The Holy Grail of Democratic Policing

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Notes

[Disclosure Statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.]

1 See Van Maanen, “Working the Street,” 85.

2 Our discussion here focuses on discretionary searches, but we believe that the same points would apply equally well—or even better—to other areas to which Friedman directs attention (such as SWAT deployments).

3 See Bar-Gill and Friedman, “Taking Warrants Seriously,” 1664–6.

4 See Eith and Durose, Contacts between Police and Public, 3, table 3. More than half of the searches were conducted with the driver’s consent, though fewer than half of those searches were perceived by drivers as legitimate. Most drivers (97%) were not arrested and most searches (86%) did not yield evidence of a crime.

5 See Paoline and Terrill, “Impact of Police Culture,” 466, Table V.

6 On the theoretical deficiencies of this research, see Engel, Calnon, and Bernard, “Theory and Racial Profiling.”

7 See Gould and Mastrofski, “Suspect Searches.” We would not suppose that observers can be trained to reliably distinguish illegal from legal searches. And it would be very difficult to build into an observation protocol all of the factors that police might consider in forming probable cause. For some such factors, see Engel and Johnson, “Toward a Better Understanding.”

8 See Gould and Mastrofski, “Suspect Searches,” 344.

9 Ibid., 345.

10 See Heffernan and Lovely, “Evaluating the Fourth Amendment”; Memory and Smith, Line Police Officer Knowledge.

11 See President’s Commission, The Challenge of Crime, esp. 103–4. Also see Remington, “The Role of Police.”

12 Goldstein, “Police Policy Formation,” 1130.

13 Caplan, “The Case for Rulemaking,” 502.

14 Ibid., 504.

15 See Kelling, “Broken Windows” and Discretion, 25–31.

16 Ibid., 28.

17 Ibid., 29.

18 Ibid.

19 Caplan, “The Case for Rulemaking,” 512.

20 See Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy. On the capacity of front-line workers to thwart hierarchical control, see Prottas, “Power of the Street-Level Bureaucrat.”

21 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 168.

22 See Walker, Taming the System, 25–33. Walker mentions the control movement on page 145.

23 See Fyfe, “Administrative Interventions.”

24 Walker, Taming the System, 28.

25 See Zimring, When Police Kill, chap. 6.

26 Goldstein, “Police Policy Formation,” 1130.

27 See Walker and Archbold, New World of Police Accountability, chap. 3.

28 Ibid., 78. For the evidence on force policies, see Terrill and Paoline, “Less Lethal Force.” Also see Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform, 190–2.

29 Thacher, “Channeling Police Discretion,” 544.

30 Caplan, “The Case for Rulemaking,” 509.

31 See Caren, “Big City, Big Turnout?”; Hajnal and Lewis, “Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout.”

32 See Hajnal and Trounstine, “Where Turnout Matters”; Trounstine, “Turnout and Incumbency.”

33 See Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.

34 See Prothro and Grigg, “Fundamental Principles.”

35 See Gibson, “Measuring Political Tolerance.” Also see Davis and Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security.”

36 See Hetherington and Suhay, “Authoritarianism, Threat, and Support.”

37 Generally, see Meyer and Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations”; Scott, Institutions and Organizations; and Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy.” On police see Crank, “Watchman and Community”; Crank and Langworthy, “An Institutional Perspective”; Katz, “Police Gang Unit”; Maguire and Katz, “Loose Coupling and Sensemaking”; Mastrofski and Ritti, “Police Training”; Worden and McLean, “Research on Police Legitimacy”; and Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform, especially chap. 2.

38 Zimring, When Police Kill, 219.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., 239.

41 Walker, “Governing the American Police,” 616. Emphasis in original.

42 Walker, Police Accountability, 9.

43 See https://www.policingproject.org/democratic-policing/.