Introduction

In 1997, Tietzel and Müller (1998) contributed one of the few papers of that period about Musgrave’s (1957) concept of merit goods, not only rejecting the concept (as did most of their economic colleagues), but also calling for an end to the discussion, suggesting that all additional publications on that matter would only lead to boredom. From their viewpoint, the absolute hegemony of individual preferences was a paradigm that was not worth debating any more among economists.

The large number of (also recent) references cited in the subsequent symposium indicate that there always remained a minority of socioeconomists finding it worthwhile to use Musgrave’s framework. More surprisingly, however, the discussion of the absoluteness of individual preferences gained new momentum by the concept of libertarian paternalism around 2010.

However, this long and exciting story should be cut extremely short because it is told in a much more elaborate and informed way by two scholars in this volume. Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay provides a history of the concept of merit goods which is, to my knowledge, unique in its detail and degree of reflection. He divides the arguments around merit goods in a way that can be appreciated from within the classical framework of welfare economics and in ways that explicitly contradict the assumptions made by welfare economics. This European perspective on the German-born Richard Musgrave is then followed by a North American paper on the concept of US economists Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Mark D. White shows that Thaler and Sunstein’s “libertarian paternalism” is not particularly elaborated in philosophical terms, a critique also applying to Musgrave’s initial introduction of the merit goods concept. White considers “nudges” as a pragmatic tool to initiate the consumption of merit goods, just in case society decides that this is a necessary objective.

This core question is probably easier to answer for concrete case studies than in general. Two such cases are part of the symposium, both taking place on the southern hemisphere. I had the honor of being invited by some distinguished Latin American colleagues on the analysis of ads for Brazilian children snacks. Our conclusion was that these ads are outright demerit goods and consumers would probably be better off if they were banned. Franklin Obeng-Odoom then uses Ghana’s oil industry for one of the very few studies about paternalism on the supply side. By highlighting both achievements and shortcomings of the “nudges” by public authorities in this sector, the author concludes that democratic processes are a very important ingredient for well-placed public interventions.

Is there any overarching conclusion from the symposium as a whole? In his opening article, Maxime Desmarais-Trembly suggests that “the strict application of the consumer sovereignty principle, and welfarism more generally, turned out to be a short interlude in the longer history of welfare economics.” This is an extremely optimistic way of putting it, especially since it is written in past tense. A more careful conclusion would be that it is always useful to question the strong assumptions of neoclassical economics, and that an increasing number of scholars does so when it comes to the rationality of our behavior. The more systematic patterns of irrationality and behavioral inconsistencies we find, the more allowances should (and will) be made to correct them.