Re-Embedding and Disembedding in Post-Socialist Hungary: An Analysis of Orbanism from a Polanyian Perspective

Abstract

The rise of populist authoritarianism is a substantial reversal of the liberal democratic path in Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary. What explains Hungary’s authoritarian turn toward Orbánism and what are the components of Orbánism that consolidate its claim to power? This paper uses a Polányian perspective and argues that the populist authoritarian turn occurred in the context of the social dislocation of the post-socialist transition period in the 1990s and 2000s. Viktor Orbán and Fidesz’ populist authoritarianism filled a political vacuum by offering a new re-embedding strategy for the population, which included material (full employment, family policy, remittances) and ideological (ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, Christian conservatism) policies. However, Orbánism has contradictory implications, because (1) material embedding takes the form of a punitive and highly conditional workfare regime, and (2) the regime simultaneously advances “disembedding” features including pro-oligarchic, pro-foreign investor, pro-rich, anti-union and anti-welfare policies. As a result, Orbán’s power consolidation is premised on political authoritarianism to prevent any expected discontent from threatening the regime.

KEYWORDS:

• Hungary
• Central and Eastern Europe
• Polányi
• populist authoritarianism
• embedding
• double movement
• post-socialist transition

Notes

1 “Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation.” (Polányi, 2001, p. 76)

2 Indexmundi. “Hungary Unemployment Rate.” https://www.indexmundi.com/hungary/unemployment_rate.html

3 One qualification is that some of these lost jobs were the result of “labor hoarding”, where firms retained workers without productive purposes to sustain full employment, see Sabel and Stark (1982).

4 Kopasz et al. (2013) and Federal Reserve Economic Database. “GINI Index for Hungary.” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SIPOVGINIHUN

5 Eurostat. “At-risk-of-poverty rate by poverty threshold, age and sex - EU-SILC and ECHP surveys [ilc_li02]”, updated Dec 17, 2020.

6 Trading Economics. “Hungary Remittances.” https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/remittances

7 The lack of material deprivation does not contradict the discussion of the közmunka program. The former reflects on the “average” Hungarian experience and the latter from the perspective of a specialized subgroup, whose electoral views are, in part, influenced by the közmunka program.

8 Trading Economics. “Hungary Employment Rate.” https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/employment-rate

9 Trading Economics. “Hungary Households Debt to Income.” https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/households-debt-to-income

10 CEIC Data. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/hungary/private-consumption–of-nominal-gdp

11 Relevant counterfactuals would be (1) Orbán failing to impose authoritarianism, in which case Fidesz would easily lose re-election. (2) Carrying out genuine “full embeddedness” (economic security, stable/ rising incomes, fully funded public/ social services) where authoritarianism might not be needed.