Critical engagements with “Climate Change as Class War”—towards a politics of better

Abstract

In recent years, a schism has emerged within ecosocialist thought on the best way to challenge capitalist responses to the ecological crisis, with modernists on one side and degrowthers on the other. This piece calls for ecosocialists to work past this schism by focusing on common ground and embracing a pluralist Left, wherein both modernist and degrowth currents work collaboratively to gain power by making it clear how confronting capitalism and pursuing ecological sustainability can make our lives better. This paper is part of the SPE Special Theme “Critical Engagements with ‘Climate Change as Class War.’”

Keywords:

• degrowth
• ecological crisis
• ecomodernism
• ecosocialism
• Matthew Huber

Introduction

In recent years, a schism has emerged within ecosocialist thought on the best way to challenge capitalist responses to the ecological crisis, with modernists on one side and degrowthers on the other. The modernist position is well encapsulated in the book Climate Change as Class War: Building Socialism on a Warming Planet by Matthew Huber.¹ Huber argues that to confront the climate crisis, the Left ought to rally around working-class interests, particularly within key high-carbon sectors such as energy and petrochemical industries, as a means of regaining control from private capital and fomenting a major buildout of public infrastructures and industries necessary for decarbonization. Meanwhile, a growing body of ecosocialist degrowth thought has tended to emphasize a downscaling of energy and resource throughput, particularly within the Global North, as the main pathway to address a broader ecological crisis. In this piece, I discuss the need for ecosocialists to work past this schism by focusing on common ground and embracing a pluralist Left wherein both modernist and degrowth currents work collaboratively and strategically to gain power.

Specifically, I call for a de-emphasizing of quantitatively oriented ecopolitics, and instead call for ecosocialists to qualitatively concretize for North Americans how confronting capitalism and pursuing ecological sustainability can make people’s lives better. My argument is framed as a friendly critique of Huber’s book because the latter marks one of the most significant contributions to the debate in terms of prompting the environmentally focused Left in the Global North to think strategically about what it is seeking and how best to get there. Yet my perspective is also informed by readings of other contributions to this debate from degrowthers, which offer compelling critiques about the material limits of green growth and the need to think holistically about capitalism’s ecological crisis.²

The problem with less and more

One of the central criticisms levelled by Huber in the book is of the Left’s embrace of what he calls “the Politics of Less.”³ He encapsulates these politics in a classic André Gorz quote from 1972: “The only way to live better…” Gorz wrote, “is to produce less, to consume less, to work less, to live differently.”⁴ Huber suggests that one key problem with this Politics of Less is that it is incapable of compelling enough popular support among the North American working class, a group that has faced decades of austerity and, for the most part, does not want less.⁵ A Politics of Less is thus “bad strategy”⁶; “this is not a politics that can win,” says Huber.⁷ Instead, he calls for a “Politics of More”—that is, a politics “aligned with the material interests of the working class.”⁸

Here, I agree with Huber that a Politics of Less poses a strategic problem for mobilizing a broad-based and worker-aligned movement in favour of ambitious climate (and other environmental) action—especially in North America and particularly when there are simultaneous political discourses on the table promising green growth. When a Politics of Less is pitted against a Politics of More, it is hard to imagine a majority opting for the former. The fact is that the vast majority of workers—even in the Global North—earn incomes that fall far short of what they believe they would need to be materially “comfortable.”⁹ And it is not just workers; students and retirees are also keen to earn more to pay off debts, pay bills, and purchase goods, and are already cutting back where they can, not to mention enduring relatively high rates of inflation. It thus seems unlikely that the idea of further reductions will be compelling to most. Simply put, a Politics of Less is a hard sell conceptually, so much so that even degrowthers themselves have sought to reframe their own movement to be about “more”—hence recent portrayals of degrowth as “a theory of radical abundance”¹⁰ or the title of Jason Hickel’s recent book Less is More.¹¹

That said, it is equally important to emphasize how the modernist proposal for a Politics of More—if employed in practice—poses a strategic problem for achieving a climatically and biologically safe foundation for humanity later this century. Degrowth criticisms have astutely shown just how destructive a political economy situated around material growth has been for the planet thus far. In this regard, they have emphasized existing scientific research on “planetary boundaries” and the idea of a “safe operating space” for human flourishing¹²—arguing that the only way for everyone in the world to achieve a good life within environmental limits is to adopt redistributive policies and reduce the biophysical footprint of rich countries.¹³ Modernists rebut this point by arguing that growth can be made green through technological innovations that result in the decoupling of wealth creation from its environmental impacts.¹⁴ Degrowthers, however, have shown how even though decoupling is certainly possible in some areas—for instance, economic growth from the deployment of carbon neutral energy generation technologies—decoupling almost never results in genuine ecological sustainability when viewed holistically (beyond, say, carbon emissions or any other single environmental indicator in a specific territorial context).¹⁵ Moreover, degrowthers have shown how, even in cases where decoupling has manifested itself, the trend is far too slow to avoid dangerous levels of ecological damage.¹⁶ It is harder to imagine carbon emissions reaching net zero within the next three decades when global energy use itself continues to grow compared to an alternate scenario in which the rate of total energy use is slowed or stabilized. Thus, a Politics of More is disingenuous about its true sustainability potential. We thus arrive at a roadblock for ecosocialist politics employing quantitative discourses: a Politics of Less is unlikely to compel most North American workers to join in on the Left’s journey, but a Politics of More is unlikely to get the Left to where it is trying to go—a just and sustainable planet for all.

Situating climate breakdown in relation to capitalism and a broader ecological crisis

One recent feature of the ecosocialist schism is that modernists have tended to focus on the climate crisis, while degrowthers have proposed a more holistic interpretation of an ecological crisis that includes climate change as well as other related ecological crises (such as biodiversity decline and ecosystem degradation). This has shaped how both schools of thought have anchored their respective understandings of “the crisis” to their anticapitalist politics. While Huber does indeed call for a broader ecological class consciousness, there is no denying the carbon tunnel vision in the book. For Huber, the “crisis” is fundamentally about the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—he says “emissions are the only measure of ‘winning’ that matters.”¹⁷ Nevertheless, the underlying argument holds for both climate and other ecological crises: winning the fight, he argues, will require us to build power to counterbalance the power of private capital (in particular fossil capital). His central argument is “that this particular power struggle is a class struggle over relations that underpin our social and ecological relationship with nature and the climate itself: [a struggle over] ownership and control of production.”¹⁸

Here, the degrowth critique offers two important addenda as to why capitalism must be challenged if we are to successfully address the climate crisis—one relating to their emphasis upon the urgency underlying decarbonization, and the other relating to their macroecological framing of the crisis. Huber rightly points to the profit motive as a strong countervailing force working against decarbonization, but his framing largely skirts around ongoing policy transformations that are increasingly making decarbonization technologies more profitable and simultaneously making fossil fuel assets more of a financial liability.¹⁹ We are a long way off from a world in which the fossil fuel industry is unprofitable, to be sure, but, in a way, that is the point. This tells us that it is not profit per se that is the problem, but profit mediated by the temporal context of urgently required decarbonization. Put differently, if the climate crisis is solely a matter of reducing emissions and there is no urgent timeline, then class struggle is not required because eventually the slow-burning policy shifts already underway in the global energy sector will yield decarbonization. In other words, the world is on a policy pathway towards decarbonization but it is just far too slow and will produce dire consequences for large swathes of the world’s population in the meantime.²⁰ Mainstream climate-focused economists and technologists have made a strong case that existing science-based capacities in energy technology and behavioural economics are sufficient, or at least close to sufficient, to bring about decarbonization.²¹ But if we are to take the urgent timeline seriously—that is, the notion that globally we need to reach net zero within the next few decades—then arguably some kind of reallocation of control over the relations of production is indeed absolutely necessary to forcibly block fossil capital from its maniacal pursuit of profit. This tells us that the climate crisis is inextricably linked to capitalism through its temporal dimension. This degrowth focus on the urgency of the crisis could work as a friendly amendment to Huber’s claim.

The second contribution to this discussion made by degrowthers relates to their situating the climate crisis within a larger ecological one affecting the earth’s habitability. As they readily point out, it is a mistake to try to separate the climate crisis from other ecological crises, in part because if we are blinded by carbon tunnel vision, then the broader ecological crisis could potentially be exacerbated by our efforts to mitigate climate change.²² We know this from critical analyses of green growth and GHG decoupling and the “rebound effect” that often ensues across an economy from efficiency gains in productivity.²³ This is why there remains no robust evidence in favour of a decoupling of the material footprint of nations from gross domestic product (GDP) growth despite plenty of evidence of a successful decoupling of GHG emissions from economic growth in a handful of countries. This ought to serve as a red flag for ecosocialists about the dangers of embracing growth-oriented approaches to decarbonization, which would not only respond at a snail’s pace to the need for climate change mitigation, but also continue to degrade ecosystems upon which humans rely for their wellbeing. Huber is thus right to target capital and the profit motive central to capitalism and to call for an ecological class consciousness, but in extending the analysis to consider both the urgency of the crisis and its broader ecological dimensions, it becomes clear that growth-oriented responses are inadequate.

Concluding thoughts: towards a politics of better

To reiterate, a Politics of Less is unlikely to be politically compelling in a North American context, particularly when it is up against a Politics of More. But a Politics of More is unlikely to resolve the core dynamics of the capitalist ecology crisis (and hence it produces disingenuous messaging); this is a core conundrum that the ecosocialist Left currently faces. So what is to be done? Can ecosocialists resolve this debate and work towards a mutual synthesis? I suggest that the Left should work towards a politics that focuses not on quantitative issues, but instead starts with qualitative change. We need a Politics of Better! Moreover, as it is evident that a Politics of Better is deeply subjective—which is to say there are many qualitative politics from within the Left—we need to be open to the possibility of a pluralist ecosocialist strategy that is open to different preferences of the future, and particularly cognizant of different geographical and cultural interests. A Politics of Better in, for example, rural Alberta or Texas might look quite different from what it would look like in urban Ontario or New York. In such a pluralist setup, the Politics of Less proponents and the Politics of More proponents should continue to make their cases for the better future worlds they envision, but with the understanding that, in strategic terms, the Left is better off if it first comes together over whatever common ground exists between its various factions to acquire political power.

And there is plenty of common ground! Upon reading some of the qualitative proposals in Huber’s book alongside those put forward by prominent degrowthers,²⁴ it is clear that there are many areas where modernists and degrowthers share ideas for tackling the capitalist ecology crisis. For instance, both schools of thought are generally in favour of:

• Some type of public job guarantee that provides a sense of employment and income security for workers everywhere, and which could be leveraged to advance ecological projects and objectives through state projects aiming to mitigate climate change, enhance community resilience, or pursue sustainable development;

• Strong labour rights, mass unionization, and a demand for shorter work weeks;

• A major overturning of income inequality, such that the absurd disparities in power and wealth in North America are reversed (economic democratization, in short);

• Support for state-led interventions in terms of funding research, development, and the rolling out of technologies for decarbonization and public services supporting ecological remediation;

• The decommodification of social needs and public services. In Huber’s words, this would help “shift power and control … from private to public ownership so that environmental goals can predominate over profits.”²⁵ In Jason Hickel’s words, this would ensure that “high-quality transportation, healthcare, education, and housing, are accessible to all.”²⁶ In either case, it is politically compelling if people receive such goods and services for free.

Again, these are proposals that are highlighted in Huber’s book but have also been vocalized in recent prominent degrowth texts. Huber has previously noted (informally on social media) that he agrees with degrowthers such as Hickel on specific proposals such as these, but that he is nevertheless wary of degrowth’s overall political framework.²⁷ To me, this suggests there is at least enough common ground for a broad-based political coalition among ecosocialists. Here, Huber’s pejorative framing of degrowthers as part of a Professional-Managerial Class who are not aligned with workers is unhelpful and divisive, if not inaccurate.²⁸

Disagreements between modernist and degrowth socialists should be steered towards practical debates on the details of a just transition, such as whether such a future should include nuclear power and carbon capture (as modernists tend to support), or focus primarily on renewables and emissions reductions (as degrowthers want); whether it should incorporate changes to lifestyles in wealthy economies and so-called “demand-side” solutions, or focus primarily on the “hidden abode of production,” as Huber prefers²⁹; whether it should favour high-yield mechanized agriculture, or focus on agroecology and localized food sovereignty movements. Arguably, such debate about details is precisely where this debate should be, so long as it is done in the spirit of open, pluralistic democratic planning, and so long as the Left focuses its eye on the prize: acquiring political power.

In sum, the ecosocialist Left should push for a qualitatively better world where our everyday lives are enhanced through job and income security; enhanced rights, equality, and a better work-life balance; improved access to essential services; a state that serves the interests of workers, students, and the elderly through genuine democracy; and, crucially, a clean, hospitable, and biodiversity-rich environment! The ecosocialist Left can iron out the details later about what to produce, how to produce it, where and how much etcetera. First, the Left must acquire political power, and to do that it needs to move past the current schism within ecosocialist thought. Huber’s book has played an important role in laying the groundwork for these types of collaborative conversations and spirited friendly debates—let us make sure the Left keeps its sights on both where it is going and how to get there.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ryan Katz-Rosene

Ryan Katz-Rosene teaches in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

Notes

1 Huber, Climate Change as Class War.

2 In particular, Hickel, Less Is More; Schmelzer, Vetter, and Vansintjan, The Future Is Degrowth; Löwy et al., “For an Ecosocialist Degrowth”; Parrique et al., Decoupling Debunked.

3 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 38.

4 Gorz, Ecology as Politics, 68–9.

5 Phillips, Austerity Ecology and Collapse-Porn Addicts.

6 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 173.

7 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 175.

8 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 175.

9 Winters, “Here’s How Much Money”; Tanner, “How Much Money?”; Ceridian, “Ceridian Study Finds Financial Stress.”

10 Hickel, “Degrowth.”

11 Hickel, Less Is More.

12 Rockström et al., “Safe and Just Earth System Boundaries.”

13 Hickel, “Is It Possible to Achieve a Good Life?”

14 Samuel, “How to Slash Carbon Emissions.”

15 Haberl et al., “A Systematic Review”; Vadén et al., “Decoupling for Ecological Sustainability.”

16 Parrique et al., Decoupling Debunked.

17 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 2.

18 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 3.

19 Semieniuk et al., “Stranded Fossil-Fuel Assets.”

20 Climate Action Tracker, “Temperatures” https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/; International Energy Agency, Global Energy and Climate Model.

21 Bataille et al., “A Review of Technology.”

22 For example, see Riofrancos et al., “Achieving Zero Emissions.”

23 Schmelzer, Vetter, and Vansintjan, The Future Is Degrowth, 87.

24 Hickel, “Degrowth and MMT.”

25 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 208.

26 Hickel, “Degrowth and MMT.”

27 Huber, Matt [@Matthuber78], “@ryankatzrosene @jasonhickel @TedNordhaus. I’m all for decommodification/shorter work week (and like Jason’s arguments for those). But those are very specific demands and the piece is trying to get at more general patterns of thought/politics.”

28 Ahern, “Environmentalists Need Unions.”

29 Huber, Climate Change as Class War, 58.