The Making of Mind

Abstract

To understand how human beings come to have the mental faculties that they do, one would do well to consider the making of mind in at least two senses. First, an evolutionary perspective promises to specify what distinguishes Homo sapiens from nonhuman primate kin, and to set whatever is unique against a background of psychological abilities that we share with our ancestral relatives. Second, an account of individuals’ development from infancy onwards should enable one to see how humans’ species-specific biological endowment dovetails with what the environment provides to yield specifically human psychological capacities. In this article, I argue that to arrive at an overarching theoretical explanation, we should set the capacity to identify with the attitudes of other people at the very core of evolutionary and developmental accounts.

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Notes on contributors

R. Peter Hobson

Dr. Hobson is Member of San Francisco Center for Psychoanalysis and British Psycho-Analytical Society, and Emeritus Tavistock Professor of Developmental Psychopathology in the University of London, UCL.