![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
On 5 and 6 January 1979, US President Jimmy Carter, British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt met on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe. These secret talks à quatre were intended to be a relaxed frank and free exchange on the current state of global politics, though Western security issues lay at the discussions’ heart. As we now know, it had been Schmidt who, behind the scenes, had been pressing the Carter administration to pursue informal (transatlantic) summitry - the Chancellor's preferred modus operandi. In view of growing Euro-strategic imbalances due to Soviet arms build-up, he sought to achieve political co-ordination among the key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) players on the theatre-nuclear-forces-modernisation-cum-arms-control issue. Schmidt's pushiness reflected West Germany's new political assertiveness, but also the Chancellor's desire to personally promote national interests in nuclear politics at the top table (similar to his approach as a shaper of international economic and energy policies). This article will explore why this ‘parley at the summit’ mattered, how within this intimate forum Schmidt pursued his goals, what diplomatic tactics and methods he employed, and to what extent he managed to control and shape proceedings and outcomes.
A draft of this article was first presented as a paper at the Conference: ‘Summitry at the Dawn of the Global Era - Historical Enquiries into the Rise of the G-7 and the European Council’ in Florence in October 2012. I am very grateful to the workshop participants and organizers for their stimulating questions. I am especially indebted to the three anonymous referees for their helpful critique; and to Steve Casey for vivid discussions on summitry and his insightful comments on earlier drafts.
Notes
1. V. Giscard d’Estaing, Le pouvoir et la vie: L’affrontement, II (Paris, 1991), 370–1.
2. See for example J. Ruhfus, Aufwärts: Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen eines diplomatischen Zeitzeugen 1955 bis 1992 (Sankt Ottilien, 2006), 214–15.
3. D. Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century (London, 2007), 6.
4. The exception - for the cold-war period - is the superpower summits as well as the Nixon-Mao encounter in Beijing in 1972 and the Camp David talks in 1978 that have received some attention. On summitry conceptually, see J. Melissen, ‘Pre-Summit Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and the Nassau Conference, December 1962’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vii, no. 3 (1996), 652–87; R. Cohen, Negotiating across Cultures: International Communication in an Independent World, 2nd revised ed. (Washington, D.C., 1999); Reynolds, Summits, 3–10, 370–403; Idem, ‘Summitry as Intercultural Communication’, International Affairs, lxxxv, no. 1 (2009), 115–27; G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy and Theory, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, 2002), 168–86; D.H. Dunn (ed), Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry (London, 1996); K. Eubank, The Summit Conferences, 1919–1960 (Norman, OK, 1966).
5. On the G7, see R.D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits (London, 1984), esp. ch. 2; J.J. Kirton, ‘Introduction: The Significance of the Seven-Power Summit’ in P.I. Hajnal (ed), The Seven-Power Summit: Documents from the Summits of Industrialized Countries 1975–1989 (New York, 1989), xxi–xli; E. Mourlon-Druol, ‘“Managing from the Top”: Globalisation, and the Rise of Regular Summitry, mid-1970s-early 1980s’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, xxiii, no. 4 (2012), 679–703. It is noteworthy, that from 1975 onwards, NATO Council meetings at head-of-state level became much more frequent, but these ‘summits’ effectively represented ‘a routine form in a special form’. See B. Park, ‘NATO Summits’ in Dunn (ed), Diplomacy, 103. On bilateral summits, see J.G. Giauque, ‘Bilateral Summit Diplomacy in Western European and Transatlantic Relations, 1956–63’, European History Quarterly xxxi, no. 3 (2001), 427–45.
6. It is noteworthy that due to the secrecy surrounding Guadeloupe at the time, not least because of this summit's focus on defence, and especially the highly sensitive nuclear affairs, very little material has been declassified (if it exists! Cf. fn. 61). Nevertheless, this author managed to track down papers on the summit preparations in the National Archives (London), and discovered notes on the actual summit talks in the former as well as in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (Berlin) and the Jimmy Carter Library (Atlanta), whereas little of interest on Guadeloupe has thus far turned up in the French archives, the Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), the Helmut Schmidt Archiv at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Bonn), or at the Helmut Schmidt Privatarchiv (Hamburg) as key files simply remain inaccessible.
7. S. Casey, ‘Roosevelt at the Summit: An Examination of FDR's Wartime Diplomatic Style’, 2 (unpublished paper given to the author). See also Melissen, who speaks of a ‘symbiotic relationship between policy and diplomatic method’ in ‘Pre-Summit Diplomacy’, 653.
8. Giscard held that the idea had come to him in ‘autumn 1978’ as he pondered the West's future strategic relations with the USSR. Guadeloupe thus was a French initiative preceded however - as was the French President's ‘rule’ - by ‘une concertation directe franco-allemande’. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 363. See also ibid., 366–8.
9. J. Callaghan, Time and Chance (London, 1987), 541. For the public presentation of Guadeloupe being a US idea, cf. ‘Sieben Regierungschefs nach Jamaika – Wirtschaftsfragen / Der Guadeloupe-Gipfel eine Initiative Carters?’, [F]rankfurter [A]llgemeine [Z]eitung, 14 Dec. 1978; P. Lewis, ‘Rationale for Guadeloupe: No agenda, Many Issues – Iran, SALT, Economy Etc.’, [N]ew [Y]ork [T]imes, 7 Jan. 1979.
10. On German pressure to see European security issues discussed among the ‘big Four’, see H. Möller et al. (eds), A[kten zur] A[uswärtigen] P[olitik] D[eutschlands] 1977. 2 vols. (Munich, 2008), Vol. II, Doc. 318, 1531; memo to President Carter from Z. Brzezinski relates contents of NSC weekly report #36, 11 Nov. 1977, in CK3100099284, DDRS. Cf. Memo, National Security Council—Information: Gregory F. Treverton and Robert Hunter to David Aaron; Subject: Consultations with NATO Allies’, 27 July 1978, [Atlanta,] J[immy] C[arter] L[ibrary], NSA—Brzezinski Material, Carter Presidential Papers—Staff Offices, Agency File, NATO 6–9/78.
11. AAPD 1978/II, Doc. 293, 1457 and 1462 n. 47. It is noteworthy too, that contrary to British thinking, Brzezinski met with Schmidt the day before he consulted with Callaghan in Blackpool on 4 Oct. 1978. See Callaghan, Time, 542. It was indeed Schmidt who raised the summit talks issue with Brzezinski first, and then also with Carter in a telephone conversation on 5 Oct. See also Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit Präsident Carter – Betr.: SALT/Grauzone, Strategie der NATO, Nahostkonflikt und Konferenz von Camp David, Währungsfragen, GATT, 5 Oct. 1978, [Berlin,] P[olitisches] A[rchiv] – A[uswärtiges] A[mt], B[stand] 150. Cf. Z. Brzezinksi, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London, 1983), 294–5; K. Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin, 2005), 261–2. Schmidt keeps himself in his own memoirs in the background and points to Carter's initiative! H. Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte (Berlin, 1987), 231.
12. Cf. Putnam, Hanging Together, 17–23.
13. See also, for example, FM Washington for PS to PM – Telegram no. 4166 of 19 Oct. 1978, 2; John Hunt to Prime Minister: Quadripartite and Grey Areas, 22 Nov. 1978, 1-2, [Kew, London,] T[he] N[ational] A[rchives], PREM 16/1984. Cf. Putnam, Hanging Together, 111.
14. G.H.H. Walden to B. Cartledge – Quadripartite Summit to Discuss Grey area, 27 Oct. 1978, 2; John Hunt to PM – Quadripartite Summit, 30 Oct. 1978, 1, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
15. See for example, ‘Western Summit with a Difference’, NYT, 5 Jan. 1979; ‘Rationale for Guadeloupe: No Agenda, Many Issues – Iran, SALT, Economy Etc.’, NYT, 7 Jan. 1979.
16. Brzezinski, Power, 294–5.
17. Vance to President, 20 Dec. 1978, 3, JCL, NLC-15-119-6-9-9.
18. Record of Conversation, 9, TNA, PREM 16/1984; Cf. G.H.H. Walden to B. Cartledge, 27 Oct. 1978, 1–2; Possible Quadripartite Meeting about Grey Area Systems etc., 30 Oct. 1978, 2, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
19. K. Spohr Readman, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics Western Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, 1977–1979’, Journal of Cold War Studies, xiii, no. 2 (2011), 39–89.
20. H. Schmidt, ‘The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture’, Survival, xx, no. 1 (1978), 2–5.
21. Ibid.
22. Vance to President, 20 Dec. 1978, 3-4, JCL, NLC-15-119-6-9-9. Cf. Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Imperial Hotel, Blackpool, on Wednesday 4 Oct. at 1000 hours, 6, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
23. Ibid.; Spohr Readman, ‘Conflict’, 59–69.
24. Vance to President, 20 Dec. 1978, 2-3, JCL, NLC-15-119-6-9-9.
25. Ibid., 4–5; Callaghan, Time, 543.
26. ‘Vance to President’, 20 Dec. 1978, 1-3, JCL, NLC-15-119-6-9-9.
27. On the conceptual points of what happens at summits among ‘friends’, see Melissen, ‘Pre-Summit Diplomacy’, 655.
28. See Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 180–206; Kristina Spohr Readman, ‘Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, xxi, no. 2 (2010), 259–85.
29. Putnam, Hanging, 23.
30. It is noteworthy that on nuclear questions the British believed in the French looking to London with a certain affinity as the other European nuclear power, and that in the matter of grey-area weapons perhaps Paris would like to stick together with London. See, J.R. Young, UK Embassy (Paris) to P.H. Moberly (FCO) – Consultations with the French on Grey Areas and Conventional Arms’, 3 Nov. 1978, TNA, FCO 46/1823.
31. ‘Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter for “Fritz to Cy – for info; no others, no copies”‘, 17, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
32. Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Imperial Hotel, Blackpool, on Wednesday 4 Oct. at 1000 hours, 9;. B. Cartledge to G.G.H. Walden – The Prime Minister's Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski on 4 Oct.: Grey Area Systems’, 3; G.G.H. Walden to B. Cartledge, 13 Oct. 1978, 1; Telegram no. 3 of 18 Oct. – FM Washington to PS for Prime Minister, 1–2; Possible Quadripartite Meeting about Grey Area Systems etc., 30 Oct. 1978, 2–3; John Hunt to Prime Minister, 3 Nov. 1978, 1–2, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
33. Initially, British Foreign Minister David Owen certainly was less keen on a separate parley as he proposed for the meeting of the four leaders to take place in the margins of the Kingston summit; but Anglo-German bilaterals, including talks between Schmidt and Callaghan, changed this by late October. See W.J.A. Wilberforce to Mr Ferguson PS – Quadripartite Summit, 20 Oct. 1978, 3; Bryan Cartledge to G.G.H. Walden – Prime Minister's discussions with Chancellor Schmidt in Bonn 18/19 Oct.: grey-area systems, 20 Oct. 1978, 3–4, TNA, FCO 46/1822.
34. Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and Chancellor Schmidt in the Federal Chancellery, Bonn, on 19 Oct. 1978 at 0935, 1–14, TNA, PREM, 16/1984; Cf. FM Washington for PS to PM – Telegram no 4166 of 19 Oct. 1978, 1–3; Jay, FM Washington – personal for Secretary of State and Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street– Telegram no. 4261 of 26 Oct., 1-3; G.G.H Walden to B. Cartledge – Mr Manley's summit on North/South relations 28/29 Dec. 1978, 27 Oct. 1978, 1–2; John Hunt to Prime Minister: Quadripartite and Grey Areas, 22 Nov. 1978, 1–2, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
35. Telegram no. 3 of 18 Oct. – FM Washington to PS for Prime Minister, 2, TNA, PREM 16/1984; Brzezinski, Power, 295.
36. Jay, FM Washington – personal for Secretary of State and Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street – Telegram no. 4261 of 26 Oct., 1–3, TNA, PREM, 16/1984.
37. KRS to Prime Minister, 7 Nov. 1978, 1; John Hunt to PM – Quadripartite and Grey Areas, 22 Nov. 1978, 1, TNA, PREM, 16/1984.
38. Jay, FM Washington – personal for Secretary of State and Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street– Telegram no. 4261 of 26 Oct., 2, TNA, PREM, 16/1984.
39. B. Cartledge to G.G.H. Walden – The Prime Minister's Conversation with Dr Brzezinski on 4 Oct.: Grey Area Systems, 1; B. Cartledge to Prime Minister – Possible Quadripartite Meeting about Grey Area Systems etc., 30 Oct. 1978, 1–3, TNA, PREM, 16/1984.
40. See for example, Jay, FM Washington – personal for Secretary of State and Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street– Telegram no. 4261 of 26 Oct., 1; B. Cartledge to G.G.H. Walden, 2 Nov. 1978, 1–2; John Hunt to Prime Minister, 3 Nov. 1978, 1–2; John Hunt to Prime Minister: Quadripartite and Grey Areas, 22 Nov. 1978, 1–2, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
41. Jay, FM Washington – personal for Secretary of State and Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street– Telegram no. 4261 of 26 Oct., 2, TNA, PREM, 16/1984. Cf. B.R. Hawtin, UK NATO Delegation to K.R. Tebbit MOD – Guadeloupe, 22 Dec. 1978, 1, TNA, FCO, 46/1823. In his letter Hawtin asked about Whitehall's arrangements regarding the production of ‘an authoritative record … of whatever discussion and decisions may be taken so that we are not thereafter operating in a vacuum’.
42. Vance to President, 20 Dec. 1978, 1–9, JCL, NLC-15-119-6-9-9. See also, FM Washington for PS to PM – Telegram no. 4166 of 19 Oct. 1978, 1–3, TNA, PREM, 16/1984.
43. J. Melissen, ‘Pre-Summit Diplomacy’, 652–3.
44. Klaus Bölling (in Guadeloupe as part of the West German delegation) quoted by Flora Lewis in her article ‘Britain Will Sell Fighters to China, Callaghan Says at Summit Meeting’, NYT, 6 Jan. 1979.
45. Putnam, Hanging Together, 140. See also Flora Lewis, ‘Summit Talks with a Difference’, NYT, 5 Jan. 1979.
46. ‘Carter to Meet Three West European Leaders in Guadeloupe on Jan. 5–6’, NYT, 8 Dec. 1978.
47. Callaghan, Time, 544; Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 369–2; Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 216. See also F. Lewis ‘Britain will Sell Fighters to China, Callaghan Says at Summit Meeting’, NYT, 6 Jan. 1979.
48. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 372.
49. ‘Carter to Meet Three West European Leaders in Guadeloupe on Jan. 5–6’, NYT, 8 Dec. 1978.
50. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 381–2; Callaghan, Time, 544; Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 216. See also, Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 7, 16, 18, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
51. See for example, ‘Guadeloupe: Idyllic Site for Talks’, NYT, 8 Dec. 1978; Ian Mather, ‘Cockfight and Gireworks’, The Observer, 31 Dec. 1978. Cf. James Reston, ‘Swimming Pool Summit’, NYT, 29 Dec. 1978. See also, T. Smith, ‘Carter and European Leaders Seek to Assure Soviet on Ties to China: At Summit Talks, Britain, France and West Germany Join in Vow That Relations Won't Harm Détente’, NYT, 7 Jan. 1979; R. Held, ‘Die Staatsmänner im Harmoniequartett auf dem Rasen – Die Gespräche in Guadeloupe’, FAZ, 8 Jan. 1979.
52. Callaghan, Time, 544.
53. Brzezinski, Power, 379.
54. O 151837Z US Embassy Paris to White House, Subj: Presidential Visit to Guadeloupe – Press Arrangements, 15 Dec. 1978, JCL, NSA,-Brzezinski Material, #13, Schecter/ Friendly (Press) File, Presidential Trip to Guadeloupe summit 12/78-2/79. See also Callaghan, Time, 544; Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 216; F. Lewis ‘Britain Will Sell Fighters to China, Callaghan Says at Summit Meeting’, NYT, 6 Jan. 1979. I. Aitken, ‘The Island Summit in the Full Glare of Privacy – Mr. Callaghan Flies to the Guadeloupe Today for Talks which were to be Cosy. They may Not Be’, Guardian, 4 Jan. 1979; I. Aitken, ‘China's Jum Jet Deal nears Take-Off’, Guardian, 6 Jan. 1979. There was also much speculation over the agenda, cf. J. Steele, ‘An Island Summit for Four’, Guardian, 8 Dec. 1978; S. Buschschluter, ‘Arms to Dominate Summit’, Guardian, 22 Dec. 1978; ‘The New Agenda for Guadeloupe’, NYT, 5 Jan. 1979; R. Held, ‘Die “großen westlichen Vier” mit einer langen Themenliste – Carter, Callaghan, Giscard und Schmidt beraten / Keine Tagesordnung / Hat die Konferenz einen Sinn?’, FAZ, 6 Jan. 1979.
55. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 372.
56. Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 216.
57. AAPD 1979/1, Doc. 2, 6; Note for the Record: Guadeloupe Summit – by M.J. Vile, 15 Jan. 1979, 1, www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111525 [Accessed 10 October 2012]; Callaghan, Time, 545; Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 216–7.
58. See AAPD 1979/1, Doc. 2, 8–9; Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 5–6, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9; Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 218.
59. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 375.
60. F. Lewis ‘Britain Will Sell Fighters to China, Callaghan Says at Summit Meeting’, NYT, 6 Jan. 1979.
61. Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 216.
62. Ibid. Cf. fn. 5.
63. AAPD 1979/1, Docs 2-3, 5-19; Doc. 5, 22-35; Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, on Friday 5 Jan. 1979 at 16:30 hours, 1-5 TNA, PREM 16/1984; Note for the Record: Guadeloupe Summit – by M.J. Vile, 15 Jan. 1979, 1–3, www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111525 [Accessed 10 October 2012]; Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Third Session on Saturday 6 Jan. 1979 at 0900, 1-2, TNA, PREM 16/1984; Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 1-18, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
64. AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 3, 12-19; Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 1-5, PREM 16/1984; Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 8, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9. Carter notably in his own record does not offer any detail on what he said. Cf. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 375.
65. Callaghan, Time, 546.
66. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 4, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
67. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 7, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
68. AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 2, 7; Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 4, 6, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9; Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 218. Note for the Record: Guadeloupe Summit – by M. J. Vile, 15 Jan. 1979, 2, www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111525 [Accessed 10 October 2012].
69. AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 2, 7.
70. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 1, TNA, PREM 16/1984; Note for the Record: Guadeloupe Summit – by M.J. Vile, 15 Jan. 1979, 2, www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111525 [Accessed 10 October 2012].
71. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 2, TNA, PREM 16/1984; Callaghan, Time, 547. Cf. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 8, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
72. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 2, TNA, PREM 16/1984; Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 8-9, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
73. See Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 9, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9. Carter wrote: ‘Valery said we have to evolve a tactical capability to trade off for the SS-20's, agreeing with me that this was a prerequisite to cutting down the threat to European people of the Soviets [sic!] medium range missile system.’
74. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 3-4, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
75. J. Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982), 235. See also, Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 8, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9, where the final paragraph on said page starts: ‘Helmut was quite contentious.’
76. Brzezinski, Power, 295.
77. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 375. See also Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 219.
78. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 3, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
79. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 9, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
80. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 3, TNA, PREM 16/1984. Cf. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 9, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
81. Ibid. AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 3, 15-18.
82. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 4, TNA, PREM 16/1984. Cf. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 379–80, who claims that the dual track decision was born at the end of this session.
83. AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 3, 17.
84. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 4, PREM 16/1984; Callaghan, Time, 549. Cf. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 379–80.
85. Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 220.
86. AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 3, 17-18; Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Second Session, 5, PREM 16/1984; Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 220; Callaghan, Time, 550.
87. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 10, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
88. Ibid.
89. Callaghan, Time, 550.
90. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 7, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
91. Callaghan, Time, 550.
92. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Third Session, 1, TNA, PREM 16/1984.
93. Ibid., 2; AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 5, 22. Cf. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 10-11, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
94. Extract from Four-Power Discussions in Guadeloupe 5/6 Jan. 1979: Third Session, 1-2, TNA, PREM 16/1984; AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 5, 22.
95. ‘Carter at Summit talks: A Gain in Stature’, NYT, 8 Jan. 1979. Cf. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 383; E. Walsh, ‘Summit Ends in Harmony’, W[ashington] P[ost], 7 Jan. 1979; R. Held, ‘Die Sicherheit verstärken und Spannungen abbauen – Iran, China und der Abschluß des Salt-II-Abkommens die Hauptthemen der Gespräche von Guadeloupe’, FAZ, 8 Jan. 1979.
96. Ibid.
97. T. Smith, ‘Carter and European Leaders Seek to Assure Soviet on Ties to China: At Summit Talks, Britain, France and West Germany Join in Vow That Relations Won't Harm détente’, NYT, 7 Jan. 1979.
98. Personal, brief notes by Jimmy Carter, 16, JCL, NLC-128-4-12-3-9.
99. I. Aitken, ‘Salt to Sugar’, Guardian, 8 Jan. 1979.
100. ‘Carter at Summit talks: A Gain in Stature’, NYT, 8 Jan. 1979. Cf. Giscard, Le pouvoir, II, 383; E. Walsh, ‘Summit Ends in Harmony’, WP, 7 Jan. 1979.
101. AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 5, 35; F. Lewis, ‘Western Summit With a Difference’, NYT, 5 Jan. 1979; Cf. P. Lewis, ‘Rationale for Guadeloupe: No Agenda, Many Issues – Iran SALT, Economy, etc.’, NYT, 7 Jan. 1979; Brzezinski, Power, 295. See also Ruhfus to Bundeskanzleramt, AA, BMVG, Telegram no. 17, 7.1.1979 – Betr: Vierertreffen auf Guadeloupe 5./6.1.1979, 1; Memorandum – Einordnung und Analyse der Grauzonenproblematik, Annex, 19 Jan. 1979, 4, PAAA, B150.
102. Brzezinski, Power, 295–6. Within NATO there was in fact strong criticism expressed also by the Netherlands, that four-power meetings undermined NATO's consultation mechanisms. See Boss to Bonn AA, Telegram no. 68, 18.1.1979 – Betr.: NATO Unterrichtung über Guadeloupe, 1, 3, PAAA, B150.
103. Especially for Callaghan, Guadeloupe proved a PR disaster with fatal political consequences. He had returned tanned and relaxed from the West Indies only to find a country torn by widespread industrial unrest. Callaghan's comments to reporters at London airport denying allegations that Britain was in chaos led to the famous Sun headline, ‘Crisis? What Crisis?’ Though these words were in truth never uttered by him, Callaghan's credibility with his electorate at home was damaged for good and led to his rapid downfall.
104. ‘West is Considering Missile for Europe Able to Hit Soviet: A Reply to Moscow's Buildup – Weapons Discussed at Guadeloupe Parley, Seen as response to SS-20 and New Bomber’, NYT, 20 Jan. 1979. See also H. Stadlmann, ‘Westeuropa muß seinen Standpunkt zu “Salt III” erst erarbeiten – Washington befürchtet Schwierigkeiten bei den Verbündeten’, FAZ, 19 Jan. 1979.
105. The post-Guadeloupe developments are discussed in much greater detail in Spohr Readman, ‘Conflict’, 74–89. On the parallelism of the two strands, see AAPD 1979/I, Doc. 114, 505-9; Jörg Kaempf to Dr. Genschel; Vermerk – Betr.: Gespräch BM Dr. Apel mit dem Bundeskanzler am 20.4.1979 zu Problemen der kommenden NPG Sitzung in Homestead/USA’, 7 May 1979, 3-4, PAAA, B150. Cf. Ruhfus, Aufwärts, 222-6; Giscard, Le pouvoir II, 380.
106. J. Vinocour, ‘Schmidt Says Bonn Assumes Growing Global Role’, NYT, 13 Jan. 1979; See also R. Held, ‘Die Staatsmänner im Harmoniequartett auf dem Rasen – Die Gespräche in Guadeloupe’, FAZ, 8 Jan. 1979.
107. Ibid.
108. Idem, ‘Gingerly, Schmidt Moves to Assume Greater World Role’, NYT, 16 March 1979; P. Jenkins, ‘While Britain declines Germany goes from strength to strength’, Guardian, 6 April 1979.