Towards a political economy of platform-mediated work

Abstract

Platform-mediated work, characterized as digital intermediation between workers and buyers of labour service, most famously exemplified by Uber, reveals how the transformation of the forces of production is reshaping relations of production. Using a political economy approach, this article takes us behind market exchanges between workers, platform operators, and clients to examine who extracts surplus value from workers, and how. It identifies two distinct models based on whether labour is performed locally on the ground or through the cloud.

Keywords:

• Gig economy
• platform capitalism
• platform-mediated work
• political economy
• precarious employment

Notes

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See Trefis Team, “How Could Uber Justify a $120 Billion Valuation?”; Uber, “Company Info.” Uber claims to have 3.9 million drivers worldwide, as of December 2018; Bloomberg, “Uber Technologies Inc.” As of April 29, 2020, Uber’s market capitalization was 54.185B.

2 Tucker, “Uber and the Unmaking,” 357–91.

3 For example, Lawrence Mishel colourfully proposed that “in any conference on the future of work, Uber and PMW deserve at most a workshop, not a plenary.” See Mishel, Uber and the Labour Market, 1.

4 Moulier-Boutang, Cognitive Capitalism; Wark, Capitalism is Dead; Also, for example, see Wittel, “The Political Economy,” 251–75.

5 Moulier-Boutang, Cognitive Capitalism; Wark, Capitalism is Dead.

6 Taxi drivers, who now face displacement by Uber, provide a good example of this phenomenon. See Tucker, “Uber and the Unmaking,” 357–91.

7 Vercellone, “The Becoming Rent of Profit?”

8 Vercellone, “The Becoming Rent of Profit?” 273.

9 Joyce, “Rediscovering the Cash Nexus”; Berg et al., Digital Labour Platforms.

10 Cherry, “Beyond Misclassification”; Prassl and Risak, “Uber, Taskrabbit, & Co.”

11 Joyce, “Rediscovering the Cash Nexus.”

12 Papadimitropoulos, “Beyond Neoliberalism.”

13 Vercellone, “The Becoming Rent of Profit?”; Manohka, “New Means of Workplace Surveillance”; Snider, “How Do I Discipline Thee,” 135–50; Ajunwa, Crawford, and Schultz, “Worker Surveillance.”

14 Vercellone, “The Becoming Rent of Profit?” 273.

15 Coase, “The Nature of the Firm.”

16 Marx, Capital, 123.

17 Vosko and The Employment Standards Research Group, Enforcement Gap, 15.

18 Lewchuk, “Precarious Jobs,” 413; Fudge, “Future of the Standard Employment Relationship.”

19 Healy, Nicholson, and Pekarek, “Should We Take the Gig Economy Seriously?”

20 Lewchuk, “Precarious Jobs,” 403.

21 Yssaad and Ferrao, “Self-Employed Canadians”; Trends in Temporary Employment Calculated from Statistics Canada, Job Permanency, Table: 14-10-0072-01.

22 Srnicek, Platform Capitalism, 43.

23 Schwellnus et al., “Gig Economy Platforms,” para 10.

24 Schwellnus et al., “Gig Economy Platforms,” Table A.2. Other studies include Katz and Krueger, “Understanding Trends”; JP Morgan Chase, “The Online Platform Economy in 2018”; The iLabour Project, “The Online Labour Index.”

25 Florisson and Mandl, Platform Work. There is little work on the PMW in Canada. A 2018 scoping exercise found no peer-reviewed articles on the experiences of Canadian gig workers. See Bajwa et al., “Towards an Understanding,” 15.

26 Re Freshslice Operating Ltd. (c.o.b. Freshslice Pizza), [2002] B.C.E.S.T.D. No. 286; 872538 Ontario Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue, [1993] T.C.J. No. 46, CarswellNat 2364.

27 Hirschberg et al., “The Changing Market for Food Delivery.”

28 Austin, “How Does Uber Eats Make Money?”

29 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks; Scholz, “Platform Cooperativism.”

30 PMW has also found a niche in the sale of sexual services, linking sex workers with clients. See Khaleeli, “At Least Hookers Get Wages.”

31 Marx, Capital, 125.

32 Vercellone, “The Becoming Rent of Profit?” 273.

33 Weil, The Fissured Workplace; Friedman, “Workers without Employers.”

34 Ettlinger, “Paradoxes, Problems.”

35 There are several other typologies on offer. The most similar to mine distinguishes between “geographically tethered work” and “cloudwork.” See Woodcock and Graham, The Gig Economy. I became aware of this important book while making final revisions to this article.

36 Munn, “Cash Burning Machine.”

37 Flanagan, “Theorizing the Gig Economy.”

38 Kessler, Gigged, 127–28.

39 Munn, “Cash Burning Machine.”

40 Durbin, “Restaurant Delivery Jobs.”

41 Dunn, “How Delivery Apps.”

42 JP Morgan Chase, “The Online Platform Economy in 2018”; Mishel, Uber and the Labour Market.

43 Silver, “For Most U.S. Workers”; Jean, “The Causes and Consequences.”

44 Berg et al., Digital Labour Platforms, 37–41.

45 Mishel, Uber and the Labour Market; JP Morgan Chase, “The Online Platform Economy in 2018.”

46 Helling, “How Much do Uber Eats Drivers Make?”; Helling, “How to Become a DoorDash Driver.” For a more positive view, see Hall and Krueger, “An Analysis of the Labor Market.” For a critique and reply, see Berg and Johnston, “Too Good to be True”; see as well Hall and Krueger, “Reply to the Comment.”

47 Woodcock, “The Algorithmic Panopticon”; See also Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin, “Algorithms at Work”; Goods, Veen, and Barratt, “‘Is Your Gig Any Good?’”; Ivanova et al., “Foodora and Deliveroo”; Rosenblat, Uberland.

48 Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin, “Algorithms at Work.”

49 Soron, “Going Shopping,” 276; See also Dawson, The Consumer Trap.

50 Graham, Hjorth, and Lehdonvirta, “Digital Labour and Development,” 140–46 and 153.

51 Berg et al., Digital Labour Platforms, 49.

52 Wood et al., “Good Gig, Bad Gig,” 70.

53 Florisson and Mandl, Platform Work, 23.

54 Hara et al., “A Data-Driven Analysis,” 1–14; Hitlin, “Crowdsourcing Age.”

55 Berg et al., Digital Labour Platforms, xvii.

56 Irani and Silberman, “Turkopticon,” 611–20; Shevchuk and Strebkov, “Safeguards against Opportunism.”

57 Berg et al., Digital Labour Platforms, 99.

58 Morozov, “Cheap Cab Ride?”; Sherman, “Why Uber Can’t Make Money.”

59 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach.

60 Englert, Woodcock, and Cant, “Digital Workerism.”

61 Woodcock and Graham, The Gig Economy, proceeds in the same way.

62 Semuels, “Why #DeleteUber.”

63 Parrott and Reich, An Earnings Standard; Johnston, “Workplace Gains.”

64 Burridge, “Uber Spared from London.”

65 Harvard Law Review Association, “California Adopts the ABC Test”; Dubal, “AB5.”

66 For example, in Uber BV v Aslam, [2018] EWCA Civ 2748 the English Court of Appeal upheld a London employment tribunal’s judgment that Uber drivers were “workers” entitled to protection under the Employment Rights Act. Also, see Lee, “French Court Follows UK.”

67 McGaughey, “Taylorooism”; Cherry and Aloisi, “‘Dependent Contractors.’”

68 Rosenfeld, “ABC to AB 5.” The Rideshare Drivers United is playing an active role in defending the law against state proposition that would grant Uber and Lyft exemptions; see Rideshare Drivers United, “We’re Uber & Lyft drivers.”

69 Canadian Union of Postal Workers v Foodora Inc. d.b.a. Foodora, 2020 CanLII 16750 (ON LRB).

70 Mandryk, “Foodora Canada Saga.” Foodora subsequently settled an unfair labour practice complaint for $3.46 million. See Mojtehedzadeh, “Foodora Couriers Win.” For a different approach in another platform context, see Minter, “Negotiating Labour Standards.”

71 Greenhouse, “On Demand”; Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, “Organizing On-Demand.”

72 Dubal, “Solidarity Unionism.”

73 Conger, Xu, and Wichter, “Uber Drivers’ Day of Strikes.”

74 Irani and Silberman, “Turkopticon,” 611–20; Ettlinger, “Paradoxes, Problems,” 31.

75 Heiland, “Workers’ Voice in Platform Labour.”

Additional information

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Eric Tucker

Eric Tucker teaches in Osgoode Hall Law School at York University in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.