The Geospatial Structure of Terrorist Cells

Abstract

Counterterrorism investigations commonly suffer from information overload problems that make the identification of relevant patterns difficult. Geographic prioritization models can be useful tools in such situations. We applied the general theories and principles of the environmental criminology perspective, and the specific ideas and concepts developed in geographic profiling, as a basis for understanding the geospatial patterns of terrorist cell behavior in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey. From a unique access to police investigation files, we collected spatial data on terrorism incidents and terrorist cell sites, mapped these locations, and measured the distances from cell sites to incident sites and the distances between cell sites. The resulting probability distributions provide the basis for the development of a geospatial model for intelligence management.

Keywords:

• terrorism
• environmental criminology
• geography of crime
• geographic profiling
• Turkey–

Acknowledgments

We wish to acknowledge the assistance, guidance, and support of Edmund McGarrell, Department of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, Quint Thurman, Department of Criminal Justice, Texas State University, Ionara Wilson, Department of Geography, Texas State University, Samih Teymur, Anti‐Terrorism Division, Ankara Police Department, Ahmet Yayla, Anti‐Terrorism Division, Ankara Police Department, Bilal Sevinc, Anti‐Terrorism Department, Turkish National Police, Patricia Brantingham, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, and the anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. We plan to report on the demographic analysis in a later article.

2. The mission of the TIPS program is to support the professional development of a cadre of future leaders of the TNP. A parallel objective is to combine the professional knowledge of these officers with the theoretical frameworks and methodological tools of graduate education. We have tried to accomplish the latter in this project.

3. The Anti‐Terror Law in Turkey states that terrorist activities are comprised “primarily of crimes outlined in the Penal Code committed within the context of terrorist group activities, which target the structure of the state, changing or destroying the principles of the state, and aiming to create panic and terror in society” (U.S. Department of State, 2008, p. 96; see also Anti‐Terror Law, 1991).

4. We have no information, however, on terrorist incidents and cell sites unknown to the police and not contained in their case files.

5. Distinguishing between terrorist organizations can be problematic because of group evolutions, merges, and separations.

6. While not directly comparable, Cothren et al. (2008) found a roughly similar mean of 4.2 preparatory behaviors per terrorism incident for international terrorist groups operating in the USA.

7. The type of spatial analysis determined the number of valid cases. While all 38 cases involved cell sites, not every case had a known target. In addition, nearest‐neighbor distances could not be calculated for cases with only a single cell or target site.

8. The x‐axis of the ROC curve does not directly display distance; rather, it represents a rank ordering by site count of the half‐mile distance intervals.

9. This is not a clear dichotomy—local terrorists may be directed through a global network, foreign terrorists may be supported by local sympathizers, and major attacks can involve a number of minor incidents.

10. For a comprehensive summary of journey‐to‐crime research findings, see Table 7.1 in Rossmo (2000, pp. 105–110).