The ‘conceit of controllability’: nuclear diplomacy, Japan’s plutonium reprocessing ambitions and US proliferation fears, 1974-1978

ABSTRACT

US-Japanese nuclear diplomacy on plutonium reprocessing was a means by which both attempted to assert control. For Japan, this meant control over its energy supplies and the status associated with advanced nuclear power technology. Japan had emerged as an economic giant but had accepted a diminution in status by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was determined not to have its access to cutting edge nuclear power technology curtailed. The US sought to control the spread of a technology which would produce plutonium and consequently, it was feared, increase the chances of weapons proliferation. Washington’s diplomatic gambit, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, attempted to use ‘neutral’ science for political ends. However, Tokyo was able to ally with partners to frustrate Washington’s ambitions. In the long-term Japan did not score a victory since the hopes of reprocessing were not realized. Ultimately, neither was able to assert control.

KEYWORDS:

• Euratom
• IAEA
• INFCE
• plutonium reprocessing
• Tokai-mura

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Martin Bullock, Bill Burr, Taka Daitoku, Toshihiro Higuchi, Kenji Ito, Nick Kapur, Gisela Mateos, Maria Rentetzi, Amy Slaton and the anonymous reviewer for History and Technology for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Research for this project was part funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, project no. IZSEZ0_184774 and by Franklin University Switzerland’s Faculty Development Fund. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Society for Historians of America’s Foreign Relations annual conference, June 2018, the Nuclear Diplomacies workshops at SOKENDAI, Japan in November 2018 and in Athens, May 2019, organized by Kenji Ito and Maria Rentetzi, and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, April, 2019. Special thanks to the Wilson Center, especially Christian Osterman and Chuck Kraus, for hosting me during my research leave in Spring 2019.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. On the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation see Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation,” on the wider dangers of the nuclear age see Sagan, The Limits of Safety. For a counter argument and debate on these issues see, Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. On the failings and shortcomings of the international nuclear order see Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment.”

2. On status and prestige in international relations see Paul et al., Status in World Politics. On the use of nuclearity for status and prestige see Hecht, The Radiance of France.

3. See Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition.”

4. Hecht, The Radiance of France.

5. The Royal Society, New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy.

6. See Proctor, Value-Free Science? on the enduring links between scientific inquiry and political concerns. On the close links between science and the military establishment in mid-twentieth century America and the effects these wrought, see Needell, Science, Cold War, and the American State. For a recent discussion of these issues, see Doel, et al., (eds.), The Historiography of Contemporary Science.

7. Mateos and Suárez-Díaz, “Atomic Ambassadors.”

8. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Record Group 59, Subject Files of the Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters (Gerard C. Smith), Box 17, Tokai Mura Agreement, 9/12/77, Ogiso Motoo speech to UN Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, August 11, 1977.

9. Vance to Carter, “Official Visit by Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda,” March 17, 1977. Digital National Security Archive, Japan and the United States, proquest.com, doc. no. JA00183. Vance to Carter, “Nuclear Processing for Japan Discussion,” March 20, 1977, DNSA, JA00185.

10. On Washington’s declining influence see Tomotsugu, “After the Hegemony of the “Atoms for Peace” Programme.”

11. On US policy formation see Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation; Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation”; see also Smith, Disarming Diplomat; on Japan’s diplomacy see Endo, Nichibei Genshiryoku Kyōtei (1988); and Takeda, “Keizai Taikoku”; on Japan’s nuclear energy policies see Tsuneishi, Nihon no Genshi Ryoku Jidai; on US nuclear power diplomacy see Burr, “A Scheme of “Control,”; and Rabinowitz and Sarkar, “US and French pledges.”

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15. There is a growing body of literature on challenges to the NPT order from the Global South; Craig, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon’s Programme; Sabet, “The April 1977 Persepolis Conference”; Alvandi, “A Ford, Not a Nixon”; Sarkar, “India’s Nuclear Limbo”; and Patti, “Brazilian Perspectives on Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

16. Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe; and Krige and Sarkar, “US Technological Collaboration for Non-proliferation.”

17. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft; and Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid.

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25. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, 274–275.

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30. “Japan: Signature of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” February 3, 1970, Accessed March 19, 2019, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/japan/sig/london.

31. “Waga Kuni no Gaikō Seisaku Taikō” [The Fundamental Principles of Japan’s Foreign Policy], September 25, 1969, “Kaku o motometa Nihon,” doc. no. 2, Accessed March 6, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokoku/pdfs/kaku_hokoku02.pdf.

32. “Waga Kuni no Gaikō Seisaki Taikō.”

33. DAJ, Nichi-IAEA Kokusai Genshiryoku Kikan to no kakuheiki fukakusan jōyaku (NPT jōyaku) dai san-jō 1 oyobi 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei)/kokkai shingi, hijun), 2014–2754, “NPT Hoshō Sochi Kyōtei,” [NPT Safeguards Agreement] [n.d. c. 1976].

34. “The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 Between Japan and the IAEA.”

35. DAJ, Kokusai genshiryoku kikan no kakuheiki fukakusan jōyaku (NPT) dai san-jō 1 oyobu 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei), 2011–0746, ‘Opening Statement by Ambassador Sugihara in the Exploratory Talk on the NPT Safeguards Agreement’ [n.d., c. June 1972].

36. DAJ, Shogaikoku IAEA kokusai genshiryoku kikan to no kakuheiki fukakusan jōyaku (NPT jōyaku) dai san-jō 1 oyobi 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei), 2011–0749, Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy in Austria, ‘Dai Yon Kai NPT Sochi Hōshō Kyōtei Yobi Kōshō’ [NPT Safeguards Agreement Preliminary Discussions, fourth round], 15 November 1973.

37. See the following folders, DAJ, Kokusai genshiryoku kikan no kakuheiki fukakusan jōyaku (NPT) dai san-jō 1 oyobu 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei), 2011–0753 and 2011–0754.

38. Krige, “EURATOM and the IAEA.”

39. Fisher, “IAEA/EURATOM Agreement.”

40. Takaki Kiichiro, “Kokunai hōshō sochi seidō no sōgōtekina jisshōjiken keikaku no jisshi nitsuite,” [On implementing the general proof of concept experiment plan of the domestic safeguard system],” Kaku Busshitsu Kanri News: Nuclear Material Control News 5, no. 12 (December 25, 1976): 1–2; Imai Ryukichi, “Dai 3-kai hoshō sochi gijutsu shimon iinkai,” [Third safeguards technical advisory committee meeting],” Kaku Busshitsu Kanri News: Nuclear Material Control News 5, no. 12 (December 25, 1976): 3–4, copy in DAJ, Kokusai genshiryoku kikan no kakuheikifukakusanjōyaku (NPT) dai san-jō 1 oyobu 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei), 2011–0753.

41. Endicott, “The 1975–76 Debate”; and Hoey, “Non-nuclear Japan?”

42. DAJ, Kokusai genshiryoku kikan no kakuheikifukakusanjōyaku (NPT) dai san-jō 1 oyobu 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei)/yobi kōshō [Agreement with the IAEA under article 3 sections 1 and 4 of the NPT (safeguards agreement)/preliminary discussions], 2011–0751, Sigvard Eklund to Fujiyama Naraichi, March 19, 1975.

43. Imai Ryukichi to Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee, National Diet of Japan, 17 June 1975, Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku System [Proceedings of the National Diet of Japan Search System] Accessed March 21, 2019. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.

44. For wide ranging changes in US non-proliferation policy caused by India’s test see United States National Security Council NSSM 202, Study Group, US Non-Proliferation Policy, 23 May 1974, DNSA, doc. no. PR01261.

45. “Canada links uranium supply, NPT ratification,” Kyodo in English, April 19, 1976, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Accessed March 22, 2019, https://infoweb.newsbank.com; and DAJ, Nichi-IAEA kokusai genshiryoku kikan to no kakuheiki fukakusan jōyaku (NPT jōyaku) dai san-jō 1 oyobi 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei)/kokkai shingi, hijun), 2014–2754, Waga Kuni no NPT Hijyun ni kansuru Bei-gawa no Ugoki [US moves on Japan’s NPT ratification], February 21, 1976.

46. Endicott, “The 1975–76 Debate,” 291; Imai to Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee, National Diet of Japan, 17 June 1975, Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku System, Accessed March 21, 2019. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.

47. DAJ, Nichi-IAEA kokusai genshiryoku kikan to no kakuheiki fukakusan jōyaku (NPT jōyaku) dai san-jō 1 oyobi 4 no jisshi kyōtei (hoshō sochi kyōtei)/kokkai shingi, hijun, 2014–2754, “Kaku Joyaku Hijun no Hitsu Yosei” [The need to ratify the NPT], Nov. 1975.

48. Kusumi Tadao to Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee, National Diet of Japan, June 17, 1975, Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku System, Accessed March 21, 2019. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.

49. See Endicott, “The 1975–76 Debate.”

50. Japan: Ratification of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 8 June 1976, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Accessed March 22, 2019. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/japan/rat/london.

51. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation; and Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation.”

52. Burr, ‘A Scheme of “Control’,” 271.

53. NARA, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Lot 77D112, box 368, WL Sensitive Non-China, 1/1/76-7/31/76, Charles Robinson to The Secretary, July 23, 1976, Nuclear Proliferation.

54. US Embassy Tokyo cable 9388 to State Department, July 14, 1975, Regional Reprocessing, NARA, Access to Archival Databases [AAD], Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Cables,1973–1979, acc. 29 July 2019, aad.archives.gov; US Mission IAEA cable 6382 to State Department, 25 July 1975, Regional Reprocessing Centers, AAD; US Embassy Tokyo cable 16,161 to State Department, November 11, 1975, Tokyo Bilateral Approach on Regional Fuel Cycle Centers, AAD.

55. NARA, RG 59, Lord Files, Lot 77D112, box 368, WL Sensitive Non-China, 1/1/76-7/31/76, Winston Lord to The Secretary, 9 July 1976.

56. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, 108–113.

57. Teltsch, “Carter Proposes a Nuclear Limit.” See also Carter, Why Not the Best?, 153.

58. Gerald R. Ford, “Statement on Nuclear Policy,” October 28, 1976; and Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, Accessed July 28, 2019. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-nuclear-policy.

59. NARA, RG 59, Lord Files, Lot 77D112, box 367, September 1976, Charles Robinson to The Secretary, [n.d. Sep. 1976], Supplier Consultations on Nuclear Policy Review; State Department Cable 243,171 to US Embassy Tokyo, October 1, 1976, Anticipated Presidential Nuclear Policy Statement, AAD. On Japanese reactions see, US Embassy Tokyo Cable 16,610 to the State Department, 9 November 1976, Initial Reaction of Key Japanese Nuclear Officials to Presidential Nuclear Policy Statement, AAD; US Embassy Tokyo Cable 17,966 to the State Department, December 7, 1976, US Reprocessing Issues with Japan, AAD.

60. “Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,” February 26, 1968. Atomic energy (cooperation for civil uses), 19 U.S.T. 5214 (1968), Hein Online, Accessed April 3, 2019, https://heinonline.org.

61. State Department cable 277,222 to US Embassy London, November 11, 1976, Outstanding Reprocessing Issues with Japan, AAD; State Department cable 293,589 to US Embassy Tokyo, December 2, 1976, Bureaus’ Daily Activity Reports, AAD.

62. US Embassy Tokyo Cable 16,610 to the State Department, November 9, 1976, Initial Reaction of Key Japanese Nuclear Officials to Presidential Nuclear Policy Statement, AAD; State Department cable 293,589 to US Embassy Tokyo, December 2, 1976, Bureaus’ Daily Activity Reports, AA; US Embassy Tokyo Cable 17,966 to the State Department, December 7, 1976, US Reprocessing Issues with Japan, AAD.

63. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, 161–171; Brzezinski to the Cabinet, undated [c. May 1977], FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, ed. Adam. M. Howard, doc. no. 78, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d78. See also Carter, Why Not the Best?, 153.

64. ‘Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,’ 26 February 1968.

65. Jimmy Carter Library [JCL], Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Box 41, Weekly Reports (to the President), 1–15 (2/77-2/77), Brzezinski to the President, Weekly National Security Report #2, February 26, 1977.

66. Vance to Carter, “Nuclear Processing for Japan Discussion,” March 20, 1977, DNSA, JA00185.]

67. JCL, Donated Material, ZB Collection, Subject File, Box 41, Weekly Reports (to the President), 1–15 (2/77-2/77), Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, Weekly National Security Report #2, February 26, 1977.

68. The terms were coined by Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, 124–128. See also William Burr (ed.), ‘Japan Plutonium Overhang Origins and Dangers.’

69. Jimmy Carter, ‘Nuclear Power Policy Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Decisions Following a Review of US Policy,’ April 7, 1977; and Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, Accessed June 22, 2020. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/nuclear-power-policy-remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-decisions.

70. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, 143–144.

71. Henry Kamm, “Tokyo Aide Hints at Bad Faith by US in Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, May 17, 1977.

72. Smith, Disarming Diplomat, 196.

73. Holbrooke to Smith and Nye, “The Politics of Tokai Mura,” August 19, 1977, DNSA, doc. no. JA00260; Mansfield to Vance, “The Reprocessing Issue and the Future of US-Japanese Relations,” July 12, 1977, DNSA, doc. no. JA00223 (emphasis in original).

74. Brzezinski to Carter, “Tokai Decision,” August 22, 1977, DNSA, JA00262. Carter wrote ‘True’ beside this in the memo.

75. “Japan: Atomic Energy: Reprocessing of Special Nuclear Material,” September 12, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 8008, Hein Online, Accessed April 3, 2019. https://heinonline.org; “US And Japan Agree on Tokyo’s Opening of Atom Fuel Plant,” New York Times, September 2, 1977; NARA, RG 59, Gerard Smith Papers, Box 17, Tokai Mura Agreement, 9/12/77, “US-Japan Tokai Mura Agreement,” September 12, 1977; and Andrew H. Malcolm, “Japanese Town Gets Atom Plant and a New Lease of Life,” New York Times, September 14, 1977.

76. Brzezinski to Carter, “Tokai Decision,” August 22, 1977, DNSA, JA00262; see also NARA, RG 59, Smith Papers, Box 17, Tokai Mura Agreement, 9/12/77. In a sign of good faith, and in order to keep negotiations on track, Japan signalled its plans to stall the construction of a plutonium conversion plant (a necessary step in the creation of usable fuel) in order to underscore how its operations at Tokai-mura would remain ‘experimental.’ Smith to Vance, August 31, 1977, DNSA, doc. no. JA00285.

77. Smith, Disarming Diplomat, 197.

78. Ibid., 194.

79. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, 123–128.

80. Jimmy Carter, “International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Remarks at the First Plenary Session of the Organizing Conference,” October 19, 1977; Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, Accessed August 19, 2018. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6809.

81. “Final Communiqué of the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation,” October 21, 1977; International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Summary Volume, 259–260.

82. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, “French Nonproliferation Policy,” [n.d.] in FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 26, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, ed. Chris Tudda, doc. no . 356, Accessed March 31, 2019. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v26/d356.

83. INFCE Summary Volume, 2.

84. Ibid., 23–24, 146–155.

85. NARA, Record Group 383, Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. INFCE Working Group Reports, 1977–1980, box 1, ‘INFCE Working Group 4, Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling, Recycle, Progress Report Submitted to the TCC,’ 19 May 1978.

86. NARA, RG 383, INFCE WG Reports, 1977–1980, box 1. Dr. W[alter]. Marshall and Dr. S[higefumi]. Tamiya, “Task 7: To Judge the Degree of Proliferation Resistance,” January 4, 1979. Working Group 4: Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling, Recycle. Subgroup 4A: Reprocessing.

87. NARA, RG 383, INFCE WG Reports, 1977–1980, box 1. Contribution of India, “Comments on Paper Co-Chairmen/WG. 4/41 (A,B) – International and Institutional Aspects of Reprocessing and Plutonium Management,” Co-Chairmen/WG. 4/58, November 29, 1978.

88. NARA, RG 383, INFCE WG Reports, 1977–1980, box 2. “Proliferation Resistance Assessment of Thermal Recycle Systems,” US Contribution, INFCE, Co-Chairmen/WG-4/97 (A, B), January 19, 1979.

89. Ibid., Emphasis in original.

90. Ibid.

91. “Summary of Working Group 4: Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling,” Recycle, INFCE Summary Volume, 138–156.

92. NARA, RG 383, INFCE Historical Documents, 1977–1980, box 1, INFCE WG 4: Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling, Recycle, Draft Final Report, 31 May 1979.

93. “Summary and Overview: A report of the Technical Co-ordinating Committee to the Final INFCE Plenary Conference,” 1–53, ‘Summary of Working Group 4: Reprocessing, plutonium handling, recycle,’ 137–156, INFCE Summary Volume.

94. See note 92 above. 1979.

95. Though Brzezinski tried to put a positive gloss on the results in a report to Carter, it was clear that the main thrust of US policy, convincing its partners of the proliferation threat inherent in reprocessing, had not been successful. JCL, Donated Material, ZB Collection, Subject File, Box 42, Weekly Reports (to the President), 102–120 (7/79-12/79), Brzezinski to the President, Weekly National Security Report #117, 16. Nov. 1969.

96. Gordin, “US Ready to Tell Japan.”

97. See Acton, Wagging the Plutonium Dog.