Governing green urbanism: The case of Shenzhen, China

ABSTRACT

Mainstream green urbanism is usually advocated for overcoming climate change and responding to the challenges of socioeconomic polarization in a market-dominated society. The purpose of Shenzhen’s pursuit of green urbanism is different. Shenzhen has formulated various incarnations of plans to direct its development. In the 1980s, land was allocated to state-owned enterprises to initiate developments in 5 clusters separated by natural green corridors. However, the reintroduction of a land market in the late 1980s and the expansion of the special economic zone to cover the rural county in the 1990s led to sprawling economic growth and massive influx of migrant population, resulting in land shortage and low productivity. Since the 2000s, various planning-related measures and technical requirements have been introduced to resurrect “clustered developments” through constructing new ecological districts and redeveloping existing settlements. These projects help boost land supply and productivity but they also raise questions of “place-breaking” and displacement of migrant population.

Modes of urban governance conducive to the development of green urbanism in the Western context (Beatley, 2012), and from a generally theoretical perspective, have been the subject of a growing body of literature (Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009; Bulkeley, Castan-Broto, Hodson, & Marvin, 2011; Floater, Rode, Friedel, & Alexis, 2014; Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014; Khan, 2013; World Bank, 2014). Yet, few studies examine in detail the genesis and developing practices of green urbanism within an existing and evolving mode of governance in a market economy (Newman & Matan, 2013), not to mention a socialist transitional market economy, such as in China. This study attempts to fill this gap through a case study of Shenzhen, the first special economic zone (SEZ) when China adopted its open door policy in the late 1970s and currently China’s first low-carbon ecocity. Shenzhen can be described as an almost “instantly developed” SEZ in the 1980s. In the 1990s, Shenzhen expanded its territory to absorb its surrounding rural county and the subsequent explosive growth and sprawling urbanism attracted a huge migrant population and led to sprawling urban developments within and outside the SEZ. The city’s development at the turn of the millennium was increasingly constrained by a severe shortage of land supply, low-status population, and poor environmental conditions, especially in the districts outside the SEZ. This article argues that spatial planning, from the formulation of master plans to the latest drive toward low-carbon ecocity development, has been an important tool to guarantee the supply of land at key historical junctures in the past decades of development.

Following this Introduction, literature on governing green urbanism is synthesized to highlight the importance of a need to reframe development in the face of climate change and of socioeconomic polarization to produce environmentally sustainable, economically inclusive, and socially just societies. Compared with the textbook understanding of green urbanism, Shenzhen’s pathway toward greener growth is rather different. Shenzhen was created as an SEZ in 1980 to spur market-led economic growth for the then failing centrally planned economy. Although the original plans had tried to integrate urban growth to take into account local ecological conditions, 2 decades of incessant economic growth and territorial expansion led to extensive development of land that yielded less than satisfactory economic return. The story is complicated by the differentiation of state-owned urban land and collectively owned rural land, which is managed at the local level and cannot be transacted freely in the market. Hence, instead of reframing development to achieve multifaceted development goals, it is argued that Shenzhen’s adoption of green urbanism is an attempt to boost land supply and spur higher value-added economic growth. The article then concludes the discussion of this mode of governing green urbanism and raises questions on the merit of wholesale redevelopment and the migrant population’s rights to the city.

The observations and analysis that follow are based on research work done on Shenzhen for almost 2 decades. In addition to desktop research and analysis of statistical and historical data, information on low-carbon development initiatives was collected during interviews with local planners and academics in Shenzhen, as well as from attending the Third International Low-Carbon City Forum held in Shenzhen, June 17–18, 2015.

Governing green urbanism

According to the IPCC (2014), “Urban areas accounted for 67–76% of global energy use and 71–76% of global energy-related CO₂ emissions” (p. 90), and without mitigation, global mean surface temperature will increase 3.7°C to 4.8°C by 2100. Indeed, since the industrial revolution, urban areas have released large quantities of greenhouse gases through industrial developments, construction, transportation, and household and related activities (Bulkeley et al., 2011). It has been largely agreed that cities are part of the climate change problem and also a key part of its solution, especially when integrated policies are in place (IPCC, 2014; Kamal-Chaoui & Robert, 2009; UN Habitat, 2011). Because more than half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas and the urban population will continue to increase, more new urban areas will be developed. Urban land cover, according to the IPCC (2014), is projected to expand by 56–310% between 2000 and 2030. The United Nations (UN, 2014) estimated that by 2050, urban population in Asia alone will increase by 61%; that is, 1.28 billion. Hence, how cities are going to be built and (re)developed will be vital for humankind in combating climate change.

Changing development directions is always a highly political issue. As argued by Bulkeley et al. (2011), accomplishing low-carbon transitions is not only a matter of policy or “niche experimentation” but a “reconfiguration of socio-technical networks—a process that is at once highly political and open to contestation and disruption” (p. 30). Governing the transition toward low-carbon urbanism requires political determination by a national government to develop normative regulatory frameworks; regional governments to promote measures that yield multidimensional benefits; local governments to effectively manage green, inclusive, and sustainable infrastructure and urban development; and the involvement of all public–private–third sector stakeholders to engage in institutional and behavioral changes to support low-carbon living (Bulkeley et al., 2011; United Nations Development Programme, 2009; World Bank, 2010, 2014).

A transition to green urbanism indeed challenges the predominant consumer culture and demands that humankind pursue spatial developments that reconnect individuals to the social and natural environments (IPCC, 2014; Valsson, 2000). In addition to respecting the natural landscape and its embedded resource cycles in designing and developing urban settlements, green and low-carbon considerations should be embedded within each stage of a project cycle, from inception to decommission. Green urbanism requires creative and integrated urban solutions that yield multiple benefits in the development process (IPCC, 2014). Examples include “co-locating high residential with high employment densities, achieving high diversity and integration of land uses, increasing accessibility and investing in public transit” (IPCC, 2014, pp. 90–91; see also Bigio & Dahiya, 2004; Rode et al., 2014). It calls for an inclusive development that addresses simultaneously economic development, environmental concerns, and social justice. Yet, this would require strong spatial planning and political and financial competencies at the city level to integrate climate mitigation measures with land use and transportation planning (IPCC, 2014). Similarly, Floater et al. (2014) advocated the 3C model of urban development: compact urban growth, connected infrastructure, and coordinated multilevel governance. Though Shenzhen also pursues a similar 3C model of urban development, the genesis and trajectory of its story of governing green urbanism are different.

“Instant city” Shenzhen and its pathway toward green urbanism

Shenzhen SEZ’s miraculous growth in the unique context of China’s evolving political economy

The Shenzhen SEZ (SSEZ), together with three other SEZs, were set up by the Chinese Communist Party cum state in 1979 as part of the economic reforms to redeem a demoralized society and a shortage economy after decades of political turmoil. Before the SSEZ was set up in 1980, Shenzhen was just a rural border town in Bao’an County. Its total population then was only 300,000 (Shenzhen Museum, 1999). When it was first set up, the SSEZ occupied only 327.5 km² out of a total land area of 2,020 km². By 1993, the rest of the rural Bao’an County was administratively transformed into two urban districts within the Shenzhen municipality. In 2010, the SSEZ was integrated with the two districts (which were further subdivided into new management districts; Figure 1). As a result, population of the city has grown by leaps and bounds, from 1.95 million in 1990 (Shenzhen Museum, 1999) to 10.6 million in 2013 (Shenzhen Statistical Bureau, 2014). The percentage of nonregistered population¹ has grown over the years from a mere 3.6% in 1980 to 71% in 2013 (Figure 2). The dramatic growth and development of Shenzhen is illustrated in Figure 3. In the 33 years from 1980 to 2013, gross domestic product has grown 5,370 times; investment in fixed assets 1,716 times; total financial appropriation of investment in fixed assets 2,741 times; foreign direct investment 182 times; and total imports and exports 26,874 times (Shenzhen Statistical Bureau, 2014). As can be seen in Figure 3, the SSEZ’s growth period can be divided into three phases: 1980–1993, the urban SSEZ and rural Bao’an County; 1993–2010, Bao’an County restructured into two districts and merged with the SSEZ to form the Shenzhen Municipality; 2010–present, integration of the two districts into the SSEZ under the same spatial planning regime.

Figure 1. Administrative boundary of districts in Shenzhen.

Figure 2. Population growth in Shenzhen (1979–2013). Data from Shenzhen Statistical Bureau (2014, p. 49).

Figure 3. Growth and development in Shenzhen (1980–2012). Data from Shenzhen Statistics Bureau (2014, pp. 22, 175, 186, 301, 306).

Shenzhen’s miraculous growth has to be understood within China’s unique and evolving political economy. Land plays a central role in China’s latest growth spree. One unique feature of China’s mode of governance is its urban-biased nature. There are indeed two Chinas: urbanites living on state-owned land enjoying “cradle to grave” services and residents in rural China having to survive on their own collectivized land holdings. In other words, under the former, centrally planned economy, urban land was in theory owned by the state (usually possessed and used by various bureaucratic and administrative units) and rural land was owned by the collectives (the farmers). The introduction of economic reforms since 1978, the expansion of the “city administering county” reform (that is, putting rural counties under the control of a city) since the 1980s and 1990s, and the reintroduction of market values to urban land in the late 1980s have transformed the fate of collectivized land in the rural areas. Figure 4 attempts to map out the possible development trajectories of collectivized rural land.

Figure 4. Development pressure and urban–rural land development in China’s transitional economy.

When development pressure is low, agricultural development on collectively owned land in rural counties will continue. However, if development pressure was high in a city, urban and industrial activities would usually overflow organically into rural counties in the form of joint venture town and village enterprises (TVEs), often fueled by outside investment. The existence of job opportunities would attract migrant populations who need to be accommodated in the vicinity of factories, thus driving the densification and sporadic housing development of rural townships. Although the transfer of land use rights in the market was legalized in 1988, this right applies only to state-owned land in the urban realm. Collectively owned land cannot be transacted in the land market without first being expropriated by the city government. Expropriation of farmland for land sale and urban growth has been an important source of revenue for local governments to fulfill their various administrative duties delegated by the central government since the open door policy (Smith, 2014; Ye & Wu, 2014). This trend has been “facilitated” by the reintroduction of the “city administering county” mode of governance in the 1980s, producing what Ye and Wu (2014) called “land-centred urbanization” (p. 355). In fact, by 1994, almost all provinces have adopted the city administering county system or its variants such as “converting county to city” and annexation of counties as districts in big cities (Shen, 2007, p. 311). In the same year, the tax system was reformed to guarantee central government’s access to 60% of the total tax revenue (Jaggi, Rundle, Rosen, & Takahashi, 1996), giving added incentives to local government to expropriate collectivized agricultural land for the sale of land use rights to boost government revenue. According to the Ministry of Land and Resources, total revenue from land concessions in 2010 amounted to 2.7 trillion yuan, or 2,000 yuan (or US$300) per capita (Z. Liu & Salzberg, 2012). This has had grave environmental implications. From 1978 to 1995, some 4.4 million hectares of agricultural land disappeared (National Bureau of Statistics, 1996). The World Bank (2006) reported that the area of economic development zones in 2004 even exceeded the total built-up area that existed in the country. The rapid conversion of agricultural land into development-related uses, though a lucrative business, has contaminated groundwater, polluting crops, diminishing biodiversity, and affecting flora and fauna, and caused air, noise, solid waste, and water pollution, thus making Chinese cities unsustainable.

The above broader development context in the more developed parts of China is essential for a better appreciation of Shenzhen’s pathway toward green urbanism. When the SSEZ was first set up in Bao’an County, collectively owned rural land within the boundary of the SSEZ was acquired and transformed into urban land. To save costs, some of the collectively owned land was left for the ex-farmers to provide for their own housing needs and was later managed through shareholding companies set up by the villages (Y. Wang, Wang, & Wu, 2009; Yi & Yan, 2005). With the growth of the SSEZ, these urban villages have become sites of massive illegal construction to satisfy a growing migrant population.

When the SSEZ was first set up, potential overseas investors preferred to adopt a “wait and see” position because Shenzhen had yet to develop adequate physical and legal infrastructure (Ng, 2003). Instead, “domestic investors” flocked to the SSEZ because the local government offered cheap land as an incentive to attract outside investment. For instance, by the mid-1980s, over 2,000 “domestic” corporations had established in Shenzhen engaging in various economic activities (Shenzhen Museum, 1999). Without much support or resources from the central government, the SSEZ’s strategy was to attract as many investors as possible so that they would take up the initial responsibility of forming and developing the land (Shenzhen Urban Planning Commission & Shenzhen Construction Bureau, 1990). Up to 1987, the local government relied primarily on loans for capital construction. To ease the then increasing financial burden of the government, a land plot was sold at a negotiated price to a local public company for a lease term of 50 years on September 9, 1987 (Zhu, 1994). Strictly speaking, the transaction was illegal because the Provisional Ordinance on Land Management of SSEZ (Shenzhen Municipal People's Congress, 1988) was only promulgated in 1988, after the amendment of the 1982 Constitution to allow transfer of land use right (Zhu, 1994). In 1988 and 1989, land revenue collected by the Shenzhen government increased to 298.5 million yuan (US$7.4 million; Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Commission & Shenzhen Construction Bureau, 1990). Nevertheless, by 1990, the majority of developable land, more than 100 km² out of 155 km², within the SSEZ had been given to various land users or prospective land users at lower than market prices (Zhu, 1994).

The second phase of growth of the SSEZ began with the transformation of the neighoring rural Bao’an County into two urban districts in 1993. Because the district-level government lacked development resources, the local townships continued to be the key actors in attracting foreign investments. Figure 5 shows the rapid growth of TVEs in Shenzhen, reflecting accelerated urbanization and industrialization processes in the two annexed districts. The TVEs ceased to exist from 2013 onward because in 2010 the two districts were formally integrated with the SSEZ and the town- and village-based collectives had to be transformed into shareholding companies etc. Figure 6 confirms that the majority of the migrant population actually dwells outside the SSEZ. It was the scenario of an almost fully developed SSEZ with rampant, often uncontrolled urbanization outside the SSEZ that drove Shenzhen toward its unique mode of green urbanism. Figure 7 attempts to outline Shenzhen’s land shortage–driven green urbanism. Let us retrace this evolution in more detail.

Figure 5. Shenzhen: Number of workers in different categories. Data from Shenzhen Statistical Bureau (2014).

Figure 6. Population distribution within and outside SSEZ in 2013. Data from Shenzhen Statistical Bureau (2014).

Figure 7. Land shortage–driven green urbanism in Shenzhen. Synthesized from various sources.

Planning as a “force of production” and clustered development as a prototype of green urbanism

Unlike Western capitalist cities in the modern era, when urban planning was a tool developed to remedy the plight created by rapid industrialization and urbanization, the legacy of a centrally planned economy means that urban planning is taken seriously as “a force of production” (F. Wang & Li, 2000, p. 27). According to the News of the Communist Party in China,² over 100 urban planners and designers were sent to Shenzhen to aid the SEZ’s early development. From 1982 to 2010, six major plans had been formulated by the municipal government and these plans were designed to help achieve the city’s socioeconomic Five Year Plans (FYPs), which in turn are related to the national and provincial FYPs. Today’s Shenzhen is built by diversified institutional and individual stakeholders through the production of a series of master plans that addresses local situations in the context of evolving central policies.

Table 1 summarizes the various plans for Shenzhen from 1982 to 2010 and how they relate to the corresponding FYPs and the national, regional, and local contexts. Shenzhen’s socialist market economy is largely a product of conscientious reforms and planning encouraged and permitted by the central government as well as a flexible and dynamic approach to emerging local circumstances. Shenzhen’s early model of urban development, especially through the leasing of land use rights to raise funds for local infrastructure development, had revived the land market in the country. This model of leasing land use rights to cover expenses of local governments to boost economic growth has been widely replicated in other cities as the central government delegated many administrative functions to cities. The consequence is spatial expansion in many parts of urban China (Ye & Wu, 2014).

Table 1. Shenzhen plans (1982–2010).

Plan and planning parameters			Guiding thoughts	Corresponding five-year plan	National, regional, and local contexts
1982 An Outline of the SSEZ Socioeconomic Plan^a
Population: ● 1980: 85,000 ● 1990: 400,000 ● 2000: 1,000,000 Land: 327.5 km^2—118.6 km^2 suitable for development and planning was done for 98 km^2			Capitalizing on its proximity to Hong Kong to facilitate “fostering connections between foreign investments and domestic workers” Linear clusters “to facilitate production and quality living” Equal emphasis on material production and spiritual civilization	Shenzhen 6th Five-Year Plan (1981–1985)	1982: National housing reform, commodification of housing. Housing built by domestic and global capital.
1985 Master Plan of Shenzhen SEZ^b
A predominantly industrial, export-oriented, multifunction industrially well-structured, technically advanced, comprehensive economic zone with a high degree of civilization—small state-of-the-art light industry 2000: 1.1 million population ● Permanent population: 800,000 ● Transit population: 300,000 Total urban area: 123 km^2			Linear belt-like multicenter clusters Plan to facilitate the future economic and cultural exchange with Hong Kong Integrated considerations and planning for each cluster Each cluster would be surrounded by natural rivers, orchards, or a green belt to ensure a quality living environment	Shenzhen 7th Five-Year Plan (1986–1990)	1986: Land Administration Law was promulgated to grant property rights of urban land to the local governments (Xu & Murphy, 2008) 1987: First transaction of land use right in Shenzhen SSZ, first case of land commodification (Zhu, 1994) 1988: The Provisional Ordinance on Land Management of the SSEZ, allowing land to be transferred, assigned, bequeathed, or mortgaged 1989: City Planning Act, giving local governments the power to prepare plans for growth and control development 1989: State Land Management Bureau under the State Council to manage urban and rural land
1991 Shenzhen’s 10-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan^c
RMB (billion)	1995	2000	Persist in the creation of first-rate “Shenzhen efficiency” Reform and openness as the historical mission Emphasis on the use of technology to promote economic development Integrated balancing to ensure coordinated and stable economic development	Shenzhen 8th Five-Year Plan (1991–1995)	1992: Deng Xiaoping, architect of China’s Open Door Policy, visited Shenzhen and delivered the famous South Speech affirming the open door policy 1993: Bao’an County became Bao’an and Longgang districts 1994: Delinking economic entities from government or the party 1994: Fiscal reform, a tax assignment system was adopted to enhance central government revenue and to reduce tax concession power of local governments (Shen, 2007)
Gross domestic product	32.00	60.0
National income	22.00	42.0
Industrial output	45.00	80.0
Agricultural output	1.40	2.0
Export	7.00	13.0
Revenue	4.00	7.3
Population (million)	2.65	3.0
The Third Master Plan of Shenzhen (1996–2010)^d (extended to the whole Shenzhen municipality)
Started in 1993 Projected population: 4.3 to 5.1 million by 2000 Projected land area: 2,020 km^2 (SSEZ: 327.5 km^2; Bao’an District: 751.6 km^2; Longgang: 940.9 km^2) ● Projected built-up area: 378 km^2 by 2000 and 480 km^2 by 2010 (160 km^2 within the SSEZ) ● Projected per capita built-up area by 2010: 105.1–120 m^2			SEZ as the central development axis with two other development axes in the east and west 1,535 km^2 (76%) of nonconstruction area: ecological area Enhancing linear belt-like multicenter clusters (11 clusters) Land conservation to realize “sustainable development” Spatial and infrastructural development to facilitate Shenzhen’s participation in the global economy A pleasant urban environment for leisure and cultural city development	Shenzhen 9th Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) and Shenzhen 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005)	1998: Ministry of Land and Resources, a super-ministry responsible for planning, managing, conserving, and utilizing natural resources 1998: Amended Land Administration Law to recentralize land authorization power (land conversion and acquisition) to protect arable land (Li & Wu, 2012; Xu & Yeh, 2009) 1998: Shenzhen Urban Planning Law was enacted 2001: China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 2001: Shenzhen issued a policy to legalize unauthorized housing in urban villages (Wang et al., 2009) 2003: Central government banned unqualified development zones
Shenzhen 2030 (2005)^e (green urbanism identified as a way out of land shortage)
Shenzhen 2030: “Pioneer Sustainable Global City”—“efficient Shenzhen” and “harmonious Shenzhen” A competitive, influential, and less resource-intensive economy that is active and dynamic (Target: 7% annual gross domestic product growth rate; level of economic development on a par with an average developed city in the west by 2030) Improve the ecological environment based on the concepts of “garden city” and “ecological modernization” to overcome environmental, economic, social, and land shortage/inefficiency challenges Enhancing the social and economic utilities of the natural ecology Harmonize human and natural developments				Shenzhen 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010)	2008: National Development and Reform Commission published “Pearl River Delta Region Reform and Development Program” 2009: “Directive on Promoting the Province-Leading-County Fiscal Reform”
Shenzhen City Master Plan (2010–2020)^f (green urbanism to boost quality and quantity of land supply)
Shenzhen: Six districts, two management districts, with a total area of 1,952.94 km^2 2020: built-up area: 890 km^2 (2007, 750 km^2 of built up area) → new development area: 140 km^2 Renewal areas: 190 km^2 (Redevelopment: 60 km^2) 2007 population: 8.6 million 2020 population: 11 million 2020: per capita built-up area: 81 m^2			Exploring a successful pathway toward urban restructuring and sustainable development under various environmental and land resource constraints Upholding the concepts of “ecological city” and “environment first” to coordinate socioeconomic development and resource and environmental protection Raising the city’s strategic position in the regional and national contexts to meet global challenges and opportunities Serving Hong Kong under the “One Country, Two Systems” framework and playing a pioneering role in regional cooperation Master planning to monitor public policies and coordinate urban development	Shenzhen 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015)	2011: The Universiade was held in Shenzhen 2012: Detailed implementation criteria of urban renewal 2013: Guangming New District won the prize “National Green and Ecological Demonstration Urban District” from the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development 2013: Carbon trading 2014: International low-carbon town in Pingshan New District won “Prize for Cities of the Future 2014” 2014: National New Urbanisation Plan (2014–2020) 2015: Third International Low Carbon Forum held in Shenzhen

Notes.

^aShenzhen Development Planning Bureau (2002, pp. 1–3).

^bShenzhen Urban Planning Commission & Shenzhen Construction Bureau (1990, pp. 17–18).

^cShenzhen Museum (1999, pp. 271–272).

^d Shenzhen Museum (1999, pp. 609–610).

^eShenzhen Urban Planning Bureau (2007, p. 71). This is a strategic urban development strategy to address challenges in the evolving regional and international context.

^f Shenzhen Municipal Government (2010, pp. 1, 2, 5).

As mentioned previously, the SSEZ was first developed by domestic investment as the city offered land as an incentive for inward domestic investment. Central ministries, especially those related to national defense, were encouraged to develop their industries and trading activities in Shenzhen when the SEZ was first set up. For instance, one of the now commercial hearts of Shenzhen, Huaqiang North, has housed many enterprises with connections to central ministries. In fact, China Merchants Steam Navigation Company under the Ministry of Communications developed the Shekou Industrial Area; Hong Kong China Travel Service ran the Overseas Chinese City; and the Ministry of Electronics was responsible for the development in Shangbu. Hence, as early as the 1982 Outline Socioeconomic Plan of the SSEZ, the SEZ was divided into three zones and 18 districts. The concept was further strengthened in the 1985 Master Plan where five clusters were identified and each cluster “operated like a city” with balanced functions (K. Liu, 2014, p. 61).Though the clustering arrangement has been a convenient way for the various units related to the central ministries to exercise spatial control, the arrangement can also be seen as the hallmark of green and low-carbon development within the SSEZ.

Because the clusters were separated by naturally vegetated hills, orchards, and rivers and linked by east–west main roads, this enabled them to develop according to local emerging circumstances, conserving green belts in between these clusters and at the same time responding to predictable and unpredictable development opportunities (K. Liu, 2014; Y. Zhang & Deng, 2013). The natural landscape provided the urban areas with natural relief, facilitating air ventilation and lowering the urban heat island effect (Y. Zhang & Deng, 2013). Because each cluster was relatively self-contained, jobs were close to people’s living quarters, thus minimizing cross-cluster movements and pollution (Y. Zhang & Deng, 2013). Each cluster was allowed the flexibility to develop at its own pace, contributing to the diversity and character of the city as a whole. This ecological approach to initiate urban development was adopted in the making of later master plans when planning was extended to the Bao’an and Longgang districts (originally Bao’an County). Administratively, since 1989 Shenzhen has combined the land administration bureau with the planning bureau and formed the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Administration Bureau to rationalize land records and classification and boost efficiency.

In the Third Master Plan (1996–2010), 479 out of the 2,020 km² of land was urban developed land, and 70% of the city was zoned as agricultural or water resource protection areas, belts separating clusters, natural ecological zones, or areas for leisure and countryside activities (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1997). The plan identified three clusters within the SSEZ and six clusters outside SSEZ in the then newly merged districts and another six independent towns. The latest master plan (2010–2020) exhibits the characteristics of “clusters cum networks” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2010, p. 18). The plan consists of “three axes, two belts and multiple centres” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2010, Art. 48), with five lines for development control: green line to protect the natural environment; blue line to guide and monitor infrastructure development; purple line for heritage conservation; yellow line to guide and monitor infrastructure development; and orange line to restrict the siting of hazardous industries. However, rapid growth and the merging of the districts with the SSEZ have added complexities and challenges to the cluster-oriented development.

1990s: Tackling inefficient, land-hungry growth in the expanded city

As shown in Table 1, planned urban development areas expanded from 98 km² in 1982 to 378 km² in 2000 (Shenzhen Development Planning Bureau, 2002). In 1993, with the merging of Bao’an County with the SSEZ as Bao’an and Longgang districts, villagers within the SSEZ were given urban household status and their collectively owned land was nationalized. The land area of the Shenzhen Municipality expanded by over six times, from 327.5 to 2,020 km² (Lu, Li, Wang, & Cheng, 1994). In theory, collectively owned land in Shenzhen should all be nationalized and, technically speaking, the rural sector should have since disappeared in Shenzhen. However, the situation was more complicated on the ground.

Within the SSEZ, illegal construction of housing in urban villages has been rampant. The urban villages were developed on land owned collectively and managed by shareholding companies (former rural committees; Ng, 2003; J.-R. Zhang, 2007). The ex-farmers were originally only allowed to construct a building of up to three stories, on a base area of 80 m² (Y. Wang et al., 2009). Yet many have built up to 12 stories and divided the flats into smaller units to accommodate the influx of the floating population that fueled the city’s industrial revolution. In 1992, the urban villagers within the SSEZ were given urban status and their land was nationalized. However, in reality, it is very difficult for the municipal government or the villagers themselves to redevelop these illegal construction packed settlements (“Shenzhen Land Reform Report,” 2014). The problem of enormous illegal construction in urban villages was not confined to the SSEZ; it was also rampant in the two districts outside the SSEZ. According to a study by the Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau ([SUPB] 2005), there were a total of 320 urban villages with 35,000 buildings occupying a total footprint of 93.49 km² providing 106 million m² of gross floor area. Though 90% of the urban villages are in the two districts outside the SSEZ, those within the SSEZ constitute less than one tenth of the land footprint but one fifth of the private construction areas (SUPB, 2005).

The nationalization of the rural land outside the SSEZ has also been incomplete because the municipality lacks the resources to expropriate and resume all of the land. For instance, out of 956 km² of land in the two districts outside the SSEZ, only 265 km² were acquired through appropriate compensation; 360 km² of forestry land was expropriated naturally; and over 300 km² of built-up areas have become historical legacies (Y. Liu, 2008). That is, though the municipal government recognizes the land use rights of the farmer collectives, the land in theory is government land. Yet, without proper compensation, the municipal government cannot put these land plots on the market.

As shown in Figure 8, by year 2000, except for Luohu and Yantian districts within the SSEZ, land development in all other districts had exceeded the planned target. Buffer zones and countryside were encroached by urban development (Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Administration Bureau & Urban Planning and Design Institute of Shenzhen [SUPBLAB & UPDIS], 2005). It was then recognized that there were four major constraints in Shenzhen’s development: land shortage, limited water resources, low education standard, and vulnerable ecological conditions (SUPBLAB & UPDIS, 2005). Land shortage was the most alarming then because the land bank for development in the city as a whole was only 294 km², 80% of which lay outside the SSEZ (SUPBLAB & UPDIS, 2005). Worse still, the productivity figures for each unit of developed and industrial land in Shenzhen were low: 36 million yuan per square kilometer and 200 million yuan per square kilometer, respectively, in 2000—much lower than the figures in Hong Kong in 1999 (HK$687 million and HK$630 million; SUPBLAB & UPDIS, 2005). There was also a huge development gap between the districts. Standards of social amenities were much lower in the districts outside the SSEZ (Table 2). Productivity per square kilomter of land outside the SSEZ was only 13% of that inside the SSEZ.

Table 2. Two development regimes within the SEZ and outside the SEZ in early 2000s.

	Within SEZ	Outside SEZ
Land area (km^2)	395.81	1,557.03
Green space/person (m^2)	5.80	1.30
Area of GIC/person (m^2)	4.50	2.20
Per capita GIC GFA (m^2)	2.60	1.20
GIC land uses (% of land used)	3.2%	Bao’an: 2.7%
		Longgang: 3.2%
Hospital beds per 1,000 population	2.34	1.56
Health workers per 10,000	40.00	12.00
Water usage (m^3/person)	123.90	76.30
Productivity per unit of land (100 m/km^2)	940.00	120.00

Note. Data from Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Administration Bureau & Urban Planning and Design Institute of Shenzhen (2005, pp. 18, 20, Table 1-1); Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau (2007, p. 59). GFA = gross floor area; GIC = per capita government, institution and community.

Figure 8. Existing and planned developed land in different districts in Shenzhen (km²). Data from Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Administration Bureau & Urban Planning and Design Institute of Shenzhen (2005, p. 25).

To better control the expansion of urban clusters under the strong influence of state-owned enterprises within the SSEZ and various TVEs outside it, the Shenzhen municipal government established a statutory planning system in 1998 in order to resume the power to plan and direct developments across the city. The statutory plans also serve to direct market development as the state and the party gave up their administrative control on economic entities. In 2001, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization and the rise and keen competition of other cities in the region and beyond threatened the status of Shenzhen as an SEZ. The city needed another round of socioeconomic transformation to upgrade itself and boost productivity. However, land shortage and low education standards have become major constraints. Two decades of industrial and urban development had also distressed the carrying capacity of the natural environment, leading to ecological degradation and water and air pollution (SUPB, 2007). At the same time, rapid urban development had led to social polarization, a lowering of the quality of urban living, and difficulties in providing housing, employment, and education opportunities to immigrants and their families, affecting the city’s appeal to talent (SUPB, 2007). The challenge of the city then was to restructure a resource-intensive mode of development into one that would be more sustainable, by economizing on resources (especially land resources), maximizing economic efficiency, and attracting more knowledgeable and talented migrants. To steer developments in this direction, another round of strategic spatial planning was warranted.

2000s onward: Green urbanism to overcome the four key constraints?

One may argue that the low productivity and shortage of land has pushed Shenzhen to move ahead of the nation in pursuing green and low-carbon development. As early as 2005, the Shenzhen 2030 strategy recommended the adoption of an ecological approach to socioeconomic and spatial developments. The strategy directly influenced the formulation of the 2010 Master Plan (2010–2020) with the aim of overcoming the key constraints in the development process: limited land and water resources, low-status population, and vulnerable ecosystems. The 2010 Master Plan, following Shenzhen 2030, lays the framework for identifying pathways toward sustainable development based on environment first and ecological principles, regional planning, and development, as well as coordinating urban developments and integrating public policies (Art. 3; Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2010; see also Table 1). In a sense, Shenzhen’s restructured development approach is similar to the double dividend concept; that is, the pursuit of higher economic growth and employment through lowering resource consumption and pollution (United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, & Korean International Cooperation Agency, 2012).

The 2010 Master Plan calls for two fundamental changes: from quantitative spatial expansion to enhancing existing urban spaces and moving from physical land use planning toward integrated planning (Art. 4; Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2010). To identify more land for development, another round of land reform (some called it the second land revolution when compared to Shenzhen’s first introduction of the leasing of land use rights in 1987) is piloted to release “not properly compensated yet ‘nationalized’ collectively-possessed rural land” (“Key Points of Land Management Reform in Shenzhen,” 2012) for more efficient and compact urban use. This not only resolves the land shortage problem but would in theory also help produce a more equitable society because former collectively owned land might now be transacted in the market, directly benefiting the ex-farmers. On the other hand, to ensure the sustainability of existing and future urban development, in 2013 Shenzhen published a white paper on a low-carbon ecological demonstration city (Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Resources Commission [SUPLRC], 2013), outlining various initiatives and policy and legislative changes necessary to produce a greener urban landscape.

To enhance the use of existing land resources, especially those that have not been fully acquired by the city government or having complicated ownership and property rights issues, the Shenzhen municipal government published a set of documents in 2013 to allow collectively used land to be listed and leased directly in the market (Cheng, 2013). The implication of this move is tremendous because collectively owned rural land amounts to 390 km², 42.5% of the total construction areas in the city (918 km²; Cheng, 2013). The new arrangement in theory would protect the property rights of rural farmers turned urban residents. In late 2013, a tract of collectively owned industrial land in Bao’an District was sold for 116 million RMB (Cheng, 2013). To sustain the collective economic entity, 70% of the proceeds went to the National Land Fund and 30% is retained by the collective, which also possesses the right to hold not more than 20% of the construction area to support their production activities (Cheng, 2013). This experiment has significant implications not just for Shenzhen but also for the central government’s call to improve the life and livelihood of rural farmers (The Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party, 2008).

Urban regeneration is also seen as an important route to release much needed land for further higher-value development. According the city’s white paper (SUPLRC, 2013) on a low-carbon ecological demonstration city, among the approved urban renewal projects, an average of 30% of the land would be for basic public amenities. Approved urban renewal plans would eventually provide 45 primary schools, 115 kindergartens, two hospitals, 86 community centers, 26 transport terminals, 156,000 m² of affordable housing, and 220,000 m² of innovative industrial buildings (SUPLRC, 2013). Green redevelopment has been identified as a key strategy to accommodate future growth.

Shenzhen has also accelerated the implementation of various pilot low-carbon districts, including Guangming New District (winner of the National Green and Ecological Demonstration Urban District in 2013) and Qianhai (the future financial heart of Shenzhen). In 2014, Shenzhen International Low-Carbon City at Pingdi won the Prize for Cities of the Future, given jointly by the Paulson Foundation in the United States and the China International Economic Exchange Center (“Shenzhen International Low-Carbon City Won Sustainable Development Planning Award,” 2014). According to the white paper, government departments in Shenzhen have collectively groomed enterprises to use construction wastes in an integrated manner, providing free land for their development and encouraging the use of green recycled materials in the procurement process of project developments (SUPLRC, 2013). Around 500 activities were launched to encourage the separation of wastes for reuse and recycling (SUPLRC, 2013) and the city’s urban planning standards have undergone several rounds of revision to facilitate an integrated approach to producing a low-carbon landscape (SUPLRC, 2013).

“Land shortage–driven” green urbanism?

The open door policy and economic reforms since the late 1970s have exacerbated the urban biased mode of governance in socialist China. The Chinese central government, through tax, economic, and administrative reforms, had tried to decentralize various governing functions to city-level governments to enliven a demoralized society and economy from the late 1970s to the 1990s. To meet the challenges of restructuring the urban fabric and attracting outside investment, Shenzhen was a pioneer in generating development capital through leasing out land use rights. This model was quickly replicated throughout urban China. The raising of local finance through the transfer of land use rights has transformed urban cores and their surrounding rural areas. Within the SSEZ, collectively owned land in the form of urban villages co-existed with urban land. Although this collectively owned land within the SSEZ was in theory nationalized in 1993 when urban villagers were given urban status, the collective entities, the rural committee turned shareholding companies, still possess the right to use and manage the land.

Outside the SSEZ, development pressure was also felt in the rural counties where TVEs sprang up, many of which were low-value-added industries originated from Hong Kong. Job opportunities have attracted migrant workers whose housing needs resulted in dense urban settlements. The result was a rapid loss of valuable agricultural land and widespread environmental degradation. The situation continued after the rural county was restructured into two districts and eventually emerged with the SSEZ in 1993. In theory, the rural land was nationalized and farmers were all given urban status by 2004. In reality, 390 km² (42.5% of total construction land) of the nationalized land was not properly compensated and hence cannot be put into productive use by the city government (Cheng, 2013). Hence, the recent experiment of Shenzhen in liberating the nationalized collectively owned land through the tacit consent of the central government may eventually unleash China’s second land revolution.

Hence, unlike other capitalist cities where the pursuit of low-carbon green urbanism has to do with tackling climate change and socioeconomic polarization through a fundamental reframing and refining of development values and the setting up of specific greenhouse gas emission reduction targets to be achieved by integrated policies and practices by multiple stakeholders, there is surprisingly no clearly stated greenhouse gas emission reduction target in the city’s 2011 white paper on a low-carbon ecological demonstration city (SUPLRC, 2013). In fact, the first two chapters of the white paper are devoted to the discussion of a new round of land reforms and redevelopment of existing land as a source of land supply and opportunities to pursue greener urban development (SUPLRC, 2013). According to the white paper, eight out of the 15 km² of land supply in 2012 would come from redeveloping existing brown field sites (SUPLRC, 2013).

Yet the redevelopment strategy has inherent contradictions. Nationalized yet not properly compensated rural land under collective use is identified as the future source of land supply to accommodate urban growth. Similarly, redevelopment of urban villages is also encouraged to boost land supply. However, as presented in Table 2, per capita resource consumption has been much lower outside the SSEZ and the urban villages have been accommodating the majority of the city’s population with a relatively small urban footprint (SUPB, 2005). How can redevelopment of these already high-density sites be greener, with lower carbon emissions, and yet accommodate more and higher-value land uses? Moreover, Figure 6 shows that the majority of the migrant population, usually the most impoverished residents in the city, is living in urban villages and in the rural districts. Though the city government has identified the urban villages as “urban cancers” with all sorts of social, environmental and crime problems (SUPB, 2005, p.11), compared to the generally highly regulated urban developments within the SSEZ, urban villages are often real organic and dynamic communities full of use values to their residents. They may be eyesores for the government, which is concerned with more productive growth, but urban villages have provided the necessary living spaces for the migrant workers who have contributed to the economic miracle of Shenzhen. It is true that the new round of land reform allowing former collectively owned land to be transacted may benefit ex-farmers with local registration. However, the majority of the migrant population may have to be displaced. The place-making efforts made in these seemingly chaotic but lively settlements would be erased, the social and health impacts of which could be huge (Barton, Thompson, Burgess, & Grant, 2015). Green urbanism should denote a mode of urban development that fits with the natural landscape and promotes social capital accumulation through compact and lively city development. However, the strand of green urbanism in Shenzhen is more about identifying the much needed land resource, greening it to attract talented workforces and investments to boost economic growth. There is little reframing of the value system—Shenzhen’s brand of green urbanism may be seen as just the latest gimmick to promote economic growth that is lower in carbon content.

Conclusion

The Shenzhen story shows that a strand of flexible and pragmatic urban planning has been an important governing instrument in providing a roadmap for the city’s socioeconomic and spatial transformation at key historical junctures. In the early growth period of the SSEZ in the 1980s, the control of land clusters by state-owned enterprises was accommodated by the linear belt-like, multicentered clusters separated by natural green spaces. With the growth of the market and a need to manage rapid urban development and encroachment into rural areas, a statutory planning system was introduced in the late 1990s for the municipal government to resume the power for spatial planning and development control. In the face of diminishing land for development since the turn of the millennium, efforts have been made to liberate nationalized collectively owned land and enhance its efficiency through the creation of various mechanisms and regulations in addition to a planning framework to encourage redevelopment of urban villages or land with complicated property rights issues.

Hence, it can be argued that the Shenzhen municipal government’s recent strategic move to adopt low-carbon ecocity development is largely driven by land shortage. Low-carbon urban (re)development has been planned in an integrated manner covering green buildings, reuse of construction waste, transit-oriented transportation, and river renaturalization (SUPLRC, 2013). To achieve the strategy, the city has undertaken over 60 studies, formulated 45 plans related to low-carbon urbanism, and developed over 90 rules and regulations (SUPLRC, 2013). The efforts will certainly upgrade the natural and built environment to attract higher caliber population to enable further economic restructuring. The question of concern is the fate of the current low-status population, the migrant workers who have lived in urban villages, worked in TVEs, and contributed to the making of the urban landscape.

Similar to the central government, protecting the rights of farmers to share the fruits of economic growth does not mean that a qualitatively different urbanization pathway has been adopted. Indeed, the nation has continued to put a premium on economic growth. Will Shenzhen be successful in governing its move toward this brand of low-carbon urbanism? Given a very strong planning culture and an urgent need to conserve environmental resources and tackle pollution problems, Shenzhen stands a good chance of moving toward less carbon-intensive economic growth. However, it is a brand of technically biased low-carbon urbanism that pays little attention to fostering social capital accumulation and nurturing sustainable communities (Cooper & Boyko, 2012; International Society of City and Regional Planners, 2010; Lombardi, Leach, Rogers, & the Urban Futures Team, 2012).

Can other developing countries learn from Shenzhen’s experiment in governing the transition toward green urbanism? As argued by United Nations Development Programme (2009), World Bank (2010, 2014) and Bulkeley et al. (2011), concerted efforts by governments at different geographical levels are essential to bring about a transition toward low-carbon urbanism. The case of Shenzhen illustrates the merit of recognizing planning as a force of production. Spatial planning has been undertaken in a flexible and pragmatic manner, adjusting incrementally and strategically to changing socioeconomic and institutional contexts. As a result, Shenzhen has pursued a brand of low-carbon urbanism to overcome various development constraints since 2004, much earlier than the central government’s turn toward green growth in the 12th FYP (2011–2015). However, Shenzhen and the country as a whole probably will still have a long way to go to pursue a green urbanism that is less top-down, economic growth conscious, and land centered but more inclusive, spontaneous, and people oriented.

Acknowledgments

I thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors of the special issue for their penetrating, critical, and yet constructive comments. All of the faults that remain are, of course, mine.

Funding

This research was supported by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project number CUHK14408314). I acknowledge the support of the New Urban Governance Project by LSE Cities at the London School of Economics and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The findings, interpretation, and conclusions presented in this article are entirely mine and should not be attributed in any manner to any of these entities.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project number CUHK14408314). I acknowledge the support of the New Urban Governance Project by LSE Cities at the London School of Economics and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The findings, interpretation, and conclusions presented in this article are entirely mine and should not be attributed in any manner to any of these entities.

Notes on contributors

Mee Kam Ng

Mee Kam Ng is Vice-Chairman of the Department of Geography and Resource Management, the Director of the Urban Studies Programme, Associate Director of the Institute of Future Cities, and Associate Director of the Hong Kong Institute of Asian Pacific Studies at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. She is a member of the RTPI, a fellow of the HKIP, and an academic advisor of the HKIUD. She has published widely on planning, governance, and sustainability issues in Pacific Asia. Her publications have earned her six Hong Kong Institute of Planners’ Awards and the AESOP Best Published Paper Award 2015. She has been consultant to the United Nations, the European Union, and Shenzhen Planning Bureau. She is an associate editor of Planning Theory and Practice and serves as a member of the editorial board of Town Planning Review, DisP—The Planning Review, City, Culture and Society, and Business Strategy and the Environment.

Notes

1. China has adopted a household registration system to impose strict control over spatial mobility and benefits entitlements of urban and rural residents. Until recent years, it was difficult for rural households to live in urban areas because urbanites were entitled to cradle-to-grave socioeconomic benefits.

2. Summarized from News of the Communist Party of China on “Wang Zhen’s Unreserved Efforts in Promoting Reform and Openness of the Special Economic Zones” (n.d.).