Politics and National Security: The Battles for Britain

Abstract

Between 1889 and 1939 Britain created security for itself through alliances, rearmament, or appeasement (either alone or in some combination). The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic characteristics, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britain's choices. I argue that within Britain, two broad and logrolled coalitions (outward-looking internationalist bloc and inward-oriented nationalist faction) battled to advance their faction's preferred security strategy and to capture the associated distributive benefits. Supporters and opponents understood that how Britain secured itself would create internal winners and losers. Supporters and opponents also recognized that any changes in the security strategy would have domestic redistributional consequences. I apply this model to Britain and use a longitudinal controlled comparison over three periods: 1889–1914, 1914–1919, and 1919–1939.

I wish to thank the anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes

¹ Fordham (1998) and Narizny (2003b), among others, have addressed some of Snyder's shortcomings. Also see Solingen (1998), Trubowitz (1998), and Rowe (1999).

² On the tradition of appeasement, see Schroeder (1976), Watt (1976), Kennedy (1983), Richardson (1988).

³ A liberal contender favors an open door trading order in any region it dominates or comes to dominate, while an imperial contender prefers economic self-sufficiency and autarky in such locales.

⁴ The liberal opposition parties in Russia opposed the loan because it would strengthen the government of Nicholas II (Crisp, 1961, 497).

⁵ During the war this was extended to artillery over infantry (Strachan, 1998).

⁶ Officers told MPs that the failure of the first major British offensives in 1915 was a result of a shortage of shells. Others contend that the argument that British advances at Neuve Chapelle were stalled by shell shortages was greatly exaggerated. In either case, the munitions factories more than met the demand of the army based on pre-war expectations (French, 1982, 139).

⁷ Men between 18 and 41 would be canvassed by local recruiting committees and pledge to join the services when summoned.

⁸ Officials were correct in their concern about exchange problems. By December 1916, the allocation of resources to the war effort contributed to the sterling-dollar exchange crisis.

⁹ The Ten Year Rule instructed the military services to plan their budgets on the assumption that no major conflict would occur for ten years.

¹⁰ Moderates in Japan realized that Japan would need British cooperation in the economic development of China.

¹¹ The C.O.S. consisted of the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff, and the Chief of Imperial General Staff.

¹² Since 1922, Britain's leaders had agreed that in the event of war in the Far East, the main fleet would sail to Singapore via the Mediterranean, with reserves left behind to defend the home waters.

¹³ Leaders acknowledged that eventually Britain might have to commit an army to the Continent (Murray, 1979).

¹⁴ The 1909 People's Budget was funded through a new tax on land and expanded direct taxes at the expense of the constituents of the Conservative Party.