A Stone’s Throw from the Metropolis: Re-Examining Small-Agency Homeland Security Practices

Abstract

Police agencies nationwide have enhanced their homeland security preparedness capacity since the 9/11 attacks. Evidence suggests that departments have not uniformly adopted measures to prepare for and respond to critical incidents. Rather, larger agencies are more likely than their smaller peers to take such steps. Small agencies do not constitute a homogenous group; some experience geographic isolation while others are near major metropolitan areas. Unclear is whether small agencies (25 or fewer full-time sworn personnel), those that are commonly found to be less prepared, benefit from proximity to large-agency peers. This study examined whether physical and relational proximity to large departments contributed to homeland security preparedness in over 300 small departments. A structural equation model revealed that interactions with large agencies facilitated preparedness but physical proximity had no direct effect. Increasing geographic isolation from large-agency peers indirectly affected preparedness by stifling the level of inter-department interactions.

Keywords:

• homeland security
• policing
• organizations
• terrorism
• structural equation modeling

Acknowledgments

This project was supported by Award #2010-IJ-CX-0024 from the National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice.

Notes

1. The 2008 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies became available after data collection had commenced. Consequently, the earlier administration was used.

2. In some cases (19.1% of respondents), surveys were returned completed by someone in the department other than the chief executive. It is assumed that the person completing the survey was the most knowledgeable on the covered topics.

3. This is based on a denominator omitting 24 agencies determined to be no longer in existence. Using the original 810 agencies as the denominator, the response rate was slightly lower, 43.2%.

4. Specifically, the survey read: “The next several questions deal with connections to or interactions with one of the large (approximately 250 or more sworn officers) law enforcement agency nearest to your own agency. We have identified an agency below. Your agency may or may not be in the same state as this agency, it may be within close proximity to it or hundreds of miles away, and may have frequent, limited, or no contact with members of the organization. Regardless of the agency’s location or your connections to it, we ask that you answer questions 7 and 8 by referencing the agency below only.”

5. Steps as they pertain to homeland security: special unit; interagency task force participation; procedures for distributing advisories; procedures for contacting other authorities; written response plan; mutual aid agreements with law enforcement agencies; mutual aid agreements with non-law enforcement agencies; operate on shared radio frequency; threat inventory (12 months); risk assessment (12 months); disseminated information to community (12 months); training of personnel (12 months); and participated in field or table-top training (12 months).

6. The question read, “In the event of a homeland security incident in your jurisdiction involving a multi-agency response, how would you rate your own agency’s …” Items comprising the index included: emergency response plan; ability to communicate with other agencies; knowledge of emergency response; knowledge of homeland security incident response; ability to rapidly deploy personnel; equipment; training; partnerships; level of preparation for large-scale incidents; ability to evacuate citizens; ability to provide food/shelter to personnel; availability of personnel; budget; and ability to receive timely intelligence.

7. Items included: look to large agency before adopting homeland security (hs) policy; more likely to adopt hs policy if large agency has done so; adopt hs policy before large agency (reverse scored); discuss hs policies with large agency; large agency is leader among peers; large agency is very influential; problems two agencies face are not the same (reverse scored); physical proximity requires us to talk often; formal/informal agreements with large agency; more likely to work with regional agency (reverse scored).

8. Items included: to share crime intelligence; to share terrorism intelligence; for training exercises; to discuss mutual aid agreements; to discuss equipment sharing; to apply for joint funding; to train on non-hs issues; to discuss crime control strategies; to jointly plan for security at large event; to exchange information on best practices.

9. Modification indices in Mplus suggested adding a correlation path between two observed indicators (terrorism: chemical and non-terrorism: chemical spill/radiological). Altering the model simply to improve fit indices is not encouraged unless there is a theoretical or empirical basis for the modification. In this case, the correlation between the two items is possible due to the likely difficulty in distinguishing between accidental and intentional chemical incidents. Alternatively, both could be linked to an unmeasured common cause (e.g. the presence of chemical facilities in the community).

10. We greatly appreciate the reviewer’s comments leading to this additional analysis.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Matthew J. Giblin

Matthew J. Giblin is an associate professor in the Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. His primary research interest involves The application of organizational theories to the study of criminal justice agencies. He holds a PhD in criminal justice from Indiana University.

George W. Burruss

George W. Burruss is an associate professor in the Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. He does research on criminal justice organizations, computer crime, white-collar crime, and theory testing. He received his doctorate in criminology and criminal justice from the University of Missouri, St. Louis.

Joseph A. Schafer

Joseph A. Schafer is a professor in the Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. His research interests include policing, organizational change and innovation, leadership, citizen perceptions of police, extremist ideologies, and futures research in policing.