilian power’ does not do justice to an evolving reality…. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand (EEAS, 2016). The following year, the European Commission’s Reflection Paper expressed; ‘While soft power alone may not be enough in an unstable world, this integrated approach lies at the heart of sustainable security (European Commission 2017). In the same year, the Rome Declaration called for ‘a stronger Europe on the global scene … standing for a rules-based multilateral system, proud of its values and protective of its people’ (European Council 2017). The same sentiment was enshrined in the 2018 proposal for the Regulation establishing the EDF:

In today’s world, guaranteeing security means dealing with threats that transcend borders. No single country can address these alone. The Union will need to take greater responsibility for protecting its interests, values and the European way of life, in complementarity and in cooperation with NATO. (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the European Defence Fund, 2018)

It is striking to note that these public statements and proposals, in contrast to, for example, the adoption of the euro, were preceded by relatively little public or parliamentary debate among the member-states, as noted by the European Parliament in July 201 (EP 2017). Thus, one could argue that the EU institutions were driving the establishment of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF, however the evidence suggest otherwise. Interviewees consistently highlighted the significance of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain in reducing existing divergencies within the EU which ultimately led to the establishment of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 7, 8). Furthermore, the defence ministers of this quartet published a letter in July 2020 committing to intensifying efforts to ‘contribute to a “more sovereign” Europe in security and defence’ (EDR 2020). What becomes evident is that the ‘idea of Europe’, what the EU stands for, in these official texts is being reconciled with ‘hard’ power. This indicates that there was a level of agreement among key EU member-states regarding the incorporation of ‘hard’ power, military power, into strategy and policy documents at the European level. Furthermore, the incorporation of ‘hard’ power to the European project in and of itself suggests that the field of security and defence is increasingly not a distinct field separate from other policy fields in the Union as historically has been the case. The EU values of freedom, democracy, equality, and rule of law are now being connected to the development of military capability in the EU in legislative texts that involve integrative commitments for member-states.

It has been established that an indicator for integration is the involvement of supranational EU institutions in decisions that affects member-states. The establishment of the European Defence Fund has given the Commission a role in the planning, funding, and development of EU member-states military capability which serves to restrict sovereignty of member-states. Secondly, and arguably most important, is that the introduction of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF have has made it so that military capability development has become a ‘European’ endeavour (i.e. military capability development cannot be reduced to the interest and values of a single member-state). This view was summarised by the Italian defence minister Lorenzo Guerini at a hearing at the Joint Defence Commissions of the upper and lower houses of parliament in October 2019, where he stated that the theme of European defence should be seen ‘not so much, or not only, as a response to an operational or financial need’, but rather as ‘a fundamental and necessary piece in the construction finally of a political Europe, indispensable to be able to compete on a world stage characterized by actors who are economically and demographically stronger than us every time we choose to go it alone’ (Ministero dello difesa 2019, 12).

Second, evidence suggests that EU member-states share an understanding beyond their national identities. There were justifications for the establishment of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF that emphasised the significance of shared understanding, in the armed forces and among military and government officials both within and between EU member-states. These justifications can be observed in national parliaments, such as in the German Bundestag in 2019 where it was argued that ‘formulating common interests and projects on the basis of European values is a central requirement for effective participation in shaping the international order and a credible foreign and security policy’ (German Bundestag debate, 15 May 2019). Justifications for EDF, PESCO, and CARD were given with reference to a kind of collective experience, a ‘European identity’ in and between members of the military and government (Interview 2, 3). The same justification is found in national parliamentary debates in Germany, where PESCO was welcomed as a step in the right direction towards a European strategic culture (a concept long promoted by France) and it was argued that this was vital to creating the necessary trust and unity to effectively protect European interests and values (German Bundestag debate, 12 December 2017). Literature on inter-state defence cooperation has highlighted the significance of shared sense of identity and norms at the level government officials, military officials, and personnel and in bureaucracies not only for the establishment of cooperative agreements between states in the field of security and defence, but also for the scope and ambition of the military cooperative arrangements (Forsberg 2013, Røren 2019).

Thirdly, the self-understanding of the group of member-states that were the main driving forces for the development of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF – France, Spain, and Italy and to a lesser and more novel but significant extent also Germany – had a military identity that involves actively projecting their voice and influence on the global stage. Parliamentary debates in Spain in 2018 highlighted the joint work of these four in countries creating a ‘true model of integration’ and asserted that PESCO ‘will become one of the pillars of our European identity and our strength as a single actor, so we must understand it as a real opportunity, assuming that by acting together, we Europeans will be able to lead the international stage and successfully face the pending challenges’ (Spanish Senate debate, May 2018). In a 2020 speech, French President Emmanuel Macron explicitly connected the security and defence of Europe to the protection of European norms and values:

Europe’s defence and security cannot be based solely on a military approach. To build the Europe of tomorrow, our norms cannot be controlled by the United States, our infrastructure, our ports and airports owned by Chinese capital, and our computer networks under Russian pressure…. All of this today requires that the European approach be brought up to date. (Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defence and Deterrence Strategy 2022)

However, the French position on the development of EU military capability has been long-standing, this is not something new. Similarly, both Spain and Italy have long traditions of active participation in external missions. What is different is that evidence from this study suggests that Germany’s long-standing self-perception as a non-militarist actor had started to fade in the time leading up the establishment of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF. One interviewee noted that the German non-militarist self-understanding was slowly changing: while it used to be ‘scary’ for Germany to have a military identity, that was now diminishing, and the view was emerging instead that Germany must shoulder more responsibility for European security (Interview 3). The transformation of the German role as to a more outwardly active military actor is still ongoing, with the German defence minister Christine Lambrecht commenting in September 2022 that the times of viewing the Bundeswehr ‘as a kind of disaster relief agency’ were over and that ‘Germany could only guarantee peace and freedom for its people if it abandoned its

Old self-image’’ (Boone 2022, September 12). However, this paper argues that the emerging shift in Germany’s role conception was a key enabler of closer integration in European security and defence already in 2017. Germany wields enormous influence in the EU and accounted for roughly one quarter of member-states

defence spending in 2017. With Germany adding its weight along with France, Italy, and Spain, this meant that member-states accounting for almost 70% of EU defence spending were vocal proponents of PESCO (European Defence Agency). The importance of the German shift was well summarised in a debate in the Bundestag in 2018: ‘it’s about nothing less than us […] re-debating and redefining our foreign-policy self-image. […] This is a dramatic fundamental change. In my opinion, this change has objectively created a European momentum that […] has never existed before’ (German Bundestag debate, 16 May 2018).

Taken together, the incorporation of military power to the idea of Europe, the emergence of ‘European values’ and a ‘European identity’ in and between members of member-states’ military and government, and the identification of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain with a role that involves actively projecting their influence and voice on the international stage seem to validate Expectation 3, that a sense of common understanding among EU member-states regarding the ‘Europe of Defence’ contributed to the establishment of integrative commitments in the field of security and defence in the EU. Prior to the strengthening of this idea of a ‘Europe of Defence’, there was little development in the EU’s security and defence, with PESCO commonly referred to as the ‘sleeping beauty of European defence’. The claim, or indeed aim, of this article is not to prove that a constructivist explanation alone can account for the establishment of PESCO, CARD, and the EDF. As we have seen, there is merit to both realist and liberal institutionalist accounts. Rather, identity and norms played a role both in removing barriers to integration and making it possible for the EU to become an appropriate arena over alternative formats or arenas such as bi- or mini-lateral agreements or broader formats such as the European Intervention Initiative or NATO’s Framework Nations Concept. To explain the breakthrough in EU security and defence integration following 2016 without considering the role of identity and norms is to miss a piece of the puzzle.

Conclusion

In this article I have developed indicators for identifying whether integration between EU member-states has taken place with the establishment of PESCO, CARD and the EDF. I have found that PESCO, CARD, and the EDF satisfy criteria for integration in two respects. First, the introduction of the EDF constrains the ability of states to make unilateral decisions with respect to the development of military capabilities in the EU. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of the three initiatives has made it so that the military capability development cannot be reduced to the interests and values of a single member-state. Accordingly, military capability development has become a ‘European’ endeavor in which member-states have made sovereignty concessions in order to strengthen a collective, namely the EU.

In order to account for the establishment of such integrative commitments, a comprehensive approach is required. The analysis examines the extent to which three analytically distinctive and empirically complementary expectations derived from realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism can be substantiated. There are certainly important justifications related to how the security and geopolitical threats facing EU member-states could best be addressed through closer cooperation in the field of security and defence. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and USA’s pivot to Asia was part of the justification for why increased EU-based cooperation in security and defence was seen as being in the interests of EU member-states. However, the neoclassical case for cooperation in the EU does not sufficiently account for the involvement of supranational actors. There are also clear economic justifications for increased cooperation between EU member-states for the purpose of increasing efficiency, coordination, and military systems compatibility. However, the economic case for closer cooperation, coordination, and development of European military capability has been clear for decades and also cannot fully account for why the EU was the preferred framework to address military capability shortcomings and a fragmented defence industry. The inclusion of an analytical expectation that suggests that foreign and security policy decisions are driven by norms and identities is thus necessary if we are to understand recent integrative developments in EU security and defence affairs. This expectation is substantiated by the emergence of a common understanding among EU member-states of a ‘Europe of Defence’ including the incorporation of military power, the emergence of a ‘European identity’ within security and defence, and the adherence among key member-states to a role which involves actively projecting influence on the world stage. The potential importance of this conclusion extends beyond the cases studied here. The Russian war on Ukraine has led to new commitments between member-states in the field of security and defence, with EDIRPA and the European Peace Facility (EPF) being prominent examples.

Relevant questions for future research include whether a stronger case for cost – benefit and strategic interest rationales reduces the need for a normative and identity-based dimension for the establishment of integrative commitments between EU member-states, or, alternatively, to what extent a stronger sense of shared understanding of ‘European togetherness’ reduces the need for strong material or strategic incentives. Furthermore, it would be relevant to understand the extent to which external shocks such as Russia’s war against Ukraine may cause shifts in identity and norms, hence attention should be given to studying how such intervening variables may indirectly stimulate normative and identity-based integration. Researching the presence and strength of normative and identity-based justifications alongside material and strategic justifications for cooperation and integration in the field of European security and defence may thus serve to expand our understanding of how agreement that goes beyond intergovernmental cooperation is possible in the context of core state powers.

Acknowledgement

Thank you to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for financing this research. The research article is part of the research project “The legitimacy of EU foreign and security policy in the age of global contestation” (288707) at ARENA, financed by the Research Council of Norway research initiative “Europe in Transition” (EUROPA).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Note that the EDF, PECSO and CARD are organised differently in the EU institutional structure, both in terms of policy and decision-making. The EDF is under the remit of the Commission, PESCO is predominantly a member-states driven initiative in concert with the EEAS and EDA. The latter institutional structure is the same for CARD.