Third-party policing: A theoretical analysis of an emerging trend

“Third-party policing” describes police efforts to persuade or coerce nonoffending persons to take actions which are outside the scope of their routine activities, and which are designed to indirectly minimize disorder caused by other persons or to reduce the possibility that crime may occur. The practice applies formal, noncriminal controls found in civil law as coercive tools against an intermediate class of nonoffending persons who are thought to have some power over offenders' primary environments. The police use coercion to create place guardianship that previously was absent, so as to decrease opportunities for crime and disorder. We link the theoretical bases of crime prevention to the theory of third-party policing, and examine gaps in traditional policing that have led to a formalization of policing through third parties. We examine third-party policing in two location-specific programs: the drug-abatement Beat Health Program in Oakland and the problem-solving RECAP Unit in Minneapolis. We conclude by discussing the potential ramifications of the third-party trend.

This article was supported in part by Grants 86-IJ-CX-0037 and 92-IJ-CX-4011 from the National Institute of Justice, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the official views of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Office of Justice Programs, or the National Institute of Justice. We wish to thank Stephen D. Mastrofski, Victor E. Kappeler, and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

This article was supported in part by Grants 86-IJ-CX-0037 and 92-IJ-CX-4011 from the National Institute of Justice, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the official views of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Office of Justice Programs, or the National Institute of Justice. We wish to thank Stephen D. Mastrofski, Victor E. Kappeler, and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Notes

This article was supported in part by Grants 86-IJ-CX-0037 and 92-IJ-CX-4011 from the National Institute of Justice, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the official views of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Office of Justice Programs, or the National Institute of Justice. We wish to thank Stephen D. Mastrofski, Victor E. Kappeler, and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.